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Abstract 
 
 
The shift in biblical studies since the Age of Enlightenment from the so-called 
positivist (i.e. modernist) paradigm to the postpositivist (i.e. postmodern) paradigm has 
become a matter of (de)centralisation of meaning and interpretation. To contribute to 
the topic, I argue that there is a need for both a composite postpositivist theory 
of meaning and a model that can explain the phenomenon of the so-called vicious 
circle in interpretation. I propose a theory of interpretative relativity, and a model 
based on the telephoto effect of an actual zoom lens. According to this theory and the 
zoom lens model, the force which compels the interpretation is the reader’s 
(dis)satisfaction with his/her paradigm. Furthermore, the apparent inconsistencies 
within the text, as well as between the text and its background, will appear greater as 
the reader centralises his/her view/focus on the text (i.e. becomes cognitively closer to 
it). In contrast, during the process of decentralisation, the same discrepancies will 
appear smaller. The only way out of the vicious circle of reasoning within the reader's 
subjective view of the compiled text is by following textual clues about relations of 
dependence between that and other texts. These relations can cause the reader to 
discover a new paradigm which can challenge his/her current paradigm. This shift of 
the reader’s paradigm is seen as the only way out from the vicious circle. To develop 
the composite theory of meaning, I have modified the following postpositivist theories: 
Thomas Kuhn’s theory of paradigms, Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory of literary criticism, 
Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson’s theory of relevance. This model of interpretation is 
furthermore applied to reading the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif in the narrative in 
Exodus 16. It is suggested that the research should be continued by applying this 
model to reading biblical texts of other genres. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
If my understanding of the world as a whole affects my reading of the Bible, how 
likely it is for the Bible to change my initial understanding of the world? This is 
the most fundamental question for the confessional, as well as academic, study of 
the Bible. The challenge is based on models of communication which propose 
that one’s reading of the Bible is subject to one’s concept of meaning, which is 
again subject to one’s interpretative paradigm. Here the paradigm is a unified 
whole in which all the data gained by observation are organised.1 Thus, my 
interpretation of the Bible is deduced from my presuppositions and paradigm, and 
not induced from the reading of the Bible.  
This fundamental problem of the vicious circle in biblical interpretation has led 
me to reconsider some models of communication and meaning, and consequently 
to propose a new theory and a model. According to my theory, the force which 
compels the reader to shift his/her paradigm and thus eventually escape from the 
vicious circle of reasoning, is the reader’s dissatisfaction with the meaning of the 
text as it is set forth in the old paradigm.  
However, according to my theory of meaning, the shift of the reader’s paradigm 
is not necessarily the desired effect of reading. Any eventual shift of the paradigm 
is only a by-product of the process of reading. This process is seen as always 
driven by the reader’s intention to satisfy his/her expectations set forth for the 
biblical text within the reader’s focus. Thus, the principal end product of the 
process of reading is in fact the reader’s satisfaction with the meaning of the text 
despite all the possible irritants. Irritants are phenomena perceived as any kind of 
challenge to the current state of affairs in the world and time of the reader. 
                                                
1 Appendix B is the glossary containing all the ambiguous terms, definitions of which are given in 
this thesis. The full definition of a paradigm, as stated in that Appendix, is: a unified whole in 
which all the data gained by observation are organised into three aspects of the unified whole: 
metaphysical aspect (the set of ideas and beliefs about reality limited by the paradigm’s master 
narrative), sociological aspect (the set of sociological factors which influence the way the science 
is done), and methodological aspect (the set of the available scientific methodology). These three 
aspects should be understood as the (sub)spheres in which the paradigm functions as an all-
encompassing organisational framework. I will develop this definition based on the Kuhnian 
theory of paradigm as explained in Section 2.1 below. 
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Accordingly, on the one hand, the eventual shift of the reader’s paradigm is seen 
as both a possibility and a necessity only in the case when the reader’s 
expectations set forth for the biblical text could not be satisfied in the reader’s 
current paradigm. In such a case, all the possible inconsistencies between the 
apparent meaning of the text and the reader’s expectations for the text, play the 
role of irritants in the reader’s current paradigm. These irritants are thus 
phenomena which cause frustration on the basis of them being a mismatch with 
the reader’s expectations. These frustrating irritants are also called anomalies. In 
those cases, since the reader cannot find a satisfactory solution to consolidate the 
apparent inconsistencies, the irritants become the force that drives the reader to 
shift his/her paradigm.  
On the other hand, when the reader can find a satisfactory interpretation of a 
biblical text within his/her interpretive paradigm, the reader will never shift that 
paradigm. Any possible challenge in this case is perceived as a match to the 
interpretative paradigm of the reader. In this sense, the reader perceives the 
irritant as a challenge and not a threat to his/her paradigm. In those cases of 
satisfactory interpretations, any small changes in the reader’s paradigm are only 
adjustments/improvements of that same paradigm. Hence those readings do 
follow a vicious circle of reasoning within the paradigm. Thus, my argument in 
this thesis is that my theory of meaning has the potential to explain both what 
compels the reader to reconsider his/her paradigm and under which circumstances 
the vicious circle of reasoning is indeed an inevitable part of one’s reading.  
Because of this explanatory nature of my theory, it is indeed a foundational 
theory of meaning. Consequently, its purpose is to explain why certain 
expressions mean certain things to some persons in a given context. I here concur 
with Karl Bühler (1879-1963), Dan Sperber (1942-), Deirdre Wilson (1941-) and 
others who understand and visualise a context as a cognitive sphere2 or 
                                                
2 Bühler’s model, known as ‘Organon model’, defines three main functions of communication: the 
expressive function, representation, and the conative (appealing) function. The context in the 
model is conceptualised as a sphere surrounding the text and incorporating (at least partially) the 
sender, the object, and the recipient envisioned as the entities around the text. A two dimensional 
graph of the Organon model shows the context as a circle, but Bühler’s theory clearly envisions 
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environment.3 Accordingly, I define context as: a person’s cognitive sphere of 
presuppositions related to communication in general and an utterance in 
particular.4 
If we were to imagine a context as a sphere, what would constitute the borders of 
the sphere? In particular, how wide would my context be, in the context of a 
contemporary reader? The narrowest possible context which provides the 
narrowest possible meaning is the one that appears to the reader who opens the 
Bible (an edition of the original text, or any given translation), reads an 
expression found in a verse, and interprets it in its immediate textual context. In 
this sense, the textual context is a person’s cognitive sphere of presuppositions 
related to only the explicit realm of a specific text. With this narrow focus, an 
interpretation of a text remains within the domains of linguistics and semantics. 
Thus, for example, I see the expression ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ in Exodus 
16.23,25 in its narrowest context as the day when God does not send the manna 
to the earth, but rests and preserves the manna from the day before from turning 
bad. This is the textual, explicit meaning of the expression in those two verses. 
In contrast, the pragmatic context is wider, so that it is a person’s cognitive 
sphere of presuppositions related to the author’s intentions, implicatures, and all 
that is not explicitly present in the text. Thus, an interpretation concerned with 
intentions and implicatures surpasses domains of pure linguistics and semantics 
and is part of the field of pragmatics.5 Accordingly, the same expression from 
                                                                                                                                
the context as a sphere. See Karl Bühler, Theory of Language: The Representational Function of 
Language  (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2011), p. 35. 
3 Sperber and Wilson define context as ‘the set of premises used in interpreting an utterance (apart 
from the premise that the utterance in question has been produced)’. They define a set of 
assumptions available to a person ‘an individual cognitive environment’. (The italics are mine.) 
See Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition, 2nd edn 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1986; repr. 1995), p. 46.  
4 I will expand this definition to a more specific one in the Section below. There, and in Appendix 
B the definition reads: a person’s cognitive sphere of presuppositions related to communication in 
general and a specific utterance in particular. The presuppositions are concerned with relations of 
relevance between the utterance and one or more centres of meaning of the utterance. (The centres 
of meaning are one or more sources of information about specific characteristics of the utterance, 
available to the recipient of the utterance). 
5 Models in the field of pragmatics can further be divided on the far-side and near-side pragmatics 
models. The criterion for the grouping is whether the semantics and pragmatics are clearly 
delineable (as standing far from each other) or not. 
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Exodus 16.23,25 can be linked to other biblical and non-biblical literature where 
God’s providence or lack of it, manna, Sabbath, or any other common motif is 
explained. In this sense, the author of Exodus 16.23,25 is imagined as being 
engaged in communication with the authors of other texts, biblical and non-
biblical. The author’s intention, as it is thus perceived by the reader, makes the 
reader see Exodus 16.23,25 in a new light. Here the pragmatic context provides 
the pragmatic meaning of the text (i.e. an articulation of one’s motivation, 
intention and aim as presented by a given text). 
Furthermore, a context can be expanded to include cultural, political, social or 
academic circumstances of the writer’s or the recipient’s world and time. 
Consequently, an interpretation of a text, which is concerned with such 
circumstances, belongs to the respective discipline. Thus, the reader can consider 
the meaning of the same expression as being linked to the state of affairs in the 
world as a whole of which the reader and the Bible are parts. In this sense, the 
‘Sabbath of the LORD’ expression may be understood as part of conflicts 
between, for example, theism and atheism, creation and evolution, Judaism and 
Christianity, humans and nature, etc. A clear delineation between these contexts 
is not possible. Yet, one can visualise how contexts expand from the field of pure 
linguistics and semantics towards other fields of study. In this sense, my 
definition of the sociological context is: a person’s cognitive sphere of 
presuppositions related to the state of affairs (i.e. sociological circumstances) of 
the author’s world and time in the way the text articulates these circumstances. 
The sociological context provides the sociological meaning (i.e. an articulation of 
the state of affairs as they are presented by a given text). 
Finally, the widest context a reader can possibly perceive is a paradigm. That is to 
say that the widest context in which I can interpret the Bible is the context of my 
personal understanding of the whole of the world of which both I myself and the 
Bible are parts. This is the paradigmatic context, defined as a person’s cognitive 
sphere of presuppositions related to an utterance as an expression of a particular 
paradigm. The meaning provided by this context I call the paradigmatic meaning 
and define it as an articulation of a paradigm by means of an utterance. More 
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precisely, it is an articulation of a paradigm in a given text conveyed by 
pragmatic and sociological meanings in the text.  
Neither in biblical studies, nor studies of the philosophy of language is there a 
consensus about how many types of meanings there are.6 However, I argue that 
the differentiation I use in this thesis on textual, pragmatic, sociological and 
paradigmatic types of meaning is feasible for communication in general and 
biblical interpretation in particular.  
The cognitive act of reconsidering the same expression as part of a wider context 
I see as the decentralisation, whilst the opposite is the centralisation in the process 
of biblical interpretation. This understanding of the process of interpretation as a 
matter of decentralisation and centralisation, from textual to pragmatic, 
sociological and paradigmatic meaning and back, has a unique potential to 
explain the apparent difference between semantic and foundational theories of 
meaning. 
As mentioned above, the foundational aspect of my theory of meaning is 
focussed on explaining why certain expressions have particular meanings to some 
people in a given context. Traditionally, one would tend to see foundational 
theories of meaning as if they stood in contrast to semantic theories which 
explain what a particular expression means to certain people in a given context.  
In this sense, my theory of meaning also shares some characteristics with 
semantic theories of meaning. In particular, when a reading is maximally 
centralised, the meaning of a text is perceived as stable. That is to say that there is 
little or no ambiguity regarding what the text reads about ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ 
in Exodus 16.23,25. The reader knows what the explicit meaning of the text is in 
                                                
6 William Alston, and Max Black list seven uses of ‘meaning’, but other scholars distinguish as 
many as sixteen (as asserted by Anthony C. Thiselton). Walter Kaiser has not explicitly defined 
the basic meaning of a text, but he has recognised the difference between types of meanings, 
while describing Karl Keil’s understanding of ‘literal, simple, plain, direct, or ordinary’ sense of a 
biblical text. See: Anthony C. Thiselton, ‘Meaning’, in A Dictionary of Biblical Interpretation ed. 
by R.J. Coggins and J.L. Houlden, (London: SCMP, 1992) pp. 435-38 (p. 435); Walter C. Kaiser 
Jr and Moises Silva, An Introduction to Biblical Hermeneutics: The Search for Meaning (Grand 
Rapids: MI: Zondervan, 1994), p. 33. 
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its narrowest possible context. This meaning is stable and within the domains of 
linguistics and semantics. 
However, the foundational aspect of my theory comes to the fore by performing 
the cognitive acts of decentralisation, towards pragmatic, sociological and 
paradigmatic meanings of the text. The reason why the expression means 
something specific for certain people in a wider context is best understood by 
having their paradigms in focus. Consequently, the wider meaning is subject to 
the reader’s paradigm and thus unstable, following the changes within the 
reader’s paradigm, as well as eventual shifts from it. 
In contrast to my understanding, Jeff Speaks, for example, points out that ‘the 
term “theory of meaning” has, in recent history of philosophy, been used to stand 
for both semantic theories and foundational theories of meaning… This has 
obvious potential to mislead.’7 I agree with Speaks in that this can be misleading, 
but I propose that a clear delineation between the two types of theories of 
meaning can be equally misleading. 
Conversely my explanation of the problem of biblical interpretation as an issue of 
(de)centralisation can be developed in a theory of meaning with both 
foundational and semantic aspects. In other words, the delineation between 
semantic and foundational aspects of a theory of meaning is thus shown as trivial, 
since the process of interpretation always tends to unfold by cognitive leaps from 
what the text means in its narrow literal context to what the text means in the 
context of the state of affairs in the world (i.e. pragmatic, sociological and 
paradigmatic contexts). At the level of the reader’s paradigm, the (paradigmatic) 
meaning of the text is indeed directly connected to the issue of the reader’s 
paradigm as the main reason why something has the specific meaning to the 
reader. The ‘what’ and ‘why’ in the process of interpretation are thus never 
totally delineable. Still, one has to be aware of the dynamics between the 
                                                
7 Jeff Speaks, ‘Theories of Meaning’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
<http://www.plato.stanford.edu> [accessed 18 February 2018]. 
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ontological (what) and epistemological (why) aspects during the decentralisation 
and centralisation in biblical interpretation. 
In order to monitor/analyse these cognitive acts of centralisation and 
decentralisation, one needs to use certain tools which pure linguistics and 
semantics cannot provide. In order to acquire these tools, I have incorporated in 
my theory of meaning the following three theories: a theory of paradigms, a 
theory of literature, and a theory of relevance.  
In what follows, I will approach the problem of the vicious circle in three 
different ways: by explaining, firstly the vicious circle in non-conduit models of 
communication, secondly, the vicious circle of the hermeneutic circle, and 
thirdly, the vicious circle of compiled texts. Each of these approaches will shed 
new light on the same problem, and show the need for these three types of 
theories (of paradigms, literature, and relevance) to be utilised in the process of 
biblical interpretation.  
Furthermore, these insights will explain my formulation for the purpose of this 
thesis, which is to develop a theory of meaning combining credible aspects of a 
theory of paradigms, a literary theory, and a relevance theory in order to explain 
the following three issues: firstly, the vicious circle in interpretation as a matter of 
(de)centralisation, secondly, dissatisfaction as the force that drives the reader to 
reconsider his/her paradigm and thirdly, satisfaction as the force which keeps the 
reader satisfied with the vicious circle of reasoning within his/her paradigm. 
1.1 THE VICIOUS CIRCLE IN NON-CONDUIT MODELS OF 
COMMUNICATION  
All models of communication in general, and models for reading of, or listening 
to, a biblical text in particular, can be divided between conduit and non-conduit 
models. The difference is based on the reader’s presuppositions regarding the 
potential of transmitting a message from its sender to its receiver. These 
presuppositions are the most critical characteristics of the reader’s paradigm in 
general and his/her view on communication in particular.  
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Thus, on the one hand, conduit models, such as the one proposed by E. C. 
Shannon (1916-2001) suggest that texts are messages/signs coded by an 
author/sender.8 These signs can be correctly decoded by a receiver who uses the 
sender’s code. The meaning of the text is thus appropriated from the decoded 
text, without anything else affecting the meaning of the text. Even though the 
conduit models of communication have an established tradition in the prominent 
works of for example John Locke (1632-1704), and Ferdinand de Saussure 
(1857-1913), to my knowledge, there is no evidence of a code which could be 
applied whereby a contemporary reader would find no ambiguities or multiple 
options regarding the meaning of a biblical text. Thus, the conduit models of 
communication are far too simplistic to be able to explain and facilitate the 
challenges of biblical interpretation, when the communication is presupposed to 
be according to these models.  
On the other hand, non-conduit models of communication take into consideration 
the contexts of biblical writers as well as of ancient and contemporary 
interpreters. Any difference between a writer’s context and that of a recipient is 
seen in these models as a negative factor or obstacle to communication. In 
addition to differences between contexts, there are factors such as psychological 
or health conditions of the participants in communication. All these factors can be 
obstacles in the flow of communication, and they work in synergy. I define 
synergy as the combined effect of a group of factors working together, where the 
effect of the group is greater than the sum of the outcome achieved by any one 
factor working separately. A synergy effect of negative factors in communication 
is perceived as noise.9 Differences between contexts of participants in a 
communication process are parts of the noise. Thus, any difference between the 
author’s paradigmatic context (i.e. his/her paradigm) and that of the reader is also 
part of the noise.  
                                                
8 Claude Elwood Shannon, 'The Mathematical Theory of Communication', in The Bell System 
Technical Journal, Vol. 27 (1948), pp. 379-423, 623-56. 
9 Noise can be both aural and visual (like for example in discourse in signed languages). Since I 
will use a metaphor of a zoom lens, visual noise fits better the purpose of this thesis. However, 
noise in general is a synergy effect of obstacles in communication.  
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Since a paradigm, as the widest context possible, is a unified whole, any enquiry 
about part of the world is subject to an initial understanding of the paradigm. 
More precisely, different paradigms direct the human enquiry to focus on 
different types of questions about the world. According to the set of the questions 
characteristic of a paradigm, all paradigms are generally grouped as belonging to 
at least these four common types : positivist, interpretive, critical, and 
poststructural.10 These paradigms focus the main intention of human enquiry, 
respectively, towards: predicting, understanding, emancipating, and 
deconstructing the phenomena observed in the world. The questions raised, 
respectively, are approximately the following: What will happen? How and why 
does something happen? What should (have) happen(ed)? What was omitted 
from previous analyses?11 
 Without discussing in more detail the particulars of each of the paradigms, I am 
pointing out that each of the four paradigms determines which questions 
interpreters will raise regarding the Bible. Consequently, if a biblical writer 
subscribed/belonged to a paradigm different from that of the reader, it is likely 
that the writer’s expectations for the biblical text he/she wrote differed from the 
expectations for the same text set forth by a contemporary reader. The reader will 
thus construe the meaning of the text in accordance to his/her initial questions 
concerning the text, which might be very different from the questions the author 
and the ancient first recipients of the text raised in their paradigm. In this sense, 
the vicious circle in biblical interpretation is based on the paradigmatic context.  
Also, since the difference between the author’s paradigm and that of the reader’s 
is the cause for the vicious circle in biblical interpretation, I wonder what kind of 
similarities and dissimilarities between the author and the reader may exist on 
realms which are subject to the paradigm. In other words, does this difference 
mean that no similarity between the consciousness of the two, is possible? And if 
so, how do those similarities relate to the realm of paradigms? 
                                                
10 See Patti Lather, Getting Lost: Feminist Efforts toward a Double(D) Science,  (Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press, 2007), p. 164. 
11 Ibid. 
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N.T. Wright’s proposal is helpful here since he clarifies five realms as sub-
realities of a paradigm: worldview, mindset, aim, intention and motivation.12 
Thus, firstly, he suggests that the worldview is defined as an explicit and public 
formulation of the metaphysical aspect of a paradigm.13 Secondly, the mindset is 
a private, individual, personal articulation of the paradigm. In this sense, the 
mindset is ‘the individual subset of, or the variant on, the worldview held by the 
society or societies to which the individual belongs’.14 Thirdly, the aim is defined 
as ‘the fundamental direction of a person’s life, or some fairly stable subset of 
that fundamental direction’.15 Fourthly, moving towards smaller particles of 
individually oriented implications of a paradigm, an intention is defined as a 
specific application of an aim in a particular situation. Finally, a motivation is the 
particular sense that on a specific occasion, a certain action or set of actions is 
appropriate and desirable. 
According to these sub-realities of a paradigm, one can experience changes in 
personal motivation, intention, aim, mindset, and even influence changes in the 
communal explicit public formulation of a paradigm. Still, all of these changes 
are only changes within the reader’s paradigm and thus answers to the questions 
the reader raised. These answers are furthermore provided by the logic which fits 
the initial questions, subject to the reader’s interpretive paradigm. In this sense, 
all changes within the reader’s paradigm are changes within the vicious circle of 
reasoning. The reader’s chances to escape from the vicious circle in biblical 
interpretation are increased when the interpretation becomes concerned with the 
                                                
12 I recognise a relative compatibility of my approach to the issue of paradigms with Wright’s 
approach to the same issue, this compatibility suggesting that some of Wright’s definitions can 
help me clarify these specific types of utterances. In particular, Wright has also started with the 
theory of paradigms, but subsequently, when applying it to literary and biblical studies, he opted 
to follow Vladimir Yakovlevich Propp (1895-1970) and Algirdas Julius Greimas (1917-92), 
instead of Bakhtin as I have done. Nevertheless, some of the definitions he proposes are 
compatible with the comprehensive theory of meaning I will develop in this thesis. Thus, I 
suggest that adopting his definitions will contribute to clarity in this thesis. See N. T. Wright, The 
New Testament and the People of God, Christian Origins and the Question of God (Minneapolis, 
MN: Fortress, 1992), 1, p. 110. 
13 Wright, does not clarify the difference between a worldview and paradigm, or even the 
metaphysical aspect, but, as far as I understand him, this is how he uses the term worldview. See 
Wright, The New Testament and the People of God, p. 110. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
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paradigmatic context, by focusing on understanding, comparing and contrasting 
the writer’s paradigm with that of the reader.  
Therefore, I suggest that a theory of meaning has to incorporate a theory of 
paradigms, where the concept of paradigm is the widest possible context of 
interpreting the Bible. I also argue that every interpretation that is concerned with 
contexts narrower than the paradigmatic context are indeed vicious circles of 
reasoning. Accordingly, as long as the reader cannot recognise another paradigm, 
like the one to which the writer of the biblical text subscribed as an alternative to 
the paradigm of the reader, the reading will indeed remain within the vicious 
circle of reasoning. Furthermore, even if the reader does recognise an alternative 
paradigm as offered by for example the author of the text, the reader will never 
accept the offer if the irritants (inconsistencies and oddities) in his/her paradigm 
are not too difficult/annoying to cope with. In this sense, the issue of the vicious 
circle in biblical interpretation is in fact an issue of the reader’s satisfaction with 
his/her paradigm. 
Accordingly, the purpose of this thesis is to use the tools provided by a theory of 
paradigms in order to develop a theory of meaning which explains the following 
three issues: firstly, the vicious circle in interpretation as a matter of 
(de)centralisation, secondly, dissatisfaction as the force that motivates the reader 
to reconsider his/her paradigm and thirdly, satisfaction as the force which keeps 
the reader satisfied with the vicious circle of reasoning within his/her paradigm. I 
will now approach the problem of the vicious circle in biblical interpretation from 
two more angles. By doing that I will provide additional insights to the same 
problem, and consequently specify the purpose of this thesis in more detail. 
1.2 THE VICIOUS CIRCLE OF THE HERMENEUTIC CIRCLE 
One need not depart from the fields of linguistics and semantics in order to see 
the same problem of the vicious circle in biblical interpretation, which I 
explained above in terms of non-conduit models and contexts as spheres of 
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different size. This second way of explaining the same problem is traditionally 
known as the problem of the hermeneutic circle.16  
The problem resides in the fact that a reader shapes his/her own expectations set 
forth for the text as a whole, on the basis of his/her initial reading of only a part 
of the whole text. The rest of the text (for example Exodus 16) is thus read and 
interpreted according to the reader’s limited knowledge of the initial part (for 
example, the accusation against Moses in Exodus 16.3). The limited knowledge 
thus serves as a presupposition about the remainder of the whole (as if the 
meaning of the remainder of Exod 16 is indeed only about God’s choice of Moses 
as the leader of the Israelites).  
This is clearly a vicious circle of reasoning, since the reader’s understanding of 
the whole might be coherent with his/her presuppositions regarding it, and yet 
different from those of the author. I will thus argue in Chapter 4 that there are 
some clear allusions in Exod 16 that direct the reader to the context of the 
creation account in Gen 1-3, which also explains the paradigm articulated by 
Exod 16. A purely linguistic and semantic analysis of a text as a whole and 
clearly delineated from other texts is thus shown to be a vicious circle of 
reasoning. 
In this sense, this second approach to the problem of the vicious circle evokes the 
idea that the problem lies in the attempt to restrict biblical interpretation to the 
linguistic and semantic analysis of a text as if the text were clearly delineated 
from other texts. Therefore, I suggest that a feasible theory of meaning which 
explains how the reader can escape the circular reasoning has to incorporate a 
literary theory suitable for close reading of a biblical text. This literary theory 
needs to be such, that a close reading of a text will increase the reader’s 
sensitivity to textual contexts, both smaller and larger than the text in the reader’s 
                                                
16 The term is first utilised by Friedrich Ast and is understood as finding ‘the spirit of the whole 
through the individual, and through the whole to grasp the individual’. See Friedrich Ast, 
Grundlinien der Grammatik, Hermeneutik und Kritik (Landshut: Jos. Thomann, Buchdrucker und 
Buchhändler, 1808), p. 178., as quoted in C. Mantzavinos, ‘Hermeneutics’, in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy <http://www.plato.stanford.edu> [accessed 30 May 2017]. 
	
	
	
13	
focus. Hence a reader needs to be sensitive to intertextual relations between the 
text in focus and other texts, as well as between the parts of the text in focus. In 
other words, the literary theory has to closely read the text as a permeable 
utterance.  
The permeability of language in general and a text in particular is the concern of 
literary theories like, for example, the one proposed by Mikhail Bakhtin (1895-
1975). In line with this literary theory, I define utterance as: a speech unit that is 
delineated by the rest of the speech by a change of speakers. Written documents 
are in this sense perceived as speech presented in a written form. In addition, 
permeability is the effect of diffuse borders which cannot prevent blending of 
otherwise delineated entities. Accordingly, the permeability of utterances implies 
diffuse borders between the utterances, otherwise delineated by a change of 
speakers. Every text is an utterance influenced by other texts and influencing 
other texts. A literary theory of this kind can be used in order to increase the 
reader’s sensitivity to relations between all parts of a text in the reader’s focus, as 
well as to a textual context greater than the text in the focus.  
Thus, the more a theory of meaning is sensitive to synergistic relationships 
between parts of a text with other texts, the more the theory is suitable to 
interpreting the text as a whole. In light of this insight, the purpose of this thesis 
is to develop a theory of meaning which employs both a theory of paradigms and 
a literary theory in order to develop a theory of meaning which explains the 
following three issues as already emphasised  above: firstly, the vicious circle in 
interpretation as a matter of (de)centralisation, secondly, dissatisfaction as the 
force that drives the reader to reconsider his/her paradigm and thirdly, satisfaction 
as the force which keeps the reader satisfied with the vicious circle of reasoning 
within his/her paradigm. The choice of the two theories should be such that my 
theory of meaning is sensitive to both the reader’s centralisation and 
decentralisation in the process of interpretation of a biblical text, and the 
permeability of the text. 
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1.3 THE VICIOUS CIRCLE OF COMPILED TEXTS 
Finally, the third way of explaining the same problem of the vicious circle in 
biblical interpretation is by focusing on challenges with interpreting a compiled 
text. The problem is as ancient as the time that people first put two (or more) 
religious texts (in oral or written form)17 together and the whole became more 
than the sum of its parts. The relation between the initial texts and the compiled 
whole is synergistic and complex. However, the reader’s (or hearer’s) 
comprehension of this complex relation (between the initial texts and the 
compilation) affects his or her understanding of the meaning of the compiled 
whole. 
In addition, much of that comprehension (of the relation between the whole text 
and its parts) is subconscious. This makes the process of understanding the 
meaning of the text rather a heuristic, intuitionally driven endeavour. Therefore, a 
meaning of a compiled text is often a product of an automatic subconscious 
process, rather than an interpretation that corresponds with a logically chosen 
criteria for it.  
But, even if the whole process of interpretation were a fully conscious process, 
the problem of the meaning of a compiled text would still baffle a reader with 
many critical questions left unanswered. Should the compiled document be read 
with or without paying attention to the meanings of the ‘original’ separate 
documents? After the merging of the documents, the reader is reading a new 
document, a new utterance, which is (again) more than just a sum of its parts. The 
new utterance is an outcome of synergy between the previously separated parts.  
Thus, on the one hand, if the recipient of the compiled whole is to focus on the 
separate originals, which one of the original documents is to receive the most 
                                                
17 ‘Texts in oral form’ is here an allusion to oral traditions which acquire their form even before 
they become written down. In addition, the same oral traditions, after being written down, still 
continue their development in a non-textual context. Oral forklore traditions are only one of many 
examples. Another example is the context of signed languages, where textuality is not an intrinsic 
part of the language. Thus, a biblical text in deaf communities is still transmitted in a non-textual 
context, even if a written form of the text exists. Scriptural ‘readings’ used in deaf church liturgies 
are often compilations of biblical texts. The signed readings reflect the oral form of the texts. 
Thus, in all these examples, a textual form of a text is only one form of several available.  
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attention and why? Furthermore, should all the documents be read with equal 
attention, the recipient still ends up reading each of the original documents in 
their own right, not the compiled whole. 
 On the other hand, if the recipient is supposed to read the compiled document as 
if it was not a compilation, a practical question arises regarding all the traces of 
the process of compilation (inconsistencies, duplications, etc.), since they are 
inevitably inherent and often apparent in the compiled document. Should the 
reader ignore these traces or not? Furthermore, how is one to discern what the 
traces (literary, semantic, stylistic…) are in the process of compilation and what 
the intrinsic parts of the compiled text are? In fact, what are the criteria for such 
discernment?  
More importantly, on what basis are these criteria to be established? Where are 
they to be found? Are they found in the ‘Sitz im Leben’ / situatedness of either 
the author(s) of the documents, or in some ideas found outside the documents, or 
in the state of affairs in the world of the initial recipients, as has traditionally been 
the case in historical criticism in general? Another possibility is to search for the 
criteria in the text itself, in which case, are the criteria to be found in the final 
form of the text or in some of its ‘original’ parts? According to where the criteria 
for the correct reading are to be found, the reading becomes centralised on/in one 
of several possible centres of meaning. By centre of meaning I mean a source of 
information available to the recipient of an utterance regarding specific 
characteristics of the utterance.  
In fact, there are at least five possible centres of meaning, especially applicable to 
biblical writings, regarding which one can delineate ancient first recipients from 
contemporary recipients. The five centres of meaning are: A - the historical 
events and ideas in which the religious writings originated; B - the author(s) of 
the compiled texts; C - the compiled writings; D – the text’s ancient first 
reader(s); E - its contemporary reader(s).18 
                                                
18 In addition, there is a sixth possible centre of meaning, widely acknowledged in literary 
criticism today (this will be discussed in more length throughout this thesis), namely the implied 
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The reader’s paradigm, by definition (being the unified whole in which all the 
data gained by observation are organised), governs his or her choice of focusing 
on one or more centres of meaning. This choice of foci which the reader makes in 
order to discern the meaning of a compiled document, is actually a choice 
regarding the contexts in which the document is perceived. Here I concur with 
Sperber and Wilson in that a context for interpretation is chosen, not given, in the 
sense that it is ‘a psychological construct, a subset of the hearer's assumptions 
about the world’.19 
The subjectivity of the choice regarding the context for interpretation within the 
reader’s paradigm is the basis for the vicious circle in the interpretation. One has 
no objective criteria for evaluating possible answers to the following questions: Is 
the main context, according to which the document is to be read, the context of an 
abstract system of ideas, or the context of circumstances regarding the life and 
personal choices of the authors? Is it the context of the ancient first recipients of 
the documents (in which case one should choose between the context of the 
documents before and the context of the documents after the process of 
compilation)? Finally, there is always an option to read the compiled document in 
the context of the present-day audience/ a contemporary reader. 
Furthermore, the choice between contexts is indeed a question concerning which 
circumstances regarding the compiled text appear to be most relevant. Therefore, 
from here on I define context, more precisely than I did above, as a person’s 
cognitive sphere of presuppositions related to communication in general and a 
specific utterance in particular, concerning relations of relevance between the 
utterance and one or more centres of the meaning of the utterance.20  
                                                                                                                                
author(s), which is, simply explained, the author(s) as seen and understood from the reader’s point 
of view. At the moment I will leave the discussion regarding the implied author for Section 2.2.9 
below. 
19 Sperber, p. 15. 
20 Here again, these centres of meaning are, by definition, sources of information available to the 
recipient of an utterance regarding specific characteristics of the utterance. Also by definition of 
utterance, the compiled text is perceived as an utterance in written form. 
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By relevance, I mean, a measure of the effectiveness of an utterance to narrow the 
wider context in which the previous utterance was understood as situated. This 
concept of relevance implies that along the process of communication, utterances 
exercise a force by which they situate the conversation closer to a centre of 
meaning.21 I call that force the force of cognitive attraction within the field of 
cognitive gravity which surrounds an utterance.  
I define field of cognitive gravity as the field of attractive force of irritants. 
Cognitive gravity or attraction is the force which makes the reader focus on the 
utterance. This attraction is based on apparent promises regarding the 
improvement of the states of affairs in the reader’s world and time. At the same 
time, that force of attraction challenges the reader with the promise of changes by 
raising his/her criteria for satisfaction.  
On the one hand, if the satisfaction is achievable with the new criteria, the 
irritants are perceived as challenging but positive. The irritants lead the reader to 
satisfaction via challenge. On the other hand, if the satisfaction according with 
the new criteria is not achievable, the reader is frustrated and in a position to 
change his/her paradigm. The reader will choose the paradigm that is the most 
suitable for achieving satisfaction. In this sense, frustrating irritants lead the 
reader via frustration towards satisfaction in another paradigm. Thus, the gravity 
of the frustrating irritant (i.e. the anomaly) has exercised the stronger force of 
attraction than the attraction at the centre of the old paradigm. In other words, the 
anomaly has proved to have the stronger field of cognitive gravity. 
However, the relevance of the explicit context (i.e. the narrowest context) is not 
changeable for a given text. This is to say that in a given act of interpretation the 
reader interprets that text which is in the reader’s focus (e.g. Exod 16 in BHS as 
the text I, the reader, have in my hands/in front of me/someone to read it for me). 
In this sense, the explicit meaning is always stable. However, the pragmatic 
                                                
21 Conceptual closeness to a centre of meaning is indeed the essence of relevance. Thus also in 
Oxford dictionary for example, relevance is defined as ‘the quality or state of being closely 
connected or appropriate’. See ‘Relevance’ in Oxford Dictionary, 
<http://www.en.oxforddictionaries.com> [accessed 30 May 2017]. 
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context is directed towards a centre of meaning, which is not necessarily the 
textual context. Thus, the social context of the ancient first recipients (e.g. wars 
national, tribal, etc.), the personal psychological conditions of the writer (e.g. 
dreams and similar), or the cognitive capabilities of a contemporary recipient 
(e.g.  knowledge of ancient Hebrew) are all examples of contexts related to 
different centres of meaning.  
So which is the centre of meaning towards which the meaning of a biblical text is 
to gravitate? Which centre of meaning should be seen as the most relevant centre 
in interpreter’s theory of meaning? In the light of these questions, the more a 
theory of meaning is sensitive to the relevance of the centres of meaning within 
the reader’s paradigm, the more the theory is suitable for explaining the reader’s 
circularity in reasoning within that paradigm. There is thus a need for a theory of 
relevance, in addition to a theory of paradigms and a theory of literature, as 
explained before. These three types of theories need to be utilised in order to 
develop a feasible theory of meaning. This leads to the final precise formulation 
of the purpose of this thesis. 
1.4 THE PURPOSE AND OUTLINE OF THIS THESIS 
The final formulation of the purpose of this thesis is to develop a theory of 
meaning which combines strong aspects of a theory of paradigms, a literary 
theory, and a relevance theory in order to explain the following three issues: 
firstly, the vicious circle in interpretation as a matter of (de)centralisation, 
secondly, dissatisfaction as the force that drives the reader to reconsider his/her 
paradigm and, thirdly, satisfaction as the force which keeps the reader satisfied 
with the vicious circle of reasoning within his/her paradigm. The choice of the 
three theories should be such that my theory of meaning is sensitive to the 
reader’s centralisation and decentralisation in the process of interpretation of a 
biblical text, the permeability of the text, and relevance of centres of meaning. 
The purpose of this thesis demands the following three working stages: firstly, 
outlining the theoretical basis for the solution I propose in this thesis (in Chapter 
2), secondly, developing the theoretical model of interpretative relativity (the 
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hermeneutical zoom lens model, developed in Chapter 3), and thirdly, showing in 
practice how this model facilitates interpretation of a particular biblical text, that 
is the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif in Exodus 16 (in Chapter 4). The final 
conclusion will explain how the findings in the thesis could be developed and 
applied in further research, and thus potentially impact scholarship (Chapter 5).   
The method I will outline at the end of Chapter 3 is in harmony with my theory of 
meaning. The method is the result of seven steps by which the reader’s 
understanding of the text changes as the conceptual distance between the 
interpreter and the text changes. In other words, the seven steps facilitate both the 
centralisation on the explicit/literal meaning of the text (by the first three steps), 
and the decentralisation on the pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic 
meanings provided by wider contexts than the text itself (by the last three steps). 
The seven steps are as follows: 
1. Centralisation on aural divisions of the text. 
2. Centralisation on visual divisions in the text. 
3. Centralisation on dependence markers in the text. 
4. Conclusion regarding the type of dependence between the texts. 
5. Decentralisation towards the independent text.  
6. Decentralisation towards the recipients. 
7. Decentralisation towards other centres of meaning. 
Accordingly, the first three steps centralise the reader’s focus whereas the last 
three steps decentralise it. The main outcome of the act of centralisation is 
apparent discrepancies in the text itself and gaps between the text and other 
ancient writings. In contrast, the main outcome of the decentralisation is the 
apparent coherency of the biblical writings as a whole, and clearer relationships 
between the biblical writings and non-biblical texts. The transitions from 
centralisation to decentralisation and from apparent discrepancies to apparent 
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coherence are achieved by following clues regarding relations of relevance and 
relations of dependence in the text itself. This process of analysing the clues 
regarding the relations between the centres of meaning is in fact a subjective 
perception of fields of cognitive gravity.  
In order to experience the cognitive gravity, one has to recognise relations of 
relevance. Even more precisely, one has to recognise the special type of relevance 
which is the relation of dependence. By dependence, I mean ‘the state of relying 
on, or being controlled by, someone or something else’.22 In any process of 
interpretation of an utterance, relations of dependence contribute to the choice of 
context. Namely, the author’s choice of words (as well as all verbal and non-
verbal elements in communication) is guided by the potential effect the author 
desires the utterance will have in the communication. This effect is dependent on 
the author’s and the recipient’s previous experience of other utterances, and in 
fact, on everything they have ever experienced. Every single functional discourse 
is functional primarily because of this ‘already known, and already experienced’ 
usage of language. In this sense, the relations of dependence are the most relevant 
relations in the process of communication.  
The utterance upon which other utterances are dependent serves as a centre of 
cognitive gravity. Therefore, analysing the field of cognitive gravity which 
attracts the attention of the author is the ultimate purpose of interpretation. In 
addition, it is only by following those clues of dependence found in the text that 
the reader can be challenged to shift his/her paradigm. For example, if the reader 
concludes that a biblical text is written in order to support a certain worldview 
(i.e. the public formulation of a paradigm), the reader is thereby offered a choice 
to firstly accept or reject that worldview, and consequently the whole paradigm.  
                                                
22 ‘Relevance’ in Oxford Dictionary, <http://www.en.oxforddictionaries.com> [accessed 30 May 
2017]. 
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1.5 MY PRESUPPOSITIONS, INTERPRETATIVE PARADIGM AND 
METHOD 
As explained above, I do not see that the conduit models of communication 
successfully explain the process of communication in general. Even less are those 
models capable of explaining biblical interpretation in particular. Thus, I 
presuppose that non-conduit models of communication are closer to the reality of 
communication as I experience it. Accordingly, I entertain postpositivist 
presuppositions with an always present uncertainty regarding any objectivity of 
my view of reality. The presupposition regarding the non-conduit models is the 
first one of seven. The following six presuppositions are directly or indirectly a 
consequence of the first one. First, there is a distinction between ‘faith’ and 
‘belief’, second, they can be related to the Scriptures, third, every interpretation is 
always subject to the reader’s paradigm, fourth, the Scriptures are speech acts in a 
written form, fifth, they are part of a communicative process, and sixth, the 
process is aimed at the maximum effectiveness in the communication. I will here 
explain each of them. 
My second basic presupposition is based on a distinction I make between the 
terms ‘faith’ and ‘belief’.23 Faith is a matter of choice. In other words, every 
human being has the freedom to be ‘open’ or ‘closed’ to committing him/herself 
to a possible tenet of belief. Even though the difference between faith and belief 
may not be present in every language, it is still useful (if not essential) to make 
the distinction when attempting to clarify the problem of the vicious circle in 
biblical interpretation as the focus of this thesis. Accordingly, faith is a cognitive 
choice of willingness to be open towards a belief. Belief is, in contrast, the tenet 
to which a person of faith can subscribe. Therefore, faith can be only of one type, 
whilst every individual can have it to a certain degree, or simply lack it. In 
contrast to the one type of faith, different beliefs have different tenets, so that 
                                                
23 Both Oxford and Merriam-Webster dictionaries use ‘faith’ and ‘belief’ interchangeably, since 
this is how the terms are used in everyday English. Nevertheless, I suggest, there is a difference 
between the two, which I try to express by the suggested definitions. The slight difference is 
useful for clarifying the problem this thesis addresses. 
	
	
	
22	
there is always a plethora of possible tenets/beliefs to which a person of faith can 
subscribe. 
Furthermore, my third working presupposition is that belief, in this case in 
Hebrew and Christian spheres, is a matter of information, that is, in some way, 
related to the phenomenon of the canon of Scriptures (Hebrew and Christian, 
respectively). From this point on I will use the terms like canon, Scriptures and 
the Bible generically, so that, for example, ‘the Bible’ covers all the particular 
Bibles in the two respective traditions. Accordingly, when a particular form of the 
Bible, Scriptures, or canon is meant, I will denote it with additional attributes (for 
example, Hebrew or Greek Bible/Scriptures/canon). In these terms a belief (that 
is the tenet of belief one subscribes to) can be ‘canonical’ or ‘non-canonical’. 
(Faith, on the other hand, cannot be, since it is a choice to believe, according to 
the definition above.)  
Accordingly, I presuppose that attempts to canonise a set of religious writings in 
Christian and Jewish communities took place in order to help a community of 
faith to maintain and nurture its faith (choice to believe) by nurturing the tenets of 
belief.24 Consequently, the phenomenon of a developing an eventually closed list 
of authoritative books25 forming the canon of Scriptures in the community of 
believers was meant to serve the purpose of an unchangeable constant in the 
                                                
24 In those terms, my understanding is that there are more and less successfully developed tenets 
of beliefs. In other words, it seems to me that the followings biblical texts suggest that scriptures 
were meant to be used in order to support and control development of the tenet of the belief: 
Genesis 9.11-17; Exodus 3.13; 12.25-27; 16.32-34; 34.27; Numbers 17.10; Joshua 4.1-7, etc.  
25 To see a biblical canon as a closed list of authoritative books is in line with the proposals 
relatively recently made by Meredith Klein, Albert Sundberg, John Barton, Eugene Ulrich and 
Stephen Chapman. I will elaborate more on the different views on the phenomenon of 
canonisation in Chapter 3 below (particularly in Section 3.5.2.4). However, at this stage, it is 
sufficient to note that I follow up the suggested differences between ‘canon(s)’ as closed lists(s) 
of authoritative books, ‘Scripture(s)’ as relatively open list(s) of authoritative books, and ‘text’ of 
the books. See Meredith Klein, 'The Correlation of the Concepts Canon and Covenant', in New 
Perspectives on the Old Testament, (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1970), pp. 265-79; Albert C. 
Sundberg, ‘Canon of the New Testament’, in The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible: 
Supplementary Volume, ed. by Keith R. Crim, (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1976), pp. 136-40 (p. 
137); John Barton, ‘The Significance of a Fixed Canon of the Hebrew Bible’, in Hebrew Bible / 
Old Testament – The History of Its Interpretation, ed. by Magne Sæbø, (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, 1996), 1, pp. 67-83 (p. 69); Eugene Ulrich, ‘The Notion and Definition of Canon’, in 
The Canon Debate, ed. by Lee M. McDonald and James A. Sanders, (Peabody, MA: 
Hendrickson, 2002), pp. 21-35 pp. 29-30); Stephen B. Chapman, ‘The Canon Debate: What It Is 
and Why It Matters?’ JTI, 4 (2010), 273-94, pp. 277-79). 
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theological universe acknowledged by the community.26 In this way the 
Scriptures adopted by a religious community shape the identity of the 
community. This shaping of the community starts when the community 
recognises a compilation of writings as authoritative in any possible way. The 
process of shaping the community takes place during the process of canonisation, 
as well as after the closure of the canon, and even when the process of 
canonisation never becomes finalised in the community.  
More specifically, in order to define and clarify the tenet of their belief, people 
have been interpreting the now canonical texts throughout the long history of 
biblical interpretation in both Judaism and Christianity, the tradition which in fact 
started even before the respective religious communities attempted to close the 
canon(s).27 However, since no systematic exposition of the tenet of canonical 
belief is found in canonical writings, the interpretation of the writings has been a 
complex endeavour.  
Therefore, I do not see that the field of study in this thesis is an issue of faith, 
because there is both freedom to believe and a need for belief within each of the 
                                                
26 I find it helpful to compare and contrast the relation between a closed list of authoritative 
books, that is of a canon of Scriptures and ‘other’ writings with the relation between the speed of 
light and the other base units, like for example measurements of length and mass. Einstein 
‘realised’ that the fundamental unit of measure in the universe is the speed of light, whilst 
measurements of length and mass are relative. Thus, it was only after Einstein’s contribution that 
the metre was defined in relation to the speed of light and not in relation to another unit of length. 
The same way, I suggest, for the community of believers who have adopted a certain set of 
writings as unchangeable, these writings become the constant fundamental unit of measure in 
their theological universe.  
27 Traces of the practice often called ‘inner-biblical interpretation’ became conserved in the form 
of the literature of the Scriptures (like, for example, the Kethib-Qere distinction in the text of the 
Scriptures). General understanding of the practice of the interpretation grew especially after 
discovering of the DSS between 1946 and 1956 CE. For a general introduction to the issue see 
Michael Fishbane, ‘Inner-Biblical Exegesis’, in Hebrew Bible/Old Testament: The History of its 
Interpretation. Vol. 1: From the Beginnings to the Middle Ages (until 1300), ed. by Magne Sæbø, 
3 vols (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996), I, pp. 33-48; Emanuel Tov, ‘The History and 
Significance of a Standard Text of the Hebrew Bible’, in Hebrew Bible/Old Testament: The 
History of its Interpretation. Vol. 1: From the Beginnings to the Middle Ages (until 1300), ed. by 
Magne Sæbø, 3 vols (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996), I, pp. 49-66; Johann Maier, 
‘Early Jewish Biblical Interpretation in the Qumran Literature’, in Hebrew Bible/Old Testament: 
The History of its Interpretation. Vol. 1: From the Beginnings to the Middle Ages (until 1300), ed. 
by Magne Sæbø, 3 vols (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996), I, pp. 108-29; Alison 
Salvesen, ‘Early Jewish Biblical Interpretation’, in The Biblical World, ed. by John Barton, 2 vols 
(New York: Routledge, 2002), I, pp. 319-28. 
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interpretative paradigms. That is to say that even once a choice to believe in 
relation to the Bible is made, the complex issue of the tenet of the belief still 
remains to be solved in each of the interpretative paradigms. 
As explained above, in accordance with the non-conduit models of 
communication, my fourth working presupposition is that interpretative 
paradigms, from within which interpreters perceive the world as a whole (and the 
canonical texts as a part of that world), influence/determine the method used in 
interpreting the canonical texts and consequently influence the content ‘read’ out 
of the texts. In this sense, methods of interpretation which are not concerned with 
the interpreter’s paradigm indeed follow the vicious circles of reasoning.  
My fifth working presupposition is that the biblical text is part of a speech act, 
whereas every speech act consists of spheres of communication characteristic of 
specific areas of human activity. Furthermore, these spheres of communication 
have their specific conditions and goals according to which compositional 
structure, style and content of the utterances in that sphere are shaped. As Bakhtin 
has suggested, ‘Each sphere in which the language is used develops its own 
relatively stable type of the utterances’ (i.e. genres).28  
Furthermore, based on the previous presupposition that the Bible is part of a 
speech act, my sixth presupposition is that the Bible is part of a communication 
between writer/author, text/speech, recipients/addressee, and superaddressee (as 
proposed by Bakhtin).29 The superaddressee is an implied addressee, personified 
in the author’s consciousness, since it is presupposed that there can be a 
difference between the original public/recipient of the biblical text and the 
recipient imagined by the author of the text. 
Finally, my seventh presupposition is that ‘all human beings automatically aim at 
the most efficient information processing possible’, as claimed by Dan Sperber 
                                                
28 Mikhail Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, ed. by Caryl Emerson and Michael 
Holquist, Slavic Series (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1986), pp. 60, 80. 
29 See Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, ed. by Michael Holquist, Slavic 
Series (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1981); Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late 
Essays.  
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and Deirdre Wilson.30 This means that, on the one hand, the relevance of a 
thought/concept/assumption is directly proportional to its impact on the context in 
which the reasoning takes place. On the other hand, the relevance of a 
thought/concept/assumption is indirectly proportional to the effort required to 
process it.31  
These seven presuppositions of mine are the basis from which I will develop my 
theory of meaning and apply it to reading the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif in 
Exod 16. As explained earlier, the initial presupposition regarding 
communication as non-conduit is indeed the point of departure to all the other 
presuppositions and this thesis as a whole. I am aware that if I had adopted the 
presupposition that conduit models of communication do reflect the state of 
affairs in reality, this thesis would have been developed in another direction, 
namely towards basic expectations of readers in the positivist paradigm. 
However, the positivist paradigm does not square with my understanding of the 
reality. 
My interpretative paradigm is variously labelled as postpositivist, constructivist 
or interpretivist. ‘In this interpretive framework, qualitative researchers seek 
understanding of the world in which they live and work. They develop subjective 
meanings of their experiences—meanings directed toward certain objects or 
things’.32 In this sense, I am aware that the choice of all the basic presuppositions 
are indeed based on the personal dissatisfaction with the alternative conduit 
models of communication and theories of meaning based on the models.  
The research method I will follow in this thesis is usually labelled as logical 
inductivism blended with deductivism.33 The process undertaken in this thesis is 
an inductive (i.e. grounded) theory development since it begins with my basic 
                                                
30 Sperber, p. 49. 
31 Ibid., p. 125. 
32 John W.  Creswell, Qualtiative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five 
Approaches. 3rd edn (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2013), p. 47. See also Lather, p. 
164. 
33 Scott W. Vanderstoep, and Deirdre D. Johnston, Research Methods for Everyday Life: Blending 
Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2009), p. 167-70. 
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dissatisfaction with the solutions offered by conduit models of communication. 
However, it is not a purely inductive process since I work with the three theories I 
have a priory adopted as the framework within which I develop my theory of 
meaning. Even so, it is indeed a qualitative enquiry aimed to achieve 
phenomenological validity, in contrast to statistic results in a quantitative 
research.34 This phenomenological validity is postpositivist, concerned with the 
possibility for recognition of same experience by others, and should not be 
misunderstood as positivist, directly knowable, and empirically testable.35 
1.6 MY CHOICE OF THE THEORETICAL TOOLS 
As explained above, my three approaches to the issue of the vicious circle in 
biblical interpretation evokes the idea that a feasible theory of meaning should be 
developed by utilising tools provided by a theory of paradigms, a theory of 
literature, and a theory of relevance.  
Firstly, I have chosen the theory of paradigms proposed by Thomas Kuhn (1922-
1996), since it is indeed a response to the positivist theory of growth of 
knowledge, as well as to the critical rationalism proposed by Karl Popper (1902-
1994). The Popperian theory of paradigms and refined versions of that theory 
proposed by Imre Lakatos (1922-1974) or Ian Barbour (1923-2013) are thus 
postpositivist alternatives to Kuhn’s theory. Even though my choice of the 
Kuhnian theory is a priori, I will compare and contrast Kuhn’s paradigm with 
Popper’s in Chapter 2. I will thus show that it is only the irritants one sees in one 
or the alternative explanation of the reality which makes one prefer one theory 
over the other. In other words, if one would try to show that the conduit model of 
communication is indeed more coherent with the reality, would it not be just 
another example of how coherency with one’s understanding of the reality 
                                                
34 ‘The sign of a good qualitative research study is that the analysis provides a new and 
compelling interpretation of a text. By new, we mean novel, unique, and engaging. By 
compelling, we mean logical and supported by rich descriptive examples that persuade the reader 
to adopt the researcher’s interpretation of the text.’ (Vanderstoep, p. 169-70.) (The italics are the 
author’s.) 
35 For more on the difference between positivist and postpositivist/postmodern phenomenology 
see: Robert C. Bogdan, and Sari Knopp Biklen, Qualitative Research for Education: An 
Introduction to Theory and Methods. 5th edn (Boston, MA: Pearson, 2007), p. 33-34. 
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satisfies one’s expectations related to communication within that reality? In this 
sense, such an attempt would only support Kuhn’s theory of paradigms (and my 
fourth basic presupposition above). 
The Kuhnian theory has already been shown to be a feasible theory for qualitative 
enquiry within humanities. One example of such research is Marko Lukic’s thesis 
on the development of the Seventh-day Adventists’ understanding of their 
identity. I will add to Lukic’s findings in order to apply the Kuhnian theory to the 
specific requirements of this thesis.  
The second theory I will integrate in my theory of meaning is Bakhtin’s literary 
criticism. As shown above, for the purpose of this thesis, I do require a theory 
developed with the presupposed permeability of language. In this sense, 
Bakhtin’s version of Russian formalism is the best choice to meet the needs of 
this thesis. In addition, Bakhtinian literary criticism is a reaction to Saussure’s 
structuralist version of conduit model of communication. Accordingly, 
Bakhtinian theory is compatible with the purpose of this thesis. 
Furthermore, on the one hand, classical Russian formalism (concerned primarily 
with the form of language as the locus of meaning) would probably provide 
similar sensitivity to the form of the language and enable me to read the biblical 
text closely. In contrast, philosophical hermeneutical theories as for example 
those of Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002), Wolfgang Iser (1926-2007), and 
even Martin Buber (1878-1965) would have enabled me to be more sensitive to 
dialectic (i.e. philosophical aspects) of the text. In my opinion, the Bakhtinian 
approach to literature combines the best of both alternatives, both a close reading 
of the text and a philosophical approach to it. The permeability of language is the 
tool which combines these two alternatives into a holistic approach required for 
this thesis.  
Finally, I will incorporate into my theory of meaning Sperber and Wilson’s 
theory of relevance. I explained above that my understanding of the topic of 
vicious circle in interpretation can indeed be seen as a matter of relevance. 
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Sperber and Wilson’s theory of relevance is the first one to be developed as a 
theory of meaning/hermeneutics with this concern with relevance. 
However, the theory of relevance has faced much criticism. One of the principal 
criticisms is based on the circular reasoning in one of its premises. Specifically, 
that the effectiveness of an utterance is directly proportional to the number of 
contextual effects, and contra proportional to the cost of effort involved in 
obtaining it. The circularity is perceived in that the contextual effect is measured 
according to the relevance, which (relevance) is calculated according to the 
contextual effect.36 In addition to this circularity, one of the main obstacles to the 
utilisation of the theory of relevance in biblical interpretation is that it is indeed 
based on the context in which communication takes place. How can such a 
context-based theory be applied to reading a biblical text, when so little is known 
regarding the specific context in which the text originated? 
I agree that all these challenges make the theory of relevance insufficient on its 
own. However, as part of a composite theory of meaning, the theory of relevance 
will provide some critical tools for focusing on relations of dependence in the 
biblical text. As with the Kuhnian and Bakhtinian theories, the theory of 
relevance has also been used earlier in biblical interpretations. In particular, I will 
follow up David Ryan Klingler’s adaptations of the theory of relevance, in order 
to fully integrate this theory into my theory of meaning.37  
In addition to these logical reasons I see for choosing these three theories (of 
paradigms, literature and relevance) in this thesis, I retain the freedom of 
postpositivist/constructivist qualitative enquiry. In other words, this enquiry has 
to maintain the tenet of a heuristic enquiry based on logic initiated by intuition.   
                                                
36 See for example Stephen C. Levinson, 'A Review of Relevance', Journal of Linguistics, 25 
(1989), 455-72, p. 459. 
37 David Ryan Klingler, ‘Validity in the Identification and Interpretation of a Literary Allusion in 
the Hebrew Bible’ (unpublished PhD Thesis, Dallas Theological Seminary, 2010), p. 149. 
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1.7 MY CHOICE OF THE ZOOM LENS MODEL 
The vastly abstract complexity of the problem of the vicious circle in biblical 
interpretation makes developing a model vital. A model is, by definition, a visual, 
descriptive or analogical representation of something otherwise too complex, 
impossible, or difficult to be directly observed.38 In this thesis, I will develop a 
model in order to facilitate an understanding of the problem of the vicious circle 
and a possible solution to the problem.  My choice of this particular model is 
based on the characteristic of the zoom lens to centralise and decentralise one’s 
view.  
The model is called ‘the hermeneutical zoom lens model’ since it is based on the 
way an actual zoom lens is capable of zooming in and out and thus changing the 
way reality is seen through the lens. In this model the changes in the perception 
of reality are based on two different processes: first, zooming in or out, and 
second, moving the camera closer to, or further away, from the subject in focus. 
Thus, firstly, the wider the zoom, the more of the field of reality is seen, whilst, 
zooming in allows one to see more details of the object in focus, but at the 
expense of more of the reality being left out of the view.  
Secondly, the relative distance between the camera and the object in focus plays a 
critical role in the perception of the distance between the object and its 
background, producing the so called ‘telephoto effect’. More precisely, the 
space/gap between the object in focus and its background is perceived as bigger 
when the relative distance between the camera and the object is shorter. Here the 
relative distance is the ratio between the distance between the camera and the 
object in focus and the distance between the object and its background (achieved 
by moving the camera closer to the object in focus).  
                                                
38 There are, of course, other senses in which the term ‘model’ can be used, but this is how I will 
use it in this thesis. This is thus my definition, which is in line with definitions found in 
dictionaries, like for example in: ‘Model’ in Business Dictionary, 
<http://www.businessdictionary.com/> [accessed 19 February 2018]. 
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In contrast, the bigger the relative distance between the camera and the object in 
focus (achieved by moving the camera away from the subject), the smaller the 
gap between the object and its background appears to be. Because of this relative 
vision of reality, through the zoom lens, the model can also be called the model 
of interpretative relativity. That is to say that every comprehension of a 
view/vision of reality is indeed an interpretation of reality. Since the model shows 
how that interpretation changes, the model is undeniably a model of interpretative 
relativity.  
1.8 THE ZOOM LENS AND THE THEORY OF INTERPRETATIVE 
RELATIVITY 
The difference between textual, pragmatic and paradigmatic meanings, dealt with 
above, needs to be explained here in the context of interpretative relativity. As I 
explained above, the textual meaning does not change for a given text. This is 
how the text reads. In the zoom lens model, this fundamental characteristic of the 
text is represented by an inert object in focus. 
Since this theory is based on this one inevitably inert, invariant object (whilst the 
camera and its zoom lens may change/move), the theory can be named the theory 
of invariance. One can monitor changes in the background and the environment 
around the object in focus, only after one has established/recognised inert objects. 
The essence of this theory of meaning is thus seen in what does not change in the 
process of interpretation. Only secondarily is the theory concerned with what 
changes in that process. The effect of the difference between inertness (of not 
movable objects) and dynamics (of the objects in motion) is thus, the essence of 
the zoom lens model. 
In addition to the non-changeable textual meaning, I explained above that 
pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings do change and are subject to 
the reader’s paradigm and the given context of reading. Those changes of 
pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings are represented in the zoom 
lens model by the apparent changes of the distance between the subject in focus 
and its background. However, this effect takes place only when both the zoom 
lens and the whole camera (i.e. the photographer) move towards or further away 
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from the subject in focus. In other words, if both the zoom lens and the camera 
are moving, the telephoto effect takes place and the model represents the general 
case of the theory of interpretative relativity. In contrast, if only the zoom lens 
moves while the camera (i.e. the photographer) is inert, there is no telephoto 
effect and the model describes the special case of this general theory. In this 
sense, one can make this essential distinction between the special and the general 
theory of interpretative relativity. 
The only effect taking place according to the model explaining the special theory 
is that by changing the zoom (i.e. by movements of the zoom lens) the 
photographer’s scope of the view changes. The wider the zoom, the more of the 
field of reality is seen, whilst, zooming in allows one to see more details of the 
object in focus, but at the expense of more of the reality being left out of the 
view.  
This special theory rarely represents a typical process of interpretation of a text in 
reality. It is possible in theory, only in cases when the reader cannot understand 
anything of what he/she reads in the text. That is to say that the reader cannot 
cognitively approach the text. The reader knows the literal meaning, but does not 
comprehend what pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings could be. 
This is the rare, special case. 
In contrast, when the reader is focused on reading a given text, but also 
understands it and cognitively comes closer to it, this process is represented by 
moving the camera closer to the subject in focus. This movement decreases the 
distance, for example, from (distance to subject) S1=300 cm to S2=2 cm. If the 
distance between the subject in focus and its background (distance to 
background) B is 10cm, the ratio between these two (R1=B/S1=10/300) is 0,03. 
Whereas when the camera is close to the subject in focus, the ratio 
(R2=B/S2=10/2) is 5. This change in relative distance between the camera and 
the subject in focus makes the gap between the subject in focus and its 
background appear bigger. Hence this is a case of centralisation not only on the 
subject in focus, but also on the gaps between the subject and its background. 
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This is analogous when in biblical interpretation the reader becomes more 
familiar with the details of a text. The reader at the same time becomes 
acquainted with the gaps and incoherencies between the text and its background. 
Conversely, when the camera moves away from the subject, the gap between the 
subject and the background appears smaller and more coherent. This is paralleled 
with the reader’s experience of seeing the Bible as more coherent once the 
biblical text is compared to its wider context.  
For example, the laws in Pentateuch look more coherent when they are 
interpreted in the context of the law of Hammurabi. The same way that, the 
cosmogony in Genesis 1-2 seems more coherent and meaningful when compared 
with other ANE cosmogonies. In this sense, the theory of interpretative relativity 
explains why the textual context and meaning are perceived by the close reading 
of the text, whereas the pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings are 
perceived essentially by distancing from the text, i.e. by looking at the text in its 
wider context. 
1.9 LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS OF THIS THESIS 
Firstly, this thesis is not an exegetical enquiry. In fact, the exegesis/interpretation 
of the biblical text in Chapter 4 is seen only as an illustration of the theory of 
meaning developed in the previous chapters. Along the same line of reasoning, 
the exegesis is not meant to compare and contrast my results of the exegesis with 
the results of others. Any comparison will be only illustrative. The nature of my 
research question both demands and justifies this limitation. In other words, 
looking for a new theory and model that might explain the usually unavoidable 
vicious reasoning in biblical interpretation limits the need to compare the 
outcomes of my theory, model and method to the outcomes of other theories, 
models and methods. I plan to show that the new theory of meaning and the zoom 
lens model are feasible, and not that the outcomes of my theory are similar or 
dissimilar from the outcomes of other theories, models and methods (even though 
I assume that sometimes the outcomes will be indeed similar and other times they 
will be dissimilar).  
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Consequently, potential similarities and dissimilarities between particular 
readings do not provide an answer to my research question. In addition, any 
attempt to compare outcomes of my reading to outcomes of any other reading 
will logically impose a question as to which exegesis mine should be compared. 
The most decentralised reading? A less decentralised reading among the non-
conduit models of interpretation? Or should it be compared to the findings of a 
conduit model? An attempt to answer these questions would demand a totally 
different concept of research, and the outcome of it would still not provide an 
answer to the research question of this thesis. Therefore, my valid research 
question, does not require broader dialogue with other interpretative theories, 
models, methods and their outcomes. 
Accordingly, this thesis is not an enquiry into the history of interpretation. My 
limited analysis of different approaches to the Bible will be presented in Chapter 
3 with a focus on changes which took place from the Age of Enlightenment to the 
present. Additional reasons for this focus are the following: first, the majority of 
changes and proliferation of differences among different methods occurred within 
this timespan; second, the changes that took place in this time span seem to be 
common to both Jewish and Christian tradition.39 
Secondly, in Chapter 4, I will apply the theory, the model and the method I have 
developed to a reading of the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ in Exodus 16.23,25. There 
are several reasons for choosing this particular motif as a case study for my 
research. Primarily, it is a motif that is common to both Jewish and Christian 
traditions. As a part of the Decalogue, it is often recognised as one of the central 
motifs in both traditions. Nonetheless, the motif is understood as a source for 
often very different practices among the believers in the different traditions. This 
wide spectrum of understanding should provide a good test for the explanatory 
capabilities of my theory. 
                                                
39 These changes, common for both Jewish and Christian tradition is the main outcome of a 
dialogue (between the two traditions) that developed around the common interest in philosophy 
and sciences at the time. See Ronald L. Eisenberg, JPS Guide to Jewish Traditions (Philadelphia, 
PA: Jewish Publication Society, 2004), p. 496. 
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Exodus 16 is a text written in a narrative genre. There are however six other 
instances when the same motif is used in the Pentateuch (Exodus 20.8-11; 31.15-
17; 35.2; Leviticus 23.3, 38; 25.2, 4; Deuteronomy 5.14). The scope of this thesis 
cannot be extended to include these texts in legal genre. However, I suggested 
that such an enquiry should be done in the near future. Such an enquiry would 
further demonstrate the flexibility and feasibility of my theory, model and 
method. My analysis of the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif in Exodus 16 will thus 
be limited to and suited for fulfilling the purpose of this research, as outlined 
above.  
Thirdly, I will limit my focus to the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif. Accordingly, 
other dialogic overtones will be analysed only to the extent needed for fulfilling 
the purpose of this study. 
Fourthly, I will limit my use of the three ‘pillar’ theories (Kuhn’s theory of 
paradigms, Bakhtin’s literary theory, and Sperber and Wilson’s theory of 
relevance) to what is essential for fulfilling the purpose outlined above.  
Finally, I will exercise the freedom to adapt Kuhnian and Bakhtinian theories in 
order to develop my method of reading the Bible (which is still going to be 
essentially both Kuhnian and Bakhtinian). As a result, I will continue ‘tuning’ the 
two theories so that they, together with the theory of relevance, become a more 
compact whole, feasible for its application in this field of theological enquiry. I 
believe that building on, for example, Lukic’s application of Kuhnian theory of 
paradigms does not deviate from Kuhn’s theory, but even enriches it and proves 
the genius of its depth. 
1.10 IMPORTANCE OF THIS THESIS 
First, the principal importance of this thesis is its explanatory nature. Our 
understanding of when, why and how our interpretation follows a vicious circle 
affects our view of personal and collective knowledge about the Bible. 
Second, the pioneering character of the research is important. Namely, while 
Bakhtin’s literary theory has been applied to biblical studies so far, I have not 
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come across a work which combines Kuhnian theory, Bakhtinian theory, and 
Sperber and Wilson’s theory of relevance. There is, however, some research, 
which has come close to the field of study of this thesis, but that research has 
utilised only one of the theories, while overlooking the other two.40 
Third, the LORD’s Sabbath motif in Exodus is common to both the Christian and 
the Jewish Bibles. Accordingly, the outcomes of the research should provide 
advancement in promoting a better dialogue between the two religions. 
Fourth, the outcomes of this research limited only to the narrative in Exodus 16 
should serve as a basis for future application of my theory of meaning in the legal 
texts. There is thus, a potential for this research to impact the studies in judicial 
interpretation in general. 
Fifth, my focus in this thesis is on developing my theory of meaning. This theory 
can later be used for analysing earlier interpretations of a text. Thus, this thesis is 
important for the potential effect it can have in the realm of history of 
interpretation. 
Sixth, my understanding of context as a cognitive environment or sphere may 
shed new light on the research in the field of signed languages in general and use 
of signing space in particular. In other words, my theory of meaning approaches 
signed and spoken languages as one whole. This thesis can thus contribute to the 
understanding of these languages. 
Seventh, my approach to a given text as an articulation of a paradigm can be 
applied to scientific texts with quantitative data as well. As a result, both 
qualitative and quantitative data can be seen as expressions of a paradigm, in line 
                                                
40 The theses to which I will extensively relate in the process of developing my method in this 
thesis are those recently produced by Marko Lukic, Hulisani Ramantswana and David Ryan 
Klingler. See Marko Lukic, ‘The Anatomy of Dissension: The Study of the Early Adventist 
Paradigm from the Perspective of a Modified Kuhnian Theory of Paradigms and Paradigm 
Changes’ (unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Wales Press, 2012); Hulisani Ramantswana, 
‘God Saw that It was Good, not Perfect: A Canonical-Dialogic Reading of Genesis 1-3’ 
(unpublished PhD Thesis, Westminster Theological Seminary, 2010). For more on particular 
methods applied in published monographs and edited books, see Chapter Three, below. 
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with the Kuhnian theory of paradigms. In this sense, this thesis contributes to the 
view where qualitative and quantitative enquiries are parts of one whole. 
Finally, since ‘Wittgensteinian fideism’41 has been shown to fall short of the 
ideals, it seems to me that this dialogical aspect of my theory is essential in order 
to communicate the biblical views in the contemporary age where one or another 
form of postpositivist interpretative paradigm is often the common platform for 
communication. 
  
                                                
41 See John Barton, People of the Book? The Authority of the Bible in Christianity (London: 
Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1988), p. 38. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE THEORETICAL TOOLS 
This and the following two Chapters constitute the method part of the thesis. The 
purpose of this Chapter is, firstly, to introduce the dynamics of Kuhnian 
paradigm, secondly, to introduce the possible centres of meaning (i.e. a source of 
information available to the recipient of an utterance regarding specific 
characteristics of the utterance), thirdly, to introduce the Bakhtinian dialogism 
and finally, to introduce the theory of relevance. By this, I plan to provide the 
tools necessary for developing the theory of meaning, the purpose of the 
subsequent Chapter 3.  
2.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE DYNAMICS OF THE KUHNIAN 
PARADIGM 
The choice to utilise the Kuhnian theory of paradigms in this thesis is not 
arbitrary. I am aware of the contributions made by Barbour in the second half of 
the twentieth century, who showed that both scientific and religious reasoning 
takes place within paradigms to which humans subscribe and within which they 
function.1 The differences between the two types of reasoning (e.g. the degree of 
objectivity, tightly or loosely established criteria in sciences and religion, 
respectively, etc.) do not diminish the essential similarities between the two.2  
Accordingly, Barbour’s contribution to our understanding of paradigms was to 
bridge the gap previously seen as dividing the scientific and religious fields of 
enquiry. After this bridge was established, revolutions within sciences became 
comparable with the shifts taking place within religious milieu. Moreover, similar 
tools of criticism started to be applied in both fields of human endeavour.3 The 
                                                
1 See Ian Barbour, Christianity and the Scientist (New York: Associated Press, 1960); Ian 
Barbour, Myths, Models and Paradigms: A Comparative Study in Science and Religion (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1974); Ian Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science (San Francisco, CA: 
HarperOne, 1990); Ian Barbour, When Science Meets Religion (San Francisco, CA: Harper, 
2000); Fifty Years in Science and Religion: Ian G. Barbour and His Legacy, ed. by Robert John 
Russell, Ashgate Science and Religion Series (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004). 
2 See Barbour, Myths, Models and Paradigms, pp. 142-45. 
3 See, for example, Küng’s rendering of Christian history as sequence of six paradigms 
(apocalyptic/primitive Christianity, Hellenistic/patristic, medieval Roman Catholic, 
Protestant/reformation, modern enlightenment, and emerging ecumenical paradigm). Hans Küng, 
Paradigm Change in Theology: A Symposium for the Future, trans. by Margaret Kohl (New York, 
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proposal Barbour made for ‘critical realism’ as an interpretative paradigm for 
enquiry in both humanities and sciences is, in fact, an adaptation of, and a follow-
up to, Imre Lakatos’s proposal for a ‘research programme’, which, yet again, is 
an adaptation of, and a follow-up to the work of Karl Popper, within the same 
field of study.4 These adaptations applied to the Popperian theory are directed 
toward applications of the theory on the gap between the extremes of naïve 
realism and that of phenomenalism (thus also between positivism and nihilism) in 
the process of human reasoning.5 In contrast, my thesis takes a different route 
aimed at understanding the vicious circle in biblical interpretation, which I 
explained above as a matter of both the possible centres of meaning and 
(de)centralisation in the process of interpretation. In what follows, I will argue 
that even though Barbour’s contributions are significant, it is the Kuhnian theory 
that provides the essential tools for fulfilling the purpose of this study. Thus, 
                                                                                                                                
NY: Crossroad, 1989). Ever since, the ‘paradigm’ became one of the terms undividable from 
theological milieu, both Christian and Jewish. See, for example, Gordon J. Spykman, 
Reformational Theology: A New Paradigm for Doing Dogmatics (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
1992); Theology as Science in Nineteenth-Century Germany, ed. by Johannes Zachhuber, 
Changing Paradigms in Historical and Systematic Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013). The whole of the series is an ample example of utilisation of theories of paradigms to 
historical theology. In Jewish milieu, Holocaust/Shoah has been the central theme that clustered 
research with implicit and explicit applications of paradigm theories. See for example, Gunnar 
Heinsohn, Warum Auschwitz? Hitlers Plan und die Ratlosigkeit der Nachwelt (Reinbek bei 
Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1995); Esther Benbassa, Suffering as Identity: The Jewish Paradigm, trans. 
by G. M. Goshgarian (London: Verso, 2010); Irving Greenberg, ‘Theology after the Shoah: The 
Transformation of the Core Paradigm’, Modern Judaism, 26 (October 2006), 213-39.  
4 Imre Lakatos, ‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’, in 
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the 
Philosophy of Science, London 1965, Volume 4 ed. by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965; repr. 1970), pp. 91-180 (p. 179). See also the 
roots of his research program as aimed at graded truth and not at absolute truth of a theorem, 
leading thus to survival of the theorem until a new counterexample is met. This is a much softer 
understanding of scientific progress, compared to Kuhn’s revolutions. See Imre Lakatos, Proofs 
and Refutations: The Logic of Mathematical Discovery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1976); Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Vienna: Springer, 1935; repr. London: 
Routledge Classics, 2002). 
5 See his five models of God (monarch, clock-maker, dialogic, agent/divine organism, and process 
model) in Ian Barbour, Myths, Models and Paradigms: A Comparative Study in Science and 
Religion (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), pp. 156-70. Also his four ways of relating science 
and religion (conflict, independence, dialogue, integration) leading to his conclusion about critical 
realism as the most viable option. Ian Barbour, Religion and Science: Historical and 
Contemporary Issues (San Francisco, CA: Harper, 1997), pp. 77-105; Ian Barbour, ‘Response: 
Ian Barbour on Typologies for Relating Science and Religion’, Zygon, 37 (June 2002), 345-60. 
For his criticism of the Kuhnian theory see Chapter six in Barbour, Myths, Models and 
Paradigms. 
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whilst I will enter into a dialogue with Barbour’s work,6 the choice of the 
Kuhnian theory for a pillar theory in my research is justified by the tools it 
provides. Thus, presenting the Kuhnian theory and context of its conflict with 
Popperian theory is the obvious next step. 
Kuhn published his theory in its fully developed form in his book The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions in 1962. At the time, his revolutionary philosophical 
theory of sciences and the way science ‘works’ stood in direct opposition to the 
alternative philosophy of science, advocated by Popper.  The critical question on 
which the conflict was based was whether an objective understanding of data 
exists. Popper (as a critical rationalist) stood closer to positivism then Kuhn. 
Popper argued that scientific data is based on objective measurements, which are 
an intrinsic part of the studied phenomena, and thus able to lead researchers 
towards analyses of the data. Popper argued that those analyses are thus 
independent from the researchers’ presuppositions regarding the phenomena. 
Conversely, Kuhn argued that any such scientific endeavour, independent from 
scientists’ presuppositions, is not possible, since every analysis of apparently 
objective data is a method that is developed according to the presuppositions 
entertained by the scientists. 
Furthermore, Kuhn made a fundamental distinction between normal/regular 
science (science ‘proper’) and the extraordinary scientific achievements, which 
serve as the trigger of shifts in science on the level of its basic principles. These 
changes in understanding and explaining the fundamental principles in sciences 
are called scientific revolutions. Thus, in contrast to the scientific revolutions 
stands regular science with its regular scientific research, that is the research that 
‘fits’ the presuppositions entertained by the scientific community. In what 
follows, I will further explain the difference between regular and revolutionary 
science. 
  
                                                
6 I will discuss Barbour’s influence on N. T. Wright’s method in particular in Section 3.7.1.4 
below.  
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2.1.1 NATURE OF REGULAR SCIENCE 
In order to present Kuhn’s theory of regular science in the clearest possible way, I 
will contrast Kuhn’s with Popper’s theory of regular science. Thus, each of the 
characteristics of the Popperian theory will be contrasted with corresponding 
characteristics of the Kuhnian theory. 
2.1.1.1 Testing vs. Puzzle Solving 
According to Popper, scientific observation (testing) comes before a theory.7 In 
other words, Popper claimed that testing is an activity, which can be done in a 
kind of a vacuum freed from scientists’ presuppositions or without a 
philosophical system as a context. The outcome of the testing is thus a set of data 
that is objective and which can become a basis for a developing a new theory. 
In contrast, Kuhn sees testing as an activity, which always happens within a 
philosophical system/theory. There is no possibility for an observation (testing in 
its simplest form) to take place in a theoretical vacuum. In other words, every 
testing is in fact a puzzle solving process, in which the rules of the game have 
been set in place even before the test starts. Thus, the theory which provides the 
context (adopted and applied either consciously or unconsciously) makes the 
problem tangible and approachable and the collection and articulation of the data 
possible and, finally, an explanation achievable. However, in all the cases, testing 
is not more than puzzle solving for which the scientists must presuppose a 
currently accepted theory as the rules of his/her game. Accordingly, Kuhn argued, 
‘These trial attempts, whether by the chess player or by the scientist, are trials 
only of themselves, not of the rules of the game.’8 
2.1.1.2 Learning from Mistakes vs. Outdating a Paradigm 
Furthermore, Popper and Kuhn argued about the nature and role of the failures or 
mistakes, which a scientific enquiry can come across. On the one hand, Popper 
                                                
7 See Thomas S. Kuhn, ‘Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?’ in Criticism and the 
Growth of Knowledge, ed. by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1970), pp. 1-23 (pp. 9-10). 
8 Tomas Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3 edn (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1962; repr. 1996), pp. 144-45. 
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argued that a scientist is open to learning from his/her mistakes along the process 
of the scientific enquiry.9 Thus, the scientific enquiry is seen as a process in 
which the theory itself is challenged and seen as the ultimate target of the 
scientific enquiry. 
On the other hand, Kuhn argued, responding to Popper, that a scientist is open to 
learning from his/her mistakes throughout the process of his/her scientific enquiry 
only because his/her own skills to solve the puzzle are challenged. In other 
words, it is never the scientific theory which is challenged in normal science. The 
scientific theory is always presupposed as correct and something the scientist 
must use as a way of solving the puzzle he/she is facing, in order to remain 
scientific. Consequently, if the scientist ventured to question the generally 
accepted scientific theory, without an objective reason for that (for the acceptable 
reasons, see 2.1.3. below), he/she would become non-scientific. The nature of 
normal science is not to question the theory, but only the scientist’s skill to solve 
the problem within the generally accepted theory. 
Accordingly, Kuhn argued that the only time a theory is truly challenged is when 
there is no other way to explain a phenomenon within the generally accepted 
scientific theory, so that the scientist is compelled to question the generally 
accepted fundamental principles. As Kuhn argued, this situation does not occur 
during the process of normal science, but only when a scientific revolution takes 
place. 
2.1.1.3 Inductivism vs. Deductivism 
That a scientific enquiry is a deductive process is the only major common 
element in the two opposing theories (Popper’s and Kuhn’s).10 However, 
according Kuhn, a truly deductive process is feasible only as the normal science, 
that is when the starting premises and theories are not under question, but 
accepted rightly as the starting axioms of the deductive scientific enquiry. 
Accordingly, normal science can never take the direction of an inductive process. 
                                                
9 See Kuhn, ‘Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?’, p. 12. 
10 See ibid., pp. 12,14. 
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The moment science in general takes the inductive direction, it starts challenging 
the supposedly correct theory, and becomes a scientific revolution, and not 
normal science, Kuhn argued.  
However, since the Popperian theory of normal sciences makes no difference 
between normal science and scientific revolution, it cannot solve the obvious 
problem of the way the deductive process can be combined with the supposedly 
inductive outcomes of the scientific enquiry. Because of this unawareness of the 
critical difference (i.e. normal science vs scientific revolution) in Popper’s theory, 
Kuhn suggested that Popper be treated as ‘a naive falsificationist’.11 
2.1.1.4 The Logic of Knowledge vs. the Observation Ideology 
Since Popper does not differentiate between normal science and scientific 
revolution, he needs to claim that there is ‘the logic of knowledge’ according to 
which an observation can and must be ‘logically deduced’ from the knowledge 
itself.12  
Conversely, Kuhn argues that this assertion about the logic of knowledge stands 
in opposition to the basic scientific rule (with which Popper agrees as well), that 
‘to be scientific a theory need be falsifiable only by an observation statement, not 
by actual observation’.13 Since Popper argues that theories need to be challenged 
by actual observation, as if a kind of objective knowledge  exists which provides 
the logic according to which observation statements need to be deduced, 
Popperian logic is called by Kuhn ‘an ideology’, whilst Popperian 
methodological rules are seen as ‘procedural maxims’.14 
2.1.1.5 Scientific Theories vs. Paradigms 
All the arguments described above make it clear that Popper’s claim that 
scientific theories are logically deduced from actual observations does not really 
hold up. On the other hand, Kuhn’s claim that all the observation statements are 
                                                
11 Kuhn, ‘Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?’, p. 14. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., p. 15. 
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deduced not from pure observations, but from the generally accepted theories, 
seems to me the only feasible theory of the way normal/proper science ‘works’. 
Accordingly, Kuhn suggested replacing the term ‘scientific theory’ with the term 
‘paradigm’. This would, according to Kuhn, make clearer the superiority of the 
paradigm over the observation process.15 
2.1.1.6 Scientific Features of a Theological Enquiry 
A scientific theory is thus a paradigm, which needs concrete examples that can 
bridge gaps between the specific content of knowledge (specifically known 
phenomena) and the new phenomena to which study the theory is to be applied.16 
Also, the term ‘scientific’ does not mean inductive from a certain objective set of 
data (as in positivism),17 nor is it logically deductive, following a presupposed 
‘logic of knowledge’ (as in Popperianism). In contrast, it simply means that there 
are certain criteria which serve as a system for grading methods as correct or 
incorrect. Accordingly, Marko Lukic’s Illustration 1 below, visualises the 
relations between three aspects of a paradigm (i.e. metaphysical, sociological and 
methodological aspects).18 
  
                                                
15 Kuhn, ‘Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?’, p. 16. See also Margaret Masterman, 
‘The Nature of Paradigm', in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, ed. by Imre Lakatos and 
Alan Musgrave (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 60. 
16 Kuhn, ‘Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?’, p. 16. See especially Kuhn’s example 
with swans in ibid., pp. 16-19. 
17 Ibid., p. 2. 
18 Marko Lukic, ‘The Anatomy of Dissension: The Study of the Early Adventist Paradigm from 
the Perspective of a Modified Kuhnian Theory of Paradigms and Paradigm Changes’ 
(unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Wales Press, 2012), p. 394. 
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Illustration 1: Lukic’s Circular Reasoning Characteristic for the Normal 
Science Mode 
 
 
The metaphysical aspect of a paradigm is the set of presuppositions according to 
which the reality is understood as a whole. The illustration visualises that this 
aspect of the paradigm is the starting point of the circular reasoning within the 
normal/proper science. In addition, the illustration also shows that the process of 
reasoning in the normal science does not challenge the metaphysical aspect of the 
paradigm, but is even aimed at securing it. In other words, everything that is 
thought and done according to circular reasoning (within normal science), is done 
in harmony with the metaphysical aspect of the paradigm. Consequently, circular 
reasoning cannot challenge or change the paradigm.  
Thus, the sociological aspect of the paradigm is subject to the metaphysical. 
Hence, communities gravitate around sets of presuppositions regarding the 
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reality. In this sense, any community can be described by the set of 
presuppositions to which the members of the community subscribe.  
Finally, the methodological aspect of the paradigm is the pattern (i.e. matrix) 
which provides the context for concrete problem solving. In other words, every 
given community will have its set of methods applicable to concrete problem-
solving situations. This set of methods is the methodological aspect of the 
paradigm. When these methods are used, they provide more and more concrete 
solutions. All these solutions have the accumulative effect of supporting the 
initially accepted set of presuppositions regarding the reality. In this way, the 
metaphysical aspect of the paradigm governs the other two aspects. They in turn 
produce the sociological and methodological context that supports the initial 
metaphysical presuppositions. 
If one accepts this understanding of the normal science as the closed circle of 
reasoning, the theological enquiry can be seen as scientific. More precisely, if the 
Scriptures are seen as a source of theological knowledge, they can serve as 
criteria for religious reasoning. In other words, the scientific nature of the 
reasoning is in that case based on the use of the Scriptures as the criterion for the 
accuracy of the reasoning. Consequently, the reasoning is established within a 
‘self-correcting mechanism’ (that is within the regular science), which serves to 
‘set things right when they go wrong’.19 The enquiry thus has the essential 
characteristic for any scientific enquiry within the range of the normal science.  
2.1.2 NATURE OF THE KUHNIAN PARADIGM  
Kuhn himself has not defined the term ‘paradigm’, but instead used the term in 
some 21 different ways in his seminal work.20 It was Margaret Masterman who 
analysed the different contexts in which Kuhn used the term ‘paradigm’ and 
distinguished three main types of the contexts: the context of metaphysics, the 
context of sociological factors which influence the way the science is done, and 
                                                
19 See Masterman, p. 60. 
20 It was Masterman herself who counted the different ways Kuhn used the term paradigm. See 
Ibid. 
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finally the context of the available scientific methodology itself. These three 
contexts define the three different aspects of the Kuhnian paradigm (also seen on 
Illustration 1 above): metaphysical, sociological and methodological.  
In using the term ‘aspect’ of a paradigm, I follow Lukic, who prefers it to other 
terms, such as for example, ‘elements’ or ‘basic paradigms’. This is because the 
term ‘aspect’ denotes both the realms in which the paradigm can be expressed 
and the constituents of which the paradigm is made. Yet again, I find it most 
helpful to use another illustration created by Lukic (Illustration 2).21  
 
Illustration 2: Lukic’s Kuhnian Paradigm and its Aspects 
 
I will provide a more detailed explanation of this illustration in the following 
three subsections.  
                                                
21 Lukic, p. 395. 
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2.1.2.1 The Metaphysical Aspect and The Worldview  
The metaphysical aspect of a paradigm is an implicit ‘set of beliefs about 
reality’.22 Even though the metaphysical aspect on this illustration above is 
visualised as the top of the construction, the metaphysical aspect functions as the 
most basic and most critical aspect of the paradigm. In other words, since every 
paradigm aims at accommodating a deductive and not inductive process of 
reasoning, the most basic aspect of the paradigm is experienced as the most 
extensive umbrella-type aspect that provides the basic epistemic context for the 
other two aspects.  
According to this primary nature of the metaphysical aspect of every paradigm, it 
could be argued that the metaphysical aspect is also the centre of the paradigm.23 
However, it is impossible to visualise all these attributes of the metaphysical 
aspect on one single illustration. Nevertheless, Illustration 2 above clearly shows 
that the other two aspects are subject to the metaphysical aspect. In other words, 
the metaphysical aspect is in the realm of the understanding of basic relations 
between all the things, which we may be aware of. Here ‘basic relations’ denote 
the most fundamental relations, which serve as a basis for understanding any 
other relation between any part of the universe we may observe.24 
Furthermore, the ‘switch of gestalt’ seemed to be Kuhn’s favourite way of 
expressing the fundamental nature of the metaphysical aspect of a paradigm. 
Gestalt (which can be translated as ‘unified whole’ or ‘shape of an entity’s 
complete form’) is used to denote theories concerning the ways people 
comprehend the observed reality. These theories claim that people organise all 
observed elements into groups by applying these four basic principles: similarity, 
continuation, closure and proximity.25  
                                                
22 Lukic, p. 395. 
23 ‘The primary sense of “paradigm”, clearly, has to be a philosophic one.’ (Masterman, p. 69). 
24 If the terms ‘worldview’ and ‘paradigm’ are not used as synonyms, the former is usually 
defined in harmony with the definition I propose in this thesis. An almost identical definition of a 
worldview is, for example, suggested in Albert M. Wolters, Creation Regained: Biblical Basics 
for a Reformational Worldview, 2 edn (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1985; repr. 2005), p. 5. 
25 The theory was proposed in the 1920s by Max Wertheimer (1880-1943), Kurt Koffka (1886-
1941) and Wolfgang Köhler (1887-1967) as a response to Cartesian atomism (which in its 
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This process of organisation of elements into a gestalt (a unified whole), Kuhn 
argued, is the process by which every paradigm works. Whilst the elements are 
the data gained by observation, the mechanism by which that data is to be 
organised into a unified whole is the gestalt principle, or the paradigm.  
2.1.2.2 The Sociological Aspect – The Sociology  
Kuhn wrote that the sociological aspect of a paradigm consists of ‘past scientific 
achievements that some particular community acknowledges for a time as 
supplying the foundation for its further practice’.26 Many, for example 
Masterman, see the originality and revolutionary essence of Kuhn’s theory 
exactly in this sociologically conditioned feature of the scientific research 
practiced within a paradigm.27 Thus, the sociological aspect of a paradigm is 
defined as: group of practitioners trained within the context of a particular 
implicit set of beliefs about reality, which (the group) develops a concrete 
disciplinary matrix within limitations of the set of beliefs.28 The practitioner’s 
explicit public worldviews,  or private personal mindsets are parts of the 
sociological aspect of the paradigm. 
This sociological aspect of the paradigm is subject to the basic values found in 
the metaphysical aspect, as described above. From a scientific point of view, it 
was revolutionary for Kuhn to claim that every scientific practice is in fact 
sociologically conditioned. But for the purpose of my research, it is also 
important to note that the level of influence of this sociological factor is subject to 
                                                                                                                                
simplest form claimed that the nature of things is absolute, regardless of the context in which the 
thing is a part). The backbone of Gestalt Theory is the fact that the whole of something is more 
than just the sum of its parts. The same theory will become a part of the philosophical background 
for Bakhtinian literary criticism. See Landmark Essays on Bakhtin, Rhetoric and Writing, ed. by 
Frank Farmer, Landmark Essays, 18 vols (Mahwah, NJ: Hermagoras, 1998), XIII, pp. 21-22; Max 
Wertheimer, ‘Gestalt Theory’, in A Source Book of Gestalt Psychology, ed. by Willis D. Ellis, 
(London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1938), pp. 1-11; Gaetano Kanizsa, Organization in 
Vision: Essays on Gestalt Perception (Westport, CT: Præger, 1979); Brett D. King and Michael 
Wertheimer, Max Wertheimer and Gestalt Theory (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 
2005).  
26 Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 10. 
27 Masterman, p. 66. 
28 Lukic, p. 395. 
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the place society has in the hierarchy of basic values in the metaphysical aspect of 
a person’s paradigm.  
As a result, if in one paradigm society and its conventions take the highest place 
in the metaphysical hierarchy of values, the methodologies applicable in the 
paradigm will be much more sociologically conditioned than in a case of another 
paradigm, in which the sociological conventions take the lowest places in the 
metaphysical hierarchy of values. In the case of my set of presuppositions 
explained in Chapter 1 above, sociological conventions are not as valued as, for 
example, in a non-religious, non-biblical paradigm, which has humanity and 
sociological conventions as the main criteria for grading values and methods. 
However, regardless of the particular presuppositions to which a given 
community will subscribe, it is important to see that both worldview, and mindset 
are included in the realm of the sociological aspect. More precisely, only 
paradigm as a whole with its implicit set of presuppositions is part of the 
metaphysical aspect of the paradigm. In contrast worldview and mindset belong 
to the overlapping area between the sociological and metaphysical aspects in 
Illustration 2 above. Likewise, personal motivation, intention, and aim are parts 
of the overlapping area between methodological aspect and sociological aspect of 
the paradigm. 
2.1.2.3 The Methodological Aspect – The Methodology  
The two aspects of the Kuhnian paradigm, visualised by Illustration 2 and 
described above, logically lead to the aspect of the acceptable methodologies in 
the paradigm. This aspect is visualised as the lowest and smallest of the three 
parts of the upside-down pyramid on the illustration. The small size points to the 
fact that the methodological aspect is indeed subject to the larger sociological and 
the largest metaphysical aspect. In other words, the values (metaphysics, the 
worldview) enable the sociological factors to influence the selection of the 
sociologically acceptable methodologies.  
These methodologies finally become sociologically accepted criteria for grading 
any reasoning/enquiry as scientific or non-scientific in a given time and society. 
	
	
	
50	
Thus, the methodological (problem-solving) aspect of a paradigm is defined as: 
the complete set of concrete problem solutions produced by the group of 
practitioners who make the sociological aspect of a paradigm, which (the problem 
solutions) tacitly carry the metaphysical commitments of that group of 
practitioners.29 One’s personal motivation, intention and aim are parts of this 
aspect of the paradigm. They are all subject to the metaphysical and the 
sociological aspects of the paradigm. 
Accordingly, new methodologies are accepted and the methodologies are 
changed in order to make the now sociologically accepted/valid values 
defendable in the contemporary ‘puzzle solving’ scientific research. Thus, the 
methodologies will change when needed and as long as they are needed to 
preserve a sociologically accepted theory. However, none of this will change 
without a reason. Thus, it is necessary to describe the nature of a need for a 
change that can instigate a change of methodology and the paradigm as a whole. 
Better The better the need for these changes is understood, the easier it is to 
understand the nature of the vicious circle in biblical interpretation. In what 
follows, I will explain how the Kuhnian theory suggests that every interpretation 
(in both sciences and humanities) is driven by the tendency to find satisfaction 
against the oddities observed in a given field of study.  
2.1.3 NATURE OF A NEED FOR A CHANGE IN A PARADIGM  
Every paradigm has its ‘level of tolerance’. In other words, there is no paradigm 
which can automatically explain every phenomenon in the world. In practice, this 
means that every paradigm will have so-called ‘irritants’. The irritants will 
challenge a scientist’s puzzle-solving skills for a longer or a shorter time until 
finally, the scientist manages to ‘solve the puzzle’ (i.e. to explain the irritant 
phenomenon within the metaphysically coherent system of values and according 
to the sociologically appreciated past scientific achievements and 
methodologies). 
                                                
29 Lukic, p. 395. 
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In addition, every irritant can potentially become the anomaly that will trigger the 
need for the shift of the paradigms/gestalts. When this happens, a change of the 
paradigm has to first happen on the level of the methodology. If this change still 
cannot solve the irritant/anomaly, a change of the core values and the way they 
are grouped has to take place instead. This extraordinary mode of science, in 
which scientific research moves into the conditions described above, is clearly 
explained by Illustration 3 below, developed by Lukic.30  
 
Illustration 3: Lukic’s Inverted Dynamics of the Normal and Extraordinary 
Science Modes 
 
There are two circles of reasoning visualised on the two sides of the illustration. 
The circle of reasoning (within the normal science) on the left side of the 
illustration, marked with letters A, B and C, denotes the circle of reasoning 
visualised on Illustration 1 (where the three aspects of the paradigm were marked 
with numbers 1, 2 and 3). The arrows denoting the direction of this circle of 
                                                
30 Lukic, p. 394. 
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reasoning taking place from A to C and back to A, in Illustration 3, visualises the 
deductive nature of the reasoning.  
In contrast, the circle of reasoning that takes place between the aspects of the 
paradigm marked by letters A’, B’ and C’ in the same illustration is clearly 
inductive, being initiated by the methodological/problem-solving aspect of the 
paradigm.  Accordingly, whilst the circle of reasoning in normal science mode 
secures the reign of the paradigm, the circle of reasoning in extraordinary science 
supports a shift of the paradigm. 
This understanding that there are the two circles of reasoning that science can 
accommodate makes science be understood as an extremely personified entity. 
Accordingly, science can be understood not just as underdeveloped, young, 
premature, mature or old, but also as in periods of a steady/secure reign and in 
periods of crisis. Consequently, there are the following three possible situations 
in which science can be found:31 
1. Non-paradigm science: the stage when there is no paradigm in place 
(‘right at the beginning of the process of thinking about any aspect of 
the world’).32 The science at this stage is in fact on the level of 
philosophical enquiry, whilst collection of data is rather random since 
all the data seems to be equally important (there is no pre-scientific 
hierarchy of values to govern the scientific enquiry). 
2. Multiple-paradigm science: the stage when instead of no paradigms, 
there are multiple paradigms. This state occurs if the competing 
paradigms are superficial in their approach to the given subject of 
enquiry. The solution is to develop a deeper, more precise paradigm, 
which would treat the phenomenon in a more effective way and thus 
cause the competing theories to be ruled out. 
                                                
31 Masterman, p. 73. 
32 Ibid. 
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3. Dual-paradigm science: the stage, which takes place directly before a 
scientific revolution. Two competing paradigms tend to provide the 
best explanation of a phenomenon in the world.  
These three states in which science can be found make queries concerning 
possible reasons for a change of a paradigm logical. The need for a change of a 
paradigm is present when there is:  
1. Existence of an anomaly (i.e. any unsolvable problem that makes a quest 
for a new paradigm a necessity).  
2. Conflict of two opposing paradigms (i.e. the two paradigms are perceived 
as incommensurable, e.g. Newtonian and Einsteinian paradigms.  
3. One of the conflicting paradigms is shown to solve more puzzles, 
especially the anomaly (i.e. the most challenging/annoying irritant) in the 
presently globally accepted paradigm. 
How do these three reasons supporting a change of a paradigm, reflect my focus 
in this thesis (i.e. the theory of meaning based on the issue of the vicious circle in 
biblical interpretation)? The following examples which represent the three 
situations described by Kuhn come to mind: 
1. In biblical studies an unsolvable problem that makes the pursuit for a new 
paradigm a necessity, can be the presence of conflicting interpretations of 
biblical texts within one religious denomination. If all members of the 
denomination subscribe to the same set of presuppositions and apply the 
same methodology when interpreting the Bible, one could expect 
harmonious outcomes of those methods. Accordingly, if there are 
conflicting results, one will be forced to reconsider changes in the 
paradigm shared by the members of that denomination.  
2. This reconsidering is focused on the choice between two or more 
incommensurable interpretative paradigms. Like for example the 
incommensurability between positivist and postpositivist interpretative 
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paradigms. When this type of conflict is present, one is forced to choose 
only one among two or more options. 
3. The choice is directed by the goal to solve as many challenges in the 
present paradigm as possible. The choice should take into account how 
many more problems this new paradigm be able to solve in addition to the 
one that initiated the shift of paradigms. In this case does the 
postpositivist paradigm offer better solutions to our present challenges 
than the positivist paradigm? Potential answers to this question are of both 
quantitative and qualitative nature. I will explain them in more detail here. 
2.1.4 CRITERIA FOR CHOOSING A PARADIGM 
Kuhn is clear that, according to his understanding, the sort of criteria for choosing 
a paradigm are at the level of the psychological and/or the sociological realm. 
The values Kuhn mentioned are:33 
1. Solution to the anomaly. 
2. Solution to the biggest number of other ‘marginal’ irritants. 
3. The new paradigm is shown to be concrete. 
4. The new paradigm is shown to be accurate. 
5. The new paradigm is shown to be simple. 
6. The new paradigm is shown to be analogical. 
7. The new paradigm is shown to be compatible with other 
specialities/fields. 
8. The new paradigm is shown to be sufficiently unprecedented among the 
particular group of people willing to solve the anomaly. 
9. The new paradigm is shown to be sufficiently open-ended, so that there is 
enough of space for new methods to be developed when needed. 
All these reasons, I argue, are indeed applicable in the realm of biblical 
interpretation as well. In fact, this thesis is a proposal for a theory of meaning 
                                                
33 Adapted from ibid., (p. 82). See also Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 206. 
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which is based on this assumption that every interpretation serves these highly 
subjective evaluations of a paradigm as a whole, as well as methodologies used 
within it. The subjective nature of this evaluation is seen in terms such as 
anomaly/irritant, marginal, simple etc. What are the criteria according to which 
something is described as irritant, marginal or simple, if not my personal position 
and experience? Since the whole process of changing a paradigm is initiated by 
the presence of an anomaly (i.e. the irritant one can no longer endure), all these 
subjective evaluations can indeed be seen as a description of the shift from 
dissatisfaction to satisfaction. 
However, the subjectivity of evaluations in the process of the paradigm shift does 
not mean that the process is individualistic. In fact, Kuhn claimed that paradigm 
shifts are driven by strong social factors (i.e. the social aspect of the paradigm). 
How can this social aspect of the paradigm shift be applied to the paradigm shifts 
in the field of biblical interpretation? To answer this question, I will focus here on 
Marko Lukic’s contribution to the Kuhnian Theory.  
2.1.5 MARKO LUKIC’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE KUHNIAN THEORY 
The presence of social factors in every shift of paradigms is based on intersection 
of each of the three aspects of the paradigm (i.e. metaphysical, social, 
methodological aspect). More the interpreter is aware of these factors, better 
he/she will be able to monitor his/her own circular reasoning within the 
paradigm. Lukic, in his Illustration 4 below, visualises this intersection as an 
overlapping area in which the metaphysical and sociological aspects of the 
paradigm are manifested in rituals (which are part of the methodological aspect of 
the paradigm).34 
 
 
 
                                                
34 Lukic, p. 395. 
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Illustration 4: Lukic’s Manifestations of the Metaphysical Aspect of a 
Paradigm and its Influence on the Sociological Aspect 
 
 
On the Illustration 4 above, the intersection of the three aspects can be followed 
from the highly philosophical metaphysical aspect of a paradigm, via its tangible 
praxis of the methodological aspect (i.e. ‘rituals’), to the paradigm’s sociological 
aspect with its formation of the society that subscribes to the set of metaphysical 
presuppositions. 
Lukic has also clarified the definitions of a master narrative (i.e. a ‘narrational 
manifestation of the metaphysical aspect, which states its limitation in a story 
form’) and of a ritual (i.e. a ‘visible manifestation of a master narrative and a 
symbol of communal identity’).35 I concur with these definitions, but in order to 
make them applicable to the research in this thesis, they need slight modification. 
It is, therefore, worth noting that Lukic’s case study, when contributing to this 
research, was in the field of systematic theology, consequently having the 
particulars of a biblical text with its linguistic aspect out of his primary focus. 
                                                
35 Lukic, p. 395. 
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Conversely, for this theory to meet the requirements of my thesis, a further 
development of one single detail on Lukic’s illustration is needed. 
2.1.6 ADDING ON TO LUKIC’S CONTRIBUTION 
I suggest that the term ‘ritual’ from Lukic’s Illustration 4 above is changed to 
‘Faith-life imagery’. There are four reasons for this choice. Firstly, both terms 
focus on empirical expressions. Secondly, both terms focus on expressions 
stemming from the master narrative of the metaphysical aspect of a paradigm. 
Thirdly, only the latter term focuses on what it actually is that links all three 
aspects of the paradigm and is made tangible in rituals and in symbols of 
communal identity. Finally, this focus, established through this add-on to Lukic’s 
contribution to Kuhnian theory, is critical for linking the three pillar theories used 
in this thesis via textual links in a biblical text. Therefore, according to the 
purpose of this thesis, I have adapted Lukic’s Illustration 4 above to my 
Illustration 5 below. 
 
Illustration 5: Adaptation of Lukic’s Manifestations of the Metaphysical 
Aspect of a Paradigm and its Influence on the Sociological Aspect 
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By having the faith-life imagery in the centre of the intersection of all the three 
aspects of the paradigm, I can soon move to incorporating Bakhtinian dialogism 
into my theory of meaning. Bakhtinian dialogism will provide tools for utilising 
the faith-life imagery one finds in the Scriptures in general. Furthermore, in 
Chapter 4 in particular, I will focus on one single motif (i.e. the Sabbath of the 
LORD motif) as part of the rich imagery in the text in Exodus 16. This 
understanding of the faith-life imagery as the bridge between the Scriptures and 
the paradigm articulated by the scriptural text is the core tenet in the rest of this 
thesis. However, I can now draw some conclusions here. 
2.1.7 CONCLUSION: REASONING ABOUT A BIBLICAL MOTIF AND A KUHNIAN 
PARADIGM 
In the Kuhnian paradigm, the distinction between normal science and a scientific 
revolution applies to the difference between ‘normal’ and ‘revolutionary’ 
reasoning, which Kuhn often names as a ‘conversion’.36 The latter describes the 
process which causes changes in the metaphysical aspect of a paradigm, and thus 
is in fact, a shift of the paradigm itself. 
In addition, one can differentiate between the paradigm shift on the communal 
level as on that of the personal level. The former is influenced by the sociological 
aspect of the paradigm in the form of irritants on the level of mindset and/or 
worldview. When they become intolerable, the community looks for solutions on 
the level of the metaphysical aspect, and the outcome of the process is a paradigm 
shift i.e. a conversion of the community. 
In contrast, the process of a personal conversion begins with irritants on the levels 
of personal motivation, intention and aim. When irritants on this level become 
intolerable the person looks for solutions on the level of the social aspect of the 
paradigm. The process will either include the entire community and consequently 
turn into a conversion of the community or continue as a process of personal 
conversion. The person will eventually prefer another paradigm and thus 
                                                
36 Eighteen times in Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 19, 150, 51, 52, 54, 55, 58, 202, 
203, 204. 
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experience a change of mindset. In these terms, this process is a personal 
conversion.  
Regardless of a communal or an individual process of change, the core distinction 
between the regular and the revolutionary reasoning is the presence of the vicious 
circle in the former and the absence of that circle in the latter. In other words, 
every biblical interpretation described by Kuhnian normal science follows the 
vicious circle within the reader’s paradigm. Only the biblical interpretation which 
can be described by Kuhnian extraordinary/revolutionary science escapes the 
circularity of the regular reasoning in the reader’s paradigm.  
This difference between the normal and revolutionary reasoning needs to be 
further clarified. Both regular and revolutionary reasonings cause the paradigm to 
change, but only revolutionary readings cause the paradigm shift.  
So what kind of changes within the reader’s paradigm are accepted before the 
changes can be described as a shift? Each of the four Illustrations above 
(Illustrations 1-4) have the metaphysical aspect of the paradigm (or more 
precisely the master narrative, as a narrational manifestation of the metaphysical 
aspect) at the top of the illustration. This hierarchy is not accidental. In fact, 
Illustration 1 above, serves as a visualisation of the fundamental characteristic of 
the metaphysical aspect of the paradigm. The metaphysical aspect, i.e. the set of 
implicit beliefs about the reality, governs the reader’s rendering of the observed 
reality.  
In this sense, the core of the Kuhnian paradigm is the metaphysical aspect. When 
the metaphysical aspect changes, the whole of the paradigm changes (i.e. the 
paradigm shift takes place). In contrast, when only the sociological aspect 
changes (e.g. change of the particular community or of the faith-life imagery 
which identifies the members of the community) the metaphysical aspect may 
remain the same. In the case of the unchanged metaphysical aspect, no changes 
within the paradigm qualify for a paradigm shift. 
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In these terms changes on the levels of personal motivation, intention, aim, 
mindset or even on the level of publicly articulated worldview, are not paradigm 
shifts, if they are not followed, or even more correctly caused by a shift on the 
level of the metaphysical aspect of the paradigm. 
Accordingly, any change on the level of one’s mindset is only an improvement of 
articulation of the same paradigm, not a true conversion in Kuhnian terms. Thus, 
the Kuhnian concept of conversion stands in contrast to the understanding of 
conversion as a change of one’s belief within the same interpretative paradigm. 
These changes are thus improvements to and not shifts of the paradigm. 
Therefore, I distinguish between the spiritual and cognitive conversion. The 
former is the change of one’s aim, and consequently also his/her intention and 
motivation. This type of conversion is caused by challenging (but not frustrating) 
irritants. In such a case, the satisfaction is found within the reader’s current 
paradigm.  
In contrast, cognitive conversion is what the Kuhnian concept of conversion 
stands for. It is a shift of paradigms caused by a frustrating irritant. The 
satisfaction, in this case, cannot be found in the current (i.e. old) paradigm. The 
reader is then forced to look for the satisfaction in another (i.e. new) paradigm.  
So what method of reading the Bible can challenge the reader’s basic 
presuppositions, i.e. the paradigm he/she is in? The answer I will develop in 
detail in this thesis, is that the reading is at all times focused on experiencing the 
cognitive gravity (i.e. the field of force of cognitive attraction). The master 
narrative is an utterance which is in a narrative style and which is surrounded by 
the strongest field of gravity. Thus, the reader, caught in that field of gravity 
perceives that other utterances apparently gravitate around the master narrative 
(i.e. the other utterances are dependent on the master narrative). 
However, an utterance to be a master narrative does not necessarily have to be 
written. Any artefact of human activity, as well as the activity itself, can be 
perceived as a part of the master narrative. This perception is based on the 
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apparent force of cognitive gravity which ensures that other utterances depend on 
the artefact/activity in order to convey their pragmatic, sociologic and 
paradigmatic meanings.  
Illustration 4 above visualises the role of the faith-life imagery which articulates 
the paradigm as one whole. For this thesis, the role of faith life imagery in the 
form of narratives is critical. The most important faith life imagery, by definition, 
is the master narrative of one’s paradigm (i.e. the utterance which is in the 
narrative style and which positions other utterances by drawing them closer to 
itself). 
 In Chapter 3, I will develop a method which starts with focusing on the smallest 
details in the text and then follows the so-called textual markers which lead the 
reader to the master narrative articulated by the text. Recognising the master 
narrative for any given text is the most critical element of reading. I will 
demonstrate this assertion in Chapter 4.  
The reason for this assertion is that every reading that allows for reconsidering 
the reader’s master narrative is a possibly a revolutionary reading, and thus not a 
closed circle of reasoning. Even so, what is the route from the biblical motif in an 
actual text to the master narrative, in a wider, or another text? How can that route 
be made into a systematic procedure? My argument is that there is a way to 
recognise markers in the text which point to the master narrative found in 
previous parts of the same text or another text. By following these markers, I as a 
reader can understand the paradigm articulated by the text I am reading. 
Furthermore, the paradigm promoted by the text can challenge the metaphysical 
aspect of the paradigm to which I subscribe. In this sense, my metaphysical 
presuppositions can thus be challenged and consequently confirmed or refuted. 
For example, in Chapter 4, I will argue that the narrative in which the ‘Sabbath of 
the LORD’ motif occurs, derives its pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic 
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meanings37 from the master narrative found in Genesis 1-3. The method I will 
develop in Chapter 3 will focus on these markers. As I will presently explain, 
these markers are also called dialogic overtones (preferred term in the field of 
literary criticism), or allusive or dependence markers (the term preferred in the 
theory of relevance, and the term I will use in the rest of the thesis).  
Thus, the purpose of the following Chapters is to analyse how dependence 
markers in a biblical text serve as markers of the metaphysical aspect of the 
paradigm which the writer had intended to communicate when writing the 
biblical text. To achieve this purpose, I need to introduce the tools provided by 
the Bakhtinian theory of literature.  
2.2 INTRODUCTION TO KEY-TERMS FOR BAKHTINIAN DIALOGISM 
As asserted in Section 1.4 above, the purpose of this thesis is to develop a theory 
of meaning which combines solid aspects of a theory of paradigms, a literary 
theory, and a relevance theory in order to explain the following three issues: 
firstly, the vicious circle in interpretation as a matter of (de)centralisation, 
secondly, dissatisfaction as the force that drives the reader to reconsider his/her 
paradigm and, thirdly, satisfaction as the force which keeps the reader satisfied 
with the vicious circle of reasoning within his/her paradigm. In this section of 
Chapter 2, my focus is on the literary theory. Also, I concluded in the 
introduction above, that the literary theory should be such as to make the reader 
more sensitive to the permeability of any given text. As I will show in what 
follows, Bakhtinian theory of literature meets these requirements. 
I will introduce the following eight key terms: utterance, chronotope, 
superaddressee, act of authoring, dialogism, polyphony, heteroglossia, and 
grotesque realism. Presentation of these key words will help me explain that the 
essence of Bakhtinian dialogism is understanding of the reality as if it had 
diffuse, undeveloped and ambiguous borders. The eight key terms do not equally 
explicitly express this view on the reality. More precisely, it will be shown that 
                                                
37 The pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings are changeable, in contrast to the 
unchangeable literal meaning, as explained in Section 1.8 above. 
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the peak of the presentation of the reality (with its undeveloped borders) is 
reached in grotesque realism and its carnival genre. This presentation of the 
reality will be explained as having a critical impact on my understanding of the 
borders between the five centres of meaning of an utterance (i.e. A - the historical 
events and ideas in which the religious writings originated; B - the author(s) of 
the compiled texts; C - the compiled writings; D – the text’s ancient first 
reader(s); E - its contemporary readers). To present those eight key terms, I will 
utilise a comparative, juxtaposing style, similar to the style I used when I 
introduced the key terms concerning the Kuhnian theory of paradigms, in 2.1 
above.  
2.2.1 UTTERANCE VS. LINGUISTIC ELEMENTS WHICH CONVEY MEANING 
Bakhtin argued that the ambiguity in linguistics (stylistics and phonetics in 
particular) on the one hand, and in literary studies on the other arose exactly 
because the idea of utterance had not been developed sufficiently. In other words, 
it is ambiguity in the definition of the utterance that causes ambiguity in other 
fields of linguistic and literary studies to spread. More specifically, Bakhtin 
argued that previous attempts to define the utterance as part of linguistic elements 
was incorrect. Consequently, he was the first literary critic to propose a definition 
of the utterance that was based on the relation between the author and ‘the 
others’.38 
                                                
38 The main stream of the late nineteenth- and early-twentieth century linguistics was influenced 
by works of Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835), Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) and Karl 
Vossler (1872-1949). Bakhtin departs from their linguistic theories on two grounds: the first is the 
influence of ‘the other’ (the partner/s engaged in dialogue) in the process of authoring a speech 
(the main nineteenth- and early twentieth-century theories were polarised around the idea of 
individual creativity in the speech act with focus on the author himself/herself, as self-sufficient 
for the speech to take place). The second, which is an outcome of the first, is the artificially 
exaggerated freedom of creativity attributed to the author in these classic literary theories. 
Bakhtin, on the other hand, argues that the absolute freedom is unreal, since in order for 
communication to function the freedom must be limited and conventionally shaped at the level of 
genres. This is where the theory of genres, comes to the fore, as one of the essential pillars in 
Bakhtin’s literary theory. Bakhtin’s theory is thus one of the first modern literary theories (along 
with Martin Buber’s rather philosophical theory) that are essentially based on the relation between 
the author and ‘the others’ in the phenomenon of a speech act, as well as the first one to approach 
the issue of utterance as speech units defined in the context of the relation between the author and 
‘the others’. See Mikhail Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, ed. by Caryl Emerson 
and Michael Holquist, Slavic Series (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1986), pp. 67-74. For 
more on the link between Bakhtinian criticism and phenomenology (advocated by de Saussure, 
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2.2.1.1 Definitions of Utterance and of Sentence and Word. 
As stated in Section 1.2 above, according to Bakhtin, an utterance is every speech 
unit that is delineated by the rest of the speech communication by a ‘change of 
speaking subjects, that is, a change of speakers’.39 However, it is not the sentence 
nor the words, within the scope of a speech of the same speaker, that constitute in 
themselves a speech unit (that is an utterance) but only a linguistic unit. 
Furthermore, according to Bakhtin, a sentence is defined as ‘a relatively complete 
thought, directly correlated with the other thoughts of a single speaker within his 
utterance as a whole’.40 Accordingly, a word (and phrases as made up from 
words) as a linguistic unit, can be defined as a building block of a sentence. 
Therefore, none of these three linguistic elements (sentence, phrase and word) is 
dependent on the context of relations between the author and ‘the other’, since the 
existence of ‘the other’ is not needed for sentences, words and phrases to exist. In 
contrast, for the existence of an utterance, the existence of ‘the other’ is an 
essential prerequisite. Already here the permeability of language is introduced by 
making the utterance the main building block in this literary theory. 
However, if a word or a sentence is delineated from the rest of the speech-flow by 
a change of the speakers engaged in the conversation, then the word or the 
sentence becomes a speech unit acquiring all the features of an utterance. Thus, 
the change of the speakers is the crucial difference between speech and language 
units, which I am going to clarify further by analysing some features of utterance, 
sentence and word. 
2.2.1.2 Features of Utterance 
Once the features of an utterance as a speech unit have been clarified, the features 
of a sentence and words as linguistic elements become almost self-explanatory. 
Therefore, I will devote considerable space to clarifying the features of an 
                                                                                                                                
Vossler and others) see Craig Brandist, The Bakhtin Circle: Philosophy, Culture and Politics 
(London: Pluto, 2002), pp. 19-21. 
39 Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 71. 
40 Ibid., p. 73. 
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utterance as a speech unit. According to Bakhtin, there are five features of every 
utterance: 
1. Change of speaking subjects. 
2. Finalisation of the utterance. 
3. Expressive aspect of the utterance. 
4. Addressivity of every utterance. 
5. Personal proximity of the addressee to the speaker/author.  
Each of these features needs clarification. The change of speaking subjects is the 
first limiter and delimiter of every utterance. This, in practice, means that there 
are primary and secondary utterances, as well as that there are primary and 
secondary conversations. To exemplify this, within Exodus, I can spot many 
primary conversations by analysing the change of speakers in each of the 
conversations. Each of the conversations is made up of a certain number of 
speech units, that is, of utterances, where each of the utterances is delineated by 
the change of the speakers. Furthermore, the book of Exodus itself is part of the 
wider dialogue (‘secondary dialogue’) that takes place on the level of the 
Pentateuch. On this level of dialogue, Exodus is seen as part of the ‘speech flow’ 
among the books of the Pentateuch. Furthermore, the Pentateuch can be 
considered in the context of the relation between the Pentateuch and other 
Biblical and non-biblical literature. Thus, an utterance can take literally any size, 
from the smallest rejoinder in a dialogue to a multivolume opus of a writer, and 
wider.  
However, it has to be clarified that voice is always a speaking personality and a 
speaking consciousness. This speaking consciousness in every utterance sets the 
stage for making the essential difference between poetry and prose, as the former 
always resembles a double-voiced reality, whilst the latter always resembles a 
single-voiced reality. Nevertheless, in both cases, every utterance is delineated by 
a shift of voices, leaving poetic utterance as one utterance that cannot be 
	
	
	
66	
dismantled into smaller utterances, whilst every prose utterance contains more 
than one smaller utterance in itself.41 
An outcome of this first feature of utterances is the finalisation, which is the next 
characteristic of every utterance. The finalisation of every utterance is based on 
the main criterion that measures the possibility of responding to the utterance. In 
other words, every utterance in its essence is directed to call for an active 
response from ‘the other’ in the speech flow. This expected and acquired 
response can be of higher degree and proximity, characteristic of military 
commands, for example. Or, on the contrary, the expected response can be of the 
lowest degree, typical of lyric poetry, for instance. The expected response in the 
latter example is delayed, introverted, but nevertheless, it is specific, particular. It 
is specific because it is determined by the following three factors: firstly, the 
speaker’s choice to finalise his/her utterance at that particular point of the speech, 
secondly, the speaker’s distinct plan for the speech and thirdly, precise 
conventions of ways the specific speech can be finalised in order to be 
understood in the specific way.42 Each of the three factors is needed to make the 
‘organic whole of the utterance’, which are the semantic exhaustiveness of the 
theme, the speaker’s plan, and generic forms of finalisation, respectively.43 
Furthermore, there is no neutral utterance. Accordingly, each utterance expresses 
the speaker’s evaluative opinion regarding the topic discussed. In this way, the 
expressivity of utterance is directly related to stylistics in linguistic studies, 
focusing on emotional evaluations expressed by the speaker.44 
In addition, every utterance is in a specific relation to the speaker himself/herself, 
and the other participants engaged in the dialogue. As Bakhtin explains, ‘both the 
composition and, particularly, the style of the utterance depend on those to whom 
the utterance is addressed, how the speaker (writer) senses and imagines his 
                                                
41 See Michael Holquist, ‘Glossary’, in The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin, 
ed. by Michael Holquist, Slavic Series, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1981), pp. 423-34 
(p. 434). 
42 See Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, pp. 76-77. 
43 Ibid. 
44 See ibid., p. 84. 
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addressees, and the force of their effect on the utterance’.45 This relation of the 
utterance to the speaker and addressees is specific for each genre. In other words, 
the very relation determines the genre the writer is going to choose to direct the 
speech to the specific addressee(s).46 Thus, addressivity of every utterance is a 
measure of the effect the relation between the addressee and the author will have 
on the choice of genre of the author's utterance. A typical example, used by 
Bakhtin, is the difference between a speech delivered before the prime court, and 
a speech whispered into the ears of a person with whom the speaker is in love. 
Finally, this directs the focus to the fifth feature of an utterance, which is the 
personal proximity of the addressee to the speaker. Thus, personal proximity of 
every utterance is a measure of the capability of the utterance to convey 
emotional relation between the addressee and the author. The same example of 
the difference between the entities to whom/which the speech is addressed 
explains the distinction. Also, Bakhtin argued that the close proximity of the 
familial styles in literature played a significant role in periods of political change 
having the purpose of presenting old, official and traditional political conventions 
as being far from the author’s and audience’s ‘hearts’.47 
Each of these five features of every utterance directs the author to choose the 
particular form of utterance that will transmit his/her message in a specific way 
so that the audience understands and reacts to it as it (the audience) is seen from 
the author’s perspective. 
2.2.1.3 Features of Sentence 
A sentence, which is not delineated by the change of speakers, has none of the 
five features above. When there is no change of speaking subjects, there is, 
therefore, no relation between the speaker, ‘the other’ and the sentence. 
Finalisation of a sentence is then always only grammatical, not ‘ideological’, 
concerning the idea or message that is intended to be conveyed by the given 
                                                
45 Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 95. 
46 See ibid. 
47 See ibid., p. 97. 
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sentence. However, the idea (i.e. the ‘meaning’) that the sentence may express is 
determined not by grammatical finalisation of the very sentence (i.e. when it is 
finalised by a pause or a full stop), but by the finalisation of the whole utterance, 
of which the sentence is only a part.  
I will illustrate the finalisation of an utterance by the following sentence in 
Exodus 16.28: ‘The Lord said to Moses, “How long will you refuse to keep my 
commandments and instructions?”’ This sentence conveys meaning not according 
to the way the sentence is grammatically finalised (i.e. with a question mark), but 
by the structure of the whole utterance in which the sentence may be positioned. 
On the one hand, the sentence may convey the meaning of true inquiry regarding 
the object of speech. At the same time, there is the same degree of possibility for 
the sentence to be part of an ironical utterance, a rhetorical question in which the 
meaning of the sentence will be the very opposite of the meaning in the previous 
example. The rest of the features (expressiveness, addressivity, and proximity of 
the author and audience) follow the same pattern; it is the whole utterance that 
determines these features, while sentences within the utterance only acquire the 
features. No sentence by itself, simply because of the grammatical features it has, 
can determine any of the features of utterance as a speech unit. 
2.2.1.4 Features of Word. 
The most often misunderstood feature of a word, according to Bakhtin, is its 
expressiveness.48 Bakhtin argued that a word, as a linguistic element, does not 
have expressiveness as something that is intrinsically embedded in the word 
itself, but rather it is attributed to the word by the context of utterances in which 
the word is used or has been used up to the present. This practically means that 
there are three aspects of the existence of any word in relation to possible 
expressiveness a word can acquire:49 
1. Nobody’s word 
2. Other’s word 
                                                
48 See Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, pp. 88,89. 
49 See ibid., p. 88. 
	
	
	
69	
3. My word 
Nobody’s word is the aspect of the existence of the word from which the possible 
‘expressiveness’ of the word is considered from the perspective of the word’s 
definition in a dictionary. It is nobody’s word because the way it is used in 
utterances of ‘others’ is not taken into account at this time. By this juncture of the 
existence of a word, only the essential minimum for the word to be used in a 
meaningful communication is met.  
On the other hand, the word as the word of ‘others’ is the aspect of which the 
word is considered as ‘carrying’ meanings (related to the author’s evaluative 
positions) attributed to the word on the basis of how the word has been used in 
previous utterances of others. 
Furthermore, when I use the same word, which is, in this case, my word, I use the 
artistic freedom to expand the ‘meaning’ of the word by using it to serve the 
expressiveness of my evaluative positions in my own utterance. By this, I am 
expanding the expressiveness of the word inherited from all the previous 
utterances in which the word has been used. In this way, the word in the latter 
two cases exists as an ‘abbreviation’ of utterance(s).  
There are many examples which illustrate this expressiveness of utterance in 
biblical texts. The most common are names of persons and places. The most 
relevant to the narrative in Exodus 16 is the name of the land of Egypt. Thus, the 
land of Egypt in Exodus 16.1 refers to the actual area on the African continent. 
However, the Israelites’ collective experience of the life in slavery related to the 
land of Egypt has charged this name of the land with additional meanings. Thus, 
already in Exodus 16.1, the land of Egypt is arguably much more than a 
geographical designation. It is rather the place of slavery. Thus, the narrator 
makes the point that the event in Exodus 16 occurred only two and a half months 
after the people of Israel became free. In this context, the people’s claim that the 
land of Egypt was the land of abundance is so striking (in Exodus 16.3). 
In this sense, the previous speech acts in which the word or phrase has been 
experienced enables the phrase to ‘inherit’ the expressive potential. This 
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expressiveness is inherited as the feature of an utterance and is not related to the 
word existing as a linguistic unit. 
2.2.1.5 Dialogic Overtones in Every Utterance. 
This inherited expressiveness that every word ‘carries’ with itself is directly 
linked to the idea of dialogic overtones (i.e. markers of relation towards 
utterances of others) in every utterance.50 Hence, no utterance deals with an issue 
for the first time in the history of human thinking. Every ‘new’ idea, ‘new’ topic 
is always in correlation with previous thoughts and utterances of others. In this 
sense, every utterance is, in a way, a response to utterances of ‘others’. An 
analysis of utterances that fails to be sensitive to the phenomenon of dialogic 
overtones falls short of any comprehensive understanding of the ways a language 
and its units are used in real-life practice. It fails to ‘hear’ the meaning that is 
‘irrational’ when the analysis is based on rules of syntax or any grammar as a 
system.51  
The theory of meaning I will propose in Chapter 3 will be based on this very 
feature of every utterance. Namely, I argue that dialogic overtones of an utterance 
can be used as markers of relations between the utterance and previous utterances 
with which the analysed utterance is in dialogue. 
2.2.1.6 Dialogism vs. Classical Stylistics. 
 All the above-presented features of utterance, as opposed to a sentence and a 
word as linguistic elements, demand a change in the methods used to approaching 
any literary work. In particular, it is the very understanding of stylistics that 
Bakhtin proposed be changed. 
Classical stylistics, according to Bakhtin,52 is based solely on two sets of factors: 
the first one of the two sets is related to the speaker/author and his/her worldview, 
evaluations and emotions. The other set of factors is related to language as a 
                                                
50 Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, pp. 92,93. 
51 Ibid., p. 92. 
52 Ibid., pp. 90,91. 
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system and the theme of the author’s speech. Because these two (the language 
and the theme) can be delineated in classical stylistics, the speech can be analysed 
almost as a self-sufficient whole. In other words, it appears as if these two sets of 
factors are the only available to determine the style of the speech.53 
In contrast, Bakhtin argues that no utterance is a self-sufficient whole.54 
Accordingly, every utterance is a link in a chain of conversations. Dialogic(al) 
features are those which resemble dialogism, that is, the context in which no part 
of the reality can be completely delineated and independent from the rest of the 
reality. Therefore, any attempt to analyse the style of the utterance without 
considering this dialogical factor, which affects the style of the utterance in the 
most critical way, is far from being realistic and natural. In this sense, classical 
stylistics, being insensitive to the dialogical factors determining the style of the 
utterance, is unable to analyse the nature of styles of utterances as they operate in 
real-life practice. In contrast, dialogism, being focused on dialogic overtones (in 
addition to factors also recognised by classical stylistics) is the only way to 
recognise the style of an utterance as it functions in practice.55 
2.2.1.7 Generic Forms vs. Linguistic Forms of Utterance. 
The difference between the features of an utterance (as a speech unit), and the 
features of sentences and words (as linguistic units), reaches its peak in generic 
forms (i.e. genre) of the utterance. Thus, Bakhtin argues, ‘the speaker’s speech 
will be manifested primarily in the choice of a particular speech genre’.56 In other 
words, the linguistic structure of a particular speech shows only the linguistic 
elements that are used in the speech. In contrast, the way the speech will function 
in conveying a specific meaning of the discourse is in practice determined by its 
generic form (genre), and not by its linguistic structure.57 Thus, generic form can 
                                                
53 Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 90. 
54 Ibid., p. 91. 
55 Ibid., pp. 91,92. 
56 Ibid., p. 78. 
57 Ibid., pp. 78-81; Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, pp. 84-85. See also Walter 
L. Reed, Dialogues of the Word: The Bible as Literature According to Bakhtin (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), p. 46.  
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be determined as a ‘relatively stable’58 form of utterances, which features a 
specific horizon of expectations that is brought on an utterance by the specific 
sphere of communication the utterance is used in, and by the chronotope (i.e. a 
specific construction of time and space) presented in the utterance.59  
However, the sphere of communication denotes a group of specific occasions in 
life in which language is used in a specific way, characteristic for that and similar 
occasions (forming, thus, spheres such as ‘at work’, ‘at a court’, ‘at home’, ‘with 
the loved ones’ etc.). However, any specific sphere of communication features a 
specific presentation of time and space in the utterance. This specific presentation 
of time and space is called chronotope. This term deserves further explanation. 
2.2.2 CHRONOTOPE VS. TEMPORAL AND SPATIAL GAPS 
The etymology of the term chronotope is found in the Greek ‘chronos’ (time) and 
‘topos’ (place) giving the literal meaning ‘time-space’. The main idea regarding 
the chronotope entertained by Bakhtin was to propose a new approach to the time 
and space issues found in any utterance. Namely, similarly to the new approach 
to energy and mass issues in the sciences introduced by Einstein’s theory of 
relativity, it was Bakhtin’s literary theory that introduced the idea of the 
inseparability of time and space in any utterance. After Einstein, the issues 
relating to mass are inseparable from the issues relating to energy (in physics of 
relativity).60 In a similar way,61 Bakhtin argued, time and space are inseparable in 
any artistic work forming a unique construction, specific to each artistic work.62 
                                                
58 Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, pp. 60, 80. 
59 See Holquist, ‘Glossary’, p. 428; Martin J. Buss, ‘Dialogue in and among Genres’, in Semeia 
63: Bakhtin and Genre Theory in Biblical Studies, ed. by Roland Boer, (Atlanta, GA: SBL, 2007), 
pp. 9-18 (p. 10). 
60 I find the following extremely simplified explanation of the theory of relativity very useful as it 
was explained by Einstein himself: ‘If we imagine all physical things, all stars, all light taken out 
of the universe, what then remains is something like a giant vessel without walls called “space.” 
With respect to what is happening in the world, it plays the same role as the stage in a theatre 
performance. In this space, in this vessel without walls, there is an eternally uniformly occurring 
tick-tock that, however, only ghosts, but those everywhere can hear; that is “time.” ‘(Albert 
Einstein, ‘Doc. 44.a: The Principal Ideas of the Theory of Relativity’, in The Collected Papers of 
Albert Einstein: Volume 7: The Berlin Years Writings 1918-1921, ed. by Michel Janssen, and 
others (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 3-6 (p. 3).) Since the speed of light is 
the fundamental unit of measure (the absolute constant), the measurements of space and time are 
relative. Space and time are therefore interwoven in a ‘fabric’ of ‘time-space’, whereas everything 
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Similar to the classification of genres as ‘fairly stable forms of utterances,’63 
Bakhtin provided a classification of chronotopes as fairly stable forms of specific 
time-space compositions. In other words, Bakhtin wanted to show how certain 
genres prefer certain types of chronotopes. Accordingly, he concluded that in 
travel style genres, which have the travel style chronotope, time takes precedence 
over space. In contrast, in idyllic, lyrical genres, chronotope is composed of space 
that takes precedence over time. Accordingly, every artistic work has a unique 
composition of time and space factors that are blended in one ‘carefully thought-
out, concrete whole’.64 Thus, the choice of chronotope resembles the author’s 
choice of worldview, which he/she intended to convey.65 The following examples 
will clarify this point. 
As regarding the travel style genres, in which chronotope is composed by time 
taking precedence over space, the wanderings of Israel from Egypt to the 
                                                                                                                                
travels through the ‘time-space’ at the velocity of light. The slower one moves through space, the 
faster one moves through time. Oppositely, the faster one moves through space, the slower one 
moves through time. For more on the general theory of relativity itself see Albert Einstein, ‘Doc. 
30: The Foundation of the General Theory of Relativity’, trans. by Alfred Engel, in The Collected 
Papers of Albert Einstein: Volume 6: The Berlin Years: Writings, 1914-1917, ed. by A. J. Kox, 
Martin J. Klein and Robert Schulmann, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 
146-200.  
61 For more on the influence of Einstein, as well as of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) on the 
development of the Bakhtinian concept of chronotopes, see Gary Saul Morson and Caryl 
Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1990), pp. 366-68; Nele Bemong and Pieter Borghart, ‘Bakhtin’s Theory of the Literary 
Chronotope: Reflections, Applications, Perspectives’, in Bakhtin’s Theory of the Literary 
Chronotope: Reflections, Applications, Perspectives, ed. by Nele Bemong, and others (Gent: 
Ginkgo Academia, 2010), pp. 3-16 (pp. 3-5)); Michael Holquist, ‘The Fugue of Chronotope’, in 
Bakhtin’s Theory of the Literary Chronotope: Reflections, Applications, Perspectives, ed. by Nele 
Bemong, and others, (Gent: Ginkgo Academia, 2010), pp. 19-33. 
62 This understanding that the main feature of every literary work is its presentation of a specific 
construction of time and space was the core difference between Georg (György) Lukács (1885-
1971) and Bakhtin. Furthermore, the same issue of chronotope in the novel made the difference 
between Bakhtin’s and Maxim (Alexei Maximovich Peshkov) Gorky’s (1868-1936) 
understanding of ‘the folk’ as the concept of specific ‘historical space’ of the collective. For more 
on these differences see Graham Pechey, Mikhail Bakhtin: The Word in the World (London: 
Routledge, 2007), pp. 82-104. 
63 Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 80. 
64 Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, p. 84. 
65 I am not the first to argue for this link between the writer’s ideology and his/her choice of 
chronotope. Thus, ‘[s]pecific chronotopes correspond to particular genres … which themselves 
represent particular world-views. To this extent, chronotope is a cognitive concept as much as a 
narrative feature of texts.’ (Graham Roberts, ‘Glossary’, in The Bakhtin Reader: Selected 
Writings of Bakhtin, Medvedev, Voloshinov, ed. by Pam Morris, (London: Arnold, 1994), pp. 245-
52 (p. 246).) 
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Promised Land in the book of Exodus is a typical example of this genre in the 
Bible. It is a case in point because in this chronotope ‘the time spent means the 
ground covered, and pages turned’, as Vice puts it.66  
The above-mentioned type of travel-style chronotope is focused on the exactness 
of the ‘unity of time and space markers’.67 However, no chronotope has to remain 
a ‘purely distilled’ type of chronotope. In fact, the chronotopes of the pure type 
are rare. Very often chronotopes are ‘charged up’ with additional meaning by 
introducing new topics with new types of polyphonic characters. In Chapter 4, I 
will argue that for example, the account of God providing manna in the desert 
utilises a chronotope which has as its basis the travel chronotope, but with this 
motif of manna and, more so, the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif, the chronotope 
develops a new horizon of expectations. 
Even though it is barely possible to find a purely road-style or purely lyrical-style 
chronotope, the focus on the composition of time and space and the way it 
‘works’ in a given artistic work remains essential, critical. The focus on the time–
space composition enables the spectator to ‘hear’ the additional dialogic 
overtones present in the artistic work. These dialogic overtones would otherwise 
remain unseen and unheard.  
Regarding the idyllic, lyrical genres, in which chronotope is composed by space 
taking precedence over time, a case in point is ‘the song of Moses’ in Exodus 15. 
There are almost no temporal designations while the text is charged with 
descriptions of space. This is achieved by prevailing motifs related to the border 
between the sea and the dry land. Thus the place of the enemies is described by 
expressions like ‘into the sea’, ‘in the Red Sea’, ‘floods covered... down into the 
depths’, ‘the waters piled up…the deeps congealed’, ‘the sea covered’, ‘the earth 
swallowed’ in verses Exodus 15.1,4,5,8,10,12 respectively. In contrast, the place 
of the Israelites is described as ‘on the mountain… the sanctuary’ in verse 17.  
                                                
66 Sue Vice, Introducing Bakhtin (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 210. See 
also Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, p. 98. 
67 See ibid., p. 98. 
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Also, the naming of other nations in Exodus 15.14,15 charges the chronotope 
with topics of publicity versus intimacy, nationality versus individuality, even 
tradition versus freedom of personal choice. Thus, the exodus from Egypt 
becomes part of the common experience characteristic of every redemption, 
emancipation, liberation, or salvation regardless of one’s relation to the actual 
historical exodus from Egypt. 
Furthermore, this notion of chronotopic motifs introduces the question concerned 
with the relation between the artistic work and history. That is, the relation 
between an artistic work and history is far more complicated and multileveled 
than any non-dialogical theory of meaning can ever comprehend. In particular, 
there are three layers of chronotope present in every utterance. They can be 
highlighted by asking the following three questions:68 
a) What are the means by which the text represents (external) history? 
b) What are the ways of presenting (formal) properties of the text itself 
(its plot, narrator, and relation to other texts)? 
c) What are the (internal) images of time and space in the text, out of 
which a representation of history is to be constructed? 
In line with this aspect of dialogical concept of reality, I define ‘image’ here, as a 
subjective comprehension and depiction of reality. Answers to the three questions 
above practically determine the way time and space mutually shape themselves in 
the artistic work analysed. In addition, the same questions provide insights into 
relations between the artistic work and history (which is here seen as 
multileveled). More precisely, there is external history, internal history, and the 
plot or the artistic work’s formal construction.  
Even more, in the light of the Kuhnian theory of paradigms introduced in Section 
2.1 above, one can make a distinction between the external, formal and internal 
chronotope by their function in designating chronotopes on the following three 
                                                
68 Based on Sue Vice’s analysis of ways Bakhtin’s chronotope works, in Vice, pp. 201, 202. 
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levels respectively: metaphysical aspect of a paradigm, an utterance, and an 
image of the world (in an utterance). Thus, firstly, the external chronotope can be 
defined as a specific construct of time and space on the level of the metaphysical 
aspect of the author’s paradigm. Secondly, a formal chronotope is an artistic 
construct of time and space in an utterance with the focus adapted to the purpose 
of conveying an image of the world in the utterance. Thirdly and finally, an 
internal chronotope is an artistic construct of time and space in an image of the 
world, with a focus adapted to the purpose of conveying the message of the 
author.  
Accordingly, it is important to note that the external chronotope is something the 
writer does not perceive as if he/she has any control over it. In other words, the 
external chronotope is independent of his/her choice, since it is determined by the 
whole of the paradigm the author subscribes to as the only logical answer to the 
most fundamental questions in life. In contrast, the formal chronotope and 
internal chronotope are constructs created by the author through specific 
accentuation on time or space in his/her utterance. Thus, as an illustration, the 
relation could be presented as the role of the Creator of the universe, compared to 
a photographer in the universe. The former adjusts the external chronotope, the 
latter adjusts the formal and internal. 
Furthermore, this multi-layered representation of time and space creates a 
possibility for the intermingling of the layers. The literary device which utilises 
this intermingling of layers is called ‘mise en abyme’, meaning, idiomatically, 
‘play-within-the-play’ or ‘story within the story’.69 For example, I see this in 
Deuteronomy 31.30-32.10 where Moses recounts how he was narrating to the 
                                                
69 Literally ‘in the middle of the shield’. The expression comes from the tradition of having a 
miniaturised form of the shield in the centre of some shields. Thus, the effect is that there is a 
shield with a picture of itself in the middle, in the centre of which there is a miniaturised 
form/picture of the same shield, with a miniaturised picture of the shield in its centre. The effect is 
the same as the outcome of two mirrors mutually reflecting each other. The reflection of each of 
the mirrors in its own mirror is endless. The same effect is gained when there is a play within a 
play or a story within a story. See Barbara Green, Mikhail Bakhtin and Biblical Scholarship: An 
Introduction, SBL Semeia Series (Atlanta, GA: SBL, 2000), pp. 75, 181. See also Lucien 
Dällenbach, The Mirror in the Text (Cambridge: Polity, 1989); and Robert Polzin, David and the 
Deuteronomist: A Literary Study of the Deuteronomic History. Part Three: 2 Samuel 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 37-47. 
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Israelites what God had done for them. In this given example, there are at least 
three layers of time, each having its own space presented, even though with a 
different level of clarity. In verses 31.30-32.3, the first (1.) layer of time 
corresponds to space clearly introduced in the preceding verses. Verse 32.4 then 
suddenly interrupts that chronotope with a statement about a fact which is not 
limited to time or space, functioning as (2.) chronotope and a bridge towards the 
following verse 32.5a, where a totally new (3.) chronotope emerges. The second 
half of the verse, 32.5b is a leap back towards the previous (1.) chronotope of 
21.30-32.3, this time utilised in 32.6,7. Nevertheless, 32.8 is a leap back to the 
(3.) chronotope from 32.5a, leading to 32.9, which utilises the (1.) chronotope 
from 32.5a. Finally, 32.10 is a leap back to the (3.) chronotope layer from verses 
32.5a and 32.8.  
Utilisation of this literary device brings a special meaning to the whole text, since 
time and space are represented as merging into one big whole, where every single 
detail interferes with others. Taking into consideration that it is Moses’ 
recounting of the history of salvation from the bondage of Egypt, knowing that, 
from his own perspective, time and space are about to cease to function (since his 
death has already been announced, see 31.29), this intermingling of all the layers 
of time and space is more than just accidental. Nevertheless, the intermingling 
becomes even more complicated when a future perspective is introduced, as is the 
case, for example in Deuteronomy 32.35-36. Past, present, and future climax to a 
peak where everything is subordinated to the representation of the time and space 
of the death of Moses, who kept the faith in God. This same death-motif which 
transcends and subordinates other chronotopes is further developed with a 
narration of Moses’ own70 death (Deuteronomy 34.1-5), as well as with the 
comment on the fact that his tomb has never been found (Deuteronomy 34.6). 
Furthermore, this intermingling of time and space leads to the question of the 
addressee(s) represented by a text. Thus, the roles of superaddressee and 
ultimately known addressee must be introduced. 
                                                
70 The fact that someone else other than Moses may have written his obituary does not invalidate 
the motif, quite the opposite. Namely, a very new chronotope of another time and space is thus 
introduced in the whole of the book, with an already turbulent mixture of chronotopes in the text. 
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2.2.3 SUPERADDRESSEE VS. ULTIMATELY KNOWN ADDRESSEE  
Just as the layers of time and space are discernible in an utterance, so at least two 
layers can be found in the addressees. Thus, Bakhtin wrote:71 
Any utterance always has an addressee … whose responsive 
understanding the author of the speech work seeks and surpasses. 
This is the second party. … But in addition to this addressee (the 
second party), the author of the utterance, with greater or lesser 
awareness, presupposes a higher superaddressee (third), whose 
absolutely just responsive understanding is presumed, either in some 
metaphysical distance or in distant historical time (the loophole 
addressee). In various ages and with various understandings of the 
world, this superaddressee and his ideally true responsive 
understanding assume various ideological expressions (God, absolute 
truth, the court of dispassionate human consciousness, the people, the 
court of history, science, and so forth). 
The introduction of the third person’s role into the dialogue is not initiated by the 
third person’s (superaddressee’s) ability, but rather by the inability of the first 
two persons’ roles’. This is to say that there is no human being with ultimate 
knowledge and it is unlikely that anyone has ever seriously claimed to have that 
kind of knowledge. Nevertheless, the implications of the non-dialogic theories of 
meaning tend to suggest this kind of knowledge. In other words, it is a utopia of 
those theories of meaning that the only way the gap between the author and 
audience can be bridged is by presupposing an ultimate mutual understanding 
between the author and the audience.  
On the other hand, according to Bakhtin and his literary theory, the author as a 
human has limited knowledge, not only of the subsequent recipients of his 
writings (loophole recipients), but even of the author’s closest, first recipients. It 
is only by the idea of superaddressee that a perfectly just and correct 
understanding of the writer’s utterance can be assumed.72 Without that 
                                                
71 Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 126. 
72 This assumption has been the basis for some critics of Bakhtin to understand him as introducing 
the religious motive of God in his literary theory. However, the ground for such a claim is vague, 
since most of Bakhtin’s private life was lost in the time of the ‘communist iron curtain’. 
Nevertheless, see Ruth Coates, Christianity in Bakhtin: God and the Exiled Author, Cambridge 
Studies in Russian Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; repr. 2004). 
	
	
	
79	
presupposed superaddressee, no author would begin writing, since what would be 
the point of writing if not in order to be understood by the intended reader? 
Therefore, the problem of reading any text is in that we can only gather clues to 
help us vaguely guess how big or small the difference between the super-
addressee and the actual addressee(s) is. The assumption, most likely correct, is 
that the difference between the superaddressee and the actual addressee increases 
gradually and proportionally with the increase of the time gap between the two 
contexts.  
However, the main problem in communication is not the existence of the gap 
between the writer’s context and the recipient’s context, (since the gap is always 
there, no matter how big or small it is) but the author’s and the reader’s 
unawareness of the gap. In other words, the main problem is the assumed 
capabilities of both the author and the reader to ultimately know and understand 
the other partner in the dialogue. This problem is avoidable, or at least the effect 
of it is absorbed with the implementation of the role of the superaddressee present 
in every dialogue, affecting the discourse and enabling it to function as feasible, 
even though always imperfect and limited. However, since the discourse is 
enabled by bridging those gaps between contexts of the reader and that of the 
author, the discourse can facilitate authoring by both the author and the 
recipients. The latter needs to be explained. 
2.2.4 ACT OF AUTHORING VS. SPEAKING AND HEARING 
According to Bakhtin, every human is an author,73 and every text has an author.74 
Furthermore, according to the dialogical features of every utterance, as presented 
above, every authoring is dialogical. This dialogical aspect of authoring is 
probably best explained if the focus of this explanation is on the two modes or 
ways by which human consciousness operates. Bakhtin called these modes for ‘I 
for myself’ and ‘I for others’.75 The first one presents the real person, as seen 
                                                
73 See Green, p. 33. 
74 Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 104. 
75 See Green, p. 34. 
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from the subjective angle of the person himself/herself. On the other hand, the ‘I 
for others’ is the person that is conveyed (authorised) in the image of the author 
of an utterance.76 It is not the real person (presenting the ‘I for myself’ 
consciousness), but the ‘I’ as already authorised by the actual author. In this 
sense, the authorised image of the voice of the author functions in the utterance 
(as a whole), as a separate, authorised voice (as a distinct consciousness). 
Accordingly, the author that is comprehensible by the analysis of an utterance is 
not the real author but the authorised one, authorised by the real author. That is to 
say that via an analysis of a written utterance, we can visualise only the image of 
the author, which is not the values and opinions of the consciousness of the 
author in person, but of the author as he/she projected, shared, and whose 
consciousness he/she authorised (the ‘I for others’ consciousness).77 Therefore, 
Bakhtin differentiates between ‘the author in person’ and ‘the image of the 
author’: ‘The author cannot be separated from the images and characters, since he 
enters into these images as an indispensable part of them (images are dual and 
sometimes double-voiced). But the image of the author can be separated from the 
images of the characters. This image itself, however, is created by the author and 
is therefore also dual.’78  
Furthermore, apart from authoring the image of the author present in the 
utterance, the author in person authors every other consciousness/voice present in 
the utterance. The act of authoring the so-called ‘heroes’ of the utterance is a 
                                                
76 See Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, pp. 106-16. 
77 See ibid., pp. 148-49. Bakhtin uses a few more terms in order to describe the difference 
between the ‘person of the writer’ and the ‘image of the writer’. These are ‘primary’ and 
‘secondary’ author, where the primary author is the author in person, whilst the image of the 
author is the secondary author. Furthermore, the primary author is also ‘natura non creata quae 
creat’, whilst the secondary is ‘natura creata quae non creat’. The latter two Latin terms are 
actually adopted and adapted from the philosopher Duns Scotus’ scheme of four modes of being 
(nature created and not creating, nature created and creating, nature not created and creating, and 
finally nature not created and not creating). The dichotomy adapted by Bakhtin makes the 
difference between the primary author who is in terms of literary act of authoring ‘not created, but 
creating’ and the secondary author (the image and not the person) who is ‘created (by the primary 
author) but is not creating’. The image of the hero authorised in a novel is also ‘created and not 
creating’, since it is created by the primary author, the same way as is the image of the primary 
author. See also Michael Holquist’s note 23 in Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 
157. 
78 Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 116. 
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process in which yet again the borders between the consciousness of the author 
and the persons he/she authorises are, if not vague, then perforated/porous.79 This 
in practice means that the image of the author that is present in a given utterance 
is created not only from the voice of the author as can be heard by analysis of the 
utterance as a whole but also by listening to every voice present in the utterance 
itself. This is so because every voice is authorised by the author of the utterance 
in a way by which the author projects and shares his/her understanding of the 
world in more or less an artistic way. 
Finally, there is also the third consciousness essential for understanding the way 
authoring works according to the dialogical theory of meaning, the so-called 
‘The-other-for-me’.80 This third consciousness is again not something that is 
absolute, but the one that I (as a recipient of the utterance) see, meet, and engage 
with. This idea of the third consciousness is the point where the act of authoring 
is introduced to the audience/readership. In other words, hearing and listening 
imply a far too simplistic and passive a representation of the process of 
understanding. In other words, ‘hearing’ and ‘listening’ were satisfactory and 
suitable only to the non-dialogical theories of meaning in which the artificial 
passive and objective understanding could be presumed. 
 In contrast, the dialogical theory of meaning does not conceptualise any 
utterance as passive. Moreover, every understanding is an act of authoring. This 
authoring is of a lesser intensity when compared to the act of authoring on the 
side of the author of the utterance. Nevertheless, it is still an act of authoring with 
all the features of formation of evaluative consciousness on the side of the 
recipient of the utterance.  
The main and in a way paradoxal outcome of the act of authoring is that there are 
the following three voices to be heard in every utterance: the voice of the image 
of the author, the authorised heroes in the utterance, the superaddressee/image of 
the recipient of the utterance. However, the paradox is that the only voice that can 
                                                
79 See Green, p. 35. 
80 Ibid., p. 34. 
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never be heard is the voice of the real, primary author. The primary author always 
‘cloths himself in silence’, Bakhtin wrote.81 
Furthermore, because of dialogic overtones in the process of both speaking and 
hearing, every voice is in a way doubled.82 The double-voicedness is a literary 
phenomenon which dictates that a clear delineation between the voices of the 
author and the voice of the heroes he/she has authorised is not possible. The 
reason for this is that each of the voices in an utterance is, in a more or less direct 
way, influenced by, and part of, the presentation of the author’s voice.83 In the 
same way, every understanding or exposition of an utterance of ‘others’ is also a 
presentation of the voice of the person who presents the utterance of ‘others’.84  
This problem of literary representation is most obvious in any ‘history of an 
artist’ style in which an author authorises an image of himself/herself in an 
artistic work about himself/herself. A typical biblical example of this literary 
phenomenon is the image of Moses in the Pentateuch/Torah. Namely, the image 
of Moses is presented as composing the account of Israel’s wandering on their 
way out of Egypt to the Promised Land. Thus, no matter how accurate the 
historical account of Moses is in his writings, it is still a (selective/censored) 
image of him, authorised by himself.  
Nevertheless, double-voicedness has the result that the same speech/writing, in 
the same context, bears a different meaning for different audiences. In other 
words, a different audience (may be present at the same time and place) will 
hear/comprehend a different voice, conveying a different message, while 
listening to the same speech, of the same person, under same circumstances of the 
speech act (or writing). 
                                                
81 Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 149. 
82 See Green, p. 35. 
83 This double voicedness of every representation is especially obvious in the carnival genre, 
where the author is a spectator and each spectator is an author as well (see carnival features in 
Section 2.2.8 below).  
84 See Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, pp. 110-16. 
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A typical biblical example of this phenomenon, I suggest, is the question posed 
by the Pharaoh’s servants in Exodus 10.7 ‘How long shall this fellow be a snare 
to us?’85 A logical question to be asked, by a contemporary (today’s) reader, is 
who that ‘fellow’ was. Namely, in verse 3, it is stated that both Aaron and Moses 
went to Pharaoh, ‘and said …’. Furthermore, from Exodus 4.15,16 and 7.1,2 the 
today’s reader/listener can understand that it was not Moses who uttered the 
words, but Aaron, according to the agreement between God, Moses and Aaron. 
Nevertheless, the utterance itself was in the first person singular, that is, as if God 
himself had uttered it (10.3-6).  
Clearly, the Pharaoh and his servants had several possibilities in regards to the 
author of the utterance heard: Moses, Aaron or God. Nevertheless, the 
explicitness of this ambiguity is brought to the fore with an inconsistency in 
terms of the number of persons speaking. As mentioned, in the beginning of verse 
3, both Moses and Aaron are described as those who ‘went in and said …’ 
However, after finishing the utterance (verse 6), only one unspecified person was 
described as the one who ‘turned and went out’. Nevertheless, both Moses and 
Aaron were brought back to Pharaoh, according to verse 8. Who was thus the 
‘fellow’ in verse 7? 
While higher criticism looks for solutions on the basis of the text being a 
composite of many pieces (as will be explained in Chapter 3), Bakhtinian 
criticism sees double-voicedness as a feasible solution to these apparent 
inconsistencies in the text since double-voicedness is anyway present in every 
single discourse. Fighting against double-voicedness to clear the biblical text 
from it is no less of a utopia than Don Quixote’s attempt to make this world 
windmill free. More precisely, the difference between utterances regarding 
double-voicedness is only in the degree of explicitness in the double-voicedness. 
Thus, contrary to this extremely explicit double-voicedness in the biblical 
example above, double-voicedness is implicit, for example, in every claim that 
                                                
85 NRSV translation. 
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the Scriptures convey the ‘word’ or ‘voice’ of God.86Nevertheless, this double-
voicedness of every utterance makes the introduction of the term dialogism a 
necessity. While double-voicedness assumes the underdeveloped borders between 
the author and the voices in the utterance (as explained above), the dialogism 
assumes the underdeveloped borders between the image of the author and the 
image of the recipient in the utterance. The latter assumption is best explained 
when dialogism is contrasted to monologue and dialogue. 
2.2.5 DIALOGISM VS. MONOLOGUE AND DIALOGUE 
Dialogism is the term used by Bakhtin, with the intention of rejecting the much 
more common term ‘dialogue’. The intention was, of course, to make the clearest 
possible distinction between the presuppositions entertained by non-dialogical 
literary theories and the presuppositions entertained by Bakhtin. 
According to Bakhtin, dialogue is often used as an antonym to the word 
monologue. Accordingly, dialogue is a term that designates exchange of 
thoughts/utterances between two partners. By this definition, it could be assumed 
that the engagement of the parties in dialogue may be partial, especially on the 
side of the recipient of the utterance of the ‘other’ voice in the dialogue. In fact, if 
dialogue can be seen as an extended version of monologue, it can be assumed that 
dialogue can also be dismantled into a number of monologues. Thus, an utterance 
in a dialogue (comprehended as a two-part monologue) could be perceived as 
self-sufficient, i.e. without a need for the other party in the dialogue. 
In contrast, in dialogical methodology, no utterance is monological. ‘The 
expression of an utterance always responds to a greater or lesser degree, that is, it 
expresses the speaker’s attitude toward other’s utterances and not just his attitude 
toward the object of his utterance’, Bakhtin wrote.87 In other words, the usage of 
the newly coined term ‘dialogism’ draws attention to more than just a mere 
exchange of thoughts/utterances between two parties. Dialogism includes not 
only participation of the two parties, but also full engagement of the parties. The 
                                                
86 Accordingly, for example, the claim in 2 Chronicles 36.15,16 follows this logic. 
87 Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 92. 
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focus is on not only what has been said, but also on the whole being of the person 
who said it. Dialogism is not only about exchange of thoughts, but also to a 
greater extent about engagement of persons.  
Finally, this holistic view on mutual influence of the both parties in the dialogism 
enables Bakhtin’s literary theory to become a holistic methodology for socio-
psychological analysis of structures of any society.88 In other words, whilst the 
term dialogue puts the focus on the mutual influence between two parties only, 
dialogism sets a basis for an analysis of mutual influence of an unlimited number 
of parties within a society as a whole. This engagement of multiple parties 
present in every dialogism is most comprehensively conveyed by the 
phenomenon called polyphony.  
2.2.6 POLYPHONY VS. MONOPHONIC AUTOCRACY 
Polyphony is a literary phenomenon in which mutual engagement of more than 
two voices takes place at the same time. Thus, a polyphonic analysis of an 
utterance presents an analysis of the utterance based on listening to all the voices 
that can be heard when analysing the utterance (i.e. voices of all the characters in 
the utterance, the voice of the image of the author, the voice of the audience to 
whom the utterance is addressed in the first place, the voice of the contemporary 
addressee/s, etc.). Consequently, polyphony and dialogism can be used as 
synonyms,89 even though there is a slight difference between them. Namely, the 
difference is in the level of engagement conveyed by the two terms. More 
precisely, polyphony is concerned with the engagement of voices in the utterance 
as a whole (that is with the ‘macrocosmic structure of the text’). In contrast, 
dialogism is a broader term, being able to denote also the engagement that takes 
place on the level of the actual parts of the utterance (i.e. with ‘reciprocating 
                                                
88 See for example Bakhtin’s argument that familial and intimate style and genres were used in the 
Renaissance in order to ‘destroy the official medieval picture of the world’. See Bakhtin, Speech 
Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 97. 
89 See Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, trans. by Caryl Emerson, Theory and 
History of Literature (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaja literature, 1963; repr. Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1984), p. 40; David Lodge, After Bakhtin: Essays on Fiction and 
Criticism (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 86.  
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mechanisms within the smaller units of exchange, down to the individual 
word’).90 
Nevertheless, every utterance can be analysed in the polyphonic fashion. More 
precisely, dialogic overtones in every utterance facilitate multiple voices to 
contribute to developing the meaning of the utterance. Thus, every utterance has a 
certain potential for more than one voice to be heard in it. In practice, this means 
that no voice has any autocracy over other voices in the utterance. In other words, 
since the voice of the author’s image is present not only in the author’s voice but 
also in the voices of every character that the author has authorised, there is no 
basis upon which any of the authorised voices should lay claim to the position of 
the ‘main’ voice. Very often the ‘main’ character is not the one through which the 
‘leading’ (in the sense of the closest to the moral ideal) voice is to be heard. For 
example, King David’s voice in the Bible is the ‘leading’ and ‘truthful’ one when 
commanding and initiating the building of the Temple for God. However, it is 
Nathan the prophet’s voice that takes over the ‘leading’ position from David’s 
voice, when Nathan makes David realise and admit his sins regarding Uriah and 
his wife (see 2 Samuel 11). 
Thus, the inevitable question is: Upon what basis should which we should decide 
which voice is to be followed among the many voices ‘heard’ whilst reading/ 
listening to a specific biblical passage? No monological treatment of the text as 
an utterance can provide the answer since no voice is ultimately correct. Every 
voice has a certain degree of truthfulness and correctness from case to case, from 
specific situation to specific situation. Every voice is to be analysed only as a part 
of the whole, with its specific role in the polyphony of voices. 
In addition, in Chapter 3 I will argue that every utterance should be seen as a part 
of a paradigm in which the utterance is uttered. Accordingly, when it comes to 
the validity of every single voice, my understanding is that all voices in an 
                                                
90 See Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, pp. 184-85; Lynne Pearce, ‘Bakhtin and the 
Dialogic Principle’, in Literary Theory and Criticism: An Oxford Guide, ed. by Patricia Waugh, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 223-32 (pp. 226-27); Lynne Pearce, Reading 
Dialogics, Interrogating Texts (Abingdon: Hodder Education, 1994), p. 21. 
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utterance borrow their validity from the metaphysical aspect of the paradigm (i.e. 
they share in conveying the image of the paradigm which is authorised by the 
author of the utterance, in which these voices are found).  
Furthermore, in addition to the polyphony present in every utterance as a whole, 
there is also the phenomenon of polyphonic features of a character (hero) in an 
utterance. A polyphonic character is a complex character in which more than one 
voice can be heard. Indeed, the polyphonic character is the result of an act of 
authoring in which the author has authorised a new being by modes of dialogic 
overtones that are intermingled into one new whole, the new authorised 
character/hero. A typical example is King Saul’s personality within the biblical 
opus.91  
In addition to the polyphonic characters, complex meaning (incorporating the 
unchangeable literal and changeable pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic 
meanings) of an utterance is developed by the presence of all the voices in the 
utterance, and by the possibility for every voice to adapt itself to the specific 
situation in which the utterance is supposed to convey meaning.  
2.2.7 HETEROGLOSSIA VS. CANONICAL UNIFORMITY OF LANGUAGE 
While polyphony assumes vague borders in the hierarchy between the voices in 
the utterance (as explained above), heteroglossia assumes vague borders between 
styles of speeches within the utterance. This socio-psychological aspect of 
Bakhtin’s literary theory makes the theory sensitive to non-grammatical and 
purely referentially semantic dialogic overtones of genres used by each person in 
different spheres of communication.92 Meaning that, every person uses different 
styles in different spheres in everyday dynamics of speech communication. For 
example, the same person will speak differently when in court, compared to the 
style used when proclaiming his/her love for a beloved person. Thus, 
heteroglossia is the literary phenomenon that utilises the ability of voices to use 
                                                
91 See for example Barbara Green’s analysis of the complex polyphonic personality of King Saul, 
in Green, pp. 67-134.  
92 See Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, p. 93. 
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(adapt to) different styles of speeches according to the context of discourse. A 
practical outcome of heteroglossia is that it is only the analysis done in this kind 
of dialogical fashion that is able to provide insights to the different meanings one 
voice can convey with different styles in different contexts of conversation.  
Heteroglossia is not to be equated with double-voicedness (see Section 2.2.4 
above), nor polyphony, as explained above (in Section 2.2.6). More precisely, 
polyphony is concerned with the presence of many voices, double-voicedness 
with layers of one voice, and heteroglossia with the adaptability/pluriformity of a 
voice. However, both heteroglossia and double-voicedness stand in opposition to 
any presupposition that either language as a dialogical system or its usage in 
practice can be uniformed in any way. Accordingly, any uniformity of a language 
can be achieved only on the level of a grammatical system. In contrast, meaning 
is conveyed and determined by the clues that are non-grammatical, but dialogical 
and thus unable to be made uniform. 
Accordingly, heteroglossia is the force that drives a language to develop as a 
living entity, living its life in all the contexts, together with the voices that use the 
language. The force opposite to heteroglossia is social uniformity of language 
that forces the language to become standardised to a specific frame, acceptable in 
certain, stereotypic social contexts. However, both heteroglossia and uniformity 
are essential for language to function as a tool for discourse. Namely, without 
certain stereotypes, specific to certain social contexts, the language is deprived of 
referential points, which are necessary for meaning to be conveyed. In other 
words, without these kinds of stereotypes, one can never comprehend the stylistic 
figures based on the language ‘crossing the borders’ of what is expectable and 
acceptable in a certain social context. More precisely, comic, satirical or ironic 
utterances are not comprehendible unless on the basis of what is known as 
socially expectable in a given context.  
Still, too much rigidity would equally deprive the language of its feasibility in 
conveying comic, satirical, or ironic meaning, since without the flexibility of 
language to cross the borders of what has become a stereotype, no contrast to the 
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stereotype can be conveyed. In this sense, one can recognise centrifugal and 
centripetal forces at work in the formation of every utterance. Thus, canonisation 
(of an utterance) is the final stage of the process of interaction of centrifugal and 
centripetal forces in formation of an utterance, resulting in blurring the 
heteroglossity of its voices and making its form rigid.93 Accordingly, newly 
canonised stereotypes are perpetually established, whilst language constantly 
seeks for new breaches of the stereotypes. 
More precisely, the centrifugal forces at work in the process of the formation of 
an utterance are heteroglossia and re-accentuation. Here, re-accentuation is a 
literary technic by which the changing of accents in an utterance, and accordingly 
of meaning, is achieved. In contrast, accentuation is the literary technic which 
utilises dialogical overtones as accents in an utterance, and which thus narrows 
the scope of possible meanings the utterance can convey. The dialogical 
overtones, as the accents in an utterance, highlight the direction of the utterance 
towards another utterance, to which the directed utterance corresponds.  
 In Chapter 3 (particularly in Section 3.5.2.4 below), I will argue that the same 
centripetal and centrifugal forces which interact in the formation of every 
utterance (i.e. accentuation and re-accentuation) are evident in the case of the 
Scriptures as an utterance. More precisely, I will utilise the concepts of 
canonisation, accentuation and direction of an utterance in relation to the 
phenomenon of Scriptures.  
Here, it is important to understand that canonisation is the outcome of a dynamic 
process of accentuation of an utterance by establishing dialogical overtones in the 
utterance. However, genres (i.e. fairly stable forms of utterances) affect the 
tendency of utterances to be accentuated and canonised. In other words, not all 
genres are equally suitable for accentuation and canonisation of utterances. The 
genre for which canonisation is the most difficult to attain is carnival with its 
grotesque realism. The carnival genre is also the genre by which the presentation 
                                                
93 See Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, pp. 417-22; Roberts, ‘Glossary’, p. 425; 
Michael Holquist, Dialogism: Bakhtin and his World, 2 edn (London: Routledge, 1990; repr. 
2002), pp. 179-91. 
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of Bakhtinian understanding of the world reaches its peak, by having all borders 
in the world vague and undeveloped. 
2.2.8 CARNIVAL AND GROTESQUE VS. IDEALISED BOUNDARIES 
Probably the most complex genre to analyse with the non-dialogical theories of 
meaning is carnival with its relation to the grotesque realism. Conversely, it is the 
genre in which the functionality and dynamics of the dialogical theory of 
meaning can be applied at its best. The dialogical theory of meaning, with its 
focus on the dialogic overtones, enables critics to understand the cultural, 
ideological and historical backgrounds of ideas entertained by each specific 
carnival.  
Only in a dialogical representation of the world (that is where the world has 
vague borders) can a street performance be utilised as a literary tool. In other 
words, only in the Bakhtinian dialogism can the link between the grotesque 
realism on the street and the grotesque realism in the text be comprehended. 
Owing to this strong link between the (grotesque) literature and the (grotesque) 
event, Bakhtin was able to apply his socio-political analysis of the sixteenth-
century literary work of Rabelais94 to an analysis of the twentieth-century 
political situation in the Stalinist Soviet Union.  
Accordingly, within the dialogical methodology, no political phenomenon is to be 
treated as if performed in isolation. Therefore, no political situation is totally 
new, but is always, in a way, a form of previous political changes. Thus, what 
was taking place on the political stage in the Stalinist Soviet Union in the 
twentieth century could be easily expressed by the same literary style that was 
used to criticise the political stage of fifteenth-century feudalism, as presented in 
Rabelais’ literary work.95 
                                                
94 See for example, an 1894 edition of the English translation of all the five novels of Rabelais 
(originally written between 1532 CE and 1552 CE in French) in Francis Rabelais, The Works of 
Rabelais (Derby: Moray Press, 1894). 
95 Nevertheless, recent studies in mediaeval history have shown that Bakhtin’s analysis of the 
medieval social context and its usage of carnival was too simplified. However, I agree with 
Brandist’s argument that Bakhtin approached carnival with a focus on a literary form (even as a 
‘proto-genre’) and not focussing on it as a historical socio-political phenomenon. For Bakhtin, the 
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In the case of other literary genres, this cross-cultural and inter-political bridging 
may also have been done more or less successfully within also a non-dialogical 
theory of meaning. However, in the case of carnival and its grotesque realism, it 
is the dialogical theory only, which provides the insights in the dialogical links 
between different cultures, politics and literature. More precisely, carnival is the 
genre that has a number of such characteristics that it is not possible for the genre 
to function within the non-dialogical theory.96 I am thus concurring with Bakhtin 
that analysis of the phenomenon of carnival leads to a better understanding of the 
most dialogical presentation of the world. 
What are the main characteristics of the carnival spectacle? Firstly, the carnival 
always contains an element of ritual.97 The element of ritual in carnivals is 
exploited in the context of profanation. In the case of profanation of religious 
ideas, the objects of the ideas are profaned to the level of the body, in terms that 
objects and persons that are under any other circumstances untouchable, 
separated and sacred, become touchable, common and profane in a carnival. 
Therefore, there is a blurring of borders between the sacred and the profane 
within carnival. In addition, an annihilation of the borders between the 
performers/authors and spectators/audience takes place at a carnival.98 In the 
context of speech, the audience and the authors are the same voices (the same 
consciousness). Consequently, there is no hierarchy among voices at a carnival; 
instead, everything is led by ‘mass action’.99 This absence of any hierarchical 
structure leads to a diminishing of all socio-political borders at the spectacle. In 
                                                                                                                                
latter was only an outcome of anthropology expressed by the carnival genre. Thus, Bakhtin’s 
contribution to the literary analysis of carnival as genre is undisputable. See Brandist, The 
Bakhtin Circle: Philosophy, Culture and Politics, pp. 137-40, 48-49. However, for more on 
refinements of Bakhtinian analysis of carnival as a philosophical and socio-political phenomenon, 
see Chris Humphrey, ‘Bakhtin and the Study of Popular Culture: Re-thinking Carnival as a 
Historical and Analytical Concept’, in Materializing Bakhtin: The Bakhtin Circle and Social 
Theory, ed. by Craig Brandist and Galin Tihanov (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 164-72; 
Brandist, The Bakhtin Circle: Philosophy, Culture and Politics, pp. 176-91. 
96 See Vice, Introducing Bakhtin, pp. 151-53; Brandist, The Bakhtin Circle: Philosophy, Culture 
and Politics, p. 139. 
97 On carnival in the pre-Reformation liturgical calendar as the historical background for both 
Rabelais and subsequent literary usage of carnival, see Carol Clark, ‘Carnival’, in The Rabelais 
Encyclopedia, ed. by Elizabeth Chesney Zegura, (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2004), pp. 28-29. 
98 See Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, p. 122. For more on authoring in the case of the 
carnival genre see Vice, Introducing Bakhtin, pp. 181-86. 
99 See Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, p. 123. 
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the mass of voices taking part in the event, all borders between social and 
political strata in the society become totally ineffective.100  
Accordingly, there is always a motif of throning and dethroning (as well as of 
crowning and decrowning) of the carnival king.101 Finally, the culmination of the 
process of making all the borders ineffective exploits the idea of death and new 
life. This degradation of all the possible borders at the carnival also demolishes 
the border between the death and rebirth, that is, the border between this life and 
the future life.102  
The main outcome of this eradication of all the borders is the motif of happiness 
and freedom for everyone. This motif of happiness is at a carnival always 
expressed as undividable from irony/satire. This aspect of carnival reaches its 
climax in carnival parody and comic shows.103 During the comic shows, the last 
border to be annihilated is the border between an event and a literary work.104 
Thus, the curses, jargon and ironic language penetrate literature with the purpose 
of destroying all conventions concerning the boundaries expected of standardised 
language and an artistic work. Consequently, the grotesque realism as the 
outcome of the carnival spectacle is a presentation of the world in which none of 
its boundaries are developed, constant or firm.  
Accordingly, I suggest that the carnival genre is defined as the form of utterances 
which features a horizon of expectations (i.e. an expectable style), brought to an 
utterance that is used with the purpose of developing a grotesque representation 
                                                
100 Vice, Introducing Bakhtin, p. 152. 
101 Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, pp. 124–27. On the relation between imitation (of 
a hierarchical role model) and parody, see JoAnn DellaNeva, ‘Imitation and Parody’, in The 
Rabelais Encyclopedia, ed. by Elizabeth Chesney Zegura, (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2004), pp. 
126-27. 
102 Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, p. 8. 
103 Nevertheless, the laughter aspect is only partially preserved in modern parodies. See ibid., p. 
128. On inseparability of humour and satire in the carnival genre, see John Parkin, ‘Humor’, in 
The Rabelais Encyclopedia, ed. by Elizabeth Chesney Zegura, (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2004), 
pp. 122-24; Bernd Renner, ‘Satire (Satyre)’, in The Rabelais Encyclopedia, ed. by Elizabeth 
Chesney Zegura, (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2004), pp. 223-24. On the function of laughter in 
desecration of both the official language and rigid official norms, see Brandist, The Bakhtin 
Circle: Philosophy, Culture and Politics, pp. 126-28. 
104 See Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, pp. 132, 159, 165. 
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of the world, in which the world is in its unfinished form, with all its boundaries 
under development and movable. Thus, the main difference between the 
grotesque in comparison with classical realism is in the presentation of 
boundaries between societies, social strata, individuals and the representation of 
human body.105  
Classical realism presents boundaries between social strata, as if no change 
between them is possible. The boundaries are not fluid or porous.106 The same is 
true of boundaries between bodies. The focus is on the body as single, delineated 
from the rest of society and the world. The body is always in its finished form, as 
an ideal body.107 
In contrast, in grotesque realism the focus is on either the body as a part of the 
society – ‘body of the people as a whole’108 – or the individual body, but always 
in its unfinished form, with boundaries ‘in development’. The focus is on all that 
the development includes: ‘Eating, drinking, defecation and other elimination 
(sweating, blowing of the nose, sneezing), as well as copulation, pregnancy, 
dismemberment, swallowing up by another body…’109  
Consequently, in grotesque realism, moving the boundaries, described above, is 
seen as positive, even essential, whilst in classical realism changing the 
                                                
105 For further research, it would be beneficial to investigate different accents of grotesque realism 
developed by Bakhtin and Julia Kristeva, for example. See Julia Kristeva, ‘Word, Dialogue and 
Novel’, in Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art, ed. by Leon Roudiez, 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), pp. 64-91 (pp. 65,78); Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An 
Essay on Abjection, trans. by Leon Roudiez (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1980; repr. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1982), pp. 2-5, 85, 105, 38-205. Since the theories of grotesque are 
not the main focus of my presentation here, I will not present in detail the differences between the 
Bakhtin’s and Kristeva’s theories. For a detailed study of the two see Vice, Introducing Bakhtin, 
pp. 162-76. For G.W. Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) and Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945) as the two 
philosophers who provided the philosophical background for Bakhtinian analysis of grotesque, 
see Brandist, The Bakhtin Circle: Philosophy, Culture and Politics, pp. 140-43. 
106 See Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, trans. by Helene Iswolsky (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1968; repr. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 166; Vice, 
Introducing Bakhtin, p. 158. On the difficulties of analysis of ‘popular culture’, based on this 
porosity of social strata see Carol Clark, ‘Popular Culture’, in The Rabelais Encyclopedia, ed. by 
Elizabeth Chesney Zegura, (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2004), pp. 190-91. 
107 See Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, p. 25; Vice, Introducing Bakhtin, pp. 155-57. 
108 See Ibid., p. 153. 
109 Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, p. 317. See also Claude La Charité, ‘Grotesque Realism’, in 
The Rabelais Encyclopedia, ed. by Elizabeth Chesney Zegura, (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2004), 
pp. 104-05. 
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boundaries is always seen as negative, as profaning and defiling the already 
developed ideal (of a society, an individual or a body). Hence, classical realism 
and grotesque realism comprehend maternal motifs (with the womb as the main 
motif) and death motifs in ironic texts differently. According to the classical view 
on boundaries, the womb and death are seen as the beginnings and ends filled 
with emotions of fright.  
In opposition, according to the medieval form of grotesque, there is no 
delineation between beginnings and ends, nor is there any place for frightening 
emotions. In the grotesque, life contains death. Every death or end is in essence a 
form of giving place for new life and new beginning. 
These are these features of the grotesque realism that made it so suitable for 
expressing views of those social-strata classes that desired change in society. 
People from the oppressed social echelons longed for the carnival situation where 
there is no difference made between the poor and the rich, between the upper 
stratum and the lower stratum in the society. Grotesque realism is a desire for 
change that will bring life out of death. 
Finally, a link between the carnival genre and some ‘carnival type’ episodes in 
biblical narratives has already been recognised by OT scholars.110 However, I 
believe, it is important not to limit grotesque realism to its form only, but to 
imply the realism on the level of ideas as well. Accordingly, Bakhtin himself 
missed the opportunity to apply his theory to its full extent exactly because he 
focused on the analysis of literary texts on the level of grotesque forms, instead of 
applying the theory on the level of grotesque ideas, as well.111 Hence, the lack of, 
for example, gender sensitivity in Bakhtin’s literary analysis. Nevertheless, as 
will be shown in Chapter 3, the feminist interpretations utilising Bakhtinian 
                                                
110 See for example, Charles M. Rix, ‘Carnivalizing Sinai: A Bakhtinian Reading of Exodus 32.’ 
(unpublished PhD Thesis, Drew University Press, 2010); L. Juliana M. Claassens, ‘Laughter and 
Tears: Carnivalistic Overtones in the Stories of Sarah and Hagar’, Perspectives in Religious 
Studies, 32 (Fall 2005), 295-308;  
111 See Vice, Introducing Bakhtin, p. 179; Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, p. 
165. 
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criticism are now numerous, only some thirty years since the publication of 
Phyllis Trible’s God and Rhetoric of Sexuality112in 1978. 
Nevertheless, it seems to me that the conflict between the two views on 
boundaries (classical realism versus grotesque realism) is also important when the 
delineation between the sanctified and the profane, between the edible and the 
non-edible, between life and death, is in focus in ‘carnival scenes’ in the 
Pentateuch/Torah, such as the example of the Golden Calf scene in Exodus 32.  
Besides this obvious example of carnival in the Pentateuch/Torah, it would seem 
that in the context in which the Pentateuch/Torah was written, the ‘lower bodily 
stratum’ together with the ‘lower bodily acts’ (with all the images of birth, 
fertility, copulative bonding, genital organs …)113 have not been regarded as an 
inappropriate part of a religious discourse. Hence the presence of all the ‘lower 
bodily images’ scattered throughout the Pentateuch/Torah, without the disgust 
that the same grotesque images would necessarily prompt in contemporary 
literary and religious context. This is to say that in biblical writings, along with 
the general use of euphemism, lower bodily images had not ceased to convey 
positive meaning, as well as the potentially negative, whilst in contemporary 
grotesque fashion, only the latter meaning survives.114 Hence, biblical images of 
lower bodily stratum were still applicable for representation of divine visions and 
laws.115 Thus, it seems to me that carnival and grotesque motifs, present in the 
Bible, provide insights into ideas that are otherwise out of reach for a ‘non-
dialogical’ reader.  
After introducing all the essential elements for understanding the dynamics of 
Bakhtinian dialogism, I can draw some profound conclusions here regarding the 
                                                
112 Phyllis Trible, God and Rhetoric of Sexuality (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress, 1978). 
113 See Ezekiel 16 as a typical example. 
114 Regarding the degradation of potentially positive meaning of these images in contemporary 
literary culture see Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, pp. 147-50; Vice, Introducing Bakhtin, p. 
181. 
115 However, this is only a digression, concerned with the potential for further research. 
Accordingly, see the provocative analysis of the biblical images of sexuality in Howard Eilberg-
Schwartz, God’s Phallus and Other Problems for Men and Monotheism (Boston, MA: Beacon 
Press, 1994; repr. 1995). 
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effect this dialogism has on my concept of communication in general, and 
biblical interpretation in particular. More precisely, since my plan is to integrate 
Bakhtinian dialogism into my theory of meaning, I will here explain the effect of 
this dialogism on a non-conduit model of communication.  
2.2.9 CONCLUSION: CENTRES OF MEANING AND CANONISED IMAGES 
Bakhtinian dialogism is shown to provide tools for seeing borders in reality as 
underdeveloped and gaps as bridgeable. This dialogical concept of reality affects 
one’s concept of meaning. A centre of meaning is by definition a source of 
information available to the recipient of an utterance regarding specific 
characteristics of the utterance. (See Section 1.3 above.) I have already 
introduced the five centres of meaning as A - the historical events and ideas in 
which the religious writings originated; B - the author(s) of the compiled texts; C 
- the compiled writings; D – the text’s ancient first reader(s); E - its contemporary 
reader(s). I have also concluded that according to the non-conduit models of 
communication, every interpretation is a cognitive process related to these five 
centres of meaning. To incorporate Bakhtinian dialogism to my theory of 
meaning, I need to analyse how this dialogism affects my concept of the centres 
of meaning. I will begin the analysis with Barton’s suggestion on how to visualise 
the centres of meaning.  
Barton has suggested the following Illustration 6 below in order to present his 
four centres of meaning: Historical Events or Theological Ideas, Author, Text, 
and Recipient of the text.116  
 
 
 
 
                                                
116 John Barton’s proposal was a follow-up to proposal made by Meyer H. Abrams (1912-2015). 
See John Barton, The Old Testament: Canon, Literature and Theology. Collected Essays of John 
Barton, SOTS Series (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), p. 99. 
	
	
	
97	
Illustration 6: Barton’s Centres of Meaning 
 
 
 
The roles of the ‘Author’, ‘Text’ and ‘Reader’ on the Illustration 6 above are 
essential in any model of communication. However, Barton adds ‘Historical 
Events or Theological Ideas’ as a separate centre. According to Barton, this 
centre represents the ideas present in the author’s world and time and thus 
available for the reader and his contemporaries. I concur with Barton in that this 
centre is indeed distinguishable from the other centres of meaning. 
I will however, take a step further and modify Barton’s centres of meaning by 
dividing his ‘Reader’ on ‘Ancient First Recipient(s)’ and Contemporary 
Recipient(s).  I will also assign a letter to each of the centres. Thus, I have the 
five centres of meaning, as presented in the following Illustration 7 below.  
 
Illustration 7: Five Centres of Meaning 
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By these adjustments of Barton’s illustration, I am able to illustrate my five 
centres of meaning, i.e. A - the historical events and ideas in which the religious 
writings originated; B - the author(s) of the compiled texts; C - the compiled 
writings; D – the text’s ancient first recipient(s); E - its contemporary recipient(s). 
As presented in Section 2.2.4 above, the act of authoring in Bakhtinian dialogism 
demands that the more accurate presentation of the relations between the centres 
of meaning incorporates the idea of images of these five centres. Thus, instead of 
seeing the author of the text, the reader appropriates only an image of the author, 
as the image is authored in the text. The same kind of authored image of other 
centres of meaning is found in the text. Thus, according to my interpretation of 
Bakhtinian dialogism, the centres of meaning should be more appropriately 
visualised as in the Illustration 8 below. 
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Illustration 8: Centres of Meaning after Application of Bakhtinian Theory 
 
 
There are five details in this illustration that need to be explained (where A’ to E’ 
are five centres of meaning and five images of the centres of meaning). Thus, 
firstly, centres of meaning/voice (marked as A’ to E’) are understood as acquiring 
an image (images here represented by letters A to E). Secondly, an image of a 
voice is closer to the text than the actual/real voice. Thus, the real voice is marked 
as X’ counterpart of X (the image of x voice). Thirdly, both the images of voices 
and voices themselves are represented with letters of equal size, making the point 
that they are all equally represented in the polyphony featured in a text.  
However, in addition to the centres of meaning visualised in this illustration, it is 
also true that Bakhtinian dialogism recognises one important difference between 
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the voices, a difference that is not visualised on this illustration. Namely, the 
image of the voice of the author is, according to Bakhtin, directly accessible only 
in the poetic genre, where monophony of the author’s voice is featured. (Even 
when the poetic utterance makes use of other voices, it still features specific 
hegemony of the author’s voice/consciousness.) Accordingly, in other genres, 
representation of the author’s consciousness is distributed across the voices 
he/she has authorised and, thus, is never fully accessible in a direct way.117 
However, I was not able to visualise this distinction on the illustration above. 
Since the scope of my research in this thesis is limited to reading the narrative 
text in Exodus 16 (in Chapter 4), this lack of accuracy in the illustration will in 
any case not affect my application of the theory I am illustrating here. 
Fourthly, the illustration above visualises some important aspects of the C and C’ 
centres of meaning. Namely, every written canon of Scriptures is the outcome of 
a process of selecting some written utterances from amongst scriptural variants. 
Accordingly, the ‘authentic’ voice is not the C centre (that is the canonical 
image), but the variants in C’, which were the historical basis/background for the 
development of the canonical image, which eventually got to be (recognised as) 
authorised by a community of faith.  
In this sense, any given Bible is only an image of many voices represented by the 
scriptural variants. However, regardless of the authenticity of the previous 
variants, the author’s intention is to make a new image of the variants, the new 
compilation. In these terms, the act of authoring is seen as the act of recompiling 
the words and thoughts of ‘others’. In other words, the act of authoring the Bible 
is based on making old utterances new by re-accentuating them so that the 
scriptural variants become a new compilation, a new utterance. This re-
accentuation is, more precisely, rearrangement of dialogical overtones in the 
utterance. The new utterance (i.e. the newly compiled text) is re-accentuated in 
the way that it fits the author’s intention to convey his/her image of the world and 
time in the utterance.  
                                                
117 As quoted earlier, the author always ‘clothes himself in silence’. (Bakhtin, Speech Genres and 
Other Late Essays, p. 149.) 
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This image of the world and time, as it is established in the compiled utterance, 
introduces the last detail in the Illustration 8 above. Thus finally, the C - the 
compiled writings centre is conceptualised as an utterance which manifests an 
image of the paradigm the author intended to convey. In this sense, the C – centre 
is part of ‘Faith-life imagery’ detail on Illustration 5 above. The Bible becomes 
part of rituals in one tradition. More precisely, the Bible is part of visible 
manifestations of a master narrative and a symbol of communal identity.  
As a symbol of communal identity, the Bible utilises the field of cognitive gravity 
surrounding the Bible (i.e. the field in which other utterances are cognitively 
drawn closer to the Bible to stabilise their pragmatic, sociological and 
paradigmatic meanings). The stabilisation is achieved by experiencing either 
challenging or frustrating irritants perceived in those other utterances. To analyse 
a community’s master narrative, one has to analyse the explicit manifestations of 
the narrative and its cognitive attraction in contrast to its potential dependence on 
other utterances. If the Bible is perceived as an utterance with a master narrative 
(or as the master narrative itself), it means that the reader experiences cognitive 
attraction, and perceives other sources of meaning with other utterances as 
dependent from the master narrative. Moreover, the Bible is part of the symbols 
of communal identity. 
This comparison and merging of Illustrations 5 and 8 above, represents a 
conceptual merging of the Kuhnian theory of paradigms and the Bakhtinian 
theory of literature. This conclusion leads us further towards understanding the 
act of authoring as an act of canonisation. Namely, the author’s plan with 
authoring an utterance is to eventually convey faith-life images which will reach 
the recipient of the utterance (e.g. images of the voice of the author, images of 
other voices in the utterance, image of community, world, time, and of the whole 
paradigm). The author’s plan with authoring is the basis for the Bakhtinian 
concept of canonisation. 
Every given Bible is, in Bakhtinian terms, a canonised utterance, i.e. an utterance 
of ‘others’ which was accentuated by the effect of centrifugal and centripetal 
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forces. (See Section 2.2.7 above.) According to Bakhtin, these centripetal and 
centrifugal forces make their impact through processes of accentuation and re-
accentuation of the utterance, respectively.  
The new utterance is thus canonised, in the sense that the author’s intention is 
preserved as long as the accents in the utterance are intact. A re-accentuation of 
the utterance will possibly change the previous accents, and perhaps indirectly the 
master narrative promoted by the text, and consequently, the paradigm conveyed 
by the text. Because of this effect of re-accentuation, the focus on the dialogical 
overtones is so critical in the dialogical theory of meaning.  
However, the matter of canonisation in biblical studies, as an issue of authority is 
not of consequence for this thesis in general, nor of my analysis of the Bakhtinian 
concept of canonisation in particular. My third presupposition in Section 1.5 
above is related to the issue of biblical canon though, but that presupposition is 
here understood as a unique case of the general concept of canonisation in the 
Bakhtinian theory of literature. In other words, my presupposition regarding who 
or what has led the centrifugal and the centripetal forces to make an impact on the 
biblical compilations to finally be accentuated the way they are, is a matter of my 
personal belief.  
The Bakhtinian concept of accentuation is concerned with the effect of the 
process regardless of what the reason for the process was. In this sense, the 
question of canonisation as a matter of authority is not an issue in the realm of 
Bakhtinian dialogism. Every single utterance is accentuated in a certain way. If 
this accentuation is preserved, in one way or another, the canonisation is 
effective. In contrast, if an act of re-accentuation is allowed to take place, the 
process of canonisation has failed.  
Accordingly, when I, as a reader, read a given version of the Bible, I am indeed 
reading an accentuated utterance. In this sense, the process of re-accentuation is 
completed, since I am reading an actual text which does not change during the 
process of reading, regardless of the fact about whether another example of the 
same book exists in the world, or whether someone else has read it. With regard 
	
	
	
103	
to the ideas and words, they are always ideas and words of the ‘others’ as in other 
than the author. In contrast, the choice of canonisation of new accents in a new 
utterance is that of the author.  
Thus, my belief that there is a Being that has affected the process of re-
accentuating the finally canonised Bible, with regard to the given version I am 
reading, is seen as one of many choices for belief, the choices which are all in 
harmony with the Bakhtinian concept of canonisation.  
According to Bakhtin, this concept of canonisation is not limited to the 
canonisation of only a textual utterance. Any other artefact of human activity is 
seen as an accentuated utterance. In fact, the whole speech act is an utterance, 
according to the non-conduit models of communication. Since every unchanged 
utterance is a canonised utterance, the canonisation is a matter of rituals 
regardless of their type or form. As long as they are not changed, they are in fact 
canonised rituals. Every not re-accentuated text is thus a form of a ritual.  
Thus, the Bakhtinian concept of canonisation represents all forms of human 
activity as a conflict between accentuation and re-accentuation, between old 
canons and new canons, rigidity and change. This concept affects one’s 
understanding of the process of interpretation. Namely, interpretation is thus 
understood as an enquiry regarding competitive and conflicting canons. 
The reader’s plan is to recognise the traces of the author’s act of canonisation. 
The problem, however, is that the reader sees an unlimited number of canons, all 
competing for the reader’s attention. As introduced in Section 1.3 above, the 
competition is based on the vicious circle in compiled utterances. Here, in the 
context of the Bakhtinian concept of canonisation, every utterance is a 
compilation. Even more, every utterance is a representation of three chronotopes, 
internal, formal and external. Each of them is accentuated and perceived as 
canonised.  
Which representation of reality of time and space should the reader prioritise? By 
using the example from chronotopes in Deuteronomy 32 analysed in Section 
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2.2.2 above, I can see the contest between the chronotope as seen from Moses’ 
point of view and the chronotope as seen from the narrator’s point of view. I as 
the reader have to make a choice how I will relate my understanding of my world 
and time (i.e. the contemporary reader’s chronotope) to the chronotopes 
represented in and by the text I am reading. This choice is subject to what I as a 
reader find the most relevant to my world and time. In this sense, the act of 
interpretation is an act of evaluating the relevance of competing canonised 
representations of reality. Therefore, I need to integrate a relevance theory into 
my theory of meaning. This is the purpose of the following Section. 
2.3 INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF RELEVANCE 
I will argue that the theory of relevance, as presented by Sperber and Wilson and 
consequently applied to the issue of centres of meaning and the issue of contexts, 
will provide the tools needed to recognise the dialogical overtones as they are 
canonised in a given text. (Note that here and in the rest of the thesis, I use the 
terms canonisation and canon as it was presented in Sections 2.2.7 and 2.2.9 
above.)118 Furthermore, in Chapter 3 below, I will develop my theory of meaning 
by utilising those tools in combination with the tools provided by my previous 
two pillar theories (of paradigms, and of literature). 
I am aware of the critique and competitive theories of relevance.119 Accordingly, 
as introduced in Section 1.6 above, I do agree that the relevance theory is far 
                                                
118 As explained above, every given Bible is, in Bakhtinian terms, a canonised utterance, i.e. an 
utterance of ‘others’ which was accentuated by the effect of centrifugal and centripetal forces. In 
this sense, the process of re-accentuation is completed in the case of reading an actual text which 
does not change during the process of reading. The Bakhtinian concept of canonisation is 
applicable to any text, regardless of the fact about whether another example of the same text 
exists in the world, or whether someone else has read it. 
119 Sperber and Wilson’s theory of relevance has been contrasted with the theory of relevance 
proposed by Barbara Gorayska and Roger Lindsay. The main difference between the two theories 
is their dissimilar focus. Namely, Gorayska and Lindsay’s theory puts its focus on pragmatic, 
physical problem solving. In contrast, Sperber and Wilson’s theory puts the focus on solving the 
problem of relationship between utterances and interpretation. As such, the latter theory is more 
applicable to the field of study of my research. There have also been some improvements, 
clarifications in the theory, made, for example, by Andreas H. Jucker and Sharmaine Seneviratne. 
However, those details do not affect my application of basic principles of relevance theory 
developed by Sperber and Wilson. See Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, Relevance: 
Communication and Cognition, 2nd edn (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1986; repr. 1995); Roger 
Lindsay and Barbara Gorayska, ‘Relevance, Goal Management and Cognitive Technology’, in 
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from the ideal for explaining the problem of hermeneutic circle in biblical 
interpretation. However, combining the theory with the other two pillar theories 
in this thesis (theory of paradigms and literature) will prove suitable for the 
purpose of this thesis. 
2.3.1 SPERBER AND WILSON’S THEORY OF RELEVANCE AND KLINGLER’S 
CONTRIBUTION 
Just as Kuhnian and Bakhtinian theories have provided the ground for 
decentralisation of meaning (by their sensitivity to the widest possible view on 
the world, and to the undeveloped borders within the world, respectively), so will 
the theory of relevance provide the ground for centralisation of meaning (by 
making the reader sensitive to apparent constants in his/her world). In particular, 
it will be shown that my theory of meaning (which incorporates the theory of 
relevance) is, in its essence, a theory about constants (since relativity cannot be 
comprehended without the existence of constants). When this issue of constants is 
seen from the perspective of the relativity of meaning, some profound 
conclusions will be drawn -regarding the role of a given text (canonised 
according to the Bakhtinian theory)120 in the process of formulation and 
transmission of a religious paradigm. 
There are two main applications of the theory of relevance that I will be using in 
this thesis. Firstly, I will utilise the theory of relevance myself in order to develop 
criteria for analysis of a relevant source of information. Secondly, I will rework 
Klingler’s definitions of allusion and echo, and the criteria for analysing an 
                                                                                                                                
Cognition and Technology: Co-existence, Convergence and Co-evolution, ed. by Barbara 
Gorayska and Roger Lindsay, (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2004), pp. 63-107; Sharmaine 
Seneviratne, ‘The Relevance Theoretic Approach to Discourse Markers: A Unified Account?’ 
RCEAL, 11 (2005); Andreas H. Jucker, ‘The Discourse Marker Well: A Relevance-Theoretical 
Account ‘, JOP, 19 (1993), 435-52; Steve Nicolle, ‘In Defence of Relevance Theory: A Belated 
Reply to Gorayska and Lindsay, and Jucker’, JOP, 23 (1995), 677-81. Regarding criticism of 
circular reasoning within the theory of relevance, see for example Stephen C. Levinson, 'A 
Review of Relevance', Journal of Linguistics, 25 (1989), 455-72, p. 459. 
120 Regarding the Bakhtinian concept of canonisation utilised in this thesis see Sections 2.2.7 and 
2.2.9 above. 
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allusion, as they were developed by utilising the theory of relevance.121 However, 
firstly  the basics of the theory of relevance needs to be explained. 
2.3.1.1 The Basics of the Theory of Relevance 
The backbone of the theory of relevance is my seventh working presupposition in 
this thesis, as asserted in Section 1.5 above.  Namely, every person ‘automatically 
aims at the most efficient information processing possible.’122Arising from this 
main principle, three others have been formulated by Sperber and Wilson:  
1. ‘[A]n assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that its contextual 
effects in this context are large’. 123 Thus, the relevance of an assumption 
is directly proportional to its impact on the context in which the reasoning 
takes place.  
2. ‘[A]n assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that the effort 
required to process it in this context is small’.124 In other words, the 
relevance of a thought/concept/assumption is indirectly proportional to the 
effort required to process it. Thus, the most relevant statement will be the 
one that impacts the context in the most powerful way, whilst using the 
minimum of effort available for processing the information. 
3. The third principle arises when the previous two are used to define the 
phenomenon of the context, which, according to Sperber and Wilson’s 
definition, is ‘the set of premises used in interpreting an utterance’.125 The 
third principle is: In order for an utterance to be relevant to the previous 
utterance, it has to aim at narrowing the wider context in which the 
previous utterance was situated. 
                                                
121 I will approach the same issue but with a different methodology from Klingler’s. See Klingler, 
‘Validity in the Identification and Interpretation of a Literary Allusion in the Hebrew Bible’ 
(unpublished PhD Thesis, Dallas Theological Seminary, 2010), pp. 25-77. However, his 
conclusions are very helpful in order to bring clarity to the otherwise ambiguous terms. (See Ibid., 
p. 92.) I will also aim to show where our approaches differ and what the outcomes of the 
differences are. 
122 Sperber, p. 49. 
123 See ibid., p. 125. See also Klingler, p. 149. 
124 Sperber, p. 125. 
125 Ibid., p. 15.  
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The main effect of these three principles is the ‘ostensive-inferential 
communication’ which is the communication model consisting of the following 
three elements: ‘the informative intention’, ‘the communicative intention’ and 
‘the ostensive stimulus’. These elements are respectively: the author’s intention 
to inform the audience of something, the author’s intention to inform the 
audience of his/her informative intention and finally, the act of the author 
designed to attract the recipient’s attention and focus it on the author’s 
assumptions.126 
More precisely, the ostensive stimulus is defined as an act which does: firstly, 
attract the audience’s attention, and secondly, focus the attention on the 
communicator's intentions.127 Furthermore, the ostensive-inferential 
communication is defined as the process in which the communicator (i.e. author, 
utterer) produces a stimulus which makes it mutually manifest to communicator 
and audience that the communicator intends, by means of this stimulus, to make 
manifest or more manifest to the audience a set of assumptions.128  
How can this model of communication contribute to the Kuhnian theory of 
paradigms and the Bakhtinian theory of literature? On the one hand, from the 
representation of Kuhnian and Bakhtinian theories, in this Chapter, we have seen 
that our understanding of a text is always subject to the paradigm from within 
which we read the text, and therefore, the pragmatic, sociological and 
paradigmatic meanings are always perceived as unstable. On the other hand, the 
principles of relevance, highlighted here, present the process of reading/rendering 
the utterance as the process of narrowing the context in which the unstable 
meanings of the utterance are to be developed and stabilised in a given act of 
reading. 
In this sense whilst the first two theories increase the reader’s sensitivity to 
centrifugal forces in the process of communication (expanding the context of an 
                                                
126 Sperber, p. 63. 
127 Ibid., p. 153. 
128 Ibid., p. 63. 
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utterance) the theory of relevance will increase the reader’s sensitivity to 
centripetal forces in the same process. 
2.3.1.2 Klingler’s Application of the Theory of Relevance 
Sperber and Wilson originally formulated their theory working on the matter of 
metaphors. It was Klingler who applied their theory to his study of the allusion as 
a literary technique.129 However, Klingler has approached the issue of 
intertextuality in general and the allusions in particular through the analysis of 
historical development of hermeneutical ideas.130 This approach had the purpose 
of exposing the limitations of the vicious circle in dialogical hermeneutics.131 
Even though he is not the first to utilise that approach,132 his conclusions relating 
to the distinction between intertextual dependence and intertextual relation are 
profound. Namely, Klingler (following up Jan Pauline’s arguments,133 who draws 
on Merrill C. Tenney134 and John Hollander)135 argues that the difference 
between an echo and an allusion mirror the difference between two types of 
intertextuality: intertextual relation and intertextual dependence. For the purpose 
of this thesis, this difference between the two types of intertextuality is critical 
since the former type represents the dominant relations in the dialogical 
representation of the world, whilst the latter type of intertextuality represents the 
dominant relations in the non-dialogical representation of the world. Illustration 9 
below, created by Klingler,136 shows the relation between an echo and an allusion 
as the elements of two different types of intertextuality. 
 
 
                                                
129 See Klingler, pp. 149-58. 
130 See Chapter 2 of his PhD thesis, ibid., pp. 25-77. 
131 Ibid., pp. 11-15. 
132 Klingler himself follows-up extensively the work done by David West. (David West, An 
Introduction to Continental Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity, 1996).) See Klingler, pp. 93-94. 
133 Jon Paulien, ‘Elusive Allusions: The Problematic Use of the Old Testament in Revelation’, 
Biblical Research, 33 (1988), 37-53 (pp. 39-40). 
134 Merrill C. Tenney, Interpreting Revelation (Grand Rapids: MI: Eerdmans, 1957), p. 102. 
135 John Hollander, The Figure of Echo: A Mode of Allusion in Milton and After (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1981), p. 64. 
136 As taken from Klingler, p. 91. 
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Illustration 9: Klingler’s Intertextual Relation 
 
 
The illustration above juxtaposes two types of relations that are developed 
according to two types of reality, namely non-dialogical (on the left hand side), 
and dialogical (on the right hand side). On the right hand side of the illustration 
above, there is only one type of intertextual relations visualised, namely echo. 
The key point in Klingler’s thesis is that the intertextuality represented by an 
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echo is an intertextual relation and that it is the type studied in most of the 
research done in the field of intertextuality since the shift of the paradigms.137 
That research follows the basic presuppositions of the dialogic, decentralised, 
postpositivist paradigm and thus ends up being detached from ideas of 
objectiveness, author and authorial intention.  
This lack of objectiveness, especially in relation to the notion of the author is the 
principal aspect of the intertextual relation based on the twofold (both directions) 
orientation of the presupposed communication in which the echo is used, i.e. the 
communication developed along the type of relations that we have seen as being 
assumed by Bakhtinian understanding of the world. Thus, according to the 
dialogical presuppositions, the contemporary recipient is an active participant in 
the process of creating the meaning of echoes in the (biblical) text, (whilst this is 
never the case with allusions, as they are defined by Klingler).  
 In contrast, the intertextuality visualised on the left hand side in the illustration 
above, is intertextual dependence. Klingler argued that the research pointing to 
this type of intertextuality is very scarce, done only by the few who have 
recognised that our understanding of allusions (as a literary device) is a kind of a 
remedy to the biblical studies that are brought to a crisis by the trends of the 
reader-response methods. In order for the biblical studies to recover from the 
crisis, Klingler argued, more research is needed to be done in order to explore 
relations between the author, text and recipients, as the relations develop along 
the clear borders in the non-dialogical representation of the world.  
In accordance with this clear purpose of exploring the relations in the non-
dialogical world, Klingler argued that the common characteristic of reference, 
citation, quotation, paraphrase and allusion is that they are all only one direction 
oriented. This is to say all of them are used in a communication where a 
communicator points back to a text of an earlier time or to an earlier part of the 
same text.  
                                                
137 Klingler, pp. 92-94. 
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The difference between them is explained by Klingler’s definitions, as follows:138 
Literary reference is when an author makes a straightforward identifying mention 
of a person, place, or thing existing in another text with no intention for further 
connections to be drawn between the text doing the referring and the thing being 
referred to. Literary citation is a direct literary marker by which the author 
directly points the reader to the referenced text. Literary quotation is when an 
author of one text intentionally reproduces the exact words of another text. 
Literary paraphrase is when an author of one text intentionally reproduces the 
same meaning of the words of another text. Finally, literary allusion is a literary 
device utilised by an author whereby allusive textual markers are placed into the 
alluding text (i.e., developing literary context) in order to trigger meaning in a 
text previously alluded to (i.e., the stable meaning of a previous text) for the 
rhetorical function of importing that meaning into the alluding text in order to 
assist in  determining  the author’s intended meaning of the alluding text.139 
After clarifying these terms, Klingler applied the theory of relevance to the 
method of reading the Bible in general, and identifying and analysing an allusion, 
in particular. The method consists of the following steps:140 
a) Explanation of the developing textual meaning of the alluding text. 
b) Identification of markers (of literary allusion). 
c) Validation of the known (stable) contextual meaning of the alluded 
text. 
d) Explanation of the rhetorical function of the allusion.  
e) Explanation of meaning to be imported into the developing context of 
alluding text. 
                                                
138 Klingler, pp. 117-18. 
139 Ibid., p. 118. 
140 Ibid., p. 185. 
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It is important to note that, in order to apply these steps whilst reading a biblical 
text, the reader has to presuppose existence of the one-way dependence of the 
‘younger’ text on the ‘older text’. In addition, the reader has to assume clear 
borders between the texts, as well as, between the author, the voices in the text, 
and the recipient(s) of the text. Also, the reader has to focus on the realm of the 
given text only, as if the text existed in a cognitive vacuum, independent of the 
rest of the reader’s reality. Therefore, the reader has to adopt a very non-
dialogical and centralised understanding of the world.  
The classical problem with this method (used in isolation) is not in what it 
focuses on, but in what the method overlooks. Explained as the vicious circle of 
complied texts (in Section 1.3 above) the problem of narrowing the focus on only 
one centre of meaning in a non-dialogical concept of reality is that such an 
interpretation makes the other (four) centres recede from the reader’s view. More 
precisely, when the reader’s focus is narrowed to C – the compiled writings 
centre, all the other four fade out of his/her view. The other four are (as visualised 
in Illustration 7 above) A – the historical events and ideas in which the religious 
writings originated; B – the author(s) of the compiled texts; D – the text’s ancient 
first reader(s); E – its contemporary reader(s).  
Apart from this weakness of Klingler’s method used as part of the non-dialogical 
paradigm, I argue that the method is still useful in regards, at least, the following 
two matters. Firstly, regarding the issue of rhetoric, Klingler argues, that the 
possible rhetorical functions of an allusion are:141 
a) Metaphoric (B≈A in terms of class or type). ‘This is like that.’ 
b) Validation (B=A in terms of fulfilment or implementation). ‘This is 
that.’ 
c) Ironic (B≠A in terms of failure). ‘This is NOT like that!’ 
d) Climactic (B>A). ‘This is better than that.’ 
                                                
141 Klingler. 
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e) Emblematic (B<A). ‘This is not as good as that.’ 
By this differentiation, Klingler asserts that even in such a centralised, non-
dialogical understanding of the world and the relations in it, one can be sensitive 
(at least to a certain degree) to rhetorical features of a text.  
Secondly, regarding the issue of the literary studies, Klingler’s method 
contributes to our understanding of how a rather philosophical/psychological 
theory of relevance can be applied to a literary theory. In particular, Klingler had 
to adapt the basic principles of relevance so that they can be utilised in his 
research focused on the ‘distant text’, that is, on the text the author is alluding to, 
by utilising the analysed allusion.142 Thus, Klingler has restated the first principle 
of relevance as: the ‘[e]xtent condition 1: A distant text is relevant in an author’s 
context to the extent that the distant text’s contextual effects are large.’ 
Accordingly, ‘the extent condition 2 is restated as follows: A distant text is 
relevant in an author’s context to the extent that the effort required to process the 
distant text is small.’ 143  
In Klingler’s thesis, the purpose of adaptations of the original theory was to apply 
the relevance theory in biblical studies within a non-dialogical concept of the 
world. In contrast, the purpose of my thesis is to develop a theory of meaning in 
accordance with a dialogical concept of the world. Because of this difference, I 
need to address some points to Klingler’s approach, before I rework some of 
Klingler’s definitions. 
2.3.1.3 A Response to Klingler’s Approach 
It is important to note that Klingler does not devote much attention to the 
difference between reader-response methods (like the one promoted by Stanley 
Fish, for example)144 and dialogical methods (like the one promoted by 
                                                
142 Klingler, p. 149. 
143 The italics are the author’s. 
144 Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980). See Klingler, pp. 35, 72, 73. 
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Bakhtinian scholars in biblical studies, Carol Newsom, for example).145 
Conversely, scholars aiming to utilise a dialogical, decentralised approach (or a 
variation on it) tend to clarify that difference, as, for example, Hulisani 
Ramantswana has done.146 
My understanding of this lack of the attention to the difference between reader-
response methods and dialogical methods, is caused by the specific approach 
Klingler had when addressing the issue of the shift of paradigms. Tracing the 
development of hermeneutical ideas (tracking the way in which Georg Hans 
Gadamer, Stanley Fish, Umberto Eco, Richard Rorty and Paul Ricoeur in recent 
history have followed in the footsteps of Renè Descartes (1596-1650), David 
Hume (1711-76), Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Johann Gottfried von Herder 
(1744-1803), G.W. Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-
1900), Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832), 
and Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher (1768-1834), etc.) throughout the history of 
philosophy is a very interesting exercise. However, tracing the choice previous 
scholars/philosophers have made does not necessarily clarify the reasons for the 
choice. The outcomes of the choice are not a revelation considering that the shift 
took place half a century ago. But claiming that the philosophers in the trenches 
on the other side of the frontline are irresponsible and lacking honourable 
intentions147 is an even older undertaking.  
Therefore, my understanding is that Klingler’s attempt to address the 
‘honourability’ of Fish’s method of approach is, out of the sphere of biblical 
studies, then at least not a solution to the problem. This falling short of the ideal 
solution (and approach, I would argue) is also pointed out by Klingler himself.148 
                                                
145 Carol Newsom, ‘Bakhtin, the Bible and Dialogic Truth’, JR, 76 (1996), 290-306. 
146 Ramantswana, ‘God Saw that It was Good, not Perfect: A Canonical-Dialogic Reading of 
Genesis 1-3’ (unpublished PhD Thesis, Westminster Theological Seminary, 2010), p. 72. 
147 See, for example, the following statement: ‘If Stanley Fish would only come clean about the 
possibility of literary knowledge, he would see that the only honourable course would be to admit 
that the truth of the meaning is right there in the text, to be discovered by reading the author’s 
words … This is to say, words mean things. Therefore, textual meaning is both determinable and 
able to be validated!’ (Klingler, p. 73.) 
148 In his own words: ‘What this approach will not do is eliminate all the existing disagreements. 
In fact, it may not eliminate any existing disagreements. What it will do, however, is reveal the 
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To avoid such a narrow view when analysing the trends in biblical studies, one 
has to take into consideration the concept of paradigms, as I have done in this 
thesis. Additionally, I am following up Kuhn’s presentation of the reasons for 
misunderstandings between people ‘operating’ in conflicting paradigms, as well 
as Abram’s, Barton’s and finally Klingler’s149 arguments in their respective fields 
of research, as presented above. In particular, Kuhn has clarified the 
incommensurability of paradigms from within which the two groups of scholars 
approach the biblical text (the group that assumes the world as being non-
dialogical, in contrast to the group that assumes this world as being dialogical). 
Furthermore, Barton (following up Abrams’ suggestions) has clarified how our 
presuppositions regarding the relation between the text and the world, affect our 
reading of the text. Finally, here I will follow up Klingler’s point that the 
relevance theory can be applied to the analysis of rhetorical functions of a text.  
2.3.2 APPLICATION OF THE RELEVANCE THEORY TO THE CENTRES OF MEANING 
In order to follow-up the previously analysed theories, I need to reformulate the 
relevance principles so that they become suitable for focusing on the possible 
centres of meaning in a theological enquiry. This I will do this by starting from 
the previously introduced five centres of meaning and their images in a given text 
(as in Illustration 8 above). Thus, the vicious circle in biblical interpretation (as it 
is perceived in the dialogical concept of the world) is summarised as a 
competition of canonised images in a given text, in which the images compete for 
the reader’s attention.  
To illustrate, I choose to use the same example of the intermingling chronotopes 
in Deuteronomy 31-34 (as I did in Section 2.2.2 above). Which representation of 
time and space should I as the reader find the most relevant when reading 
Deuteronomy 32? Is the Moses’ (‘internal’) image of world and time (related to 
                                                                                                                                
true source of disagreement between interpreters that lead to their disagreement over the 
interpretation of a literary allusion.’ Klingler, p. 185. This plan of Klingler’s seems to be much 
more viable, compared to the one from the previous quotation, seemingly aimed at Fisher 
personally. 
149 Klingler has also pointed to the probability of the solution being found in focusing on the 
issues of centres of meaning or context (Ibid., pp. 189-91.) 
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his soon death) more relevant than the (internal) image of the Israelite who 
comments on the fact that Moses’ tomb has never been found (Deuteronomy 
34.6)? Also, the reader has to choose between those internal chronotopes and the 
formal chronotope represented by the combination of all those internal 
chronotopes in the given form of the Pentateuch. I as the reader have no access to 
the author’s external chronotope, that is the reality as he/she experienced, but 
only to the images the author has authorised (and canonised) by the given text. 
Therefore, the interpretation is a matter of evaluating the relevance of competing 
canonised representations of reality.  
This reality of competitive images is even more complicated than the 
intermingling chronotopes within a given text. Namely, in Bakhtinian 
representation of reality non-textual centres of meaning are able to provide their 
images of reality. Thus, all five centres of meaning offer their competitive 
images. Moreover, in line with the Kuhnian representation of reality, every 
ritualised artefact is a visible manifestation of a master narrative and indirectly of 
a paradigm. So which narrative, from which centre of meaning am I as the reader 
supposed to identify as the master narrative? Which paradigm should I perceive 
as the one conveyed by the given text that I as the reader have in front of me? 
To answer these questions, I need to reformulate Klingler’s principles of 
relevance to fit my definition of context. As stated in Section 1.1 above, the 
context is a person’s cognitive sphere of presuppositions related to 
communication in general and a specific utterance in particular. The 
presuppositions are concerned with relations of relevance between the utterance 
and one or more centres of meaning of the utterance.  
Stemming from the axiom that all persons ‘automatically aim at the most efficient 
information processing possible’, the three principles of relevance should thus 
read: 
A centre of meaning/source of information is relevant in a reader’s context to the 
extent that contextual effects of the centre of meaning are large. 
	
	
	
117	
A centre of meaning is relevant in a reader’s context to the extent that the effort 
required to access/process the centre of meaning is small. 
In order for an utterance stemming from a centre of meaning to be relevant to the 
previous utterance, it has to aim at narrowing the wider context in which the 
previous utterance was processed to be situated. 
Thus, I conclude that a definition of relevance, for the purpose of this research is: 
a measure of effectiveness of an utterance to narrow the wider context in which 
the previous utterance was processed to be situated. 
Furthermore, Wilson and Sperber have argued that there are only three conditions 
under which an assumption is valued as irrelevant: 
(1) The assumption may contribute new information, but this 
information does not connect up with any information 
present in the context. 
(2) The assumption is already present in the context and its 
strength is unaffected by the newly present information; 
this newly presented information is therefore entirely 
uninformative and, a fortiori, irrelevant. 
(3) The assumption is inconsistent with the context and is too 
weak to upset it; processing the information thus leaves 
the context unchanged.150  
According to the purpose of this thesis, these conditions can be reformulated in 
the context of the relevance of centres of meaning, so that they read as follows; a 
centre of meaning is valued as irrelevant if: 
1. The centre of meaning may contribute new information, but this 
information does not connect up with any information gathered 
from a(nother) centre of meaning that has already been evaluated as 
relevant. 
2. The centre of meaning could be a priori evaluated as relevant 
according to the reader’s basic presuppositions, but the information 
collected from the centre of meaning is already present in another 
                                                
150 Sperber, p. 121. 
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centre of meaning already valued as relevant. This newly presented 
centre of meaning is therefore entirely uninformative and, a fortiori, 
irrelevant. 
3. The centre of meaning could not be a priori evaluated as relevant 
according to the reader’s basic presuppositions, and the information 
collected from the centre of meaning is too weak to upset the 
reader’s basic presuppositions; processing the information from this 
centre of meaning thus leaves the presuppositions unchanged. 
Note how the style of the language used in Wilson and Sperber’s description of 
this third condition of irrelevance is very similar to the language Kuhn has used 
in order to describe irritants of a paradigm that (the irritants) tend to grow into 
anomalies of the paradigm that (the irritants) would, ultimately, so upset the 
person/community within that paradigm that the person/community will pursue 
change of basic presuppositions entertained in the paradigm resulting in a shift of 
paradigms in order to avoid the irritating distress. (Conversely, if an irritant is too 
weak to grow into an upsetting anomaly¸ a shift of paradigms will not take place, 
with the person/community remaining in the current paradigm with the existing 
set of basic presuppositions, and their always present, but weak, distressing 
irritants.)  
I argue that this similarity in language style, points to the compatibility of the two 
theories (i.e. the theory of paradigms, and the theory of relevance) and 
accordingly makes it possible to combine the two theories. However, before 
using the theory of relevance in order to develop a comprehensive method for 
reading the biblical text, a further reworking of the definitions in the relevance 
theory needs to be done. 
2.3.3 REWORKING KLINGLER’S DEFINITIONS 
First of all, in my opinion, Klingler was not interested in non-literary allusions 
(since he did not approach the issue from the point of view of multiple centres of 
meaning). Consequently, Klingler’s limited approach to the issue of meaning, 
makes reworking of Klingler’s definitions an essential prerequisite for using the 
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definitions in combination with the theory of paradigms and the Bakhtinian 
criticism (i.e. in accordance with the purpose of this thesis). 
The first of the definitions affected is intertextuality itself. Whilst it is helpful to 
know what the pitfalls of an extremely decentralised approach are, Klingler’s 
definition does not provide an explanation for those phenomena which 
intertextuality in general aims to explain. Namely, as seen from Bakhtinian 
theory, intertextuality (in its broader sense) tends to be sensitive to the multiple 
relations between an utterance and the rest of the world. Klingler’s definition of 
intertextuality (and its subcategories) is just not capable of appropriating that kind 
of sensitivity to different contexts, from and between my five centres of meaning, 
i.e. A - the historical events and ideas in which the religious writings originated; 
B - the author(s) of the compiled texts; C - the compiled writings; D – the text’s 
ancient first recipient(s); E - its contemporary recipient(s). For the sake of clarity 
in this field of study, I suggest the relations between an utterance and other 
contexts to be called intercontextuality (instead of intertextuality), simply because 
the essence of the problem is not the meaning between texts, but in/stability of a 
meaning between multiple contexts. 
However, if the relation of a (monophonic) dependence is in a written context, it 
is called intertextuality. Thus, intertextuality still takes place in the context of two 
parts of the same text, or between two texts, with dependence markers pointing to 
a previous part of the same text or to a text from an earlier time. 
Concerning the next two terms, two types of inter(con)textuality, which Klinger 
suggests be called intertextual dependence and intertextual relation, are not 
precise enough, since both of the names signify relation (dependence being a kind 
of relation as well). Even though the broader view on intertextuality presupposes 
a bi-directional relationship (interrelations), I argue that this lack of clarity in 
terminology is not the main problem, but just the outcome thereof, whereas the 
main problem is the multiplicity of centres of meaning. The phenomenon of 
multiple centres of meaning makes many contexts available as potential contexts 
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for a developing meaning to be stabilised or destabilised, leaving the reader 
(recipient of the utterance) with ambiguity regarding the developing meaning.  
As explained in Chapter 1 above, I recognise textual, pragmatic, sociological and 
paradigmatic context, and the difference between them as a cognitive path of 
decentralisation (from the narrowest textual to the widest paradigmatic context) 
and centralisation in the opposite direction. At the same time, I recognise that 
only the textual meaning is stable. In contrast, pragmatic, sociological and 
paradigmatic meanings are not stable. Because of this instability, these meanings 
are always developing from one context to another. 
The vicious problem is, thus, not that the direction of relationship utilised by an 
allusion and an echo is different, but that the relationships an echo utilises leave 
the allusive context broad enough for the contextual meaning to remain vague 
and unstable (since, by definition, they do not have allusive markers). 
Conversely, as was successfully argued and clarified by Klingler, an allusion’s 
allusive markers narrow the context of possible meanings so much that there is 
only one (most relevant) context with its contextual meaning which the allusion 
demands be imported from the alluded context.  
This narrowing of the context is achieved by the author’s ostensive stimulus, i.e. 
the act of the author designed to attract the recipient’s attention and focus it on 
the author’s assumptions. In the terms of the Bakhtinian dialogism, this act of 
making the ostensive stimulus is in fact, the author’s act of canonisation of the 
utterance. The act consists of developing specific accents in the utterance so that 
the utterance becomes directed towards another utterance, as it fits the author’s 
intention. 
In these terms, both the dialogical theory of literature and the theory of relevance 
perceive the nature of the relevance of utterance as based upon the markers of the 
direction of the utterance. These markers of the direction, although differently 
named, are the same. For the sake of clarity, from here on, I will use the term 
dependence markers.  
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Accordingly, I suggest that the term intertextual dependence is changed to 
relation of monophonic dependence, since there is only one dominant relation of 
dependence emphasised by the dependence markers and thus also only one 
delineated stable meaning that is resembled in the developing meaning of the 
alluding text. Accordingly, I suggest, the term ‘intertextual relation’ should be 
changed to ‘relation of polyphonic dependence’ since the essence of the problem 
is that the echo continues to resemble many stable meanings, and not just one, as 
is the case with an allusion.  
Finally, since both an allusion and an echo contain allusive markers to the 
utterances in the rest of the world (so well argued by Bakhtin), it is not the 
presence of them that cause an allusion to be an allusion, but the quantity and 
quality of them, whereas allusive markers in allusions narrow the possible 
contexts much more effectively. Thus, I suggest the markers be called 
‘dependence markers’ (and not ‘allusive markers’ since all of them are allusive 
and directed to something already contained in the utterances already having been 
used in the world). Accordingly, dependence markers are defined as markers in a 
text which point to previous parts of the same text or in some other text(s) so that 
the metaphysical aspect of the paradigm can be further utilised. In this sense, the 
dependence markers are indeed the markers of cognitive gravity. 
Since the rest of Klingler’s definitions concern the literary elements and 
techniques utilising a stable meaning, this change of approach to the issue has not 
affected the definitions suggested by Klingler. Therefore, I suggest an adaptation 
of Klingler’s illustration, as shown in Illustration 10, below. 
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Illustration 10: Adaptation of Klingler’s Intertextual Relation: 
Intercontextuality 
 
The right column in the illustration above represents every possible utterance, 
whilst only some utterances qualify to be represented by the left column in the 
illustration. In other words, every utterance echoes many other utterances (in line 
with Bakhtinian dialogism). Thus, an utterance containing an allusion will also 
always echo many other utterances. But, in the case of an allusion, the alluding 
utterance will, simultaneously, allude to only one utterance (validated as the most 
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relevant utterance), and thus demand importation of meaning from the alluded 
utterance to the alluding one (in line with the theory of relevance). 
Thus, every analysis of intercontextuality must include: 
1. Analysis of the developing meaning of an utterance by every part of the 
utterance being accounted for as of the highest relevance (by validating 
that every part of the utterance is the most relevant for the narrowing 
context). 
2. Cognition of the narrowing plethora of stable contexts which could 
accommodate the developing meaning of the analysed utterance (based on 
the meanings from the stable contexts which resemble the developing 
meaning) 
3. Cognition of a presence of – or lack of dependence markers in the 
analysed utterance and thus concluding if there is a single most relevant 
utterance on which the developing meaning would be exclusively 
dependent and stabilised accordingly, or that the resemblance between the 
developing meaning and the plethora of stable meanings (narrowed but 
still being a set of more than one stable meaning) is based on the 
polyphonic dependence where the developing meaning echoes two or 
more stable meanings and yet remains unstable. 
4. In the case of the presence of dependence markers in the analysed 
utterance, cognition of the dependent relation takes place. 
5. Stabilising the developing meaning according to the recognised relation of 
(monophonic) dependence. 
2.3.4 CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS OF MY APPLICATION OF THE RELEVANCE 
THEORY 
The potential of the theory of relevance, as applied to the method of analysis of 
an allusion, has already been well argued in Klingler’s research presented above. 
But, when the same theory is applied to the issue of competing centres of 
meaning (especially in literary and/or biblical studies) there are profound 
implications which are not apparent. I present them as follows: 
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1. Different paradigms require the reader to raise a different set of questions 
regarding the given text. In the context of these questions, the three 
principles of relevance, when applied to the issue of the relevance of five 
centres of meaning, require the reader to prioritise the text as the most 
relevant centre of meaning.  
2. At the same time, valuing one centre of meaning (i.e. any one of the five 
centres available) as the most relevant does not necessarily make all the 
other centres of meaning irrelevant. Quite the opposite, the three 
principles of the theory of relevance, being applied to the issue of the 
centres of meaning, as presented above, point to graded relevancy. 
According to the first two principles of relevancy, the reader will evaluate 
and select his/her choice of the next most relevant information available. 
In addition, according to especially the third principle of relevancy, the 
reader will evaluate and select the next most relevant centre of meaning 
available.  
Before moving on to the next, fourth point, I need to further adapt 
Illustration 8 above. The conclusions drawn at this stage affect our 
understanding of the centres of meaning, as envisioned on that illustration. 
Accordingly, Illustration 11 below, visually clarifies the graded relevancy 
of the five centres of meaning. 
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Illustration 11: Centres of Meaning after Application of Bakhtinian- and 
Relevance Theory Combined 
 
 
On the illustration above, the difference between the capital and small 
letters of the centres of meaning is meant to represent the graded relevancy of the 
respective centres. Accordingly, it is images (of the world, the ancient author, 
first recipients and of the contemporary recipients) that the Scriptures are meant 
to develop and transmit to its recipients.  
Accordingly, the difference between the real world, author, recipients and the 
biblical images of the world, author, and recipients, is a matter of a personal 
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choice of faith within the given interpretative paradigm. In other words, there will 
always be a gap between the images and the real world, author, and recipients. 
Those gaps are rarely within the limits of a scientific enquiry. In those cases, the 
gaps are a matter of faith and belief.  
For example, if I, as the reader, presuppose that the image of the world 
(developed by the Scriptures) is relevant to me, in terms that it is prescriptive for 
my own image/vision of the world, my faith will lead me to prefer the belief 
wherein the difference between the image and the world is very small or non-
existent (such as, for example, the fundamental belief in the orthodox movement 
in Judaism, which holds that not just the written Torah was given at Sinai, but 
also the whole of the oral Torah. Consequently, everything in the Torah is a 
mirror of reality, since it was handed down directly from God). Conversely, if I, 
as the reader, presuppose that the biblical image of the world is irrelevant to me, 
because it is not descriptive of my own image/vision of the world, my faith (or 
lack of it?) will lead me prefer the belief which supports the difference between 
the image and the world is great or huge (such as any of the set of beliefs 
characteristic for any more liberal movement in Judaism, or branch of 
Christianity).151 
3. Different paradigms direct the reader towards different questions 
regarding the given text. In those terms, only the textual meaning is 
stable, whilst the other three meanings are subject to the reader’s 
perception of the context with which the utterance is associated. In those 
terms the process of comprehending the unstable meanings is a subjective 
process within the vicious circle of reasoning, based on the principles of 
relevance.  
4. However, the principles of relevance explain the potential for the process 
to become non-circular. The potential is based on the intensity of the 
                                                
151 For example, Cyril Rodd entertains presuppositions about extreme distance between the world 
of the Bible and ours (See Rodd, Glimpses of a Strange Land). Consequently, the otherness and 
even more the oddity of the world of the Bible leaves no room for prescriptive features of the 
glimpses of images of the world we might find in the Bible. There are, however, other ways to 
entertain presuppositions regarding a huge gap between the real world and the biblical image of 
the world. I will analyse them in Section 3.7.2 below. 
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ostensive stimulus of the utterance. In Bakhtinian terms, the same effect is 
the effect of the direction of the utterance developed by the accents 
canonised in the utterance. In Kuhnian terms, the effect is in fact the 
irritant (either challenging or frustrating) which forces the reader to 
reconsider his/her paradigm in accordance with the cognitive gravity in 
which the reader is caught. In the terms of my rendering of the Klingler’s 
definition, this potential is based on the dependence markers in the text, 
which direct the reader towards other texts according to which the reader 
should appropriate the changeable meanings of the text. This is why 
dependence markers are indeed markers of cognitive gravity. 
5. Furthermore, if an utterance alludes to another utterance, it means that, for 
the speaker/writer of the alluding utterance, the alluded utterance is has 
stable meaning. In that case, if the reader/recipient has not yet recognised 
the alluded reference as one with the stable meaning, he/she should return 
to the alluded utterance and investigate the dependence markers in the 
alluded utterance so that the utterance becomes an utterance with a stable 
meaning for the reader/recipient, as well. Thus, for example, if an 
utterance in the Bible alludes to Genesis 1-3 (as I will argue in case of the 
‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif) it is a clear sign that, for the author of the 
alluding text, the alluded utterance (in this case Genesis 1-3) was 
perceived as having the most stable meaning and of the highest relevance 
for developing the meaning of his/her (alluding) utterance.  
6. Finally, I can illustrate the relations between the utterance and the 
paradigm to which the reader is directed by the dependence markers in the 
given text. Illustration 12 below, provides a visual representation of the 
relation between different forms of utterances and the image of a 
paradigm in which the utterances operate and carry their meanings. 
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Illustration 12: The Master Narrative as the Centre of Cognitive Gravity 
 
 
The illustration above visualises the process of reading in which, the reader is 
drawn by assurance of the master narrative regarding improvements of the 
current state of affairs in the world and time of the reader. This attraction 
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draws the reader’s mindset towards the master narrative as the centre of 
cognitive gravity (represented in the illustration above by the arrows). In this 
process, the reader perceives other utterances as being closer or wider from 
the master narrative. This apparent distance is based on the reader’s 
perception of markers of dependence of those other utterances on the master 
narrative. The image of the paradigm with its impression of metaphysical 
presuppositions, community, and concrete problem solutions all make up the 
reader’s cognitive universe. Every utterance is expected to be part of the 
universe and gravitate around the master narrative. 
7. Any failure to meet this expectation is perceived as an irritant. The irritant 
likewise has its field of gravity. However, that field of gravity is perceived 
as weaker than the field of gravity of the master narrative in case the 
irritant’s challenge is perceived as challenging and not frustrating. (I.e. 
only the reader’s motivation, intention and aim are challenged, in contrast 
to his/her intact mindset, worldview or paradigm). In other words, the 
reader believes that with more improvements of his/her motivation, 
intention and aim, the field of gravity of the irritant will become weaker. 
In this sense, improvements of the aim (within the reader’s paradigm) will 
confirm the magnetism of the reader’s master narrative. 
8. In contrast, there are situations when improvements to the reader’s goal 
do not weaken the irritant’s field of gravity. In other words, the 
phenomenon of the irritant still promises improvements of the state of 
affairs in the reader’s world and time, even when all the possible 
improvements in the reader’s paradigm seem already to have been made. 
More precisely, the irritant becomes intolerably frustrating by the lure of 
its promises, even after the current paradigm of the reader seems to be 
totally exploited. In this case, the reader is drawn to the irritant as the new 
master narrative. Then, a reorganisation of the cognitive universe of the 
reader takes place, this time with the new master narrative at its centre. 
This process is in fact a merging of the theory of relevance and theory of 
dialogism according to the Kuhnian theory of paradigms. In Kuhnian 
terms, as explained in Sections 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 above, this process is as it 
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were a sequence of the three possible relations between paradigms: 
tolerance, clash and finally a ban of the losing paradigm. 
Eventually, one of the paradigms is ruled out for the sake of the ‘winning’ 
(most convincing) paradigm, where the latter is validated as explaining 
the world in a simpler, more coherent, more detailed and, thus, a better 
way.  
For the sake of feasibility in presentation, Illustration 12 above visualises 
only the simplified form of the ongoing process of weighing various 
paradigms. Thus, only the outcome of the process is presented, according 
to which the master narrative is a formulation of the winning (most 
convincing) paradigm.  
9. In addition, if the utterance does not have a discernible master narrative 
and its paradigm, the utterance loses all of the intrinsic attributes of an 
utterance (change of speaking subjects, finalisation of the utterance, 
expressive aspect of the utterance, addressivity of every utterance and 
personal proximity of the addressee to the author, as well as direction of 
the utterance) as explained in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.7 above. Without 
these features the utterance ceases to be an utterance. Simply put, a 
literary utterance without a relation to a master narrative (and the 
paradigm of which the master narrative is the most critical formulation) is 
an oxymoron.  
10. Furthermore, according to Bakhtinian dialogism, the master narrative is 
the utterance which is a constituent part of a larger utterance (thus a sub-
utterance) and which presents a worldview in the most feasible way in the 
utterance, so that other constituent sub-utterances within the utterance 
borrow their meaning from the master narrative. In this sense, recognising 
an utterance as the master narrative is a process based on centralisation to 
smallest sub-utterances and decentralisation to the largest utterances and 
their images of paradigms.  
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11. Along the process of centralisation and decentralisation, the reader’s 
mindset, aim, intention and motivation is caught in the strongest field of 
gravity of the utterances he/she perceives.  
12. This concept of developing meanings within the cognitive universe of the 
reader is the basis for my theory of meaning. In what follows, I will use 
the tools presented in this Chapter and develop my theory of meaning and 
a model of the theory. After, I will apply the theory of meaning to reading 
the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif in Exodus 16. 
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CHAPTER 3: INTERPRETATIVE RELATIVITY – A THEORY AND A 
MODEL 
This Chapter is the second section of the method part of this thesis. The purpose 
of this Chapter is to develop my theory of meaning, model of the theory, and a 
method based on the theory and the model. I plan to do it by means of the five 
steps: firstly, I will reconsider my concept of relations between the five centres of 
meaning, secondly, I will reconsider some of the models for theories of meaning, 
thirdly, I will develop my model for the theory of meaning and finalise my theory 
of interpretative relativity, fourthly, I will reconsider different approaches to the 
Bible with focus on changes which took place from the Age of Enlightenment to 
the present. Fifthly, I will present my method based on the zoom lens model for 
my theory of meaning. 
3.1 RELATIONS BETWEEN CENTRES OF MEANING 
Earlier in this thesis (See Illustration 7 above), I developed a modified Barton’s 
centres of meaning with the following five centres: A - the historical events and 
ideas in which the religious writings originated; B - the author(s) of the compiled 
texts; C - the compiled writings; D – the text’s ancient first recipient(s); E - its 
contemporary recipient(s). 
To visualise all the possible relations between the C centre and the other four 
centres of meaning (A, B, D, E), I will add five more details to illustration 7 
above. The additional details are: firstly, I have visualised the position of the 
camera, secondly, I have assigned different colours to each of the five centres of 
meaning, and thirdly, I have assigned corresponding colours to the links which 
present relations between them. By introducing the colour-coded system in 
Illustration 13 below, I can visualise the difference between relations of relevance 
in the field of cognitive gravity and relations of dependence. In the illustration 
below, black lines represent potential relevance, which denotes the reader’s 
openness to experience the field of cognitive gravity surrounding a given centre 
of meaning. In contrast, colour-coded lines represent potential dependence, which 
denotes the reader’s experience of the gravity. Consequently, all relations among 
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the centres of meaning are relations of relevance. In contrast, only those relations 
which the reader perceives as attractive are labelled as the relations of 
dependence. 
  
Illustration 13: Angle of View, Centres of Meaning, and Relations within the 
Field of Cognitive Gravity  
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There are two more details (in addition to the previous three) in the illustration 
above that need clarification. Thus, fourthly, all but one of the centres of meaning 
are labelled as an ‘image’ of a given centre of meaning. I did this in line with my 
conclusions from Section 2.3.4 above and Illustration 11, when I analysed the 
effect which the theory of relevance and the theory of literature have on my 
concept of the centres of meaning. According to those conclusions, the 
Illustration 13 above represents a vision of reality as it is perceived by the reader 
(e.g. a ‘vision’ or an ‘image’ of reality, rather than the reality itself). 
In contrast, the only centre whose name does not follow the pattern is the C – 
centre, the Text, which is the only one the contemporary reader does not perceive 
as an image. An ‘image’ here is, as asserted before, a subjective comprehension 
and depiction of reality. The reason for not labelling the C centre in the 
illustration above as an image is because the text, seen from the recipient’s angle 
of view is not an image, but an artefact. In other words, when the text is looked at 
or heard it is perceived as a real, concrete utterance (not an image). 
Fifthly, the final adjustment to the Barton’s centres of meaning I have made in 
the illustration above is that I adjusted the positions of the centres, so that each of 
them is at least partially visible from every other centre of meaning.  The next 
step in the development of my theory of meaning and the corresponding model, is 
to visualise the concept of context as a person’s cognitive sphere of 
presuppositions related to communication in general and a specific utterance in 
particular. How does that concept of context relate to the relations between the 
five centres of meaning?  
In Illustration 14 below, I am adding context spheres (i.e. spheres of relevance). 
These spheres are illustrated by circles of different radius, with their common 
centre in C centre of meaning. For the sake of clarity, I have omitted the lines 
representing potential relevance presented on the previous illustration. 
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Illustration 14: Angle of View with Different Contexts 
 
 
The reason for centralising the context spheres in the C centre of meaning is the 
same as in Illustrations 8 and 11 above. Namely, the text centre has the only 
stable meaning, i.e. the textual meaning. From the textual meaning, which is 
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perceived as a fact, the reader expands the context from the smallest utterances to 
the biggest in order to comprehend the pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic 
meanings of the text. In the process of decentralisation, the reader’s intention is to 
find irritants which will attract his/her attention by their promise of improving the 
state of affairs in the reader’s world and time. In that sense, the irritants have a 
field of cognitive gravity around them. The same field of gravity is perceived as 
attracting utterances from other centres of meaning to develop their pragmatic, 
sociological and paradigmatic meanings by importing the context from the 
irritants. In this sense, the other utterances are perceived as dependent on the 
irritant with the strongest field of cognitive gravity. 
If the irritant is found by reading the C – text centre of meaning, the reader will 
continue reading, since the text is perceived as having sufficient appeal to invest 
the effort of reading. In contrast, if no irritant is found in the text which 
challenges the status quo in the reader’s world and time, the reader will simply 
dismiss the text, since the text is not worth the effort of reading it. 
Accordingly, if there were any utterances which the reader has found challenging, 
the reader will continue investing in the reading process by following the clues of 
dependence, as suggested by Klingler’s adaptation of the theory of relevance (see 
Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 above). 
By following the clues of dependence (i.e. clues of the force of gravity), the 
reader is directed towards other irritants and their fields of cognitive gravity.  
These other irritants, in this case, set the context in which the initial text is 
perceived (i.e. the other irritants ‘situate’ the initial text). This new context 
(sphere of relevance) has possibly then shifted its centre from C centre of 
meaning to any of the other four, according to the attraction the reader has 
experienced when trying to comprehend the reading of the text. 
This is my theory of meaning developed thus far. To develop it further, I will 
now compare and contrast some of the recently proposed models for theories of 
meaning, in relation to the paradigms in which they were used. By this 
comparison (in the following two Sections of this Chapter), I plan to take the 
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second step towards fulfilling the purpose of this Chapter. This comparison will 
show the direction which the development of my model of theory of meaning 
needs to take. 
3.2 PARADIGM ENQUIRIES AND HERMENEUTICAL MODELS 
The purpose of this Section is to show a new hermeneutical model which could 
explain hermeneutical issues as issues of centralisation and decentralisation of 
meaning. First, I will present four major paradigms and compare them on the 
basis of their presuppositions regarding centralisation of meaning.  
3.2.1 DIFFERENT PARADIGM ENQUIRIES 
There have been four major interpretative paradigms since the nineteenth century, 
each having a turn to be the dominant wave in the world in general, and in the 
western world in particular: positivist, constructivist, critical, and post/structural 
paradigms. Even though they do coexist, one can still recognise the dominant 
paradigm at a given time and historical location.1  
The main difference between all the paradigms however, are the expectations and 
claims they place on the human enquiry. In the positivistic paradigm the main 
expectation can be described as prediction. This is because there is an assumption 
of the existence of that reality which can be quantified, measured, and 
categorised. Consequently, the main agenda of the human enquiry in the 
positivistic paradigm is to quantify, measure, and categorise its subject, and, 
accordingly, predict results of future measurements. In comparison, the 
interpretative paradigm (often named as constructivist paradigm) claims an 
understanding of the construction of reality as its main agenda (i.e. investigating 
what factors affect our limited and subjective perception of reality).  Furthermore, 
                                                
1 Thus, Patti Lather and Elizabeth A. Pierre distinguished positivism with August Conte (1778-
1857); social constructivism with Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966); emancipatory 
paradigms with Frankfurt school and the social movements in 1960’s and 1970’s; and the post 
paradigms mainly with critiques proposed by Michael Foucault (1926-1984), Jacques Derida 
(1930-2004), and Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995). One can, of course, argue for different 
representatives of the initial propagators of the paradigm shifts, but there is a general consensus 
about the shifts that have taken place. See Patti Lather, Getting Lost: Feminist Efforts toward a 
Double(D) Science,  (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2007), p. 164. 
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the critical paradigm prioritises the ideological critique of inequities of all types. 
Finally, the poststructural (often called postmodern) paradigm claims that 
interrupting and restructuring established ‘binaries’ is the purpose of human 
enquiry. 
By binaries here, I mean the philosophical opposition of two related terms or 
concepts that are opposite in meaning. Whilst these binaries served as the basic 
elements in, for instance, structuralist linguistics (by claiming that meaning of a 
phenomenon can only be understood in terms of its opposite, i.e. what the term is 
not), poststructuralism rejects them, and even more, deconstructs them. The 
following Illustration 15 below, visualises the paradigm shifts that took place.2 
 
Illustration 15: Different Paradigm Enquiries 
 
 
In the illustration above, I have drawn attention to the first two lines in the 
illustration, i.e. the explanation of the focus of enquiry within the paradigm, and 
the most usual name for the paradigm. However, the most crucial detail in the 
illustration is the break between the critical and postmodern/poststructural 
paradigm. The outcome of the agenda of the poststructural paradigm is an 
essential difference in the type, and not just the focus of human enquiry, as used 
to be the case in the previous shifts. In other words, whereas the previous 
                                                
2 The chart is developed by Lather and Pierre. See Lather, p. 164. 
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paradigm shifts moved from a focus on the quantification of reality, to the 
construction of reality, and then to the inequities of the reality, respectively, the 
final shift of the paradigms proposed a new reality altogether.   
In the new reality ‘all major epistemological concepts (e.g. language, discourse, 
knowledge, truth, reason, power, freedom, the subject, objectivity, being, reality, 
method, science) are deconstructed.3  In this sense, the prior choice of focus, is no 
longer possible. Human enquiry has now become characterised as intrinsically 
decentralised. Thus, the break in the table above visualises the shift from 
intrinsically centralised to intrinsically decentralised paradigms. 
To illustrate the effect of that shift, for example, in the positivist paradigm, 
different readings are appropriated as opposite and incompatible and harmony 
between them is not a viable solution (the binaries are stable, not interchangeable, 
and not deconstructible). In the poststructural paradigm, compatibility is always 
possible, exactly because the binaries are not stable. The opposites in one reading 
can be perceived as synonyms in another reading. A deconstructed reading can 
always provide a possibility for harmony within chaos.  
The effect of this extremely decentralised approach to reality is also seen in the 
way deconstruction operates within the postmodern interpretive paradigm. 
Namely, Derrida is explicit in that ‘…deconstruction doesn’t consist in a set of 
theorems, axioms, tools, rules, techniques, methods... There is no deconstruction, 
deconstruction has no specific object...4  Thus also: ’Deconstruction is neither an 
analysis nor a critique…. I would say the same about method. Deconstruction is 
not a method and cannot be transformed into one…. It must also be made clear 
that deconstruction is not even an act or an operation….’5 
                                                
3 Lather, p. 164. 
4 Jacques Derrida, 'As If I Were Dead: An Interview with Jacques Derrida', in Applying: To 
Derrida, ed. by John Brannigan, Ruth Robbins, and Julian Wolfreys (London: Macmillan, 1996), 
pp. 212-27 (p. 218).  
5 Jacques Derrida, 'Letter to a Japanese Friend', in A Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds, ed. by 
Peggy Kamuf (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 270-76 (p. 273). 
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Thus I concur with Gary Rolfe’s analysis of the statements of Derida that method, 
classically defined as ‘a systematic procedure, technique, or mode of enquiry’ 
does not exist in poststructural readings.6 Still, Rolfe concludes that one can 
recognise a strategy of deconstruction, which incorporates: 1) locating a 
promising marginal text (that what is omitted by the classical methods), 2) the use 
of antithesis of that what has served as the standard, 3) the reversal of the 
established hierarchy, in order to also displace and dismantle this hierarchy.7  
Apart from this essential difference in centralisation of the focus in previous 
paradigms and the extremely decentralised focus in the postmodern paradigm, 
there is however, a common element in all of these four major interpretative 
paradigms, the postmodern one included. The common element is the reliance of 
each of the paradigms on a particular model of hermeneutical enquiry. In other 
words, hermeneutical method, or absence of it, arises from an underlying 
hermeneutical / interpretative model. Hence, I define a hermeneutical model as a 
metaphorical presentation of a hermeneutical agenda.  
In the study of hermeneutics, several ways of visualising hermeneutical models 
have been proposed: hermeneutical spirals, hermeneutical labyrinths, triangles, 
circles, and a special modification of circles, the Möbius strip. All of these can be 
grouped in families of, for example, spirals, circles, triangles, etc. Here the type 
of hermeneutical models, is a group of hermeneutical models that share a 
common visual metaphor, which explains their similarities and differences, by 
each particular model adjusting the visual metaphor in a specific way.  
However, I argue that while this classification based on the common visual 
metaphor, shared by a specific type of models, is logical, it fails to reflect the 
essential difference between the models based on what is their sensitivity to 
centripetal and centrifugal forces in process of interpretation. In other words, it is 
possible to have two hermeneutical models that share the same visual metaphor, 
                                                
6 Gary Rolfe, 'Deconstruction in a Nutshell', Nursing Philosophy, 5 (2004), pp. 274–76 (p. 275). 
7 Ibid. See also Raoul Moati, Derrida/Searle: Deconstruction and Ordinary Language,  (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2014), p. 37;  Christopher Norris, Deconstruction: Theory and 
Practice, 3 edn (New York: Methuen, 1982; repr. London: Routledge, 2002), p. 1-3. 
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but which still are intrinsically different, in the sense that one of them can be 
intrinsically centralised and the other decentralised.  
In order to show why centralisation and decentralisation as features of a model 
are more relevant, then the metaphor the model is based on I will here briefly 
compare four models,8 two different spirals, one proposed by Grant Osborne,9 the 
other by Paul Ricoeur,10 a labyrinth, proposed by John Dominic Crossan,11 and a 
Möbius strip (a special version of a circle), proposed by Anne Beate Reinertsen.12 
By doing this I will demonstrate a need for a new model, which is intrinsically 
neither centralised nor decentralised, but developed in such a way as to facilitate 
control of centralisation and decentralisation in interpretation. I will call my 
model ‘the model of interpretative relativity’ i.e. ‘the zoom lens model’. This 
comparison of the four models is also intended to show the need for 
hermeneutical metamodels. I define ‘metamodel’ as the initial set of 
presuppositions, expressed in a metaphor, which serve as criteria for choosing a 
particular model. 
3.2.2 HERMENEUTICAL MODELS 
A typical example of a centralised hermeneutical model is the so called 
‘hermeneutical spiral’, proposed by Grant Osborne.13 The model actually consists 
of two spirals, one narrow, the other broad. Both of them are conical, with a wide 
bottom and narrow top. The only difference between them is the conceptual 
width/breadth they describe.  
Thus, on the one hand, the narrow spiral has the following four centres in the 
bottom circle of the spiral: the reader as the interpreter, an initial set of questions 
                                                
8 There are other models as well. Susan Wittig, for example, has worked with a triangle as a 
model. See Susan Wittig, 'A Theory of Multiple Meanings', Semeia, 9 (1977), 74-103. 
9 Grant Osborne, The Hermeneutical Spiral: A Comprehensive Introduction to Biblical 
Interpretation, Revised edn (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1991; repr. 2010), p. 418. 
10 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 3 vols (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), I, p. 
72. 
11 John Dominic Crossan, 'A Metamodel for Polyvalent Narration', Semeia, 9 (1977), pp. 104-47 
(p. 105). 
12 Anne Beate Reinertsen, 'Welcome to My Brain', Qualitative Inquiry, 20 (2014), pp. 255-66 (p. 
259). 
13 See Osborne, p. 418. 
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regarding the text, the text itself, and the agenda which the text itself sets out for 
the reader. It is important here not to confuse the agenda in this hermeneutical 
spiral with the hermeneutical agenda as the main characteristic of four different 
interpretative paradigms, in Section 3.2 above. In fact, the two agendas are 
opposite. The agenda in Osborne’s model is set out by the text itself. Oppositely, 
the hermeneutical agenda is, by definition, set out by the interpreter, before even 
approaching the text. Thus, hermeneutical agenda corresponds to Osborn’s 
questions which the reader asks regarding the text (before analysing it).  
On the other hand, the broader hermeneutical spiral is broader in the sense that 
the reality it encompasses is wider than the text. This spiral has the following four 
foci: receptor, meaning, source, and significance. Every circle of the conic spiral 
has four elements positioned so that the reader faces the text, and the (authorial) 
meaning faces (contemporary) significance.  
The metaphor of the spiral is supposed to describe different centres the reader is 
assumed to focus on when proceeding in the enquiry regarding a text. The reader 
is visualised as following the spiral from the bottom to the top, moving from one 
centre to the next, from the bottom circle to the same centres on the next circle 
above, the interpreter is supposed to move upwards, narrowing the possible 
meaning of the text. 
According to my understanding of Osborne’s proposal, the narrower spiral is a 
model for comprehending the meaning of the text, whereas consequent 
contextualisation, which encompasses the interpreter’s life and situation, is 
represented by the broader spiral.14  
The actual shifting of the foci is accomplished in two steps: grammatical-
syntactical exegesis and investigation of historical-cultural background. Along 
the process (visualised as moving from the bottom to the top of the spiral) the 
reader becomes more and more informed, and accordingly, his or her 
understanding of the possible meanings of the text becomes narrower and 
                                                
14 See Osborne, p. 418. 
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narrower (i.e. more focused). At the end of the process the reader understands the 
text as having only one possible, original meaning, intended by the author of the 
text.  
The spiral is thus a model. However, there is an endless number of different types 
of spirals, which might be used for explaining different hermeneutical agendas. 
For instance, what if the spiral was turned up-side-down? What if the spiral only 
had circles of the same size, like spiral stairs, presenting a never-ending, always 
escalating process of hermeneutical enquiry? The latter is indeed Paul Ricoeur’s 
choice for his model. Riceour asserts that his model is a spiral and not a simple 
circle: 
That the analysis is circular is indisputable. But that the circle is 
a vicious one can be refuted. In this regard, I would rather 
speak of an endless spiral that would carry the meditation past 
the same point a number of times, but at different altitudes.15 
Ricoeur’s spiral is thus conceptually the exact opposite of Osborne’s spiral(s). 
Osborne’s model is intrinsically centralised (focused always on one single centre 
at a time, and then, moving from one centre to the next along the process of 
interpretation, aimed at reaching author’s single intended meaning) whereas 
Ricoeur’s is intrinsically decentralised, with an endless meditation, without a 
presupposed author’s intended meaning in a text.16 Even so, they share the same 
visual metaphor, the metaphor of a spiral.  
In contrast, in Crossan’s model there is no centre. Namely, Crossan builds his 
model on the metaphor of a labyrinth. As for the specific shape of the labyrinth, 
Crossan suggests that the reader is free to create it as the reading process unfolds.  
                                                
15 Ricoeur, p. 72. 
16 Thus, Craig Bartholomew concludes that ‘… Ricour finds a significant role for the reader in 
interpretation; as a result, a world is opened up in front of the text.’ See Craig G. Bartholomew, 
Introducing Biblical Hermeneutics: A Comprehensive Framework for Hearing God in Scripture,  
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2015), p. 67. 
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Structuralism says that we create the labyrinth ourselves, that it 
has no centre, that it is infinitely expansible, that we create it as 
play and for play, and that one can no more consider leaving it 
than one can envisage shedding one’s skin.17 
It is important to note that, the way I understand it, that Crossan’s ‘structuralism’ 
in the quotation, belongs, by its nature, to what Lather and Pierre would classify 
as ‘poststructural’ enquiry in the Illustration 15 above. Crossan’s labyrinth is one 
possible example of labyrinth-based models for theories of meaning. But, 
although it is possible to have several theories which visualise their models as 
labyrinth, the main characteristic of the theories and models is not the visual 
metaphor, but the intrinsic decentralisation of meaning as their hermeneutical 
agenda. In this sense, the visual metaphor is indeed a deceptive feature, whereas 
the centralisation/decentralisation feature is what characterises them best. 
This raises the question concerning the criteria which the reader follows when 
choosing between different hermeneutical models. Crossan argues that the criteria 
for the choice are provided by metamodels. He suggests ‘play’ (ludic play) to be 
the metamodel. Crossan (concurring with Johan Huizinga) defines ludic game as 
‘a free activity standing quite consciously outside “ordinary” life as being “not 
serious”, but at the same time absorbing the player intensely and utterly.’18 
Crossan’s argument that ‘reality is play’ appears to be strong, since, if human 
enquiry is not ludic play, one should be able to identify some criteria for finding 
the rules of the game. Crossan’s point is clear: ‘If one can think up any other 
metamodel, would not the act of such thought be easily construed as an act of 
play?’19 Crossan’s answer to the question of metamodels makes Reinertsen’s 
model exceptionally interesting.  
                                                
17 Crossan, p. 112. 
18 Crossan, p. 113. 
19 Ibid. p. 116. 
	
	
	
145	
Moreover, Reinertsen developed her model by adapting the circular model for 
living research designs proposed by Karl H. Müller.20 Namely, Reinertsen used 
Möbius strip as her model of enquiry. Möbius strip is a strip/band with only one 
side, and only one boundary/edge. It is made by twisting a strip half way 
(twisting only one end by 180 degrees) and then joining the ends of the strip to 
form a loop.  
The key mathematical property of Möbius strip is that it is non-orientable. 
Therefore, this model has some profound implications on one’s theory of 
meaning. The first one is the most obvious: the possibility to endlessly follow the 
strip’s surface without crossing edges illustrates constant nonbinary decision-
making.21 Furthermore, according to Reinertsen, Möbius strip is not only a model 
for decision-making, but also for the researcher’s brain, will, and for the 
researcher him- or herself.22 This is clearly a decentralised approach to 
interpretation and meaning, classified as ‘poststructural’ in the Illustration 15 
above. 
In addition, Reinertsen’s model is a very good example of how extremely 
decentralised approaches to hermeneutical questions lead hermeneutical methods 
to a dead-end. When a hermeneutical method becomes equal with the 
researcher/interpreter, the hermeneutical method ceases to exist. It leads the 
interpreter/researcher out of hermeneutics with a hermeneutical method, and into 
the poststructural paradigm, with deconstruction and without a method.  
However, Reinertsen’s model is also an excellent example of how a model can be 
self-sufficient, that is, to serve as a metamodel, meta-metamodel, etc. 
Specifically, Reinertsen’s model, compared to Crossan’s, does not need an extra 
metamodel. Reinertsen’s model explains the researcher’s reality as a whole. This 
intrinsic difference between the methods in regard to their concept of reality is 
sufficient to draw some important conclusions for the purpose of this thesis. 
                                                
20 K. H. Müller, The New Science of Cybernetics: The Evolution of Living Research Designs, 3 
vols (Vienna: Edition Echoraum, 2009-11), II (2011), p. 79.  
21 Reinertsen, p. 259. 
22 Ibid. 
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3.2.3 CONCLUSIONS REGARDING MODELS 
Osborne believes that his model is suitable for keeping balance in the process of 
hermeneutical enquiry. He calls for keeping the balance between ‘abstract 
proposition’ and ‘dynamic communication’. He points out that ‘it is true that 
twentieth-century evangelical hermeneutics has emphasized only the 
propositional dimension; but we do not solve that by going to the opposite 
extreme. A biblical balance is required.’23 
However, I do not see Osborne’s contribution as satisfactory, since his model is a 
priori directed towards one single intended meaning of a text. This is not 
surprising since his model is developed within centralised pre-postmodern 
paradigm, with the only dynamics in the model being achieved by moving the 
focus from one centre to the following one, along the hermeneutical spiral. In this 
sense, Osborne operates within the presuppositions (of interpretative paradigm) 
which he (and for example N. T. Wright) calls for ‘critical realism’.24 Critical, in 
contrast to ‘naïve realism’ and in the sense that it never assumes that theological 
constructions are exact depictions of revealed truth.25  
In contrast, I plan to move from poststructuralist towards critical theories, and 
end by subscribing to a form of critical realism. However, this form is different 
from Osborne’s in the sense that he aimed at making an intrinsically centralised 
concept of reality more dynamic. In contrast, my concept of reality is intrinsically 
decentralised, dialogical. My plan is to understand how the intrinsically 
decentralised (i.e. dialogical) concept of interpretation functions. 
Thus, if dialogism (in contrast to dialogue) is understood as a decentralised 
concept of communication, with voices involved never clearly delineated, then 
my set of presuppositions can be grouped under a term ‘critical dialogism’. In this 
sense, the model I propose is developed in the opposing direction of Osborne’s, 
insofar that I am starting with the three theories developed within a genuinely 
                                                
23 Osborne, p. 418. 
24 See Osborne, pp. 342, 398. See also N. T. Wright, The New Testament and the People of God. 
Vol. 1, Christian Origins and the Question of God (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1992). 
25 Osborne, p. 398.  
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decentralised paradigm, and then using the tools the theories provide, in order to 
derive pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings of a text.  
Thus, should Osborne’s model be able to control (de)centralisation of meaning in 
a process of interpretation, my model will contribute differently from Osborne’s, 
by providing tools for the same work on a genuinely different path of 
hermeneutical enquiry.   
I nevertheless concur with Osborne’s understanding of the need for balancing, 
and conclude that developing a model which (does not need a metamodel, and 
yet) facilitates control of centralisation and decentralisation in the process of 
interpretation, can be compared to what Einstein’s contribution to bridging the 
reality of energy and the reality of matter, meant to scientific research of his time. 
Newtonian physics has no tools for bridging the two realities (of energy, and of 
matter). Einstein’s theory of relativity has provided the tools. 
Similarly, my model of interpretative relativity can contribute to bridging the 
reality of a centralised interpretation and of a decentralised interpretation by 
providing a theory of meaning which utilises intrinsically decentralised concept 
of meaning to explain how the concept facilitates communication in general and 
biblical interpretation in particular. By presenting my model and theory of 
meaning in the following Sections, I will take the fourth step in accordance with 
the purpose of this Chapter. 
3.3 THE ZOOM LENS MODEL 
The metaphor on which my model of my theory of meaning is developed is a 
zoom lens, capable of changing the zoom from under 50 mm (known as wide-
angle lens) to above 135 mm (known as telephoto lens). The model is based on 
two different movements: firstly, move of the zoom lens, and secondly, move of 
the entire camera. Below is a detailed explanation of these movements.  
3.3.1 MOVE OF THE ZOOM LENS 
Every move of the zoom lens (so called ‘zooming in, and out’) narrows or 
broadens the view, so that at longer zooms (by zooming in) the view becomes 
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narrower. Consequently, as it was visualised in Illustration 14 above, the centres 
of meaning gradually fall out of the view, as the zoom increases. The 
widest/shortest zoom (SR3 in Illustration 14 above) is able to capture all four 
centres of meaning. In contrast, the narrower, longer zoom (visualised as SR2 in 
Illustration 14 above) could not capture the E centre of meaning. Finally, the 
narrowest/longest zoom (visualised as SR1) had only C centre within its view. 
This was the centralisation i.e. movements directed towards narrowing of the 
view of the zoom lens. The movements of the zoom lens in the opposite direction 
(i.e. decentralisation) have the opposite effect.  
It is vital to understand that during these movements of the zoom lens, the 
position of the camera as a whole is not changed. In other words, the 
photographer does not change his/her position. Additionally, in these examples, 
the position of the camera was as if the viewer stands independent from the 
centres of meaning. Specifically, since I here too, follow the presentation of these 
centres of meaning on previous illustrations in the thesis, and because it serves 
the purpose of showing how centres of meaning will fall out of view, as the zoom 
gradually increases. In contrast, when describing the telephoto effect as a 
metaphor for my theory of meaning, the initial position of the camera is going to 
assume the angle of view of the contemporary recipient (i.e. E centre of 
meaning). Below is a detailed explanation of this movement. 
3.3.2 MOVE OF THE CAMERA (RELATIVE DISTANCE) 
Moving the camera closer and further away from the subject in focus changes the 
relative distance, as it is compared with the distance between the subject in focus 
and its background. The effect is called the ‘telephoto effect’ (also known as 
‘distortion of space effect’, ‘telephoto compression phenomenon’, ‘lens 
compression effect’…). On the four illustrations below (Illustrations 16, 17, 18 
and 19), we will see how the distance between the subject in focus and its 
background decreases, as the distance between the camera and the subject in 
focus increases. In this sense, this is a movement that supports centralisation. In 
practice, as the four illustrations below will show, this movement of the camera is 
normally accompanied by enlarging the zoom (that is the corresponding 
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movement of zoom lens). This enlarging of the zoom, as it was seen on the 
previous four illustrations, causes narrowing of the view, and thus again supports 
centralisation of the view. 
Furthermore, on the four illustrations below, the camera is positioned differently 
than on the four illustrations above. The reason for that is that this time 
movement of the whole camera represents conceptual distance between the 
interpreter and the text. Accordingly, the movement of the camera in the four 
illustrations below metaphorically presents conceptual, as well as temporal, 
cultural, geographical, etc., distancing of the recipient of the text from the text. 
This representation of the relations between the contemporary recipient and the 
other centres of meaning is in keeping with the theory of meaning according to 
which the reader changes his/her cognitive distance from a given centre of 
meaning. As explained earlier, the process of reading is conceptualised as 
experiencing gravity effect of utterances from different centres of meaning. In 
this case, for the sake of illustration, the reader is supposedly increasing the 
distance from the centres of meaning in the illustrations below. Thus, in 
Illustration 16 below, I present three photographs taken with the purpose of 
achieving the telephoto effect.  
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Illustration 16: Apparent Change of Distance Representing Cognitive 
Gravity 
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Each of the photographs has the green E centre of meaning (i.e. the contemporary 
recipient) within the view of the camera. When compared, the photographs show 
apparent change of the gaps between the green E centre and the other centres in 
the photographs (in the Illustration 16 below above). Thus, gaps (i.e. the space 
between the centres) appear to be the largest on the first photograph, and smallest 
on the third photograph. This effect is achieved by movements of the camera 
while zooming out from the shortest zoom, to the longest.  
Illustrations 17, 18 and 19 below provide a graphical explanation of the effect on 
the photographs above. Thus, Illustration 17 below explains the situation with the 
camera narrowest to the centre of meaning. 
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Illustration 17: Cognitive Gravity at Relative Distance, Ratio 1, Zoom of 25 
mm 
 
 
In the illustration above, S1 is the distance between the camera and the subject in 
focus, while B1 is the distance between the camera and the background of the 
subject in focus. For the sake of illustration, S1 is 5 cm. In contrast B1 is 105 cm. 
The relative distance is the ratio between the distance between the camera and the 
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object in focus and the distance between the camera and the background of the 
object in focus. In the illustration above ratio R1 is calculated at 21.  
It will be clear after the comparison with ratios R2 and R3 in the Illustrations 18 
and 19 below, that the ratio increases, i.e. the ratio is directly proportional to the 
apparent gap between the subject in focus and its background. In other words, 
closer the camera is to the subject in focus, the bigger the gaps appear to be. In 
terms of reading an utterance as testing the field of cognitive gravity surrounding 
the utterance, the same effect is described as the utterance is more attractive when 
apparent inconsistencies between the utterance and its background are bigger. In 
contrast, the more an utterance seems to be part of the cognitive universe of the 
reader, the less attractive it is to the reader. 
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Illustration 18: Cognitive Gravity at Relative Distance, Ratio 2, Zoom of 379 
mm 
 
In Illustration 18 above, the zoom increases in order to keep the same centre of 
meaning in focus whilst moving the camera away from the centre of meaning in 
focus. Accordingly, the distance between the centres (all of them) and the camera 
increases as well. The effect, calculated by Ratio 2 is that the gaps between the 
centres of meaning appear smaller. 
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This effect is most obvious in Illustration 19 below, with the focus on the same 
subject, but at the narrowest/longest zoom and the camera furthest away from the 
centres of meaning.  
 
Illustration 19: Cognitive Gravity at Relative Distance, Ratio 3, Zoom of 600 
mm 
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The depth of the space as seen through a zoom of 600 mm, with the camera being 
even more distant from the subject photographed, provides an illustrative Ratio3 
at 1,3. The ratio is the smallest, and so are the apparent gaps. In terms of the 
process of reading conceptualised as the movement of the reader in the field of 
cognitive gravity, the situation envisioned with this illustration is when the reader 
is cognitively distant from the text. He/she is not acquainted with all the details of 
the text. In this situation, the text seems to fit in the cognitive universe of the 
reader. There are apparently no big gaps between different centres of meanings in 
the cognitive universe. Also, there are no challenges for the reader’s aim or 
mindset. Everything tends to remain status quo. Let us now conceptualise the 
cognitive movement of the reader in the opposite direction, i.e. towards a centre 
of meaning. This conceptualisation essentially presents my theory of meaning.  
3.4 THE THEORY OF INTERPRETATIVE RELATIVITY 
The reader starts his/her cognitive journey distanced from a given text. In other 
words, the reader does not know what the text is about. I will illustrate my theory 
of meaning by using two extreme examples, firstly, the situation of extreme 
incomprehension and secondly, the situation of extreme cognitive closeness to 
the given text.  
Thus, firstly, let us imagine a child from a distant land, grown up with the 
knowledge of only one local dialect. At the age of seven, he/she becomes adopted 
and relocated to Jerusalem uniting with an Orthodox Jewish family. It is Pesach, 
and the family is gathered around the dining table. The candles, festive meal, 
music, songs and meeting with the extended new family all leaves an 
extraordinary impression on our young person. When the evening comes to a 
close, and the family is about to retire at the end of the long festive day, the 
young person, with the very limited knowledge of Hebrew, points to the book the 
adoptive father read earlier that evening. The young reader opens the first page. 
The old book leaves some impression that fits the feelings related to the 
traditional symbols used that evening. However, the young reader is 
disappointed. The text is inaccessible. The reader stays at the initial cognitive 
distance from the text. Any relation to the text comes from other experiences the 
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reader has had. The only experience directly related to the text is that it is 
inaccessible.  
Secondly, let us imagine the extreme contrast of the experience of the young 
reader from the previous example. Here we have an experienced scholar from the 
humanities department at Hebrew University Jerusalem. He/she is at the 
university library. The person reaches towards the same text used in the previous 
example above. However, here the text is on a library shelf. In this example, the 
text is part of an anthology of traditional Hebrew prayers. Many quotations from 
the text of the Torah are explained and analysed with long notes about the 
different traditions in which multiple forms of the tradition developed. The 
scholar is about to write an article on different streams of the development of the 
text in the anthology. I will now use both these examples to clarify the difference 
between the special and general theory of interpretative relativity. 
3.4.1 THE SPECIAL THEORY OF INTERPRETATIVE RELATIVITY 
The first example above is the closest I can envision the phenomenon represented 
with Illustration 14 above. There is no cognitive movement of the reader towards 
the text. The minimum of reading is invested in the process of zooming in 
towards the text, but there is no cognitive relation to the text. The reader tries to 
connect the text with the other centres in his/her cognitive universe, but no 
approach to the text is possible. Thus, the text remains only that what other 
centres of meaning (in the reader’s already established cognitive universe) could 
explain about the text. Therefore, the young reader only understood about the text 
what other centres of meaning could offer him/her (i.e. the effect of the rich faith-
life imagery used that festive evening). This is an extreme example and rare in 
reality. This situation is a unique case in the general experience of reading as the 
process in which the cognitive distance between the text and the reader changes. 
Therefore, I call the first example an example of the special theory of 
interpretative relativity. The theory is based on the inertness of both the text and 
the reader. According to this unique case of the theory, the reading is limited to 
(at best) appropriating only the literal meaning of the text. In our example above, 
the child could see the letters, but he/she could only appropriate, at best, what the 
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text reads. The child could not move forwards towards the pragmatic, 
sociological and paradigmatic meanings of the text. 
3.4.2 THE GENERAL THEORY OF INTERPRETATIVE RELATIVITY 
In contrast to the case of special theory of interpretative relativity, in the second 
example above, the reader is both willing and capable of investing in reading as 
the process in which the cognitive distance between the text and the reader 
decreases. The textual utterance the reader reads is part of a bigger utterance (i.e. 
the anthology). Also, the utterance the reader is reading incorporates recognisable 
smaller utterances. The cognitive journey of reading begins with opening the 
cover, focusing on the form of the text. At this stage, everything in the text 
appears as a whole. Texts written in different times in history all appear to belong 
to one world and time. In this sense, every reading begins with utilisation of 
apparent synchronicity of the text as a whole. It is the only way to cognitively 
come closer to the text. Subsequently, the reader cognitively zooms into the 
smaller sections of the utterance. The reader is reading rational portions of the 
given text.  
As the reader cognitively approaches the text, various images of world and time 
become discernible in the reader’s cognitive universe. The reader begins to notice 
dependence markers apparent in the text. The dependence markers have a twofold 
effect: firstly, the reader is guided to become better acquainted with the given 
text, and secondly, the reader is guided to recognise gaps between the text, 
images the text produces (i.e. of voices, communities, worlds, and times) and 
other centres of meaning. By being guided/directed to see these gaps, the reader 
experiences the text, images the text produces and other centres of meaning as all 
becoming more distanced from each other.  
The reader comes as close to the text as possible. The apparent relations of 
dependence play the role of irritants that challenge the reader to situate the given 
text in the cognitive universe, which, at this step, is apparently disharmonious. 
How to make sense of the text which is here set apart? How frustrating is this 
situation for the reader? Depending on the reader’s paradigm, i.e. the initial set of 
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questions which govern the development of the inquiry, the reader has two 
possible solutions to the apparent and challenging discrepancies between the text 
and the rest of his/her cognitive universe.  
Firstly, the challenge might be solved if the reader zooms out and moves back, 
away from the text. As a consequence, the gaps will become smaller and the text 
might again seem to be part of a coherent cognitive universe. 
Thus, if the challenges of the irritants become weakened by the act of 
decentralisation, the reader has experienced a challenge which he/she was 
capable of overcoming within his/her paradigm. In this sense, this confirms the 
capabilities of the paradigm, which in this case appears to be even more stable. 
Thus, the reader was in this case challenged only at the level of his motivation, 
intention and aim, not the level of his/her mindset. Consequently, any changes of 
the aim, i.e. the fundamental direction of a person’s life, or some fairly stable 
subset of that fundamental direction, may be big changes but are in essence not of 
paradigmatic nature. I suggest these changes be called spiritual conversion. 
However, there is another possible scenario as well. Thus, secondly, what could 
happen is that, when zooming out, the text or parts of it seem to make more sense 
as parts of another field of gravity, associated with another utterance. The reader 
experiences a conflict of centres of gravity and zooms out and moves back, away 
from the text.  However, it is possible that the fields of the cognitive gravity 
experienced when approaching the text make the text seem to make more sense 
as situated in another field of gravity. In other words, the pieces of the text seem 
to make more sense as parts of another field of gravity, associated with another 
utterance. The reader has two options, and the choice depends on the set of initial 
questions the reader accepted before approaching the text. Namely, if the initial 
set of questions regarding the text (i.e. initial expectation set forth for the text) is 
such that, that kind of discrepancy in the text can be accommodated, the reader 
will reassemble the text, i.e. situate it in the field of cognitive gravity around 
another utterance.  
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In contrast, if the initial set of questions, i.e. expectations regarding the text, 
cannot accommodate such discrepancies, the reader is challenged on the level of 
those initial questions. The irritants are challenging the fundamental 
presuppositions regarding the cognitive universe of the reader. The reader 
becomes open to a paradigm shift, i.e. to change the initial presuppositions. This 
shift is called the cognitive conversion. 
As was proposed in this thesis, the irritants which affect the reader on the level of 
his/her motivation, intention and aim, I call the ‘challenging irritants’. In contrast, 
the irritants which affect the reader on the level of his mindset, worldview or 
master narrative, I call the ‘frustrating irritants’. They are described as anomalies, 
in terms of the Kuhnian theory of paradigms. 
As explained above, in contrast to the unique case of the theory of interpretative 
relativity, the challenge with reading a text which is accessible, i.e. when 
experiencing the general case of interpretative relativity, the reader is challenged 
by pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings of the text. The textual 
meaning does not cause challenges. The effect of challenges is caused by change 
of the reader’s cognitive proximity to the text and his/her experience of the field 
of cognitive gravity of utterances from textual and non-textual centres of 
meaning.  
This presentation of my theory of meaning still does not answer the question of 
the method of approaching the Bible. By method I mean a fairly organised, 
logical sequence of actions or procedures for accomplishing something. In the 
remaining Sections of this Chapter, I plan to reconsider different methods/ 
approaches to the Bible with the focus on changes which took place from the Age 
of Enlightenment to the present. Based on this comparison, I plan to draw a 
conclusion regarding the method which is in harmony with my theory of 
meaning. 
3.5 METHOD AS MEASURING COGNITIVE GRAVITY 
Presently I will compare different experiences of this field of cognitive gravity, as 
it was experienced in biblical studies since the 19th century positivism. This 
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comparison will help me explain in more detail how the same irritants have been 
experienced differently in different paradigms. The shift from understanding the 
Bible, as mirroring the reality in the positivist paradigm, to the Bible illuminating 
the reality was a complex socio-ideological process, as already argued earlier in 
this thesis. However, I find it essential at this stage in the thesis, to focus more 
closely on the effect these changes had on the actual methods in biblical studies.  
The first dramatic changes in the methods used to study the Bible that anticipated 
modern biblical criticism started to take place around the time of the 
Reformation. Accordingly, I agree that ‘it is not unjust to trace the origins of 
biblical criticism in the modern sense back to the Renaissance’,26 most notably in 
writings of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), Isaac La Peyrère (1596-1676), Baruch 
Spinoza (1632-77), Richard Simon (1638-1712), John Locke (1632-1704) and 
Pierre Bayle (1647-1707), where the traditional view on Mosaic authorship of the 
Pentateuch was put under question and the Bible as a whole put under the 
scrutiny of human reason. However, these roots only started to take hold in 
biblical studies, as Biblical or ‘Higher Criticism’27 at the time of the 
Enlightenment in the eighteenth century.  
In particular, it was with Jean Astruc (1684-1766) that the first idea of multiple 
sources of Pentateuch text was published (1753).28 Astruc focused his research on 
the book of Genesis. His logic reflected two presuppositions that in later 
scholarship became explicit; that a single writer would not repeat a story and not 
                                                
26 W. Neil, ‘The Criticism and Theological Use of the Bible, 1700-1950’, in The Cambridge 
History of the Bible: The West from Reformation to the Present Day, ed. by S. L. Greenslade, 3 
vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963; repr. 2008), III, pp. 238-93 (p. 238); See 
also Antony F. Campbell, ‘Preparatory Issues in Approaching Biblical Texts’, in The Blackwell 
Companion to the Hebrew Bible, ed. by Leo G. Perdue, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), pp. 3-18; 
Michael Jeanneret, ‘Renaissance exegesis’, in The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism: The 
Renaissance, ed. by Glyn P. Norton, 9 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; repr. 
2008), pp. 36-43; Marcus Walsh, ‘Biblical Scholarship and Literary Criticism’, in The Cambridge 
History of Literary Criticism, Volume 4: The Eighteenth Century, ed. by H. B. Nisbet and Claude 
Rawson, 9 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997; repr. 2008), IV, pp. 758-77. 
27 A term first coined by J. G. Eichhorn (1753-1827) in his Einleitung in das Alte 
Testament (1780-1783). See Johann Gottfried Eichhorn, Einleitung in das Alte Testament, 5 vols 
(Leipzig: Weidmann’s Erben & Reich, 1803; repr. Göttingen: C. E. Rosenbusch, 1824), I-IV. 
28 Gordon J. Wenham, Exploring the Old Testament: The Pentateuch, Exploring the Old 
Testament (London: SPCK, 2003), 1, p. 162; Jean de Astruc, Conjectures sur les Memoires 
Originaux (Brussel: Chez Fricx, 1753). 
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use different names of God as synonymously. Following this logic, he ended up 
with the conclusion that Genesis was a product of a process of editing of four 
separate documents, merging them into one book. This process, according to 
Astruc, started with Moses, but was continued by subsequent editors. Followed 
by J. G. Eichhorn (1753-1827) and his Einleitung in das Alte Testament (1780-
83),29 and Julius Wellhausen (1844-1918) and his Prolegomena zur Geschichte 
Israels (1878),30 the ‘German scissors’31 sharpened Astruc’s presuppositions even 
further and cut the biblical text into even smaller pieces.32  
It is of critical importance to note that Charles Darwin’s Origin of the Species 
(1859)33 played an essential role in the process of establishing and developing 
biblical criticism, Darwin’s hypothesis becoming the master narrative for the 
metaphysical aspect of the paradigm embraced (even though not explicitly) by 
the critics of the Bible. It seemed that if faith of any kind was to be maintained, 
the shift from the text as a mirror (of reality) to the text as a lamp (illuminating 
reality) was inevitable. However, it also appeared that ‘the lamp’ could be 
switched on either side (pre-historical, i.e. ‘behind the text’ and historical, i.e. ‘in 
front of the text’) of the biblical text, as will be shown in the Sections that follow. 
Historically, however, the lamp was first switched on ‘behind’ the text, namely 
                                                
29 Johann Gottfried Eichhorn, Einleitung in das Alte Testament, 5 vols (Leipzig: Weidmann’s 
Erben & Reich, 1803; repr. Göttingen: C. E. Rosenbusch, 1824), I-IV. 
30 Julius Wellhausen, Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israels (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1878; repr. 1883). 
31 Neil, ‘The Criticism and Theological Use of the Bible, 1700-1950’, p. 279. 
32 There is far from enough room in this thesis to present the development of the documentary 
hypothesis in more detail. My omission of W. M. L. de Wette (1780–1849), D. F. Strauss (1808 – 
1874) and many other influential theologians of the nineteenth century is intentional. There is 
however abundant literature providing more than enough information on the development of the 
documentary hypothesis. See, for example, R. N. Whybray, The Making of the Pentateuch: A 
Methodological Study, JSOTSup (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1987; repr. 1994), 53, pp. 
17-34; Gordon J. Wenham, ‘Pondering the Pentateuch: The Search for a New Paradigm’, in The 
Face of Old Testament Studies: A Survey of Contemporary Approaches, ed. by David W. Baker 
and Bill T. Arnold, (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1999), pp. 116-44; Wenham, 2003 #146; 
Joseph Blenkinsopp, ‘The Pentateuch’, in The Cambridge Companion to Biblical Interpretation, 
ed. by John Barton, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 181-97; Neil, ‘The 
Criticism and Theological Use of the Bible, 1700-1950’; G.I. Davies, ‘Introduction to the 
Pentateuch’, in The Oxford Bible Commentary: The Pentateuch, ed. by John Muddiman and John 
Barton, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; repr. 2010), pp. 16-53 (pp. 16-42); Gerhard 
Hasel, Old Testament Theology: Basic Issues in the Current Debate, 7. edn (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1972; repr. 1991), pp. 10-114. 
33 Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species (New York: P. F. Collier & Son, 1859; repr. 1909). 
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by focusing on the traditions and their development ‘behind’ the ultimately 
canonised text within a community of faith.34 
3.5.1 COGNITIVE GRAVITY BEHIND THE TEXT 
The so-called ‘Higher Criticism’ of the Bible is built on the presupposition that 
there was a long and complicated history of intermingled traditions (for instance, 
the so-called J, E, D and P) so that the final product is the text we find in the 
Bible as an ‘amalgam’35 of the traditions. Illustration 20 below, from Gordon J. 
Wenham, presents the relation between sources in a very simplified and, for this 
purpose, helpful manner.36 
 
Illustration 20: Wenham’s Conglomeration of Sources According to 
Documentary Hypothesis 
 
 
 
It was thus by the time of Wellhausen that the outcome of the documentary 
hypothesis, applied to the Pentateuch/Torah, was the delineation of four major 
editions of the text (J, E, D and P), Priestly (P) being the youngest edition, dated 
from the time after the Babylonian exile. Illustration 21 below, shows the dating 
                                                
34 Note that here and in the rest of the thesis, I use the terms canonisation and canon as it was 
presented in Sections 2.2.7 and 2.2.9 above. Every given Bible or part of it is, in Bakhtinian 
terms, a canonised utterance, i.e. an utterance of ‘others’ which was accentuated by the effect of 
centrifugal and centripetal forces.  
35 John Barton, ‘Historical-Critical Approaches’, in The Cambridge Companion to Biblical 
Interpretation, ed. by John Barton, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 9-20 (p. 
10). 
36 Wenham, Exploring the Old Testament: The Pentateuch, p. 167. 
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of the alleged sources of the Pentateuch/Torah, as suggested by Wellhausen (but 
endlessly revised since his time).37 
 
Illustration 21: Dating of the Sources to Pentateuch/Torah 
 
Document 
 
Date BCE 
 
J 
 
950 
 
E 
 
850 
 
JE 
 
750 
 
D 
 
622 
 
JED 
 
600 
 
P 
 
500 
 
JEDP 
 
450 
 
 
It has to be noted however that none of these suggested dates have acquired a 
consensus in biblical studies. This lack of any single agreement on the part of the 
very proponents of the hypothesis, especially as the hypothesis developed in the 
twentieth century, is also the most obvious sign of the speculative nature of the 
reasoning involved. In an attempt to reach a consensus, an adjustment of the 
hypothesis, achieved by Albrecht Alt (1883-1956),38 Martin Noth (1902-68)39 
                                                
37 Wenham, Exploring the Old Testament: The Pentateuch, p. 196. 
38 Albrecht Alt, Israel und Aegypten; die politischen Beziehungen der Könige von Israel und Juda 
zu den Pharaonen (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1909). 
39 Martin Noth, Exodus: A Commentary, trans. by J. S. Bowden (Philadelphia, PA: The 
Westminster Press, 1962). 
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and Gerhard von Rad (1901-71)40 helped, albeit very little. More precisely, their 
adjustment to the hypothesis, claiming that the process of the evolution of the 
biblical text was of a more homogenous (and thus a more coherent) nature than 
previously believed, did produce some common ground, maintained until the 
1970’s.41 However, the ever-growing plethora of new dating for the documentary 
sources arising from constant reconstructions of the pre-history of biblical text 
showed that any consensus fell short of the ideal. In fact, as Barton pointed out, 
Wellhausen’s dating of pentateuchal sources was only meant to be a prolegomena 
to the actual reconstructed history of Israel, the history, which is yet to be 
written.42  
However, in 1901 Hermann Gunkel (1862-1932) established a new milestone in 
the criticism of the Pentateuch/Torah with his commentary on Genesis.43 The 
critical thought in his work was to focus on oral traditions and their context, 
instead of the textual (written) tradition in the pre-history of transmission of the 
biblical text. This change of focus puts, according to Gunkel, the biblical text (or 
pieces of it) in its more historical/more natural context, that is, in an oral/aural 
setting. In my opinion the importance of this change of focus, initiated by 
Gunkel, can hardly be overstated in overviews of the history of the interpretation 
of the Pentateuch/Torah.44 More precisely, this very shift initiated not only 
Gunkel’s version of ‘literary’ criticism (better known under the label ‘form 
criticism’), but also the ‘new’ literary criticism in the latter part of the twentieth 
century. I will return later to this important point.45 However, even though 
Gunkel himself believed that his focus on oral tradition was compatible with 
                                                
40 Gerhard von Rad, Studies in Deuteronomy, trans. by David Stalker (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1947; repr. London: SCM, 1961); Gerhard von Rad, Genesis, trans. by Marks H. John 
(Philadelphia, PA: The Westminster, 1961; repr. 1972).  
41 Wenham, Exploring the Old Testament: The Pentateuch, p. 167; Wenham, ‘Pondering the 
Pentateuch: The Search for a New Paradigm’, pp. 116-18. 
42 Barton, ‘Historical-Critical Approaches’, p. 11. 
43 Hermann Gunkel, The Legends of Genesis, trans. by W. H. Carruth (Chicago: The Open Court, 
1901). The German original: Hermann Gunkel, Handkommentar zum Alten Testament in 
Verbindung mit Anderen Fachgelehrten: Genesis Übersetzt und Erklärt (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, 1901). 
44 Surprisingly underestimated, I think, in Wenham, Pondering the Pentateuch: The Search for a 
New Paradigm. but not in Neil, ‘The Criticism and Theological Use of the Bible, 1700-1950’. 
45 See Section 3.6.2 below. 
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Wellhausen’s focus on literary traditions, so that the two complemented each 
other, Rolf Rendtorff pointed out the logical incompatibility of the two, and 
finally concluded that ‘each dating of the pentateuchal “sources” relies on purely 
hypothetical assumptions which in the long run have their continued existence 
because of the consensus of scholars’.46  
Moreover, the so-called ‘Scandinavian School’ of interpretation was indeed an 
offspring of Gunkel’s focus on oral tradition, which preceded (and co-existed 
with) the written history of biblical text, even though not all Scandinavian 
scholars claimed, as Gunkel did, that it is possible to reconstruct the oral 
prehistory of the text. The most notable scholars of the Scandinavian group are 
Ivan Engnell47 and Alfred Haldar48 from the Uppsala School, and Sigmund 
Mowinckel49 from Norway.50 In spite of the many differences between them,51 
                                                
46 Rolf Rendtorff, The Problem of the Process of Transmission in the Pentateuch, trans. by John J. 
Scullion, ed. by David Clines and Philip Davies, JSOTSup (Sheffield: JSOT, 1990), 89, p. 202. 
47 Ivan Engnell, Israel and the Law (Lund: C.W.K. Gleerup, 1954); Ivan Engnell, Studies in 
Divine Kingship in the Ancient Near East (Uppsala: Uppsala University Press, 1943; repr. 
Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell, 1967); Ivan Engnell, A Rigid Scrutiny: Critical Essays on the Old 
Testament (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1969); I. Engnell and J. T. Willis, Critical 
essays on the Old Testament (transl. from Svenskt Bibliskt Uppslagsverk: Nordiska 
uppslagsböcker, Stockholm, 1962) (London: SPCK, 1970), 2. 
48 Alfred Haldar, Studies in the Book of Nahum (Uppsala: Uppsala University Press, 1946). 
49 Sigmund Mowinckel, Esra den Skriftlærde (Kristiania: O. Norli, 1916); Sigmund Mowinckel, 
Statholderen Nehemia: Studier til den Jødiske Menighets Historie og Litteratur: Første Samling 
(Kristiania: O. Norli, 1916); Sigmund Mowinckel, Psalmenstudien (Kristiania: SDNVAO, 1921-
24), 6; Sigmund Mowinckel, ‘Tradition, Oral’, in The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible, ed. by 
George Buttrick (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1962), pp. 683-85; Sigmund Mowinckel, The 
Spirit and the Word: Prophecy and Tradition in Ancient Israel, ed. by K. C. Hanson, Fortress 
Classics in Biblical Studies (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2002); Sigmund Mowinckel, The 
Psalms in Israel’s Worship (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1962; repr. 2004); Sigmund 
Mowinckel, He That Cometh: The Messiah Concept in the Old Testament and Later Judaism 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1956; repr. 2005);  
50 However, even at the Faculty of Theology in Oslo, where Mowinckel’s influence is expectably 
the strongest, works such as Martin Ravndal Hauge’s Between Sheol and Temple, still with strong 
roots on voices ‘behind’ the text, show interest in the literary (even ‘new-literary’) features of the 
text. See Martin Ravndal Hauge, Between Sheol and Temple: Motif Structure and Function in the 
I-Psalms, ed. by David Clines and Philip Davies, JSOTSup (Sheffield: JSOT, 1995), 178. On the 
shift from Mowinckel to Hauge see Rannfrid I. Thelle, ‘Historiens Utfordringer: 
Gammeltestamentlig Forskning ved Det Teologiske Fakultet i det 20. Århundre’, NTT, 101 
(2000), 17-32, (p. 27). 
51 For a very informative analysis of the similarities and differences between them see Aulikki 
Nahkola, Double Narratives in the Old Testament: The Foundations of Method in Biblical 
Criticism, BZAW (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2001), 290, pp. 36-46; Neil, p. 290; Patricia G. 
Kirkpatrick, The Old Testament and Folklore Study, ed. by David Clines and Philip Davies, 
JSOTSup (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1988), 62, pp. 45-50; Magne Sæbø, On the Way to 
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the common element in their approaches was to presuppose that the centre of 
meaning is still well-rooted in the voices behind the text (that is in Sitz im Leben 
in the pre-history of the evolution of the text).52 However, this focus has appeared 
to conceal many methodological irritants. Applicability of the findings of the 
nineteenth-century folklorists, potential incomparability between European and 
ancient Near-Eastern cultures, and the evolutionistic paradigm are the principal 
concerns for this thesis and thus need to be explained. 
Firstly, regarding the applicability of the findings of the nineteenth-century 
folklorists, Aulikki Nahkola has clarified that Gunkel’s hypothesis was very 
much a product of the European nineteenth century’s interest in national identity 
in general and national oral traditions in particular.53 Accordingly, Gunkel’s 
division of genre types in the Pentateuch, for instance legends (Sagen) and folk-
tales (Märchen), was largely adopted from the Grimm brothers’ division of 
genres.54 In addition, as Nahkola pointed out, Gunkel’s hypothesis was in line 
with the research of Danish philologist and folklorist, Axel Olrik (1864-1917).55 
The parallel research, done by Gunkel and by Olrik separately, led to a 
culmination of their respective hypotheses, entertaining three crucial 
presuppositions: namely, that there is a long oral tradition behind the biblical text 
(a presupposition already mooted by some documentary critics) and that the oral 
                                                                                                                                
Canon: Creative Tradition History in the Old Testament, JSOTSup (Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic, 1998), JSOTSup 191, pp. 24-32. 
52 Rendtorff seems to agree with this conclusion: ‘My point is that, in spite of the obvious 
fundamental divergences and even contradictions among the schools, they had in common a 
certain approach to the biblical texts, taking them, within the respective paradigms, mainly as a 
means, sometimes even as tools, for discovering something assumed to lie behind the texts.’ (Rolf 
Rendtorff, Canon and Theology: Overtures to an Old Testament Theology (Minneapolis, MN: 
Augsburg Fortress, 1993), p. 26.)  
53 Nahkola, pp. 137-41. For more on intellectual milieu in nineteenth-century Germany, see also 
Henning Graf Reventlow, ‘The Role of the Old Testament in the German Liberal Protestant 
Theology of the Nineteenth Century’, in Biblical Studies and the Shifting of Paradigms, 1850-
1914, ed. by Henning Graf Reventlow and William Farmer, JSOTSup (Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic, 1995), pp. 132-48. 
54 ‘Gunkel’s concept of certain Old Testament narratives as Sage, even Märchen and Mythen, not 
Geschichte – thence oral, not literary creations that developed according to certain universal 
principles, not haphazardly – was consistent with, and rooted in, the oral narrative scholarship of 
his time and therefore enabled as well as limited by its orientation and modes of expression.’ (The 
italics are the author’s.) (Nahkola, p. 118.) See also Kirkpatrick, p. 18. 
55 Axel Olrik, ‘Epische Gesetze der Volksdichtung’, ZDADL, 51 (1909), 1-12; Nahkola, pp. 137-
41. 
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tradition is discernible from and via the biblical text (a genuinely new 
presupposition) and that it could be reconstructed according to universal/epic 
laws.56 Thus, according to Gunkel: ‘investigators have instead treated the 
legendary books too much as “books”. If we desire to understand the legends 
better, we must call to mind the situations in which the legends were recited’.57  
Secondly, regarding the incomparability between European and ancient Near-
Eastern cultures, Patricia G. Kirkpatrick’s findings are critical. She has shown 
that folklore studies have developed drastically since Gunkel’s work, so that early 
presuppositions regarding the comparability of oral transmissions among 
different cultures must be treated with discretion today. For instance, Gunkel has 
followed only the German and Finnish/Scandinavian schools of folklore studies, 
so his (and Olrik’s) research/‘laws’ were based on a study of a limited sample of 
oral traditions. When learning has increased and more models have become 
available.  
More precisely, prior to Gunkel and Olrik, by the collection of the Finnish oral 
tradition that lead to the formation of the Kalevala national epic, it was made 
clear that there is no single prototype/ universal way for the development of oral 
traditions. Moreover, Kalevala did not develop in an entirely typical way, Elias 
Lönnrot (1802-84) was working not just as a collector but also as editor.58 In 
addition, shortly after Gunkel’s Genesis, there emerged a new school of folklore 
studies, led by Milman Parry (1902-35) and Albert Lord (1912-91); the school 
focused on studying Homeric epics and epics of the South Slavs. Both of the oral 
traditions (Balkan and Homeric) were shown to have developed through the use 
of conventions or formulae,59 showing yet another way for specific oral traditions 
                                                
56 In words of Kirkpatrick: ‘Unlike Wellhausen who had maintained that the oral stage could not 
be uncovered, Gunkel sought to establish criteria by which the earliest form of the tradition could 
be detected.’ (Kirkpatrick, p. 32.)  
57 Gunkel, The Legends of Genesis, p. 40. 
58 Albert Bates Lord, Epic Singers and Oral Tradition (New York: Cornell University Press, 
1991), p. 104. 
59 For examples of complex chiastic structures as well as of anaphora, alliteration, and parataxis in 
South Slavic oral literature, see ibid., pp. 31-34; Albert Bates Lord and Béla Bartók, Serbo-
Croatian Folk Songs: Texts and Transcriptions of Seventy-Five Folk Songs from the Milman 
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to develop. Developments in folkloristics have shown that oral traditions never 
stay the same but develop as they are transmitted. Nevertheless, it has not been 
established that the traditions develop according to any universal pattern.   
The following comparison of the three traditions will hopefully clarify the point. 
Kalevala is created into one poem by a single editor, thus becoming a long 
22,795-line epic. The epics of the South-Slavs are individual songs, ranging from 
several hundreds to sometimes even 10,000 lines. The Iliad and Odyssey, range 
from more than 10,000 lines each whilst still being independent songs. What 
makes Kalevala the best contender for a comparison with the development of the 
pentateuchal text? The poems from which Kalevala was created were not even 
close to the length of the Iliad, Odyssey or some of South-Slavic epics. Still, 
Kalevala is indeed the best prototype, not of any universal oral tradition, but of 
the collection of traditions by an editor, matching in this respect the documentary 
hypothesis, where after a long oral tradition presumed redactors textualised and 
finally merged separate single traditions into one whole (compare Lönnrot’s 
creation of Kalevala with Wellhausen’s Deuteronomistic editor). 
 It is thus clear that Gunkel’s hypothesis was an outcome not only of the 
achievements of the folkloristics of his time, but also of its drawbacks. In 
addition, the research of other national traditions in Africa, or among the North 
American Indians, shows clearly that Gunkel’s presuppositions of universality of 
any oral tradition cannot be sustained today. 60 
Thirdly and finally, it is important to recognise that the drawbacks of Gunkel’s 
hypothesis are rooted in its evolutionistic presuppositions. Namely, the crucial 
principles in the hypothesis are that the tradition has developed in a linear, 
uniform manner, so that the laws we can observe today are the same laws at work 
                                                                                                                                
Parry Collection and a Morphology of Serbo-Croatian Folk Melodies (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1951). 
60 Since Parry/Lord research among Yugoslavian bards, many other studies have been done, 
bringing the various oral traditions of folklore studies to emerge. See for example D. Tedlock’s 
research among North American Indians (Cited in Kirkpatrick, p. 70.). See also Ruth Finnegan’s 
research among the African oral traditions in Ruth Finnegan, Oral Literature in Africa (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1970; repr. Oxford: Open Book, 2012). 
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throughout pre-history times. Moreover, the traditions have evolved from 
primitive forms of oral literature, to meeting the needs of primitive man. In the 
words of Gunkel: ‘it is to be expected from the nature of the case; legends come 
from ages and stages which have not yet acquired the intellectual power to 
distinguish between poetry and reality’.61 The transformation of the oral tradition 
is thus an unconscious process in the society of a primitive man.62 I believe,  the 
personal choice of these presuppositions should be respected, but claiming the 
status of a theory for a personal hypothesis like this is not attainable today. 
Gunkel’s centralisation on the image of the author/s, fuelled with his 
presupposition of a huge gap between the image of the author and the actual 
author/s, prevented him from having any sensitivity to the Bible as an utterance. 
Moreover, this insensitivity to the Bible as an utterance (that conveys a paradigm) 
prevented him from even glimpsing the possibility that his rendering of the 
biblical text might be the offshoot of the evolutionistic paradigm of his time and 
his place. 
However, I have pointed out some irritants in the hermeneutical paradigm of the 
Scandinavian school, some of them being outcomes of their own interpretation, 
whilst some of them were simply inherited from Gunkel and Wellhausen. 
Nevertheless, it is vital to understand that the focus on the oral tradition behind 
the text, whilst claiming that it is not reconstructable, was indeed a catalyst for 
shifting the focus from the fragments/documents of the biblical text to the text 
itself. The pendulum thus swung back to the text, but the text was no longer 
perceived as a mirror, not after the experience of the higher criticism. This time it 
was indeed a lamp, switched on in the text itself. 
3.5.2 COGNITIVE GRAVITY OF THE TEXT 
The collection of methods of interpretation where the focus is on the biblical text, 
and where the text is seen as illuminating reality, is recognisable in the works of 
                                                
61 Gunkel, The Legends of Genesis, p. 40. 
62 Ibid., p. 39. 
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Robert Gordis,63 Isac Leo Seeligmann,64 Brevard Springs Childs,65 James A. 
Sanders,66 Michael Fishbane,67 Geza Vermes,68 to mention just a few. Common 
in their work is also a follow-up to the notion of a more homogenous transition 
from the history of tradition to formation of the Bible. This notion, furthermore, 
allows them to move the focus closer to the phenomenon of the Bible as an 
utterance. More precisely, the formation of the text in the Bible is perceived as a 
long, and more unified process, resulting in a presumably homogenous whole of 
the Bible as an utterance. 
There are, as always, differences in the methods within this group. The main 
difference is, in my opinion, the various understandings of inner-biblical 
exegesis: whether it stems from an intrinsic feature of the Scriptures itself 
(leading thus to, for example, Childs’ understanding of the canon) or from the 
ideological/political agenda of the interpreter (leading thus to, for example, 
Fishbane’s understanding of the canon). This difference results in two conflicting 
views on the authority of the Scriptures and the canon: authority stemming from 
                                                
63 Robert Gordis, The Biblical Text in the Making: A Study of the Kethib-Qere (Philadelphia, PA: 
JPS, 1937); where he pointed to homiletically and used Kethib-Qere distinction, as it was 
preserved in the text of the Hebrew Scriptures. The idea of a type of interpretation (midrash), 
already preserved in the very text of the Bible is further expanded in Robert Gordis, ‘Midrash in 
the Prophets’, JBL, 49 (1930), 417-22. 
64 Isac L. Seeligmann, ‘Indications of Editorial Alteration and Adaptation in the Massoretic Text 
and the Septuagint’, VT, 11 (1961), 201-21; Sæbø, p. 298. 
65 Following up Rendtorff’s idea of midrash in the biblical text in Brevard S. Childs, ‘Psalm Titles 
and Midrashic Exegesis’, JSS, 16 (1971), 137-50. See also Brevard S. Childs, Introduction to the 
Old Testament as Scripture (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress, 1979); Brevard S. Childs, ‘The Canon in 
Recent Biblical Studies: Reflections on an Era’, ProEccl, 14 (2005), 26-45; Daniel R. Driver, 
‘Brevard Childs: The Logic of Scripture’s Textual Authority in the Mystery of Christ’ 
(unpublished PhD Thesis, University of St Andrews Press, 2008), pp. 90-99. 
66 James A. Sanders, ‘Text and Canon: Concepts and Method’, JBL, 98 (1979), 5-29; James A. 
Sanders, From Sacred Story to Sacred Text: Canon As Paradigm (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 
1987); James A. Sanders, Canon and Community: A Guide to Canonical Criticism (Minneapolis, 
MN: Augsburg Fortress, 1984); Peter W. Flint, ‘Of Psalms and Psalters: James Sanders’s 
Investigation of the Psalms Scrolls’, in A Gift of God in Due Season: Essays on Scripture and 
Community in Honor of James A. Sanders, ed. by Richard D. Weis and David M. Carr, JSOTSup 
(Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1996), pp. 65-83; Childs, ‘The Canon in Recent Biblical Studies: 
Reflections on an Era’, pp. 34-35). 
67 Michael Fishbane, ‘Revelation and Tradition: Aspects of Inner-Biblical Exegesis’, JBL, 99 
(1980), 343-61; Michael Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1985); Michael Fishbane, The Garments of Torah: Essays in Biblical Hermeneutics 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1989; repr. 1992). 
68 Geza Vermes, ‘Bible and Midrash: Early Old Testament Exegesis’, in The Cambridge History 
of the Bible: From the Beginnings to Jerome, ed. by P. R. Ackroyd and C. F. Evans, 3 vols 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), I, pp. 199-220. 
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the Scriptures themselves, being distinct revelation from God, or from the 
interpretative tradition, being instead a religious community/tradition-based 
phenomenon. However, note that the Bakhtinian concept of canonisation, utilised 
in this thesis, is broad enough to accommodate views of both Child and 
Fishbane.69 
In addition, the methods in this group can be also divided according to the 
twofold view on the comparison between canon and Scriptures. Namely, the 
difference between canon and Scriptures is either between the canonical process 
and the final form interpretation (as predominant among scholars from the 
English speaking world) or between the nature of the process of canonisation and 
the nature of the final form (as predominant among scholars of a German-
speaking background).70  
Nevertheless, what all the representatives in the group have in common is that 
they have recognised two types of forces that lead to the formation of the canon; 
the centrifugal and centripetal forces. In particular, terms such as ‘literary 
redactions’, ‘literary variants’, ‘various traditions’, ‘forward-looking 
interpretation’, and even ‘dynamic exegesis’71 all denote the centrifugal force(s) 
aimed at broadening the canonical opus of books. Conversely, 
‘Nachgeschichte’,72 ‘unifying reflections’ (Zusammen-Denken), ‘inner-biblical 
comments, revisions, interpretation, exegesis, midrash’, ‘post-biblical midrash’, 
‘protective exegesis’,73 and ‘backward looking interpretation’74 all denote the 
centripetal forces,75 aimed at narrowing the canonical opus. I contend that this 
common understanding of the forces at work during the process of canonisation is 
one of the core contributions of these approaches. The compatibility between this 
                                                
69 See Sections 2.2.7 and 2.2.9 above. 
70 Childs, ‘The Canon in Recent Biblical Studies: Reflections on an Era’, (p. 44). 
71 Michael Fishbane, ‘Torah and Tradition’, in Tradition and Theology in the Old Testament, ed. 
by Douglas A. Knight, (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress, 1977), pp. 292-93. 
72 ‘Post-history’ or ‘Subsequent history’, the term first used by H. W. Hertzberg. See H. W. 
Hertzberg, ‘Die Nachgeschichte alttestamentlicher Texte innerhalb des Alten Testaments’, in 
Werden und Wesen des Alten Testaments, ed. by Paul Volz, Friedrich Stummer and Johannes 
Hempel, BZAW, (Göttingen: A. Töpelmann, 1936), pp. 110-21. 
73 Fishbane, ‘Torah and Tradition’. 
74 Sæbø, p. 291. 
75 Ibid., pp. 291-307. 
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understanding and Bakhtinian understanding of the phenomenon of the 
canonisation of language and/or utterance is striking.76  
This experience of the field of cognitive gravity surrounding the text of the Bible, 
perceived as a whole, provided certain solutions, but some new questions as well. 
Regarding the former, Aulikki Nahkola’s findings are most relevant to my 
research; regarding the latter, a difference between Scriptures and canons as 
competitive centres of meaning is pivotal. In what follows, both the solution and 
the new question are to be better explained.  
3.5.2.1 Variants in Scriptures as the Common Denominator for Traditions 
Biblical text contains so-called doublets, sometimes called double narratives or 
simply variants of the same account. This feature of the biblical text has been an 
essential element in all the methodologies ever since Astruc. According to 
different approaches to the doublets, the methodologies can be classified in two 
camps. The difference between the methodologies is simply that, on the one 
hand, Astruc and all the critics in the camp of Higher Criticism presuppose that 
one author should not, would not and could not use the doublets synonymously in 
process of writing the scriptural books. On the other hand, as it will be presented 
below, the commentators (utilising the so-called new literary criticism) in the 
opposite camp presuppose the reverse: one author should, would and definitely 
could use the doublets synonymously in process of writing the Scriptures. 
Moreover, they argue, these doublets are in fact the very tool used by biblical 
writers/editors to link the different texts in the scriptural opus with each other. 
Nahkola has highlighted and explored this common focus on the double 
narratives. Her argument is compatible with what I argue, so that outcome of any 
reading of the Scriptures is, thus, subject to the reader’s centralisation of the 
phenomenon of doublets into any one of at least five possible contexts (between 
                                                
76 Note the definition of canonisation as ‘the final stage of the process of interaction of centrifugal 
and centripetal forces in formation of an utterance, resulting in blurring of heteroglossity of its 
voices and making its form rigid’. (See Sections 2.2.7 and 2.29 above.) 
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other centres of meaning and the canonised text as a centre of meaning).77 
‘Translating’ this into Nahkola’s terminology,78 one could recognise the ‘nature 
model’ in methodologies like Spinoza’s, the ‘archivist-historian model’ in 
methodologies like Astruc’s, the ‘historian model’ in methodologies like 
Wellhausen’s and finally the ‘literary artist model’ in methodologies like Robert 
Alter’s.  
Accordingly, Spinoza approached the doublets in the context between the Bible 
(C centre of meaning on Illustration 11 above) and the real world/historical 
events (a’ centre of meaning) which, in fact, he used in order to prove that the 
Bible does not mirror reality. Furthermore, the context between the Bible (C 
centre) and the textual tradition behind the canonised text (b’ centre of meaning) 
is the context in which the doublets from the Bible are read by Astruc and 
Wellhausen. Finally, according to Robert Alter’s method, the doublets are read in 
the context of the canonised list of books as a literary whole (i.e. context between 
C and c’ centres of meaning on Illustration 11 above). 
In addition, apart from the compatibility of the conclusions above, I find the 
following contribution of Nahkola’s as of even greater importance; she has drawn 
attention to the findings of the late Shemaryahu Talmon of the Hebrew University 
in Jerusalem79 with regard to the literary–textual variants dichotomy. Talmon’s 
contribution deserves our attention, since, as I will argue, it is directed towards 
the C–c’ context of meaning as having some unique features (see Illustration 11 
above). 
3.5.2.2 The Common Field for Textual Criticism and Source Criticism 
Nahkola drew attention to Talmon’s argument that there are three types of textual 
variants in the Masoretic text.80 The first type, (literary) variant reading, is the 
variant studied by traditional textual criticism. Included in this category are: 
                                                
77 As envisioned on Illustration 11 above. 
78 See Sabø, pp. 73-114. 
79 Talmon’s articles were recently republished in Shemaryahu Talmon, Text and Canon of the 
Hebrew Bible (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2010). 
80 Shemaryahu Talmon, ‘Double Readings in the Masoretic Text’, Textus, 1 (1960), 144-84. 
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a) Deliberate corrections of the text. 
b) Variants arising from the scribal routine. 
c) Textual corruptions resulting from visual and aural mistakes, or from 
flawed memories of scribes and copyists.81  
The second type is synonymous readings. Contrary to the variant readings in the 
group above, synonymous readings ‘have no direct bearing on the criticism and 
emendation of the text since by definition it is impossible to decide that any one 
of them is intrinsically preferable to the others’.82 Variants are synonymous if: 
a) They result from the substitution of words and phrases by others 
which are used interchangeably and synonymously with them in the 
literature of the ΟT. 
b) They do not adversely affect the structure of the verse, nor do they 
disturb either its meaning or rhythm. Hence, they cannot be explained 
as scribal errors. 
c) No sign of systematic or tendentious emendation can be found in 
them. They are to be taken at face value. Synonymous readings cannot 
be explained as variants with a clearly defined ideological purpose. 
They are characterised by the absence of any difference between them 
in content or meaning. 
d) ... [T]hey are not, as far as we can tell, the product of different 
chronologically or geographically distinct literary strata.83 
Finally, the third type of variant is called (literary) double readings. In contrast to 
(d) above, double readings are the product of different chronologically or 
geographically distinct literary strata, which, in particular, originate during the 
process of translating the biblical text and then transmitting the translation, or are 
simply a translation of an already existing double reading from the earlier 
manuscript. The variants in this group are: 
a) Alternative renderings of a single Hebrew word or a single Hebrew 
expression found in the different MSS of the version in question … 
                                                
81 Talmon, ‘Double Readings in the Masoretic Text’, p. 144. 
82 Ibid., p. 146. 
83 Ibid. 
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b) Conflate translations of synonymous readings. In these cases, the 
translator had recourse to a doublet to preserve two alternative Hebrew 
traditions which he found in different MSS of the original, because he 
would not presume to prefer one to the other. 
c) Translations of double readings which had already been incorporated 
as such in the Hebrew MS used by the translator and whose conflated 
character escaped his notice; or if he noticed them, he did not presume 
to correct them.84 
Furthermore, Nahkola points out that synonymous and double readings, as 
categorised by Talmon, could include the double narratives used by the source 
critics. Specifically, as an example, she points out that both W. Nowack and 
Talmon have used the same verse, Judges 19.9, in order to argue for two different 
sources behind the MT text.85 Nevertheless, whilst Talmon argues that it is an 
example of a textual double reading variant, Nowack argues that it is a literary 
double reading variant. The logical question is thus: how can one delineate the 
two86 – especially since the criteria for determining the two correspond, since 
both of them are, according to Talmon, a ‘synoptical’ or ‘horizontal’ rendering of 
variants, aimed at determining the sources, origins and development of the textual 
variants?87  
Talmon, thus, follows the hypothesis of Paul E. Kahle (1875-1964) (and opposes 
the hypothesis of Paul de Lagarde (1827-91)),88 according to which the direct 
predecessors of MT were vulgar texts (Vulgärtexte), which furthermore have a 
common source, called the Urtext. Furthermore, Talmon’s optimism regarding 
the possibilities of reconstructing the Urtext seems to compete with the optimism 
exercised by the forerunners of documentary hypothesis.89  
                                                
84 Talmon, ‘Double Readings in the Masoretic Text’, p. 151. 
85 Wilhelm Nowack, Richter, Ruth und Bücher Samuelis: Übersetzt und Erklärt, Handkommentar 
zum Alten Testament (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1902), p. 161; Talmon, ‘Double 
Readings in the Masoretic Text’, p. 181. 
86 Nahkola, p. 185. 
87 Talmon, ‘Double Readings in the Masoretic Text’, p. 145. 
88 De Lagarde did not agree with the hypothesis about the existence of vulgar texts in the pre-
history of Masoretic texts. See Tov, ‘The History and Significance of a Standard Text of the 
Hebrew Bible’, p. 52. 
89 Talmon, ‘Double Readings in the Masoretic Text’, p. 144. 
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However, for this thesis, the similarities between source criticism and Talmon’s 
textual criticism are just as important as the differences. The similarities are thus 
the presuppositions regarding the pre-history of the text, criteria used in the 
method, and the phenomena analysed. In addition, similarities are also the two 
irritants, claimed to be present when the presuppositions, in common with source 
critics, are entertained. The first irritant is the speculative optimism regarding the 
deconstruction of the Urtext, when there is no textual witness which could lift the 
hypothesis to the level of thesis. The second irritant is that some of the basic 
principles presupposed to lead to the formation of variants are contradictory; the 
immense reverence for the preceding tradition (which ensures preservation and 
transmission of the text) seems to be contradictory to the freedom attributed to 
the scribes to amend the text on the level of synonymous readings and especially 
on the level of double readings.90  
Nevertheless, the differences between the source critics and Talmon are that 
Talmon claimed that his criticism is still textual criticism, and thus centred on the 
C (Text) centre on Illustration 11 above, and even more precisely at the c’ 
(Scriptural variants) centre on the same illustration. This recognition has a 
particular implication for my research. I will explicate the implication in what 
follows. 
3.5.2.3 Adding on to Nahkola’s Contribution 
As I understand it, a specific feature of Talmon’s criticism is the combination of 
the locus of his method (resulting in the criticism being termed textual), and the 
presuppositions and criteria which he shares with source critics. Thus, interpreted 
into the terms of this thesis, he sees the text as a lamp switched on in the text 
itself, and not behind the text. Thus, contrary to source critics’ centralisation on 
the pre-history of the text, Talmon showed that source critical presuppositions 
could be entertained even from the biblical text as the very centre of the critic’s 
method. Talmon’s arguments and Nahkola’s contribution should thus be seen as 
                                                
90 The argument already used by Whybray and mentioned earlier in this thesis. See Whybray, The 
Making of the Pentateuch: A Methodological Study, p. 49; Nahkola, p. 182. 
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supporting the idea that C and c’ are the centres of meaning with a unique 
relation between them, compared to other centres of meaning (the relation I have 
already tried to express visually on Illustration 11 above). That is to say, it is only 
at the accessible C centre (canonised image of the biblical text) that the remote 
centre (c’) is incorporated in the C centre of meaning. On the contrary, all the 
other remote centres of meaning (namely a’, b’, d’ and e’) are indeed distant and 
not incorporated in the accessible centres of A, B, D and E (see Illustration 11 
above).  
Furthermore, my understanding is that, this conclusion should raise questions 
regarding a possible common field between textual criticism and form criticism. 
In other words, according to the common ground between textual criticism and 
source criticism (observed by Nahkola), the possibility of common ground 
between textual criticism (analysing the textual tradition of the Scriptures in the 
context between C and c’ centres of meaning), and form criticism (analysing oral 
transmission of the Scriptures by focusing on their pre-textual forms) should be 
investigated. Thus, what is the relation between the two types of criticism and is 
there a common field of study for the two? 
In order to answer these questions, one has to take into consideration two critical 
factors. First, the study of orality and oral transmission has shown that oral 
transmission does not cease after a text is written.91 On the contrary, oral tradition 
and textual tradition coexist and interfere. Moreover, the particular circumstances 
of usage of the Scriptures in familial and public liturgy make this point even 
clearer.92 In other words, if not the majority, then still a considerable number of 
followers of the Scriptures have not read them but listened to them. Thus, it is fair 
                                                
91 ‘Oral literature did not need writing to become literature, and it continued long after writing 
was invented.’ Even more: ‘Literacy has little or no effect on oral history, except that eventually, 
when literacy becomes widespread and begins to be used for recording, and finally for writing, 
literature, the writing of history is an important part of that larger development’. (The italics are 
the author’s.) (Lord, Epic Singers and Oral Tradition, pp. 21, 22.) See also Albert B. Lord, The 
Singer of Tales, ed. by Stephen Mitchell and Gregory Nagy, 2 edn (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1960; repr. 2000). 
92 Deuteronomy 6.6-7; 17.18-19; 31.9-13; 2 Kings 23.2; and especially Nehemiah 8.8. 
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to say that interest in the orality of the Scriptures in biblical studies has its niche, 
even in cases where the text of the Scriptures is already present. 
Secondly, the form of the text contributes to answering the questions above. 
Namely, the form of the text (that is, its actual physical appearance on the page or 
the rhythm of its delivery) has changed throughout the process of both its oral and 
written transmission, so that it has eventually been divided by means of (the 
smallest) stichs and verses,93 aliyot94 (readings by a single reader in the 
synagogue), petuchot95 and setumot96 (closed sub-paragraph and open paragraph 
markers),97 chapters,98 and sedarim99 and parashot100 (weekly reading portions in 
                                                
93 The division of verses is work of the Masoretes. However, there are evidences that even the 
division of verses followed several streams of textual witnesses. ‘Sometimes one-and-a-half 
verses in one book form one verse in another one.’ Emanuel Tov, Textual Criticism of the Hebrew 
Bible, 2 edn (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 1992; repr. 2001), p. 52. In addition to verses, 
there are Masoretic section divisions in the middle of a verse, called stichs. These smallest 
divisions are made using the same signs otherwise indicating the end of ‘open’ and ‘closed’ 
sections at the end of verses. The breaks in the middle of verses normally follow a natural break 
in content of the text. See Tov, Textual Criticism of the Hebrew Bible, p. 53; Emanuel Tov, 
Scribal Practices and Approaches Reflected in the Texts Found in the Judean Desert (Leiden: 
Brill, 2004), pp. 127-28. 
94 The plural of עליה meaning ‘ascend’ or ‘go up’ and also ‘to be counted’. The latter meaning is 
to be applied to this public reading, since it denotes that everyone (including women) can ‘be 
counted’ for reading the Torah in the synagogue. See Meg. 23a; Judith Hauptman, ‘Blessings over 
Torah: Talmud’, in My People’s Prayer Book: Seder K’riat Hatorah v. 4, Traditional Prayers, 
Modern Commentaries, ed. by Lawrence A. Hoffman, (Woodstock, VT: Jewish Lights, 2000), pp. 
104-10 (p. 110). It was not before Maimonides of the twelfth century CE that a uniformity in 
textual divisions is attempted on a halakhic level. Aliyot, as the most recent development of the 
divisions in the text was, most likely, implemented at his time. However, no uniformity in aliyot 
was reached until approximately the eighteenth century. See Ephraim Stulberg, ‘The Last Oral 
Torah? The Division of the Torah into “Aliyot”’, JSIJ, 8 (2009), 183-202, pp. 183, 86, n.8). 
95 The plural of סתומה meaning ‘closed’. 
96 The plural of פתוחה meaning ‘open’. 
97 They are also called ‘large sense division.’ See Tov, Scribal Practices and Approaches 
Reflected in the Texts Found in the Judean Desert, p. 127. For further on proof for the paragraph 
and sub-paragraph sections as part of pre-Masoretic practice, see Emanuel Tov, ‘The Background 
of the Sense Divisions in the Biblical Texts’, in Delimitation Criticism: A New Tool in Biblical 
Scholarship, ed. by Marjo C. A. Korpel and Josef M. Oesch, Pericope, 1 (Assen: Van Gorcum, 
2000), pp. 312-50 (p. 332). 
98 ‘The division into chapters was established in the thirteenth century by Archbishop Stephen 
Langton from Canterbury, England …’.  (The italics are the author’s.) (Tov, Textual Criticism of 
the Hebrew Bible, p. 52.)  
99 The earlier tradition (thus also called ‘Palestinian’) of dividing the text of Jewish Scriptures for 
reading in a triennial cyclus. It originated from times prior to the Babylonian captivity (586 BCE). 
See Christian D. Ginsburg, Introduction to the Massoretico-Critical Edition of the Hebrew Bible 
(Vienna: Carl Fromme, 1894; repr. New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1966), p. 32; Norman L. 
and Nix Geisler, William E, A General Introduction to the Bible (Chicago: Moody Press, 1986), 
p. 339. 
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a triennial and annual cycles, respectively). Stichs, verses, petuchot and setumot, 
and chapters became part of the body text, whilst parashot and sedarim were 
added in form of Masoretic notes in the margins of the text. Even though aliyot 
are of the most recent dating, their origins are in stichs, the smallest sense 
divisions, which were never fully standardised. Conversely, fairly standardised 
aliyot are incorporated in the text of some editions of the Hebrew Bible.101 Thus, 
one can indeed claim common ground for both textual criticism (as suggested by 
Talmon) and (a de-centralised understanding of) form criticism. Consequently, 
for sensitivity to orality of the Scriptures to be employed, I believe one does not 
necessarily need to engage in ‘Gunkel-style’ speculations regarding the pre-
history of the Scriptures. Accordingly, differences between these divisions (as 
traced in the history of the Scriptures) directly illuminate the issue of how the 
Scriptures were used in an oral/aural context, in addition to its usage in a context 
of reading. 
Thus, on the one hand, petuchot and setumot as ‘large sense divisions’102 seem to 
be part of the earliest tradition of transmission. It is, in fact, almost certain that 
the autographs contained them.103 Indubitably, these divisions are a product of 
content divisioning, not quantitative divisioning.104 Furthermore, petucha has a 
form of a paragraph division, starting at the beginning of a new line, after the 
previous section ended. In contrast, setumah is a sub-paragraph, beginning 
                                                                                                                                
100 The later tradition of dividing the text of Jewish Scriptures for reading in an annual cyclus. 
Originating as a Babylonian tradition during the captivity (prior to 536 BCE), adopted by 
European communities. See Ginsburg, Introduction to the Massoretico-Critical Edition of the 
Hebrew Bible, p. 32; Geisler, A General Introduction to the Bible, p. 339. 
101 For example, CJB. 
102 Tov, Scribal Practices and Approaches Reflected in the Texts Found in the Judean Desert, p. 
134. 
103 ‘The system of subdividing a text into larger sense units by means of spacing was used for the 
transmission of many texts in antiquity, sacred and nonsacred, in Hebrew, Aramaic, and Greek.’ 
(Ibid.) Thus, this conclusion is not derived only from the Judean Desert Scrolls, since there are 
indeed various opinions about how optimistic one should be about the existence of a specific 
school of writing at Qumran. For opposing views see Eibert J. C. Tigchelaar, ‘Assessing Emanuel 
Tov’s “Qumran Scribal Practice”’, in The Dead Sea Scrolls: Transmission of Traditions and 
Production of Texts, ed. by Sarianna Metso, Hindy Najman and Eileen Schuller, (Leiden: Brill, 
2010), pp. 173-208. However, for more on the practice of sense units’ dividers, see Tov, ‘The 
Background of the Sense Divisions in the Biblical Texts’; Tov, Textual Criticism of the Hebrew 
Bible, pp. 50-51.  
104 ‘The subdivision itself into open and closed sections reflects exegesis on the extent of the 
content units …’. Tov, Textual Criticism of the Hebrew Bible, p. 51.  
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merely nine letter-spaces after the previous section ended, within the same line. 
These divisions, by definition, testify to the visual sense divisions in the context 
of reading.105 
On the other hand, stichs and verses,106 aliyot, parashot and sedarim,107 are all 
sense divisions that originated in the oral/aural context, which left written traces 
only at later stages of development. However, what is specific for stichs and 
verses (as the earliest developed in this group) is that they exist only as related to 
the Scriptures (also among the Judean Desert Scrolls) and have not been found in 
other types of ancient literature.108  
Nevertheless, among the evidence for this type of divisioning as part of the 
earliest oral tradition, we have the inner biblical testimony of the tradition of 
public reading of the Scriptures (see Deuteronomy 17.18-19; 31.9-13; 2 Kings 
23.2; and especially Nehemiah 8.8). In addition, there is Talmudic witness, that 
Moses himself divided the text into verses,109 as well as Talmudic prohibition 
against writing that division into a Torah scroll.110 There is also a Talmudic 
argument that ‘already Moses instituted the custom of publicly reading portions 
of the Torah on Sabbaths, festivals, and Rosh Hodesh (a semi-festival in ancient 
times) (JT Meg. 4:1)’.111 It is thus justifiable to assert that the above-mentioned 
                                                
105 There are also so-called paragraphos which denote types of a not widely standardised visual 
divisions. For more on paragraphos, see Tov, Scribal Practices and Approaches Reflected in the 
Texts Found in the Judean Desert, p. 139.  
106 Ibid., pp. 127-34. 
107 Sedarim are understood as more technical divisions of the text, whilst parashot are much more 
‘sense-oriented’ divisions. This is one of the reasons that sedarim divisions became unnecessary 
and extinct, after the technical divisions in terms of chapters was introduced in the thirteenth 
century CE. Thus, sedarim divisions are not adhered to during the reading of the Torah in 
synagogues today. See Aron Dotan, 'Masora', in Encyclopedia Judaica, Lif–Mek, ed. by Fred 
Skolnik and Michael Berenbaum, 22 vols (Jerusalem: Keter, 1971; repr. 2007), XIII, pp. 603-56 
(p. 607). 
108 ‘Among all the Hebrew and Aramaic texts from antiquity and more particularly from the 
Judean Desert, the division into smaller units than the larger section divisions (open and closed 
sections), though not the smallest units possible, is evidenced only in Hebrew Scripture.’ Tov, 
Scribal Practices and Approaches Reflected in the Texts Found in the Judean Desert, p. 127. 
109 ‘… any verse which Moses had not divided, we may not divide.’ Meg. 22a 
110 ‘If a Torah scroll has spaces <to mark> the beginning of verses, it may not be used for the 
lections.’ (Tov, Scribal Practices and Approaches Reflected in the Texts Found in the Judean 
Desert, p. 128.) 
111 Ronald L. Eisenberg, JPS Guide to Jewish Traditions (Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication 
Society, 2004), p. 438. 
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aural sense divisions originated as part of the practice of oral 
transmission/proclamation of the Scriptures. Therefore, the two traditions, oral 
and written, had their separate histories, and only at later stages merged into a 
form of written tradition. However, as confirmed by folklore studies, oral 
traditions do not cease to exist after they leave traces in a written tradition.  
Accordingly, I concur with Tov that, if not earlier, the public reading of the Torah 
is certainly evident from the middle of the second century BCE.112 For the 
communities of faith which practiced the public reading of the Torah, the 
canonisation process led to stabilisation of the closed list of Scriptures, that is, the 
canon. (See Sections 2.2.7 and 2.2.9 above for the Bakhtinian concept of 
canonisation utilised in this thesis.) 
Consequently, if one is to formulate a method of approaching the Scriptures with 
the view of understanding the meaning of the Scriptures as an utterance, one 
should consider the circumstances under which the Scriptures were used at the 
time they became the canon for a particular community of faith. In other words, if 
validation of the method follows the logic that ‘the proof of the pudding is in the 
eating’, one should consider how (even more precisely, in what portions) the 
pudding was ‘prescribed’ to be eaten by those who ‘discovered’ it. 
Regarding the exact portions, it is true that little is known about the actual 
practice of public reading of the Torah, prior to the time when divisioning weekly 
reading portions (aliyot) was indicated on manuscripts. However, after aliyot 
came into use, most likely at the time of Maimonides in the twelfth century CE, 
the whole practice of public reading became illuminated. 
Accordingly, it is known that parashot (weekly reading portions) had reached 
significant (although not perfect) uniformity. Thus, a single mistake regarding the 
parashot (a mistake regarding the place, type or a missing parasha) in the text of a 
                                                
112 See Tov, Scribal Practices and Approaches Reflected in the Texts Found in the Judean 
Desert.127, n.173 
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scroll rendered the scroll completely invalid.113 Talmud testifies that regular 
readings of the Torah were instituted on Monday, Thursday, and twice on the 
Sabbath (morning and evening services).114 However, ‘there was no systematic 
order for the substance and length of the public Torah readings until the Rabbis 
established the practice of consecutive readings’.115 Nevertheless, the latter 
tradition of reading parashot as consisting of consecutive aliyot bears additional 
witness to the approximate size of the text that was listened to. 
Namely, the Palestinian tradition had the Torah/Pentateuch divided into 155 
portions, so that the whole is read in a triennial cyclus.116 In contrast, the 
Babylonian tradition had the Torah/Pentateuch divided into 54 sections, so that 
the whole is read in an annual cyclus.117 Eventually, the Babylonian annual 
cyclus became accepted as the norm in the Palestinian Jewish community as 
well.118 In addition, there are also haphtaroth, the 54 sections of the text of the 
Prophets. The divisions of the text of the Prophets are introduced during the 
Maccabean period, at about 165 BCE.119 
 Finally, for this thesis the following rules for choosing and subdividing the 
weekly readings of the Torah and Prophets into aliyot (the readings done by one 
reader in the synagogue) are critical. Firstly, the readings of the Torah and of the 
Prophets had to match thematically, both with each other and with the 
                                                
113 M. T. Hilchot, Chapter 8 in Maimonides, Rambam Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger, 
28 vols (Brooklin, NY: Moznaim Publishing, 1998), 2. For further on the dynamics between the 
Jewish law regarding the validity of a scroll and the accuracy of the text in it, see B. Barry Levy, 
Fixing God’s Torah: The Accuracy of the Hebrew Bible Text in Jewish Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001).  
114 ‘The [following] ten enactments were ordained by Ezra: That the law be read [publicly] in the 
Minhah service on Sabbath; that the law be read [publicly] on Mondays and Thursdays …’ B.K. 
82a; See also Eisenberg, p. 438. 
115 Ibid., p. 439. 
116 ‘for the people of Palestine, who complete the reading of the Pentateuch in three years’. Meg. 
29b. 
117 See Eisenberg, pp. 439, 440. 
118 Palestinian triennial cyclus is no longer in use anywhere. However, various versions of a newly 
arranged triennial cyclus of reading the Scriptures are used in some synagogues in Reform, 
Conservative, Reconstructionist and Renewal Jewish movements. See Ginsburg, Introduction to 
the Massoretico-Critical Edition of the Hebrew Bible, p. 32; Geisler, A General Introduction to 
the Bible, p. 339. 
119 See Geisler, A General Introduction to the Bible, p. 339. 
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season/festival, in case it was not an ordinary Monday, Thursday or Sabbath.120 
Secondly, an aliyah should not be shorter than three verses.121 Thirdly, the last 
aliyah must not finish so that fewer than three verses are left of a large sense 
section (petucha or setumah).122 Fourthly, the last aliyah must not finish so that 
fewer than three verses are read from the beginning of a large sense section.123 
Fifthly, the last aliyah read on all occasions, should finish on an optimistic note, 
so that often an additional three verses are read from the next consecutive sense 
section, or another which fits thematically to the one just read.124 Sixthly, there 
were from three to seven and more aliyot at each public reading, subject to which 
occasion it was (minimum seven aliyot on each Sabbath).125 Seventhly, 
haphtarah, the reading from the Prophets was a minimum of three verses long for 
congregations where a translation was needed, and a minimum of twenty-one 
verses long for congregations where no translation took place. All the same, even 
in the latter case, if an entirely new theme was discussed within the scope of the 
twenty-one verses, the haphtarah is shortened to for example only ten verses (for 
example, in case of Isa. 54.1-10).126 However, haphtarah is read only on 
Sabbaths, major festivals and fast days.127  
In addition, since the public reading after the Babylonian exile was performed to 
the audience whose vernacular language was Aramaic, a translator was 
translating verse by verse ad hoc having no script in front of him, but only by 
listening, understanding and translating the heard verse. Nevertheless, the 
translation had to meet the following standard: the translator ‘was not permitted 
to translate word by word, lest he distort the sense of the text, nor was he 
                                                
120 For example, Exodus 20.1-14 on Shavuot, Leviticus 16 on Yom Kippur… See Meg. 31a-b. 
121 ‘He who reads in the Torah should not read less than three verses.’ Meg. 22a. 
122 ‘… at the end of a section not less than three verses should be left.’ Meg. 22a; 21b. 
123 ‘… we do not read less than three verses together at the beginning of a paragraph’. Meg. 22a; 
23b. 
124 Eisenberg, pp. 458-59. 
125 Minimum three on Mondays and Thursdays, and minimum seven on Sabbaths. See ibid., p. 
444.  
126 Ibid., p. 457. 
127 Meg. 23b. The reading of haphtarah originated, most likely at the time of Antiochus 
Epiphanes, and his decree by which all public reading of the Torah was banned. Thus, haphtarah 
is read instead. Nevertheless, after the circumstances changed, the reading of both the Torah and 
haphtarah remained. Jesus in Luke 4.16-21 followed the custom to read from the Prophets, the 
sense section he chose, and then elaborate on it. 
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permitted to elaborate on the text. His was to be a free, though exact 
translation.’128 
It is thus evident that every public reading followed a logic of sense divisions. 
Even more, every detail of the practice of public reading was subject to this logic 
of sense divisions. The fact that the whole Bible became divided into verses even 
though only the Torah and part of the Prophets were used in oral liturgy, testifies 
to the strength of the oral tradition and its logic (since verses are divisions 
originated under oral tradition, not written). 
The logic to which this oral practice attests has considerable implications on the 
issue of centralisation and decentralisation of meaning. In what follows, I will 
argue that methods of approaching biblical text, which are good at sensing the 
overarching narrative in the Bible, tend to loose sensitivity to the small details of 
the text. The opposite is true for the dialogical ‘close reading’ approaches, which 
rarely reach a level of sensitivity to the overarching scope to which the whole 
opus of the Scriptures witness. Thus, the practical question is where should one 
start from: the details, or the overarching structure? The logic of the oral tradition 
of Torah readings seems to me to provide the solution, since neither of the 
extremes (in decentralisation or centralisation) seems to be justified by the 
context of practice in which the Scriptures became the canon for the particular 
community of faith. 
Therefore, I believe, one has to approach the Scriptures by being open to hearing 
sense divisions in it. Consequently, outcomes of higher criticism, according to 
which the Bible cannot be read in sequence of sense divisions, seem simply not in 
accordance with the nature of the Scriptures.129 Furthermore, the sequences of 
sense division heard cannot be abnormally long, like for example a biblical book 
                                                
128 Eisenberg, p. 453. 
129 Thus, even if one could argue that there were times when the Scriptures were used in a 
predominantly written context, it seems to me against common sense to claim that the Scriptures 
cannot be used in an oral/aural context, so that one makes use of sequences of sense divisions. 
Nevertheless, the opposite of this logic is the outcome of the nineteenth-century’s higher 
criticism, after which reading the Bible as a whole became an endemic phenomenon preserved 
only in most conservative scholarly circles. See Walter C. Kaiser Jr, ‘Biblical Theology and the 
Interpretation of Messianic Texts’, AUSS, 34 (Autumn 1996), 195-209, (p. 196). 
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in its entirety. Therefore, the presupposition that one can intuitively get a hint of 
what the overarching narrative is like, does not seem to be supported by the 
portion of the Scripture traditionally heard on a single occasion.  
Thus, a controlled understanding of the overarching narrative can only be 
developed after centralising meaning on small details within a sense division of 
the biblical text, read and heard. Thus, the time needed for listening to the entire 
book is not the main reason for the lack of practice of reading the whole Bible in 
its entirety (not even in large sections). Instead, the main reason for dividing the 
text into small sensible portions lies in the practice of centralisation, which I 
argue should always precede decentralisation, as seemed to be the case each time 
the Torah was read. Simply put, one cannot centralise on small details when 
aiming at reading a whole book in one reading/listening. However, splitting the 
text into small quantitative, instead of content units, is not natural either.130 
Conversely, if the text is divided into smaller sense divisions, a centralisation on 
small details is both possible and natural. Thus, a decentralisation is the 
consecutive step, which is to be taken via the small details already recognised 
during centralisation. In those terms, the decentralisation after centralisation is 
not without control, but is controlled by the small details, which Bakhtin called 
‘dialogic overtones’, whilst Klingler called them ‘allusive markers’; I have 
suggested that they should be called ‘dependence markers’.131  
The next step, then, towards the final conclusion of what a genuine biblical 
approach to biblical text should contain is to clarify the differences between the 
Scriptures and the canon. In other words, I claimed that sensitivity to orality of 
the Bible can already be applied at the C–c’ context between centres of meaning, 
without necessarily changing the context to the b’ centre of pre-history (as 
Gunkel, for example, did).132 Furthermore, I claimed that centralisation on the 
                                                
130 On a critique of some modern triennial Torah-reading cyclus where logical consecutive texts 
are abrupt, as well as limitations of the present lectionary in Lutheran tradition see, for example, 
Walter Sundberg, ‘Limitations of the Lectionary’, Word & World, 10 (1990), 14-20; Eisenberg, p. 
440. 
131 See again my reworking Klingler’s Definitions in Section 2.3.3 above. 
132 By this, I do not claim that Gunkel did not start by focusing on small details in the text, as it 
was, that is the form of the text he was reading. However, I argue that the drift towards the pre-
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small details in a portion of the text read/heard should be employed at the 
beginning of the process of rendering the text. Both claims give rise to the 
following question: Is the method then to be located at the level of the canonised 
text (i.e. an edition of the Bible), or its underlying scriptural variants? 
3.5.2.4 Scriptures vs Canon as the Locus of Method 
As explained above, every given Bible or part of it is, in Bakhtinian terms, a 
canonised utterance, i.e. an utterance of ‘others’ which was accentuated by the 
effect of centrifugal and centripetal forces. (Note that here and in the rest of the 
thesis, I use the terms canonisation and canon as it was presented in Sections 
2.2.7 and 2.2.9 above.) The canon is the most accessible centre of meaning for 
the contemporary reader in any biblical tradition with his/her Bible being ‘at 
hand’. Therefore, according to the principles of relevance explained in Chapter 2 
above, the respective canon of writings in the particular Bible would typically 
deserve the status of the most relevant centre of meaning. However, the irritants 
associated with this centre of meaning are multiple. 
Firstly, there are at least four biblical canons available to me as the contemporary 
reader: the Greek LXX, the Latin vulgate, the Hebrew MT, and for example the 
English KJV (with a version133 of MT text but with different order of books). 
Historically speaking, all four have had a community of believers who saw their 
Bible as the biblical canon and preferred it to the others.  
                                                                                                                                
history of the text was not necessary for his sensitivity to orality of the text to be employed. For 
more on Gunkel’s choice to move the centre to pre-history of the text, as part of the sociological 
momentum of his time, see John Barton, The Old Testament: Canon, Literature and Theology. 
Collected Essays of John Barton, SOTS Series (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 183-84. 
133 Even the focus on MS, as the edition of the final form preserved by the Masoretes, through 
whose efforts the canonisation reached its peak for their particular community of faith, does not 
eliminate the initial questions at stake. More precisely, the question ‘which final form of the text?’ 
is simply rephrased into the question ‘which Masoretic text?’, since even the MS has developed 
via recognisable streams and branches of transmission. Thus, ‘even were we to surmise that [MS] 
reflects the “original” form of the Bible, we would still have to decide which Masoretic Text 
reflects this “original text,” since the Masoretic Text is not a uniform textual unit, but is itself 
represented by many witnesses’. (The italics are the author’s.) (Tov, Textual Criticism of the 
Hebrew Bible, p. 11.) See also Barton, The Old Testament: Canon, Literature and Theology, pp. 
185-89.  
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Secondly, choice of the canon that is historically and geographically the nearest 
to the context of the reader justifies usage of the term the final form of the text of 
the Bible but does not solve any problem – quite the opposite. In other words, the 
so-called final form approaches are in fact particular tradition approaches, leading 
to the inevitable question of the criteria by which the particular tradition was 
perceived as most favourable and relevant. I find this choice of locus hardly 
attainable within a view wider than a particular tradition is. Along this line of 
argument, Barton affirms that KJV is an equally legitimate final form of the text, 
according to the criteria limited to one particular tradition. Namely, from the year 
1611, and within the Protestant tradition(s) of the English-speaking world, KJV 
has indeed been the final form of the text, being the latest version of the 
authorised translation of the inherited Scriptures.134 
However, it is clear that historical and geographical proximity cannot justify any 
canon be awarded the status of the centre of hermeneutical theory and meaning. 
Based on the historical and geographical criteria, anchoring the theory to one 
particular canon with (at best, graded) ignorance of other canons, is nothing less 
than locating the method at one particular religious tradition (of faith and 
interpretation) within which the canonisation took place or the canon became part 
of the religious heritage. There seems to be no objective answer to the question of 
which tradition deserves to be regarded as genuinely biblical: Hebrew, Greek, 
Latin or English. 
In spite of these irritants, the majority of hypotheses135 regarding the formation of 
the canon of the Scriptures follow precisely historical and geographical criteria 
that are presumed to have governed the process of canonisation. Accordingly, the 
emphasis the critics put on the tradition with its socio-political circumstances 
                                                
134 See Barton, The Old Testament: Canon, Literature and Theology, p. 189.  
135 I do not believe that any of those should deserve the status of a theory, since the historical 
witnesses for both of them are either weak, or non-existent. I find Wright’s definition of 
hypothesis here as having no need for further explanation: a hypothesis is ‘essentially a construct, 
thought up by a human mind, which offers itself as a story about a particular set of phenomena, in 
which the story, which is bound to be an interpretation of those phenomena, also offers an 
explanation of them’. (The italics are the author’s.) (Wright, The New Testament and the People 
of God, p. 99.) 
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under which the process of canonisation took place, is explicit in the case of 
James Barr,136 Sanders,137 Seeligmann138 and Fishbane,139 to mention just a few.  
In contrast, Childs was the first to locate the method in the Scriptures, instead of 
in the canon, avoiding thus the dead-ends of the ‘final form’ issue, whilst still 
searching for the criteria for canonisation in the intrinsic qualities of the writings 
themselves, rather than any socio-political factors in the society in which the 
writings happened to be canonised. This difference urged him to claim his 
method not to be canonical in comparison to Sanders’ method, for example.140 
It is important, then, to recognise the fact that the locus of Childs’ method is at 
the c’ centre (the Scriptures with scriptural variants), as opposed to the C centre 
(the Canon of Scriptures), on Illustration 11 above. This does not mean that 
Childs’ method is not sensitive to the canon as a list of authoritative writings, 
which closed under a particular tradition of interpretation. In fact, quite the 
opposite: Childs played a pioneering role in introducing the history of 
interpretation (Wirkungsgeschichte) as a discipline in the field of 
hermeneutics.141  
Furthermore, Barton’s contribution with the proposal to distinguish between the 
canon (as the list of books) and Scriptures (as the authoritative books) seems to 
                                                
136 James Barr, Holy Scripture: Canon, Authority, Criticism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983); James 
Barr, The Scope and Authority of the Bible (London: SCM, 1980; repr. 2002). 
137 Sanders, ‘Text and Canon: Concepts and Method’; Sanders, Canon and Community: A Guide 
to Canonical Criticism; Sanders, Canon and Community: A Guide to Canonical Criticism. See 
also Childs, ‘The Canon in Recent Biblical Studies: Reflections on an Era’, pp. 33-35. 
138 Isac L. Seeligmann, Gesammelte Studien zur Hebräischen Bibel, FAT (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2004), 41. See also Driver, ‘Brevard Childs: The Logic of Scripture’s Textual Authority 
in the Mystery of Christ’ (unpublished PhD Thesis), pp. 157-64. 
139 Fishbane, ‘Torah and Tradition’; Fishbane, ‘Revelation and Tradition: Aspects of Inner-
Biblical Exegesis’; Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel; Fishbane, The Garments of 
Torah: Essays in Biblical Hermeneutics. 
140 Childs, ‘The Canon in Recent Biblical Studies: Reflections on an Era’, pp. 33-35; As a matter 
of fact, his main monograph, introductory to his method, was meant to lead to the Scriptures, not 
canon. (Childs, Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture.) See also Barton, The Old 
Testament: Canon, Literature and Theology, pp. 44-47. 
141 ‘The history of exegesis is of special interest in illuminating the text by showing how the 
questions which are brought to bear by subsequent generations of interpreters influenced the 
answers which they received. No one comes to the text de novo ...’ (Brevard S. Childs, The Book 
of Exodus: A Critical, Theological Commentary (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1974), 
p. xv) 
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be helpful, since it delineates the notion of tradition (that finalises the 
canonisation) from theology/ideology that drives it.142 In the praxis of 
hermeneutics, a focus on the former, as explained above, leads to circulus 
vitiousus of justifying one interpretative tradition based on criteria established by 
the same tradition. Focus on the latter, thus, strikes me as a logical and viable 
solution for avoiding the irritants of ‘the final form’ proposals. In other words, it 
is not the focus on the tradition that leads to a satisfying explanation of the 
phenomenon of the canon, but, as I will suggest below, the focus on a balance 
between centralisation and decentralisation of meaning. 
Furthermore, this notion of the intrinsic quality of the canonical books is indeed 
common to, among others, Childs, Walter C. Kaiser Jr and Wright. There is good 
reason to include Wright in this list,143 even though he is a New Testament 
scholar. Specifically, the way he developed his method has much in common 
with the route I took in this thesis. In particular, both of us started with a theory 
of paradigms (Wright followed Barbour,144 I followed Kuhn). Both of us linked 
the paradigm theories to literary analysis of the biblical text (Wright followed 
Propp145 and Greimas,146 I followed Bakhtin). Finally, he saw a need to combine 
the two theories with the theory of history proposed by Edward Hallett Carr 
(1892-1982).147 In contrast, my understanding was that a combination of the 
Kuhnian and Bakhtinian theories would be most productive if linked with theory 
of relevance in general and theory of literary allusions in particular. The outcome 
of Wright’s comprehensive theory is the so-called critical realism, which, in his 
case is a follow-up to critical realism proposed by Ben F. Meyer (1927-95). Thus, 
                                                
142 Barton, The Old Testament: Canon, Literature and Theology, pp. 44-47. 
143 In addition to what I have used of his proposals already in the thesis. See Section 2.3.4 above. 
144 See Ian Barbour, Myths, Models and Paradigms: A Comparative Study in Science and Religion 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1974). 
145 See Vladimir Y. Propp, Morphology of the Folk Tale, trans. by Laurence Scott, The American 
Folklore Society, 2 edn (Leningrad: Academia, 1928; repr. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 
1968). 
146 Wright, The New Testament and the People of God, p. 70. See also Algirdas Julien Greimas, 
Structural Semantics: An Attempt at a Method, trans. by Alan Velie (Lincoln, NE: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1984); Algirdas Julien Greimas, On Meaning: Selected Writings in Semiotic 
Theory, Theory and History of Literature (Minneapolis: MN: University of Minnesota Press, 
1987). 
147 Wright, The New Testament and the People of God, p. 82. See also David M. Carr, What is 
History?, 2 edn (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1987). 
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comparing Wright’s method (the so-called five-acts method) with mine (I will 
suggest the name zoom lens method), appears to be logical and promising, at 
least to the level required to evaluate my choice of tools in my rendering of the 
biblical text. 
In particular, Childs, Kaiser, and Wright claim that there is an overarching, 
homogenous ‘controlling story’, or a master narrative, which justifies the view on 
the Scriptures as a unified whole. Nevertheless, it is the differences between their 
methods that will prove to be helpful in solving the problem of my research.  
It should be noted, however, that the differences between these methods, 
discussed in what follows, are very subtle. Thus, at many points, as will be 
shown, the difference is between a good and a better tool used, an appropriate and 
a more appropriate one. None the less, my application of the method in the 
following Chapter will show that even the fine-tuning of the methods yields 
considerable differences in the outcomes. 
The first difference among the methods concerns the level of sense of 
homogeneity of the Scriptures. Namely, as explained above, Childs locates his 
method at the c’ centre (Scriptures, with its variants), whilst Kaiser’s method 
seems to be almost insensitive to the variants. Moreover, this insensitivity seems 
to be caused by Kaiser’s much stronger focus on the unifying theme that is spread 
throughout the Bible; the theme he finds to be ‘God’s promise’.148 Accordingly, 
                                                
148 See Walter C. Kaiser Jr, ‘The Center of Old Testament Theology: The Promise’, Themelios, 10 
(1974); Walter C. Kaiser Jr, ‘The Promise Doctrine and Jesus’, TrinJ, 4 (1975), 58-66; Walter C. 
Kaiser Jr, ‘The Old Promise and the New Covenant’, in The Bible and Its Literary Milieu, ed. by 
John Maier and Vincent Tollers, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1979); Walter C. Kaiser Jr, ‘The 
Promised Land: A Biblical-Historical View’, BibSac, 138 (July 1981), 302-12; Walter C. Kaiser 
Jr, ‘The Promise of Isaiah 7:14 and the Single-Meaning Hermeneutic’, EvJ, 6 (1988), 55-70; 
Walter C. Kaiser Jr, ‘The Old Testament Promise of Material Blessings and the Contemporary 
Believer’, TrinJ, 9 (1988), 151-70; Walter C. Kaiser Jr, ‘The Unfailing Kindnesses Promised to 
David: Isaiah 55:3’, JSOT, 45 (1989), 91-98; Walter C. Kaiser Jr, ‘God’s Promise-Plan and His 
Gracious Law’, JETS, 33 (1990), 289-302; Walter C. Kaiser Jr, ‘Promise’, in Holman’s Bible 
Dictionary, ed. by Trent C. Butler, (Nashville, TN: Holman, 1991), pp. 1140-41; Walter C. Kaiser 
Jr, ‘Promise’, in The Flowering of Old Testament Theology: A Reader in Twentieth-century Old 
Testament Theology, 1930-1990, ed. by Ben C. Ollenburger, Elmer A. Martens and Gerhard F. 
Hasel, (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1992), pp. 233-53; Kaiser and Silva, An Introduction to 
Biblical Hermeneutics: The Search for Meaning; Walter C. Kaiser Jr, ‘Biblical Integrity in an Age 
of Theological Diversity’, EvJ, 18 (2000), 19-28; Walter C. Kaiser Jr, Recovering the Unity of the 
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Kaiser’s method could be labelled as genuinely canonical, since his method is 
indeed located and practised within the borders of the canonical opus. But, the 
cost for such a strong emphasis on the central theme is drifting away from the c’ 
centre (with all the variants of the biblical text), and indeed becoming less, if at 
all, sensitive to it. 
In addition, Wright’s method, according to my understanding, is developed by 
taking another step towards the image of the historical events/theological ideas, 
that is to A centre on Illustration 11 above. (However, I am stressing again that 
these differences are indeed on the level of fine-tuning.) More precisely, the Bible 
is seen as a narrative of an unfinished drama, so that the biblical story provides 
five acts (Creation, Fall, Israel, Jesus, Church) whilst the last stage of the fifth act 
(Church) is left for the contemporary reader to play out, being governed by the 
theme, plot, impression, and style of the previous parts.149 The outcome, it would 
seem, is the maximum sensitivity to the all-embracing story, but at the cost of 
lack of sensitivity to smaller details in the story itself, something that a sharper 
focus on the text could provide. This has already been noted by Wright’s 
predecessors, collectively belonging to the school of ‘structuralism’, and even 
more so by their critics.150 It would seem  that Wright has also seen these criteria 
for the control of the story, to be the most critical part of his method; thus, in his 
own words: ‘There is urgent need for better control within the practice of this 
method, for finding some ways to assessing the respective assertions of critics 
who have used it.’151  
In other words, Wright has achieved substantial control over the plot of a story, 
following Greimas,152 and acquired a tool that seems compatible with my method 
                                                                                                                                
Bible: One Continuous Story, Plan, and Purpose (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2009). Also 
Hasel, Old Testament Theology: Basic Issues in the Current Debate, p. 52. 
149 See N. T. Wright, ‘How Can the Bible Be Authoritative?’ VoxEv, 21 (1991), 7-32; Wright, The 
New Testament and the People of God, pp. 121-44; N. T. Wright, Scripture and the Authority of 
God (London: SPCK, 2005), pp. 83-103. 
150 David Jobling, ‘Methods of Modern Literary Criticism’, in The Blackwell Companion to the 
Hebrew Bible, ed. by Leo G. Perdue, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), pp. 19-35 (p. 24). 
151 Wright, The New Testament and the People of God, p. 73. 
152 Ibid., pp. 70-77. See Greimas, Structural Semantics: An Attempt at a Method; Greimas, On 
Meaning: Selected Writings in Semiotic Theory. 
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as well. (I believe, Bakhtinian dialogism leaves room for similar elements for 
controlling the plot of the story.) Nevertheless, Bakhtinian sensitivity to dialogic 
overtones, I suggest, would provide control of the story over even smaller 
elements than the plot. Accordingly, if the previous acts of the drama are to lead 
me to an understanding of what the end of the drama should look like, the critical 
question is about what the criteria are for the correct understanding of the 
previous acts. What are the criteria for the correct reading of the plot? I am 
convinced that the criteria cannot be found on the level of the plot, since it would 
clearly produce a circulus vitiosus. 
Furthermore, the criteria cannot be found on the level of the paradigm either, 
since the mainstay of the method is that the plot is the chief criteria for 
determining the paradigm/worldview, not vice versa. The only viable solution I 
thus see is tools sensitive to elements smaller than plot. Nevertheless, Wright 
does not seem to provide them, at least not explicitly. It seems that he has rather 
taken the route of searching for that tool by resorting to historical scholarship.153 I 
have to admit that I do not understand how historical scholarship could provide 
criteria for correctly understanding Genesis 1-3, for example. However, Genesis 
1-3 is seen as incorporating the first and second part of the drama we are 
supposed to take part in, according to Wright.  
Thus, in the light of the strengths and weaknesses of Wright’s method, explained 
above, I think that in comparison with Childs’ method and Kaiser’s method, 
Wright’s is the nearest to the A centre on Illustration 11 above, that is to the 
image of the historical events/theological ideas of the biblical paradigm. In 
                                                
153 It is, of course, legitimate to conclude that the only possible solution for lack of criteria in his 
method was to resort to the history of interpretation, following the solution proposed by Childs. 
However, in what follows, I will argue that there is a close link in hermeneutical methods sharing 
presuppositions with structuralists and hermeneutical methods sharing presuppositions with 
poststructuralists. Moreover, poststructuralists’ claim that there is a strong connection between 
‘genesis’ and structure, between history and semantics, and seem also to provide grounds for 
Wright’s solution. Thus, Wright concludes: ‘Genuine historical scholarship is still the appropriate 
tool with which to work at discovering more fully what precisely the biblical authors intended to 
say.’ (Wright, Scripture and the Authority of God, p. 81.) See also Jobling, ‘Methods of Modern 
Literary Criticism’, (p. 24); On the link between ‘Genesis and Structure’ and Phenomenology see 
Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. by Alan Bass (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1967; repr. 
London: Routledge Classics, 2001), pp. 193-211. 
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contrast to Wright’s method, Kaiser’s focus on details in the canonical text of the 
Old Testament that provide factual minutiae about the Messiah, his life, teaching, 
and so on, in the New Testament shows how important to him the small details of 
the narratives in the Bible are.154  
This comparison invites us in numerous ways to reconsider the chicken-and-egg 
question, what comes first and what follows, that is, the chicken or the egg, 
sensitivity to centrifugal forces in the Bible or on the centripetal, focus on 
variants or on the overarching theme, on the small details or the structure … This 
is where, I suggest, functionality against theory comes to fore.155 On the one 
hand, centralising the meaning having started from a centre already sensitive to 
centripetal forces at work, would handicap the meaning, leading to a ‘canon 
within the canon’156 hermeneutical handicap, or at best to a method being 
criticised as far too ‘flat’.157 On the other hand, decentralising the meaning having 
started from a centre already sensitive to centrifugal forces would handicap the 
meaning, making it simply not functional, just as Wellhausen’s decentralisation 
of meaning, on top of the b’ centre, (already distant and insensitive to centripetal 
forces of a unifying narrative in the Bible) made the meaning a part of history.158 
This leads me to conclude that the method has to start with sensitivity to the 
                                                
154 See especially the appendices in Walter C. Kaiser Jr, The Messiah in the Old Testament (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1995); See also Walter C. Kaiser Jr, ‘Messianic Prophecies in the Old 
Testament’, in A Guide to Biblical Prophecy, ed. by Carl Edwin Armerding and W. Ward Gasque, 
(Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1989), pp. 75-88; Walter C. Kaiser Jr, The Uses of the Old 
Testament in the New (Chicago, IL: Moody Press, 1985); Kaiser, ‘Biblical Theology and the 
Interpretation of Messianic Texts’. 
155 Following Kuhnian criteria for choosing a paradigm (see Section 2.1.4 above), rather than just 
entertaining Wright’s repeating of the phrase that ‘the proof of the pudding is in the eating’.  
156 A popular hermeneutical fallacy attributed to Martin Luther who applied the salvation-by-faith 
rule to the text of the Bible. The outcome was an unbridgeable incompatibility of the epistle of 
Jacob with the rest of the biblical canon. ‘St. John’s Gospel and his first epistle, St. Paul’s 
epistles, and especially Romans, Galatians, and Ephesians, and St. Peter’s first epistle are the  
books which teach all that is necessary for salvation, even if you read no other books. In 
comparison with them, James is a right straw epistle, for it has no evangelic manner about it.’ 
Even more: ‘Let us banish this epistle from the university, for it is worthless. It has no syllable 
about Christ, not even naming him except once at the beginning.’ (Preserved Smith, The Life and 
Letters of Martin Luther (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1911; repr. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 
1914), pp. 268,69.) Also Oswald Bayer, ‘Luther as an interpreter of Holy Scripture’, in The 
Cambridge Companion to Martin Luther, ed. by Donald K. McKim, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), pp. 73-85. 
157 See Hetty Lalleman, Celebrating the Law? Rethinking Old Testament Ethics (Milton Keynes: 
Paternoster, 2004), pp. 46-48. 
158 Kaiser, ‘Biblical Theology and the Interpretation of Messianic Texts’, (p. 196). 
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smallest details found in the variants of the text, but then also to proceed to 
decentralisation towards the overarching theme and structure in the wider 
scriptural context.  
However, as one might expect, the pendulum of history of interpretation did not 
stop at C centre (text), on its route from behind the text (from c’ centre). After 
experiencing irritants associated with a lamp located in the text as the centre of 
meaning, the pendulum seemed to be moving forward, towards the centres in 
front of the text. A closer look at the trends and methods of this period is what 
follows.  
3.5.3 COGNITIVE GRAVITY IN FRONT OF THE TEXT 
In the latter part of the twentieth century, the majority of methods used in biblical 
studies could be described as switching on the lamp in front of the text. The 
common feature of these approaches to the Bible (despite many differences) is 
that they moved their presupposed centre of meaning from C centre (text), 
towards the voices heard in front of the text, that is to D centre (image of the first 
recipient/s) or E centre (image of the contemporary recipient/s).  
However, as presented above, every shift of the pendulum presented a change in 
the location of the ‘main stream’ in biblical studies of that time. I think that in my 
presentation of the methods earlier in this thesis, it was evident that many 
varieties in methods in biblical studies co-exist at all times, whereas my intention 
was always to discern the shift of the ‘mainstream’. However, in terms of the 
variety exercised in methods in biblical study, the latter part of the twentieth 
century is not comparable to any other epoch. In other words, the shift of the 
location of the ‘mainstream’ was a shift towards un-uniformed practice and 
decentralised meaning. In those terms, grouping together the methods of this 
period is indeed an almost utopian endeavour. Utopian since not to be grouped 
was the very trend of the time unless under the label of ‘ungrouped’. Almost 
utopian, since the shift towards decentralisation of meaning did take place via a 
few critical steps, which, thus, provide some ground for association.  
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Furthermore, as I understand it, the purpose of the shift was, of course, not ‘to 
belong to the ungrouped’. It was rather the outcome of the process of moving 
towards the voices in front of the text. The complex reality is that the voices on 
this side of the text are of so many groups and contexts, that the decentralisation 
of methods, of fields of study, and indeed of the meaning (as the outcome of the 
study) was inevitable. 
It is thus understandable that my presentation of the methods in this section has to 
be on the level of a general overview, far more general than in the previous 
sections. However, I believe that it will fulfil the purpose of this thesis. 
Accordingly, I believe that visualising the relations between the ‘main’ streams at 
this period of history is always helpful. Illustration 22 below, shows only the 
most important years and names of the persons whose writings represented a step 
forward (even if the person was not the most influential person at the time of the 
step).  
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Illustration 22: Lamp and Torch in front of the Text as a Canonised 
Utterance 
 
 
 
The first glance at the illustration above, I believe, directs us to two main trends 
in biblical scholarship of the time, both of them rooted in philosophy of language 
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in general and semiotics in particular. On the one hand, de Saussure’s semiotics 
leads towards the so-called structuralism as the overarching theory for explaining 
language, communication, human understanding and, in fact, the whole reality. 
On the other hand, Bakhtin’s proposal with the same purpose was the theory of 
dialogism. When introducing Bakhtinian literary theory in Chapter 2 above, I 
used the incompatibility of the two theories as the way to explain them. It is thus 
already obvious that the two theories were in fact two worldviews, pregnant with 
potential to develop new methods as well as to establish groups of practitioners. 
The incompatibility of the two groups is the main line of my argument visualised 
in Illustration 22 above. 
The first signs of this movement of the hermeneutical pendulum can be traced 
back to James Muilenburg (1896-1974) and his ‘rhetorical criticism’, initiated 
with his article ‘Form Criticism and Beyond’ in 1969.159 Muilenburg, in fact, 
followed up Gunkel’s notion of intrinsic literary qualities of Scriptures.160 This is 
the crucial point, the one I highlighted when introducing Gunkel’s hypothesis 
earlier in the thesis.161 Both the form critics of the nineteenth century and ‘new’ 
literary critics of the late twentieth century rightly called their methods 
‘literary’.162 The essence was the same, even though the outcomes of it and even 
the elements of the method were so diverse. On the one hand, the common 
essence for both streams, as I am seeking to explain, is indeed ‘the lamp’. On the 
other hand, the basic difference is in the centres of focus. 
In the same year, 1969, the second turnover took place: Edmund Leach published 
his Genesis as Myth and Other Essays163 and set the milestone of a symbiosis 
between anthropology and ‘new’ literary criticism. Moreover, he (as a 
                                                
159 James Muilenburg, ‘Form Criticism and Beyond’, JBL, 88 (March 1969), 1-18 (p. 1). 
160 See Joe M. Sprinkle, ‘Literary Approaches to the Old Testament: A Survey of Recent 
Scholarship’, JETS, 32 (September 1989), 299-310; Jobling, ‘Methods of Modern Literary 
Criticism’. 
161 See Section 3.5.1 above. 
162 Thus, ‘[a] few generations ago much ‘literary’ criticism was just as diachronic as the work of 
most biblical interpreters [that is, of most (source and form) critics].’ John Barton, 'Historical-
Critical Approaches', in The Cambridge Companion to Biblical Interpretation, ed. by John Barton 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 9-20, (p. 14). 
163 Edmund Leach, Genesis as Myth and Other Essays (Cape Editions) (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1969). 
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structuralist anthropologist) applied structuralism as a method for reading biblical 
text.164 This is why he is on the left side, of Illustration 16 above, visually 
belonging to the ‘structuralist’ stream (notice the thick solid line arrow denoting 
direct lines of thought, whilst the dotted lines on the illustration denote the 
background theories, being present and influential, even though not intrinsic to 
biblical studies). 
Thirdly, in 1974, Fernando Belo applied a political agenda to his rendering of the 
Bible (more precisely, the New Testament).165 This will be paired-up with Phyllis 
Trible’s God and Rhetoric of Sexuality,166 in which the text of the Hebrew 
Bible/Old Testament is rendered with having a feminist agenda in mind. 
However, the pairing of Belo and Trible should not be over simplified. Belo was 
a structuralist, Trible a rhetoric critic disciple of Muilenburg.167 The differences 
are as important as the similarities. Namely, rhetorical criticism can stand close to 
structuralist approaches, but it is not necessarily always the case. My 
understanding of this is that the very idea of rhetoric is so vague that the scope, 
majority of tools and thus the outcomes of the methods used by rhetorical critics 
can overlap with those of the structuralist.168 Accordingly, rhetoric criticism in its 
early phases had more in common with so-called ‘close reading’ of the Bible, in 
the form of Bakhtinian criticism, than with structuralism. This was even more 
evident after the publication of Robert Alter’s The Art of Biblical Narrative 
(1981) and Meir Sternberg’s The Poetics of Biblical Narrative (1987).169 Both of 
them applied a Bakhtinian approach to the biblical text.  
                                                
164 For consequent steps, see for example articles from 1972 in Semeia 1: A Structuralist 
Approach to the Parables, ed. by Robert W. Funk (Atlanta, GA: SBL, 1974). 
165 See Fernando Belo, A Materialist Reading of the Gospel of Mark (London: Orbis Books, 
1981). 
166 Trible, God and Rhetoric of Sexuality. 
167 I agree with Alan J. Hauser, (and disagree with T. B Dozeman) that the ‘Muilenburg School’ 
never existed as a group, let alone homogenously. See Duane F. Watson and Alan J. Hauser, 
Rhetorical Criticism of the Bible: A Comprehensive Bibliography with Notes on History and 
Method (New York: Brill, 1994), p. 3. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Robert Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative (New York: Basic Books, 1981); Meir Sternberg, 
The Poetics of Biblical Narrative: Ideological Literature and the Drama of Reading (Bloomington, 
IN: Indiana University Press, 1985; repr. 1987). 
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I believe this ‘close’ reading of the Bible is then best understood, if the opposing, 
structuralist approach is labelled as a ‘distant’ reading. It is important to read (and 
not misread) these labels in the context of the comparison. Simply put, for 
Bakhtin the smallest details, nuances in a speech/text are where the logic of 
reasoning rests. A simple experience of reading Sternberg’s rendering of a 
biblical text is a good way to test this. Conversely, for structuralists, moving a 
step or two away from the small details in order to recognise the big structure of 
the speech, text, language as a whole, is not just welcome but essential, since that 
is where their logic of reasoning rests.  
This difference should lead to the conclusion that both of the approaches have 
their strengths and weaknesses, as is always the case with opposing theories. 
However, regarding the issue of the de/centralisation of meaning, some of the 
weaknesses of structuralist approaches seem to me to be anomalies, not just 
irritants. More precisely (as noted during the analysis of Wright’s method, when 
applied to reading a text) if the overall structure of the text is what defines the 
meaning of the particles in the text, what are the criteria for recognising the 
structure? It cannot be the details in the text itself, since structuralist logic takes 
exactly the opposite direction. The lack of these criteria was the irritant, growing 
into the anomaly that led to ‘poststructuralism’ in general and ‘deconstruction’ in 
particular. Whilst poststructuralism had (and still has) many forms, subject to the 
field of study in which it is applied, deconstruction is its best example in the field 
of philosophical-literary analysis of a text. 
More precisely, Jacque Derrida proposed the theory of deconstruction in his Of 
Grammatology (1967).170 Derrida has claimed that his deconstruction is not a 
                                                
170 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology / Corrected Edition, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
(Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1967; repr. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1997). See also Reading Derrida’s Of Grammatology, ed. by Sean Gaston and Ian Maclachlan 
(London: Continuum International, 2011); Arthur Bradley, Derrida’s Of Grammatology: An 
Edinburgh Philosophical Guide (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008); Leslie Hill, The 
Cambridge Introduction to Jacques Derrida (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); 
Nicholas Royle, Jacques Derrida (London: Routledge, 2003); Nicholas Royle, ‘What is 
Deconstruction?’ in Deconstructions: A User’s Guide, ed. by Nicholas Royle, (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2000), pp. 1-13. 
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method, nor critique, analysis or any type of poststructuralism.171 Respecting this 
claim, it is thus appropriate to talk about Derrida’s agenda. Approaching it from 
the issue of de/centralisation, the agenda could be summarised as follows. 
As I understand it, the essence of Saussurean heritage is the notion that reality 
functions in forms of binary opposites (for example, a cat is understood and 
defined by differences between cats and dogs). Challenging and changing the 
future is thus achievable by challenging and eventually changing the binary 
opposites. This idea, applied to a text, sets the agenda according to which the 
binary opposites in the text are searched for and then exposed. Furthermore, the 
purpose of the exposition is to show that all the hierarchies, past and present, are 
based on presupposition that structures are an intrinsic feature of the reality (just 
as the binary opposites are), whereas the structures are not an intrinsic feature, 
according to Derrida. Thus, restructuring the binary opposites in a text, leads to 
restructuring assumed hierarchies in the text, and consequently in societies as 
well. This restructuring is called deconstruction. Thus, deconstruction is, in fact, 
changing the frame-structure within which a text and its particles carry meaning, 
so that the meaning of the text is changed and directed towards challenging 
hierarchical structures in societies. 
It is not difficult to see how this agenda can be applied to biblical text as well. 
Nevertheless, a link with structuralism is also obvious. However, Derrida’s twist 
to it is what I would describe as structuralism detached from a centre of meaning. 
In order to further the analogy with the biblical text as mirror and lamp, it seems 
adequate to describe Derrida’s rendering of the text as if the text was a torch. 
Accordingly, the text is seen as being able to enlighten any topic, preferably a 
current issue of gender, economic, political, racial or any other form of 
oppression in current societies.  
As it transpired, the gender issues, addressed by Trible in 1978 were the meeting 
point of Bakhtinian and structuralist streams in biblical studies.172 The torch was 
                                                
171 Jacques Derrida, ‘Letter to a Japanese Friend’, in Derrida and Différance, ed. by David Wood 
and Robert Bernasconi, (Warwick: Parousia Press, 1985), pp. 1-5 (p. 3). 
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switched on and the borders between the two streams seem to have slowly started 
diminishing, allowing them to merge under the umbrella of ‘ideological 
criticism’. 
However, this did not happen at once. Thus, on the one hand, one can still discern 
the stream of Bakhtinian-type approaches represented by the works of Adele 
Berlin,173 Robert Polzin,174 Shimon Bar-Efrat,175 Lyle Eslinger,176 George 
Savran,177 Joel Rosenberg178 and others.179 On the other hand, the stream of 
structuralist approaches is furthered by the work of Jobling180 and others.181 
Finally, essentially deconstructive approaches are discernable in the works of 
Peter D. Quinn-Miscall,182 Mieke Bal,183 Athalya Brenner,184 Cherly J. Exum,185 
Ellen Van Wolde,186 Regina Schwartz,187 Yvonne Sherwood188 and others.189  
                                                                                                                                
172 On the link between structuralism, poststructuralism and feminism see (especially chapter 12 
in) A History of Feminist Literary Criticism, ed. by Gill Plain and Susan Sellers (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
173 Adele Berlin, Poetics and Interpretation of Biblical Narrative (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 
1983). 
174 Robert Polzin, Samuel and the Deuteronomist: A Literary Study of the Deuteronomic History. 
Part Two: 1 Samuel (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1989); Polzin, David and the 
Deuteronomist: A Literary Study of the Deuteronomic History. Part Three: 2 Samuel. The first 
volume was done in a more structuralist style. See Robert Polzin, Moses and the Deuteronomist: 
A Literary Study of the Deuteronomic History. Part One: Deuteronomy/Joshua/Judges 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1980). 
175 Shimon Bar-Efrat, Narrative Art in the Bible (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1989). 
176 Lyle Eslinger, Into the Hands of the Living God, JSOTSup (Sheffield: Almond Press, 1989); 
Lyle Eslinger, House of God or House of David: The Rhetoric of 2 Samuel 7, JSOTSup 
(Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1994). 
177 George W. Savran, Telling and Retelling: Quotation in Biblical Narrative, Indiana Studies in 
Biblical Literature (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988). See also George W. 
Savran, Encountering the Divine: Theophany in Biblical Narrative, JSOTSup (London: T&T 
Clark International, 2005). 
178 Joel Rosenberg, ‘The Institutional Matrix of Treachery in 2 Samuel 11’, Semeia, 46 (1989), 
103-16. The whole of the 46th Volume of Semeia is a primer on the close reading of the biblical 
text (Semeia 46: Narrative Research on the Hebrew Bible, ed. by Miri Amihai, George W. Coats 
and Anne M. Solomon (Atlanta, GA: SBL, 1989).) 
179 See Semeia 46: Narrative Research on the Hebrew Bible, ed. by Amihai, Coats and Solomon. 
and The Literary Guide to the Bible, ed. by Robert Alter and Frank Kermode (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press, 1987; repr. 1990). 
180 David Jobling, The Sense of Biblical Narrative: Structural Analyses in the Hebrew Bible, 
JSOTSup, 2 vols (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1986), I; David Jobling, The Sense of Biblical 
Narrative: Structural Analyses in the Hebrew Bible, JSOTSup, 2 vols (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 
1986), II. 
181 See, for example, the contributors to Semeia 18: Genesis 2 and 3, Kaleidoscopic Structural 
Readings, ed. by Daniel Patte (Atlanta, GA: SBL, 1980; repr. 1983). 
182 Peter D. Quinn-Miscall, The Workings of Old Testament Narrative (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress, 
1983); Peter D. Quinn-Miscall, 1 Samuel: A Literary Reading, Indiana Studies in Biblical 
Literature (Bloomberg, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986). 
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However, it is important to note that when I introduced the dialogical features of 
Bakhtinian literary criticism, it was obvious that it was already a decentralised 
methodology (see Chapter 2 above). Conversely, the shift of the hermeneutical 
pendulum towards deconstruction also reaches decentralisation, but on the 
grounds of the detached structure of the text, and not on the grounds of genuinely 
decentralised borders between centres of meaning.  
In addition, when introducing the terms essential for understanding Bakhtinian 
dialogism, it was explained that every utterance features orientation, achieved by 
accentuation via dialogical overtones in the utterance itself (see Section 2.2.7 
above). Thus, during the natural development of language, re-accentuation 
represents a change in what has earlier been accepted as a stereotype, or, simply, 
conventional in the language. 
                                                                                                                                
183 Mieke Bal, Lethal Love: Feminist Literary Readings of Biblical Love Stories (Bloomington, 
IN: Indiana University Press, 1987); Mieke Bal, Death and Dissymmetry: The Politics of 
Coherence in the Book of Judges (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1988); Mieke Bal, 
Murder and Difference: Gender, Genre and Scholarship on Sisera’s Death (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 1988); see also Anti-Covenant: Counter-Reading Women’s Lives in the 
Hebrew Bible, ed. by Mieke Bal, JSOTSup (Sheffield: Almond Press, 1989). 
184 See ‘A Feminist Companion to the Bible’ series and Athalya Brenner and Fokkelien Van Dijk-
Hemmes, On Gendering Texts: Female and Male Voices in the Hebrew Bible (Leiden: Brill 
Academic, 1993); A Feminist Companion to Exodus to Deuteronomy, ed. by Athalya Brenner, 
The Feminist Companion to the Bible (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1994). 
185 Cheryl J. Exum, Tragedy and Biblical Narrative: Arrows of the Almighty (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990); Cheryl J. Exum, Fragmented Women Feminist (Sub)versions 
of Biblical Narratives, JSOTSup (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1993). 
186 Ellen J. Van Wolde, Words Become Worlds: Semantic Studies of Genesis 1–11 (Leiden: E. J. 
Brill, 1994). 
187 Regina M. Schwartz, The Curse of Cain: The Violent Legacy of Monotheism (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1997). 
188 Yvonne Sherwood, The Prostitute and the Prophet: Hosea’s Marriage in Literary-Theoretical 
Perspective, JSOTSup (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1996). 
189 See The New Literary Criticism and the Hebrew Bible, ed. by Cheryl J. Exum and David 
Clines, JSOTSup (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1993); Danna Nolan Fewell and David M. 
Gunn, Gender, Power, and Promise: The Subject of the Bible’s First Story (Nashville, TN: 
Abingdon, 1993); A Feminist Companion to Exodus to Deuteronomy, ed. by Brenner; The Labour 
of Reading: Desire, Alienation, and Biblical Interpretation, ed. by Fiona C. Black, Roland Boer 
and Erin Runions, SBL Semeia Studies (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1999). For race 
oppression/African centred criticism see Semeia 76: Race, Class and the Politics of Biblical 
Translation ed. by Randall C. Bailey and Tina Pippin (Atlanta, GA: SBL, 1996); Yet with a 
Steady Beat: Contemporary U. S. Afrocentric Biblical Interpretation ed. by Randall C. Bailey, 
Semeia Studies (Leiden: Brill Academic, 2002). For Marxist/political ideological criticism see 
Semeia 59: Ideological Criticism of Biblical Texts, ed. by David Jobling and Tina Pippin (Atlanta, 
GA: SBL, 1992). An early example of a purely deconstructive approach to the Bible is also 
Gabriel Josipovici, The Book of God: A Response to the Bible (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1988). 
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Thus, when re-accentuation is applied to an utterance, by modifying dialogical 
overtones in it, a change in the meaning conveyed by the utterance is achieved. 
This is, in essence, deconstruction of a text, in terms of Bakhtinian dialogism. It 
is achieved by maximising the act of authoring on the side of the addressee. In 
those terms it is not a decentralisation, but the opposite of it; it is a centralisation 
on the a’ centre of meaning (the contemporary recipient centre on Illustration 11, 
above). In this way, the text is thus seen as a torch, being able to illuminate (bear 
witness to?) any context, any issue on ‘this’ side of the text; just like a torch that 
can be directed towards any (deconstructed) recipient on this side of the canon. In 
what follows, I will show how this detachment of the hermeneutical focus from 
the C centre presents considerable problems. The two cases presented in what 
follows are deconstructions of the D centre and E centre (on Illustration 11 
above). 
3.5.3.1 Cognitive Gravity of Deconstructed Recipients 
As argued above, the reader-response theories of interpretations have in common, 
a focus on the voices heard in front of the text.190 Deconstruction criticism is an 
ample yield of the shift; the biblical text is interpreted as detached from its 
canonical context, and immersed in another context, presumably a more relevant 
one to the contemporary interpreter of the text. There is thus hardly any need to 
cut the biblical text into fragments, as was the practice when the focus was on 
voices behind the text. This time the whole text is transposed into a new whole, 
foreign to the times when the biblical canon was the relevant context. The newly 
chosen, more relevant contexts are various: the contemporary 
ecological/scientific context, socio/political context, or even the context of 
another canon, like, for example, the early Christian Apocrypha. 
I think that an example of the latter focus can provide grounds for understanding 
the anomalies of all the methods centred on a context detached from the C centre 
                                                
190 It is appropriate, thus, to see theology as being ‘particularised’ according to many 
contexts/issues in which it could find its locus; feminism, liberation of the oppressed (black or 
Latin American), or local contexts of Africa, South Asia, East Asia respectively. See The Modern 
Theologians: An Introduction to Christian Theology since 1918, ed. by David F. Ford and Rachel 
Muers (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), pp. 427-552.  
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(on Illustration 11 above). More precisely, the irritants/anomalies of this focus on 
non-canonical traditions from the contexts in front of biblical text can be clarified 
by an exposition of Bart D. Ehrman’s approach. At first glance, Ehrman’s method 
is developed according to the notion of the biblical canon. In other words, 
Ehrman places the focus of his method at the time and place of writing of the 
biblical books (in particular the New Testament). However, his presupposition is 
that the correct meaning of the canonical books is only properly understood in the 
context of (even more so in contrast with) the books, which did not make it to the 
scope of the canonical opus. More precisely, the locus of Ehrman’s method is not 
in the voices heard in the canon of the Bible, but in the voices heard at the outer 
edge of the border of the canon. Thus, contrary to Wellhausen’s and Gunkel’s 
master narrative, reflecting Darwin’s The Origin of The Species, Ehrman locates 
the master narrative of his theological paradigm (rather implicitly than explicitly) 
in the writings of Roman philosophers promoting polytheistic, decentralised and, 
above all, tolerant ideals of ideology and politics.191 This master narrative is the 
basis for Ehrman’s paradigm in which the attitude of ‘proto-orthodox’ Christians 
(to be selective in their evaluation of canonical and non-canonical writings) is 
seen as intolerant, unfair and, in fact, unacceptable. This intolerance of the proto-
orthodox tradition, responsible for selectiveness and limitedness of biblical canon 
is thus the main irritant and, indeed, the anomaly that made Ehrman subscribe to 
other ideologies/paradigms available at the time of making the canon. 
Contrary to Ehrman’s method, I think that whilst there are logical reasons for 
pointing to the relevance of the non-canonical writings for our understanding of 
the message of the canonical writings, granting the non-canonical writings 
presumed relevance greater than the relevance of the canonical writings is 
illogical and against the principles of relevance, as explained in Section 2.3 
above. Consequently, the idea that the winner writes the history is only partially 
                                                
191 The main logic of argument against the ‘proto-orthodox’ intolerance, as contrasted to Roman 
tolerance (presumably common to all of the non-Christian societies) is implicit in the next 
paragraph, and echoed throughout the book: ‘This intolerance was not something proto-orthodox 
Christianity derived from its broader Roman milieu. In point of fact, the polytheistic religions of 
the Roman Empire were famously tolerant of one another.’ (Bart D. Ehrman, Lost Christianities: 
The Battles for Scripture and the Faiths We Never Knew (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), p. 254.) 
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true, since Ehrman develops his conclusion specifically on the historical writings 
of the losers. Furthermore, the fact that the ‘losers’ did not get to write the ‘main-
stream’ history, does not necessarily make the losers’ view on history more 
relevant, objective or true. As R. A. Baker comments in his review of The Lost 
Christianities, ‘Five hundred years from now someone will dig up some twentieth 
century Neo-Nazi writings that describe and explain the struggle of the Nazi party 
of the 1940’s against the Allies. Why would anyone believe this testimony over 
the writings of Winston Churchill or Dwight Eisenhower?’192 
Furthermore, what Ehrman does is to locate his method at a centre of meaning 
which does not have a stable ‘winning’ master narrative, and thus does not 
represent a delineable utterance. An even more critical move in the method is to 
apply decentralisation of meaning, after locating the centre of his method at the 
centre alien to the canonical. The outcome of his method, as could be predicted, 
is not just one paradigm of the non-canonical writings but many of them, all of 
them being in conflict with the biblical paradigm (and with each other). 
Consequently, and not surprising that Ehrman cannot find an answer to his 
question: ‘Where did we get our New Testament Gospels in the first place, and 
how do we know that they, rather than the dozens of Gospels that did not become 
part of the New Testament, reveal the truth about what Jesus taught?’ (The italics 
are the author’s).193 
Following the same line of his hermeneutical logic, Ehrman explicitly ranks the 
apocryphal revelation as greater than the canonical revelation. The outcomes of 
this hermeneutical method are, as could be predicted, at best odd194 to the voices 
heard from the canonical context (and at worst, in direct conflict195 with them).  
Thus, as mentioned above, there are indeed many contexts, many traditions of 
interpretation of the canonised texts that could be granted greater relevance than 
                                                
192 R. A. Baker, Review of Bart Ehrman’s Lost Christianities, 2005, Available: 
<http://www.churchhistory101.com/docs/Ehrman_Review.pdf>, [Accessed 18 February 2018]. 
193 Ehrman, Lost Christianities: The Battles for Scripture and the Faiths We Never Knew, p. 93. 
194 The idea that Jesus had a twin brother. See ibid., pp. 39-59. 
195 Authorship of 1 Timothy, for example. See ibid., p. 39. 
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the canonical context itself – early Christian Apocrypha (in the case of Ehrman’s 
method) being only one possibility. Accordingly, the torch can be directed to 
enlighten the A centre in Illustration 11 above (the image of historical 
events/theological ideas). The effect of this needs to be clarified in what follows. 
3.5.3.2 Cognitive Gravity of a Deconstructed Image of the World 
After the biblical text presumably got the function of a torch that can be detached 
from its canonical context, the text could illuminate an image of the reality (the A 
centre in Illustration 11 above), which presumably did not claim anything 
prescriptive or propositional regarding the actual reality. In other words, the A 
centre can be deconstructed, so that it receives new features and functions. By the 
same deconstruction, theology and science divorced, by an agreement that 
theology will continue to be responsible for images, whilst the real world is a 
matter for science.196 The artificial and deceiving assumption that these two fields 
of study are delineable is hard to defend for many reasons. I find the following 
three reasons most relevant for this thesis. 
Firstly, the biblical text claims to be historical by nature, even though the type of 
historicity is not scientific. In other words, the fact that the contemporary 
audience fails at attempts to re-construct the actual minutiae of the pre-history of 
Scriptures is not logical grounds for denying the historicity of the Scriptures. 
Moreover, the part of the history of the text, which the contemporary audience’s 
                                                
196 This is a solution already proposed by Kant, who followed up Hume’s argument against 
religion’s attempt to explain the natural world. Thus, religion’s field of study is ethics/morals, 
whilst the study of nature is to be left to science. This view is extremely popularised in writings 
of, for example, Stephen Jay Gould. An example of a moderate version of the separation between 
science and religion is presented by Van Huyssten. See Stephen Jay Gould, Rocks of Ages: 
Science and Religion in the Fullness of Life (New York, NY: Ballantine, 1999); Wentzel J. Van 
Huyssten, The Shaping of Rationality: Toward Interdisciplinarity in Theology and Science (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999). For more on the metaphors used for the relation between religion 
and science in Europe in pre-modern and modern time, see Margaret J. Osler, ‘Mixing Metaphors: 
Science and Religion or Natural Philosophy and Theology in Early Modern Europe’, History of 
Science, 36 (1998), 91-113. 
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enquiry can reach, has shown that the text and its (also historical) context cannot 
be clearly delineated.197  
Secondly, the biblical image of the world, author, text and the primary recipient is 
authorised in its own terms, just as any other writing authorises its images. More 
precisely, our understanding of the type of accuracy of biblical presentation is 
subject to our sensitivity to the way time and space are presented in a particular 
biblical text. Thus, instead of imposing criteria foreign to the text, the text itself 
should be consulted when a choice of criteria for measuring the accuracy of the 
biblical text is made. Thus, the assumed agreement between biblical studies and 
scientific studies regarding the monopoly over matters of nature and the world is 
deceiving in that it implies that standards required by and from a scientific piece 
of writing are imposed on the Scriptures. The same way, the dichotomy in itself is 
false, since the standard of the scientific accuracy between the two (between a 
scientific writing and the Scriptures) is different does not necessarily mean that 
one of them (in this case the Scriptures) does not have any scientific accuracy, 
and thus any credibility in explaining the natural world. 
Thirdly and finally, superimposing the type of scientific presentation of the world 
over the biblical presentation (so that the scientific presentation becomes the 
criterion for the measure of scientific accuracy of the biblical presentation) is 
nothing else but centralisation on the context of the contemporary recipient of the 
biblical text. In other words, there is no such thing as the science, but rather the 
current state of the science.198 Consequently, the scientific rendering of the world 
                                                
197 This became especially relevant after the great archaeological discoveries during the twentieth 
century.  See William Foxwell Albright, The Archaeology of Palestine and the Bible, Kiraz 
Classic Archaeological Reprints 5 (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias, 2009), p. 127. 
198 The fluidity of scientific knowledge has never been an issue. To the contrary, it was the 
fluidity that initiated the conflict regarding the ways the fluidity/growth functions. In addition to 
the resources I used when introducing the conflict between Kuhnian and Popperian theory in 
Chapter 2 above, see also Nectarios G. Limnatis, German Idealism and the Problem of 
Knowledge: Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, ed. by Reinier Munk, Studies in German Idealism 
(New York: Springer, 2008); John Waller, Fabulous Science: Fact and Fiction in the History of 
Scientific Discovery (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Friedel Weinert, The Scientist as 
Philosopher: Philosophical Consequences of Great Scientific Discoveries (Berlin: Springer, 
2005); Aharon Kantorovich, Scientific Discovery: Logic and Tinkering (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1993); William A. Wallace, Galileo’s Logic of Discovery and 
Proof: The Background, Content, and Use of His Appropriated Treatises on Aristotle’s Posterior 
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is not a constant. Thus, by definition, it should not be used as a criterion for any 
rendering of the biblical image of the world. The real criterion is thus not any 
constant, but the current recipient/audience. Even more particularly, the real 
criterion is cognitive structure of the audience’s paradigm.199 Lack of 
understanding of the reader-centeredness of this approach to the biblical text 
creates the possibility for ‘scientific’ approaches to the Bible to keep claiming 
their scientific validity, or theological validity, or in the worst case, both …200 
Meanwhile the personal choice of faith regarding the existence of a gap (or 
absence of it) between the biblical presentation of the world and the real world, 
that is between the A centre and a’ centre (on Illustration 11 above), is apparently 
set aside. 
3.6 CONCLUSION: NEED FOR DYNAMICS IN THE METHOD 
After reconsidering the three groups of methods (according to their sensitivity to 
the realities behind, in and in front of the text) in this Chapter, and summarising 
the irritants these methods have failed to resolve, I can draw the conclusions 
which will further shape my method. These conclusions will lead into the 
exposition of my method in the following Section. 
To conclude, denying the existence, or simply ignoring either the centrifugal or 
the centripetal forces of Scriptures, is both foolish and problematic. A pursuit of 
                                                                                                                                
Analytics (New York: Springer Science, 1992); Thomas Nickles, ‘The Strange Story of Scientific 
Method’, in Models of Discovery and Creativity, ed. by Joke Meheus and Thomas Nickles, (New 
York: Springer Science, 2009), pp. 167-207. 
199 The function of the cognitive part of a paradigm is an often-neglected part of the process of 
scientific progress/revolution. Nevertheless, exactly the neglect of the cognitive factor in 
scientific progress/revolution is what makes critical realism seem like a feasible way to reconcile 
science and religion. My point is that critical realism in general is an agenda rather than a method. 
Thus, the agenda of reconciliation is furthered at the cost of neglect of the cognitive structure 
offered by biblical text, on the text’s terms. For more on the relation between realism and 
cognitive structures (particularly in the process of scientific revolutions) see Peter Barker, Hanne 
Andersen and Xiang Chen, The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 164-80. 
200 For example, a type of critical realism in general and panentheistic theistic evolution is argued 
by Arthur Peacocke. See Arthur Peacocke, Intimations of Reality: Critical Realism in Science and 
Religion (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984); Arthur Peacocke, Theology 
for a Scientific Age: Being and Becoming – Natural, Divine and Human (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1990; repr. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1993). 
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this kind makes some peculiar solutions seem viable, often even essential. 
However, such solutions have rarely been functional.  
A far too strong emphasis on the centrifugal forces will delineate and in fact 
estrange the Scriptures from its unifying image of the genuine biblical paradigm. 
In contrast, far too strong an emphasis on the centripetal forces will delineate the 
genuine paradigm from its basis, the Scriptures, thus robbing the image from the 
criteria according to which the image was created in the first place. 
The logical question to ask is: What is the balanced level of centralisation and 
decentralisation? The answer, I believe, has to be based on the purpose of the 
method, that is to satisfy the expectations the reader has set forth for the text. In 
the light of the history of interpretation, as I have briefly reviewed it in this 
Chapter, I find it inappropriate to align with methods which focus on the 
prehistory of the text so much that they deprive the Bible from its functionality in 
the current religious context.201 Likewise, expecting the Bible function only in the 
narrow context of one particular religious tradition, limited to one specific time 
and space, is equally unsatisfying. A method which is sensitive to, instead of 
ignorant of the competing fields of gravity surrounding the centres of meaning is 
the method which serves the purpose of this thesis. 
3.7 EXPOSITION OF THE ZOOM LENS METHOD 
Based on the theory of interpretative relativity, zoom lens model and my review 
of the conflicting methods of interpretation, I conclude that the method which 
will be able to increase the reader’s sensitivity to the dependence markers in the 
text should comprise the following seven steps/tasks. The first three reflect 
methodological centralisation, the last three, methodological decentralisation, 
whilst the fourth task represents the mainstay of the method: validation of the 
dependence between two texts. The literal meaning of the text is appropriated by 
                                                
201 See again Kaiser, ‘Biblical Theology and the Interpretation of Messianic Texts’, p. 196. 
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the first three steps, whilst pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic by the last 
three steps of the method.202  
The steps of the zoom lens method I propose are: 
1. Centralisation on aural divisions: raising potential questions regarding 
voices, utterances, plot, chronotopes, and social ideologies.  
Purpose of the step: validation of: double-voicedness, polyphony, plot, 
chronotope(s), and heteroglossia. 
2. Centralisation on visual divisions: raising potential questions 
regarding words, sentences, verses, chapters, textual criticism. 
Purpose of the step: validation of insights from linguistics and textual criticism. 
3. Centralisation on dependence markers: initial validation of 
highlighters (direction markers) in the text. 
Purpose of the step: initial validation regarding the presence of monophonic 
dependence markers. 
4. Conclusion regarding the type of dependence: validation of 
dependence. 
Purpose of the step: validation of in/stability of pragmatic, sociological and 
paradigmatic meanings and of an image of a paradigm of the dependent text. 
Final validation of the presence of monophonic dependence markers in the text. 
5. Decentralisation towards the independent text: validation of 
independence.  
                                                
202 Literal, pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings as they were explained in Sections 
1.8 and 3.4 above.  
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Purpose of the step: validation of stability of an image of a paradigm in the text. 
Validation of stability of meaning within the image of the paradigm. Validation 
of the text’s potential to qualify to status of the master narrative. 
6. Decentralisation towards the recipients: Validation of rhetorical 
function of the dependence markers. 
Validation of allusion, reference, citation, quotation, or paraphrase with five 
options of rhetorical functions (B≈A; B=A; B≠A; B>A; B<A) in each case. 
7. Decentralisation towards other centres: validations of answers to the 
questions. 
Validation of implications (of the reading) for a particular view on the text, seen 
from particular centres of meaning. In other words, the implication should 
involve an attempt to answer the questions about the text, raised at the first three 
steps. An application of these steps to reading the narrative text in Exodus 16 is 
the purpose of the following Chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE ‘SABBATH OF THE LORD’ MOTIF IN EXODUS 16 
In this Chapter, I will apply the zoom lens method whilst analysing the ‘Sabbath 
of the LORD’ motif in Exodus 16. The literal meaning of the text will be 
appropriated by the first three steps of the method, whilst pragmatic, sociological 
and paradigmatic meanings by the last three steps. With this purpose in mind, I 
will explain my logic of reasoning through the steps of the method, hopefully 
making it more clear by delineating some steps, that, in practice simply come in a 
more synchronic way. 
Owing to the scope of this thesis, the application of the method to the text in 
Genesis 16 will be limited, focussing on the one single dependence marker, the 
‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif. Therefore, the rendering of the sections of biblical 
text in this Chapter is not intended to produce an extensive commentary on 
biblical text. 
The ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif occurs only twice in the narrative texts in the 
Torah, namely as part of the following two expressions: ַׁשַּבת־קֶֹדׁש ַליהָוה in 
Exodus 16.23 and as ִּכי־ַׁשָּבת ַהּיֹום ַליהָוה in Exodus 16.25. In the next step, I will 
delineate the text in which these expressions are logical.  
4.1 ‘SABBATH OF THE LORD’ MOTIF AS A PART OF AURAL 
DIVISIONS 
Whilst it was concluded earlier in this thesis, that the first context the narrative 
was used in was oral/aural, it is noteworthy that even details such as complex 
chiastic structures, have been shown as functional in the context.1 In other words, 
even the features usually perceived as visual (e.g. complex chiastic structures) 
can be appropriated without the text being seen/read. Thus, my rendering of the 
text at this first step of the zoom lens method, by listening to, instead of reading 
or seeing, the narrow, as well as the wider context/plot of Exodus 16, will be 
justifiable.  
                                                
1 For the feasibility of complex chiastic structures as part of the oral/aural context see Section 
3.5.1 above. 
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The ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif in Exodus 16.23,25 is part of the narrative 
regarding the congregation of Israel in the wilderness of Sin (Exodus 16.1-31). 
This is the narrow context of the motif. In addition, the same text is a part of a 
wider context of the wandering of the congregation, from the crossing of the Red 
Sea (Exodus 13.17) to the arrival at Sinai (Exodus 19.1). Both blocks of the 
canonical text make recognisable wholes. 
Furthermore, my endeavour to understand the orality of this text is facilitated by 
the recognition of the use of the text in the Jewish oral/aural tradition. Here we 
find Exodus 16.23,25 as part of the sixteenth parasha/seder in the yearly cyclus, 
and its sixth aliyah (sixth reading). Nevertheless, the fifth and sixth aliyah make a 
logical sequence of sense sections. They start with Exodus 15.27 recounting that 
in Marah, after God through Moses turned bitter water sweet, the congregation 
encamped at Elim, a place abundant with sweet water, which had precisely 
twelve springs of water (the exact number of the tribes of Israel). The link is thus 
clear between the previous (fourth) aliyah and the following two from chapter 16, 
with a new description of moving to another wilderness: the wilderness of Sin 
(16.1). However, since verse 15.27 serves as a bridge between the two miracle-in-
a-desert events (without introducing a new voice), I will focus on Exodus 16.1-36 
as a whole (without the bridge-verse), when analysing the voices in the narrative. 
4.1.1 POLYPHONY OF VOICES AND DOUBLE-VOICEDNESS IN EXODUS 16.1-36 
To appropriate the function of orality in Exodus 16, we firstly need to recognise 
the multiplicity of voices in the narrative. The following five voices are 
recognisable in the oral/aural section of Exodus 16.1-36: the narrator, God, 
Moses, Aaron, and the congregation (of the sons of Israel, also called ‘the house 
of Israel’ in verse 31). All five voices form a whole of interconnected dialogism, 
being dependent on each other and mutually affecting each other. In addition to 
heteroglossia, plot, chronotopes and confronting ideologies, which will be 
discussed later, the dialogism is also developed by representation of the voices 
themselves.  
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Namely, none of the voices is represented as fully independent. In other words, a 
limited independence of the voices comes to the fore only in rather rare instances 
when a particular voice is meant to propel the dialogism forward, only to 
immediately be dissolved again among the other voices. The following examples 
will clarify the dynamics between the voices. 
The voice of the narrator seems to lead the narrative. However, the narrator not 
only describes and narrates, but also assists the other individual voices to have 
their say. Thus, the utterances of the other voices are heard almost fully, so that 
the direct speech of the other voices (within quotation marks, according to our 
rules) are a regularity in the narrative, not an exception. Thus, the narrator’s voice 
serves the same role as in verse 15.27, the role of bridging the quoted utterances 
of the other voices.  
Furthermore, even when the narrator carries out his/her role as the bridge 
between other voices, the bridging seems to be inefficient. Consequently, the 
narrator is not represented as a fully developed authority in the text. Rather, the 
other voices exercise the authority to interrupt the narrative, and to aim it in their 
direction. A comparison between the portions of verses 3-7 and 12-14 illustrates 
this. Namely, the narrator’s voice is already onstage. He/she could have 
effortlessly narrated what happened, how, why, and with what consequences. 
However, the narrator chooses to almost hide behind other voices, even at the 
cost of clarity in the flow of the narrative. Thus, the audience needs to focus on 
who said what and to whom in order to follow the sense division, despite the fact 
that simply focussing on the narrator’s narration would have been much easier.  
This choice of the narrator’s voice results in a vivid representation of the other 
voices. However, none of them are represented as independent. Namely, Moses’ 
voice acts as the leading voice compared to the other human voices (Aaron’s and 
the congregation’s voice). However, even Moses’ voice is primarily represented 
as merely a repeater of God’s utterances (compared to rare instances of 
paraphrasing/narrating what God has said).  
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The double-voicedness is furthermore highlighted in verses 6-7, with a doubled 
reported speech of Moses and Aaron. ‘At evening you will know that the LORD 
has brought you out of the land of Egypt; and in the morning you will see the 
glory of the LORD, for He hears your grumblings against the LORD; and what are 
we, that you grumble against us?’2 Whose words were these? Did Moses and 
Aaron talk in unison? If not, what is the sense of using a quoted utterance, instead 
of simply paraphrasing what the two of them announced to the congregation?  
Furthermore, after being merged into one, the two voices, Moses’ and Aaron’s 
split and act according to what was supposed to be the formal pattern of Moses’ 
official speeches, from the time Moses was called into leadership ministry 
(Exodus 4.15,16 and 7.1,2). Thus, Moses tells Aaron what to say to the 
congregation, so that Aaron can pass on the words of Moses. However, the 
almost ironic representation of the voices is that the narrator quotes what Moses 
told Aaron to quote, whilst the quotation is already part of a quote of the doubled 
quotation of Moses’ and Aaron’s doubled voice in verse 8! 
Nevertheless, the double-voicedness is equally present in the voice of the 
congregation. That is to say the congregation is presented in unison, while, in 
reality, it is the only voice that naturally comprises multitudes of voices, lives, 
aims …3 Thus, when the congregation says something, the voice is a single voice 
– the congregation grumbled, said, complained and so forth (verses [indirectly 2,] 
3, 15.) However, a way of splitting the consciousness of the congregation’s voice, 
in verse 22, is achieved by presenting what the leaders of the congregation did 
(but never the way they uttered something!) even when there was an opportunity 
to allow someone as an individual from the congregation’s consciousness have a 
say, the opportunity was not made use of.  
In addition, when the voice of the congregation acts as split, in verse 27, the act is 
presented as a conflict within the one united consciousness. Thus, ‘It came about 
                                                
2 The NASB translation will be used throughout this Chapter, if not stated otherwise. 
3 Note that here, as well as in the rest of the thesis, I use the term ‘aim’, as defined in Section 1.1 
above, as ‘the fundamental direction of a person’s life, or some fairly stable subset of that 
fundamental direction’. 
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on the seventh day that some of the people went out to gather, but they found 
none’ Hence, this act is presented not as an act against Moses, (as when the 
congregation said something earlier) but as a conflict within one consciousness, 
resulting in a ‘rebellion of neglect’ against God. (I labelled this event as a 
‘rebellion of neglect’, since it is represented as a neglect of what God said, rather 
than as an open, loud rebellion against God, like for example Miriam and Aaron’s 
and Korah’s rebellions in Numbers 12 and 16, respectively.) Accordingly, God’s 
reaction in the following verses (28 and 29), clarifies this point, directing his 
reaction not only against the people as a whole, but also against Moses, who is 
part of humankind!  
Thus, God directs the critique to Moses, despite the fact that Moses had clearly 
not done anything wrong in the context of the events in the wilderness of Sin. 
However, this universalisation is understandable in the context of the 
Pentateuch/Torah, as a whole, recalling the context of the first act against the 
explicit will of God in the Garden of Eden (Genesis 3). 
Thus Moses is part of the whole of humanity, whose transgression is represented 
here by the entire congregation in the wilderness of Sin. In what follows, it will 
be shown that this universalisation of double-voicedness of all the voices is 
intentional, serving the rhetoric of this narrative. 
In addition, the representation of God’s voice in this section needs to be analysed. 
The voice of God is represented as the most authoritative voice compared to any 
human voice. However, God’s voice is not represented as independent, either. 
Thus, God adapts how much to say, whenever he is heard. Accordingly, God 
does not reveal everything about future events, thus creating an element of 
surprise throughout the events in the desert. In this way, God’s voice adapts its 
revelation according to the needs of the congregation. However, I believe this 
limitation is somewhat theological. Nevertheless, the rhetorical limitations of 
God’s voice are striking.  
The narrator’s voice is the one who actively limits the representation of God’s 
voice. Thus, direct quotes from God are limited to only two utterances, in verses 
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4-5 and 12. In contrast, the narrator chooses to let God’s voice be hidden behind 
Moses’ voice! Thus, it is through Moses’ utterances that we, as the recipients, 
‘listen’ to what God uttered. Accordingly, in verses 16, 23, and 32, what Moses 
described as a quotation or a paraphrase of God’s utterance we are not permitted 
to hear as God’s direct speech. The repression of the representation of God’s 
voice is clearly seen in verse 24, where the narrator chooses to represent the 
revelation and instruction (about keeping the manna overnight without it being 
spoilt) as coming from Moses, and not from God! This contradiction of the voice 
of Moses, who claims that his utterance in verse 23 is a quotation or paraphrase 
of God’s utterance, is so strong, that NASB, chose to render the pi’el meaning of 
 in the verse as ‘meant’ instead of ‘said/commanded/told’, in contrast to the ָּדַבר
latter meaning used in ASV, CPB, KJV, YLT, LHDOT, CJB, even GNT, NLT, 
and MSG. Thus, NASB’s rendering of this verse softens the contrast between the 
narrator’s perspectives in the parallelism with verse 32, where the same pattern is 
used (Moses quoting God’s utterance), but the narrator’s comment (in verse 34) 
is clearly on God’s behalf.  
Finally, the culmination of this double-voicedness of God’s voice, I believe, is in 
verse 29. Namely, in contrast to all the other quoted utterances in the narrative, it 
is only in verse 29 that the quotation is ambiguous in terms of the voice that 
uttered it. More precisely, the utterance starts (as the last part of verse 28) as a 
typical quoted utterance, with an introduction provided by the narrator. 
Accordingly, the quotation in verse 28 represents God as talking in the first-
person singular. However, in verse 29, the perspective is changed, so that the 
audience is confused regarding whose voice is heard. Is it God who speaks about 
himself in the third-person singular, or Moses, whose voice is, in the latter case, 
represented as blended with God’s voice? According to my basic presuppositions 
in this thesis4 I argue that this blending of voices (of God and Moses) is 
intentional, aiming to convey to us the way God’s voice is and remains accessible 
in the Scriptures. 
                                                
4 See Section 1.5 above. 
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4.1.2 UTTERANCES AND HETEROGLOSSIA IN EXODUS 16.1-36 
According to the purpose of this Chapter, I am mostly interested in the two 
utterances in verses 23 and 25, already identified as double-voiced, as these 
verses will help us to see how the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif functions in 
heteroglossia. Even so, there are also some general qualities, common to all the 
utterances in the text that need to be noted here. Namely, there is not a single 
utterance with ambiguities in terms of implicit finalisation, expressivity, 
addressivity or personal proximity. In contrast, as shown above, there is only one 
field of ambiguities, and that is the field of delineation of utterances. Thus, 
analysis of other unambiguous features of the utterances reveals how the 
ambiguities in the text seem to be intended, and finely tuned. 
The entire text gives the impression of a dynamic sequence of 
announcements/commands, and actions in accordance with or against what was 
announced/commanded. Thus, this finalisation of utterances with a clear, explicit 
expectation of a response on behalf of the respective addressee(s) is probably the 
most precise feature of the utterances in the text. 
Furthermore, some of the expressivity has already been evaluated above, when I 
concluded how God’s voice was represented as the most authoritative. This 
expressivity of utterances of God reveals the relations he has with other voices in 
the narrative. In addition, it is Moses who commands Aaron what to say and do, 
never the other way around, even though they are also described as talking 
together/in unison, as analysed above. Furthermore, it is the utterances of the 
congregation which are represented as being suppressed, with only two types of 
utterances being heard from this voice; the utterance expressing dissatisfaction, 
discomfort, rebellion and anger in verse 3, and the utterance expressing wonder 
and amazement in verse 15. 
Finally, the narrator’s voice is not neutral either, even though one could argue 
that the narrator’s voice is indeed the least expressive. In other words, the 
narrator’s voice expresses its relation to the events and topics by his/her choice of 
representation. As explained above, the choice not to allow the congregation to 
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have their say in more than two types of speech clearly shows what the narrator 
considered to be the most appropriate types of utterance with which to represent 
the congregation’s voice. A comparison with other instances in the 
Pentateuch/Torah, where there was always (at least) one among the despairing 
people/congregation who kept the faith, showed faithfulness and kept the 
commandments when the huge majority ceased to do so proves that this 
representation is an exception. This exception shows that the narrator is not 
neutral but expresses his/her ideology by the chosen style of narration. 
This leads us to addressivity and personal proximity of particular utterances in 
verses 21-30, as I narrow the context on verses 23 and 25. God never relates 
directly to the congregation. Earlier, verse 10 described only that they saw/met 
each other, almost as if God could not avoid looking at them, the addressivity of 
the text in verse 10 would suggest. In verses 21-29 this idea is developed further, 
so that God actively avoids talking directly to the congregation. The culmination 
is, of course, verses 28-29, where God, described as more desperate than angry, 
chooses to talk to Moses as if talking to the congregation. In accordance, the 
voice of the congregation is totally silenced. Not one utterance is heard as the 
congregation’s voice. The voice of congregation is not described as uttering 
anything. Only the ‘leaders’, as a specially privileged group from within the 
congregation, are described as uttering something, without their voice being 
allowed to be heard by the addressee of the text.  
One of the most interesting choices made in the text is that Aaron’s 
voice/consciousness is completely absent from this segment, in fact between 
verses 11 and 33. He is last seen in verse 10, where the congregation saw God, 
somehow, over Aaron’s shoulders, whilst Aaron was talking. After the view 
moved from Aaron to the Lord, ‘whose glory appeared in the cloud’, Aaron 
disappears completely until he is given a special role in the text; to take care of 
the manna, in the Sanctuary. Thus, in this segment (verses 11-33), the role of 
Aaron’s voice is absent, until it reappears when the view is moved to the 
Sanctuary. I believe that it is thus not surprising, that in Jewish tradition, the fifth 
aliyah finishes with this dramatic ‘behold, the glory of the LORD appeared in the 
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cloud’ in verse 10, hence leaving the imbalance between personal proximities of 
utterances in the sixth aliyah to come to the fore. 
In accordance, the only voices that the author could use to express his/her 
proximity to other voices in this context, are God’s voice and Moses’ voice. 
However, as will be shown they are sufficient tools. In verses 21-30, the narrator 
authorises dual representation of proximity between God, Moses and the 
congregation. Namely, on the one hand, Moses has the role of the interpreter of 
God’s will. It is Moses who knows all, so the congregation comes to him for 
everything that happens, conveying either grumbling or questioning. In other 
words, it is Moses who is supposed to know, whilst the congregation is supposed 
listen, learn and obey. 
Accordingly, Moses has a privileged relationship with God whom Moses is 
supposed to listen to, learn from, and obey. Thus, God and Moses are described 
as having a very close relationship, whilst the congregation has been described as 
having distant relationship with Moses, and even more distant with God. 
However, this proximity gradually changes, so that Moses is described as 
increasingly close to the congregation, distancing thus the proximity between him 
and God. Verse 24 highlights this point, when the narrator chooses to represent 
the command coming from Moses. The gradation reaches a peak when God 
reacts to the wrongdoings of the congregation by addressing the critique to 
Moses, as a part of the congregation in verse 28. Consequently, in verse 29, one 
could argue that the representation of God’s voice makes it so much more distant 
that even Moses hears it as indirect speech. 
In addition to this change in proximities, there is a strange usage of the term 
Shabbat. For the sake of clarity in delineation of the steps of the method, I will 
leave analysis of this problem for the section when I focus on the literal divisions 
in the text, below.5 For now, it is sufficient to note that the ‘Sabbath of the 
LORD’ motif occurs for the first time in the Bible in verses 23 and 25, in the 
                                                
5 See Section 4.2.2 below. 
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context of the proximity between God and the congregation, and even humanity 
as a whole, being the furthest apart. 
Finally, this change in proximities between the represented voices and the aspect 
of heteroglossia in them, that we have focused on in this section, emphasises the 
importance of the plot as a representation of the dynamics in relations between 
the characters in the narrative. In other words, the change of places in relational 
hierarchy directs the reader’s focus on what has happened before, and at the same 
time, sets expectations for any future changes in the following parts of the 
narrative.  
4.1.3 PLOT IN EXODUS 16.1-36 AND 13.17-17.16 (-18.27) 
The interest in the events before and after the events described in the desert of 
Sin, is in fact, a call to recognise the plot of the narrative. Thus, the first 
impression is that this event has its strategic place between two similar accounts, 
being the already mentioned event in the desert of Marah (15.22-27, with the 
camping at Elim serving as a bridge between the two desert-type accounts) and at 
Massah and Meribah (Exodus 17.1-7). This account in Exodus 16 is the longest 
among the three and can be understood as the peak of a chiasm developed on the 
theme of rebellions in the deserts. Finally, the chiasm is supported with two 
parallel accounts of victories on the journey, the one culminating with the Song 
of Moses in 15.1-21 and the other in 17.8-16 as the victory over Amalek at 
Rephidim. Passing through the Red Sea (13.17- 14.31) is thus roughly paralleled 
with the account of the battle with Amalek and the visit of Jethro (18.1-27). 
Accordingly, I do not assume that any parallelism, either in the Bible or in 
languages and rhetoric in general, should comply with strict mathematical rules. 
Thus, I understand that chiastic rings are mostly thematic, rather than 
mathematically precise. Here I see latitude for differences between Jewish and 
Christian traditions regarding traditional divisioning of the biblical text. Namely, 
the account of Jethro’s visit is in Jewish tradition rendered as a part of the 
account of the Sinai event (the seventeenth parasha in the yearly cyclus, Exodus 
18.1-20.23), whilst Christian tradition attaches the Jethro account to the 
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previously described sequence of events preceding the events at Sinai.6 However, 
whichever way the text is divided, one can see that Jethro’s visit serves as a 
bridge between the desert-type events (Exodus 14-17) and the events taking place 
at Sinai. Thus, no matter how one looks at a bridge, there are always two ends to 
it. 
There is one key idea emerging from this short look at the wider structure of the 
narrative. Namely, the composition of the plot reaches one of its chiastic peaks in 
the account of manna in Exodus 16, considered from the perspective of the wider 
narrative in Exodus 13.17-17.16 (-18.27). 
However, one should bear in mind that what I have tried to emphasise throughout 
this thesis is that this wider composition is only a secondary tool for rendering the 
pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings of the text. In other words, a 
big chiastic structure is like a big ladder: very helpful, providing one knows 
where and in which direction to set it. Thus, as I suggested earlier in the thesis, it 
is the other details in the text itself which are to be used as the criteria for the 
correct place and direction of our exegetical ladder, called plot. 
Accordingly, the details in the text seem to support the idea that Exodus 16 is the 
thematic and narrative centre of the plot developed between the two major events, 
exodus and the revelation at Sinai. However, I suggest that the direction of the 
plot in Exodus 16 in particular is of vital importance. For the purpose of 
understanding the referential directions in the plot, analysis of representations of 
time and space in Exodus 16 is essential. 
4.1.4 CHRONOTOPES AND GENRES IN EXODUS 16.1-36 
Representation of time and space in Exodus 16 further supports the above-noted 
markers of the plot. The first verse already serves that purpose. Thus, the space is 
represented by just two coordinates: Elim and Sinai. Elim is in many ways an 
                                                
6 As in, for example, John I. Durham, Exodus, ed. by David A. Hubbard and Glenn W. Barker, 
Word Biblical Commentary, 61 vols (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1987), III, p. x; Douglas K. Stuart, 
Exodus, The New American Commentary (Nashville, TN: Broadman & Holman, 2006), pp. 50-
52.  
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expected reference, since that was their previous place of encampment. However, 
the narrator knows that Sinai is not the following place of encampment (but 
rather Massah and Meribah, according to the narrative). Accordingly, the 
reference to Sinai is the choice of the narrator, a choice, I believe, with a specific 
rhetorical function.  
In the same way, the representation of time in the text employs specific 
highlighters. Thus, verse 16.1 refers to the point in time ‘of their departure from 
the land of Egypt’. Accordingly, verse 3, describing the ‘grumbling’ of the 
congregation (of the sons of Israel), demonstrates extreme selectiveness in their 
representation of time and space. Namely, the gap between the time of living in 
Egypt and the present is minimised, as if no events ever took place in between 
(the events of God’s miraculous salvation of this congregation).  Thus in the 
representation, there are only two points: the past time of eating in Egypt, and the 
present time of starving in the desert.  
Likewise, representation of the space is limited to the following two points: the 
proximity of ‘the pots of meat in the land of Egypt’ and the vast distances in ‘this 
wilderness’. The irony in the narrator’s account of the grumbling of the 
congregation is found in the extremely unrealistic representation of time and 
space on behalf of the congregation. This already invites the reader/listener to 
think about ideologies conveyed by this representation of time and space. 
Nevertheless, before considering ideologies, there are few specific utterances 
with their chronotopes vital for understanding the function of the ‘Sabbath of the 
LORD’ motif in the text. 
Verses 4 and 5 juxtapose this grumbling in an untypical manner. Namely, the role 
of the narrator is minimised (as explained above) whilst God’s (apparently 
immediate) response comes to the fore. Representation of time and space in this 
utterance of God’s is of vital importance. Specifically, with an exclamatory 
‘Behold!’ God invites the congregation to re-structure its representation/rendering 
of time and space. Verse 4 re-structures space: the meat is not in pots, by which 
the congregation is to sit, but, in God’s representation, the meat will be sent as 
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rain upon them, so that they are to go out into that vast wilderness as if into the 
rain. Thus, God’s representation turns the limitlessness of space in the desert into 
a limitless pot of miraculous blessings. This is also reinforced with the contrast 
between the verbs ‘sit’ and ‘go’. The life in bondage had been represented as the 
life of limited space within which to move. Accordingly, God asked the pharaoh 
to let God’s people ‘go’ (not ‘sit’). The verb ‘go’ is thus in essence the 
representation of the limitless life and space of freedom. 
Furthermore, verses 4 and 5 introduce a re-structured time. Whilst the 
congregation represents the time as only between ‘then-past’ (next to the 
Egyptian pot with meat) and ‘now’ (in the desert), God represents the time as 
between ‘now’ (in the rain of meat) and ‘then-future’. Furthermore, the 
congregation’s ‘then-past’ was an undivided, solid, homogenous time. God’s 
‘then-future’ is time that is split into six sections with a difference between them; 
the difference will be shown on the sixth day. Accordingly, the time in the 
congregation’s representation has already past, whilst in God’s representation, the 
time is just about to begin, ‘at evening’, at the beginning of the first time-section 
in the row, having a clear course towards the sixth day. 
Accordingly, the text reads as a dialogue in a somewhat unnatural way, almost as 
if God had waited for a while with the prepared representation of space and time 
to confront the congregation’s representation of space and time. Since the 
congregation initiated the dialogue/dialogism, God comes with a ready answer. 
That is to say, there is no account of God investigating the murmurs, there is no 
description of God weighing up whether to act this way or another way; God’s 
solution is presented as a ready-made solution. 
Finally, these confronted representations of chronotopes are not just arbitrary 
choices. God’s utterance in verses 4 and 5 emphasises this horizon impending 
confrontation with the words ‘that I may test them, whether or not they will walk 
in My7 instruction’. Accordingly, verses 6 and 7 broaden this polarisation 
                                                
7 The ‘My’ in the verse is written with capital ‘M’ in NASB. For the sake of consistency, I keep it 
unchanged. 
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between God and the congregation to two teams with two representations of time 
and space: God, Moses and Aaron on the one hand, and the congregation on the 
other hand (clearly delineated with the doubled double-voiced utterance ‘At 
evening you will know that the LORD has brought you out of the land of Egypt; 
and in the morning you will see the glory of the LORD, for He hears your 
grumblings against the LORD; and what are we, that you grumble against us?’ 
Therefore, the matter at stake is not hunger or appetite, but trust and paradigm.8 
In other words, God’s rationale for his solution is not ‘then you will be hungry no 
more’, but ‘you shall know that I am the LORD your God.’ (verse 12) Thus, the 
solution for that problem is not provision of the food, but restructuring of the 
paradigm, by providing the food.  
This conflict between voices in the text can be rephrased in the terms of 
chronotopes. Namely, God has no problem when people authorise formal and 
internal chronotopes that are in accordance with his external chronotope. 
Accordingly, people are called to creatively develop, change focus and use the 
chronotopes they authorise. Thus, for example, the narrator chooses to set the 
focus on time, instead of space in the formal chronotope of Exodus 16. Moses 
and Aaron did likewise in verses 6-8. Moreover, it is God who chooses not to 
reveal the information about the seventh day until the morning of the sixth day. 
Thus, selectiveness in representation (formal and internal chronotopes) is not 
wrong, but is a normal, natural part of the process of authorisation of utterances 
in every dialogue. 
However, the flexibility of representations of formal and internal chronotopes 
does not seem to be applicable to external chronotopes as well. For example, 
God’s restructuring of time and space, through the miracle with the quails and 
manna, is not a statement regarding focus, accent or selectiveness on the level of 
                                                
8 In order to clarify this point, God chooses to perform an extra miracle every day with the volume 
of manna (verses 16-18). Namely, people are allowed to collect ‘as much as he should 
eat/according to his eating’. When the manna collected is measured, it turns out to be the same 
volume for every person, independent of his/her appetite. Furthermore, there are rotten leftovers 
as well (verse 20) showing that the miracle of the equal distribution of every person’s daily 
portion is intentional, meaning that the matter at stake is not appetite, but faith and belief. 
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formal or internal chronotopes, but a statement regarding the whole paradigm and 
its external chronotope. Accordingly, the chronotope God introduced was not 
meant to replace the congregation’s formal or internal chronotopes, but the 
external, that is the metaphysics, their belief. Thus, this new chronotope offered 
by God is also a statement about himself, and about the congregation; about the 
Creator of the world and the ‘photographers’ in the world, since only the former 
decides on the external chronotope, whilst the latter is created to decide (only) on 
the formal and internal chronotopes.  
Thus, it is here that the broader understanding of the rhetorical function of the 
fine-tuned representations of voices can be understood (see the rendering of the 
doubled double-voicedness of Moses’ and Aaron’s utterance in verses 6 and 7, as 
presented earlier in this Section). This unnatural way to represent voices, 
generating many questions regarding the narrative, is now understood as a 
rhetorical device used to emphasise the conflict of chronotopes, and, even more, 
the conflict of ideologies. 
The disappearance of Aaron’s voice/consciousness after verse 10, also makes this 
rhetorical point that the conflict is really between only two parties: God and the 
congregation. Moses’ and narrator’s voice are still essential for the narrative to 
flow, so they are present. However, the presentation of time and space does not 
change until verse 31.  
In verse 31, God’s voice is described as mentioning Egypt for the first time in the 
narrative (previously, it was mentioned only in the congregation’s utterance, in 
verse 3). Accordingly, it is the first instance of God’s chronotope having 
something in common with the congregation’s chronotope. This mention of 
Egypt is nevertheless made with the perspective of God’s representation of the 
‘then-future’ time. Accordingly, the past, present and future are structured, but in 
a very different way from the congregation’s chronotope. Namely, in God’s 
restructuring, the references used are: salvation as a historical and geographical 
point in the chronotope, the present time and space, and the future time and space 
of ‘throughout your generations’. The final reference is the most striking, since 
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God’s promises previously recounted in the Pentateuch/Torah, given to the 
predecessors of this congregation, assume the unlimited/vast time and space (see 
God’s promises to Abraham, Isaak, and Jacob regarding the promised 
descendants/generations in, for example, Genesis 13.14-16; 15.18-21; 22.17-18). 
Finally, and according to this rhetorical point, the chronotopic references are 
mixed in verses 32 and 33 (thus, suddenly, the time after the erection of the 
Sanctuary is mixed with, apparently, the present time before the Sanctuary, in 
addition to Aaron’s re-appearance in the narrative). It is important to notice that 
the blending of the referential points is done on the level of the formal 
chronotope, and in accordance with God’s external chronotope. In other words, 
the change in the formal chronotope does not jeopardise the previously 
introduced God’s chronotope, but indeed supports it. 
Thus, after authorising this mixing of time and space, (on the level of the formal 
chronotope) the narrator sets the chronological and spatial references back to 
their initial place in verse 35. Even then, the referential point in the narrator’s 
formal chronotope is in accordance with the promised ‘then-future’ (the 
perspective used in the verse is the perspective of the congregation who made it 
to the Promised Land).  
Accordingly, a short conclusion regarding the genres in the narrative is 
beneficial. Thus, I would suggest the following three genres be recognised in the 
text. Firstly, the narrator’s genre is a travel-type genre, where the places are 
changed, and distance is covered through the pages turned. With this narrator’s 
travel-type genre, the other two acquire their rhetorical functions. Thus, secondly, 
the genre of the utterances of the congregation is pessimistic, romantic, nostalgic 
(even when charged with the motif of surprise and awe regarding manna). The 
accent is not on the actual space (acquired from the narrator’s genre) but rather on 
a melancholic remembrance of the time past (consequently, wherever similar 
occasions took place, the reaction of the congregation would have been the 
same). Thirdly and finally, the genre of God’s, Moses’ and Aaron’s utterances is 
the opposite; the accent is on the future time (the seventh section, in seven days’ 
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time, and the time of the life in the Promised Land). The genre conveys 
constructive optimism and, accordingly, the accent is again not on space but 
rather time. This precedence of time over space is even more drastic when the 
new time perspective is brought in the narrative in verses 32-35 (the life in the 
Promised Land), thus breaching the representation of the space (wilderness of 
Sin) for the sake of the representation of time (evident as ‘throughout your 
generations’). In what follows., the ideologies that we have already observed as 
being in conflict in this narrative will be summarised and further explained.  
4.1.5 SOCIAL IDEOLOGIES IN EXODUS 16.1-36 
The above-analysed voices and double-voicedness, as well as heteroglossia, 
chronotopes and genres, all point to the narrator’s strategy to describe the 
dominant ideology in the text. The plan is fulfilled, but at a price, namely at the 
cost of fluency, consistency and coherency in the narrative. Accordingly, the text 
develops a presentation of the conflict between the pessimistic, destructive, 
doubtful ideology (on the side of the congregation) and the optimistic, 
constructive and faithful ideology (on the side of God, Moses, and Aaron).  
This conflict of ideologies is presented implicitly by the fact that the congregation 
murmured. Simply put, they complained about the situation which they evaluated 
as worse than another situation. Accordingly, what is implied in the text is criteria 
for the evaluation of what is good or better, and what is bad or worse. 
Furthermore, it is only God who utters the words that explicitly refer to the idea 
of criteria (test, commandments and laws in verses 4 and 28). This exclusiveness 
of the utterances of God is highlighted by the narrator’s choice not to allow any 
other voice to utter the direct nuance of the criteria for goodness. As a result, 
even though there were instances when the narrator could allow Moses, or the 
congregation to utter the nouns ‘commandment’ or ‘law’ (for example, if they 
murmured ‘the law/commandments of the Egyptians provide a much better 
life!’), the opportunity was never used. However, the verb ‘commanded’ is 
uttered by Moses and the narrator in verses 16 and 32. This, however, does not 
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rule out the point of the exclusiveness of the commandment and law to be heard 
only via God’s voice in the narrative. 
Thus, this detail regarding the utterances of God supports the idea of conflicting 
criteria for determining the goodness. In other words, the context in the narrative 
implies that the congregation evaluated the goodness of the situation according to 
the proximity to the pots of meat. In contrast, God explicitly determined the 
goodness of the situation according to the test of following his commandments 
and laws. 
Finally, the only verse that gives an indication of the resolution of the conflict is 
verse 30: ‘So the people rested on the seventh day’. However, the basis for this 
rest clearly does not conform to the ideology presented by the congregation. 
Hence, the narrative does not give any clue of the congregation changing its 
ideology. The conflict is implied as still present. Thus, there is still a need for 
further development of the conflict of ideologies towards a more complete 
resolution. 
I believe this need for further development of a resolution is emphasised with the 
crossing of the borders of time and space in the formal chronotope, in verses 31-
36. Namely, the closing verses of the chapter serve as an invitation to search for 
the resolution outside the borders of this event in the wilderness of Sin. Thus, the 
chronological and spatial loops are introduced by the narrator. However, the 
loops are also accentuated by the special textual/visual peculiarities of this 
narrative. Therefore, the analysis of the textual peculiarities of the narrative is the 
purpose of the following step. 
4.2 ‘SABBATH OF THE LORD’ MOTIF AS A PART OF A TEXTUAL 
DIVISION 
This is the second step of the zoom lens method where I, as the reader, having 
previously listened to the text, centralise on words, sentences, verses, chapters, 
and various textual markers in the written text. Here I will raise potential 
questions regarding these elements. Accordingly, some of the previously raised 
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questions will be answered, whilst newly raised questions need to wait for the 
subsequent steps to be taken. 
4.2.1 COMMON AND SPECIAL VERSES AND PARAGRAPHS 
In this section, petuchot and setumot (i.e. the sense/paragraph divisions indicated 
in the Hebrew text by special textual markers) support my rendering of rhetorical 
sense divisions explained above. Thus, the narrative is divided in two petuchot 
(the first one being Exodus 15.20-16.10, and the second being 16.11-36). 
Accordingly, this divisioning supports the assumption that the three ‘desert-type’ 
events (15.22-26; 16.1-36 and 17.1-7) were intended to be read in a sequence. In 
addition, the divisioning also supports the presupposition that each of the events 
in the narrative was also an account in itself (thus, Exodus 17.1-7 constitutes a 
separate petucha).  
Moreover, the divisioning in petuchot and setumot in the narrative shows clear 
signs of rendering the text in regard to its content. Thus, the change of the scene, 
with the sudden disappearance of the voice of Moses is marked by the shift of 
petuchot. Likewise, the initial utterance of the congregation is rendered as one 
setumah (15.27-16.3). The same is the case with God’s reply in the following two 
verses (4, 5).  
4.2.2 COMMON AND SPECIAL WORDS, PHRASES AND TEXTUAL NOTES 
The first note, in verse 1, the exact place of the wilderness of Sin is not known. 
This, I understand, only further supports the idea that the particular chronotope in 
the narrative prioritises time over place. Accordingly, the references to place are 
not intended to put the focus on the place itself, but on the new circumstances. 
Hence, the sequence of encampments between the lists in Exodus 17.1 and 
Numbers 33.11-12 differs. 
Furthermore, in verses 2 and 7, the verb ‘to murmur/grumble’ (לּון) seems to 
suggest that the narrative belongs to the texts of the earliest developments of 
Hebrew literary history. More precisely, the verb only occurs in Exodus 15, 16, 
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17, Numbers 14, 16, 17, and Joshua 9:18.9 In addition, Masoretic notes to verses 
1 and 7 contain permuted K-Q forms of the verb, suggesting that the spelling of 
the verb developed in pluriform traditions. This point seems to be supported by 
the fact that ⅏ in both verses bears witness to a unique spelling.10 Thus, the Q in 
16.2 is niphal imperfect, denoting that the congregation ‘grumbled themselves’, 
whilst the Q in verse 7 is hiphil, signifying that the congregation ‘caused 
grumbling’.11 
Furthermore, verses 6 and 7 use a grammatically unusual expression of ‘evening’. 
That is to say that the sequence of ‘morning’ following ‘evening’ is typical as a 
phrase (see Genesis 1), but often, if there is a reference only to ‘evening’, it is 
usually introduced with a preposition (either as a separate word or as a prefix, as 
is the case here in verses 8 and 13, and elsewhere in Genesis 19.1; 29.23; Exodus 
12.18; Deuteronomy 16.5, and so on.). Thus, even though the usage of ו as a 
temporal marker is verified,12 it is still very unusual. 
The G	variants of verses 6, 8, 9, 29 and 32 do not seem to have any bearing on the 
pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings of the text. The same is the 
case with textual variants regarding the quails, which God used to feed the 
congregation in the evening in verse 13.13 Verse 14 now introduces the first 
hapax legomenon, within the description of manna. Namely, ְמֻחְסָּפס has a very 
ambiguous meaning. In other words, the basic meaning related to flakes, seems to 
be insufficient to describe the manna in the narrative. A comparison with other 
descriptions of manna, support this point (cf. G, which only repeats the 
description from verse 31, as if being unable to translate the original  ְָּפסְמֻחס . See 
also Numbers 11.7 and BDB, 341). 
This idea of the uniqueness of manna seems to be further supported by the 
congregation’s utterance and the phrase ָמן הּו (in verse 14). Namely, it stands in 
                                                
9 BDB, 534. 
10 Thus, in verse 2: K: ַוּיִַּלינּו, Q: ַוּיִֹּלינּו, ⅏: וילנו. Conversely, in verse 7: K: ִתּלֹונּו, Q: ַתִּלונּו, whilst 
⅏: תלנו. 
11 See Durham, Exodus, p. 216. 
12 GKC (§112.oo), 337. 
13 For more on ְׂשָלו as Cotturnix Communis, (quail,) see, for example, BDB, 969. 
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contrast to Moses’ and God’s description of manna as ּוא ַהֶּלֶחםה  in verse 15, and 
throughout the narrative, until verse 32, when the instruction is given to keep a 
portion of it in the Sanctuary. However, throughout the narrative, God, Moses 
and the narrator seem to avoid calling manna by name, choosing the rather 
general name ‘bread’ or simply the pronoun ‘it’. Verse 31 explicitly states that 
the name-giver was not God, the narrator, Moses, or Aaron, but that the 
congregation (as the ‘house of Israel’, or the ‘sons/children of Israel’) named ‘it’ 
manna. 
Furthermore, in verse 14, the expression ְלִפי ָאְכֹלו is not only strange and 
ambiguous, but also one which occurs only once more in the Bible, in the 
Passover narrative, in Exodus 12.4. Additionally, in verse18, the uniqueness of 
manna is further emphasised with the measure of ‘omer’ instead of ‘ephah’ as a 
common measure.14 If one understands that verse 36 is a later addition to the text, 
the question regarding the absence of any other instance of usage of ‘omer’ in 
other texts from this period still remains. The question is even more significant in 
the context where the mentioning of the measure for the sake of measuring does 
not seem to be supported by the context (since the reader already knows that, 
miraculously, everyone gathered as much as he/she needed). Thus, how much the 
portion of manna precisely weighed or how much it measured in its volume, is 
rational in the following two cases. First, to support the idea that appetite was not 
the main concern, since all the differences based on different appetites 
disappeared after they collected manna and measured it. Second, to support the 
idea that it was a miracle, and that the miracle concerned manna as something 
totally unique. Therefore, I believe, the explanation of how much one omer was 
in volume, compared to an ephah, serves only one single purpose; to bridge the 
gap between the internal chronotope of the narrative, and the new formal 
chronotope with its perspective from the Promised Land (after the two 
chronotopes mingled in verses 32-36). 
                                                
14 See BDB, 35, 771.  
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Verse 23 contains the word Shabbat and its derivatives for the first time in the 
entire Bible. Thus, now is the time to focus on the problematic nature of this, 
when rendering the aural divisions in the text. Namely, this and the following 
verses witness a striking increase in the usage of the term Sabbath. Thus, the 
multiplicity of Sabbath-related forms is witnessed in the following verses: verse 
 and in ,(ַׁשָּבת) verse 26 ,(ַׁשָּבת ַהּיֹום ַליהָוה) verse 25 ,(ַׁשַּבת־קֶֹדׁש ַליהָוה and ַׁשָּבתֹון) ,23
verse 29 (ַהַּׁשָּבת). In other words, there are no two verses that use the same form 
of the Sabbath-related term or phrase. Nevertheless, there is only one common 
train of thought, and that is the idea that the Sabbath is ‘ַליהָוה’, as ‘to the LORD’ 
(common to verses 23 and 25). 
In strong contrast to this multiplicity of forms related to the Sabbath, it is 
apparent that it is only Moses who uses them. In other words, when the narrator 
or God is ‘heard’ talking, they seem to avoid the terms. Thus, the Lord does not 
mention anything about the Sabbath in verse 5, which is something the reader 
might expect, since the Lord would keep the additional information as a surprise 
for the sixth and the seventh day. However, why not mention the Sabbath by 
name given that it was already announced in verses 26-28? Why did God choose 
to use the more general term of ‘My commandments and My instructions’, 
instead of ‘my Sabbath’? The only mention of the word Sabbath, as (potentially) 
in God’s utterance, is in the verse 29. However, as already mentioned above, it is 
one of the most ambiguous utterances in the whole narrative, since the reader 
cannot separate that utterance from Moses’ utterances. In addition, that is the 
utterance in which the distance between God and the congregation is at its 
greatest. In addition, if this is the utterance of God, addressed to Moses then, the 
only instance of God pronouncing the term Sabbath in the text is when speaking 
about himself in the third-person singular, and when seeing at Moses as part of 
the errant congregation and, indeed, humanity as a whole.  
In accordance with this strange avoidance of God’s voice to pronounce the term 
Sabbath, the narrator’s voice will not use the term, either. Instead, in the 
utterances of the narrator, it is ‘the seventh day’ (verse 27, 30). Why is the task to 
declare the name of the day left exclusively to Moses’ voice? Accordingly, there 
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is a strong contrast between the congregation’s naming manna, and Moses’ 
declaring the Sabbath. The text does not support any thought of Moses naming 
the seventh day as ‘Sabbath’ – in fact the opposite: Moses explains that the 
Sabbath is ‘of/to the LORD’. Accordingly, verse 29, which might be understood 
as God’s voice, even though with all the peculiarities described above, the G 
stream of witnesses suggests the reading τὴν ἡµέραν ταύτην instead of ַהַּׁשָּבת, 
making it even clearer that all the occurrences of the term ‘Sabbath’ were heard 
only via Moses’ voice. 
In addition, verse 23 has variants that attest to my interpretation of the text as part 
of the oral/aural context (I raised the question concerning whose ordinance it was: 
Moses’ or the Lord’s, cf. verse 24). Namely, pc Mss seem to suggest that the 
utterance belonged to Moses, thus G-BSTJV add מֶֹׁשה, so that the focus is on 
Moses who uttered it. Nevertheless, GB seems to highlight that the utterance 
should be rendered as belonging to the Lord, thus GB adds κύριος. 
However, it seems that Moses’ choice of words, when describing manna in verse 
23, sounded odd, to some of the recipients. This seems to be the reason for G 
witness to a stream of Mss with the other reading, namely τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆµά ἐστιν, 
as Moses’ choice of words/phrases in verses 16 and 32. Still, it seems that neither 
of the textual variants provides final answers to any of the questions raised above. 
Thus, I suggest, seeking for the answers in the subsequent steps of the zoom lens 
method (instead of entertaining any speculative answer at this step in the 
method). 
Furthermore, in verse 31, at the segment where chronotopic borders are mixed, 
there are variants that attest to the reading ‘children of Israel’, instead of ‘the 
house of Israel’. Thus pc Mss, namely GSTMs read ְבנֵי instead of ֵבית. Even though 
one could argue that the reason can be a synonymous reading, the idea of children 
as descendants is far more in line with the rhetorical point of vast space and time, 
explained above. 
Finally, verse 31 introduces the other hapax legomenon in the text, when 
describing the vessel/jar in which manna is to be held as a witness for generations 
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to come. The noun ִצנְֶצנֶת is translated as, in G, στάµνον χρυσοῦν, (a golden jar) 
and, in V, vas (vessel/vase). Both of the meanings are in accordance with Heb. 
9.4, as an additional witness in the context of Christian Scriptures. My 
understanding of the usage of the hapax legomenon is in accordance with the 
other hapax legomenon in verse 14. Namely, both of them are connected to 
manna, further supporting the idea that it was something unique.  
All the above noted aural and visual markers need to be evaluated in terms of 
their potential to direct the recipient of the text to the relation this text has with 
other texts (both biblical and extra-biblical). This analysis is the purpose of the 
next step. 
4.3 ‘SABBATH OF THE LORD’ MOTIF AS A PART OF DEPENDENCE 
MARKERS 
Here, at the third step of the zoom lens method, I centralise my focus on the 
specific dependence markers that stand out as unusual or unique, my plan is to 
validate the potential of the text to direct the reader to another text. All the above-
mentioned peculiarities are thus going to be re-evaluated according to this 
strategy. 
There are only four con/texts that I find as candidates to be recognised as the 
con/text(s) that Exodus 16 points to. Namely, first, Deuteronomy 34 (the 
congregation reaching the Promised Land/Canaan), second, Numbers 11 
(multitude of similar elements; murmuring, manna, quails, God’s rebuke), third, 
Exodus 12 (the beginning of the exodus from Egypt and paschal ritual), and, 
fourth, Genesis 1-3 (the six-day creation and the first Sin). In what follows, I will 
argue that the markers of dependence are present in all four of the texts, whilst 
the relations between the texts are not of the same type. 
4.3.1 MARKERS OF THE RELATION BETWEEN EXODUS 16 AND DEUTERONOMY 34.  
The main link between the two texts, Exodus 16 and Deuteronomy 34, I find in 
the accentuation of Exodus 16. 31-35. In other words, the link is based on the 
introduction of the time and space of the context in which the congregation 
reached Canaan.  
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Nevertheless, these links, I believe, are not monophonic, but are echoic. Hence, 
one can hear echoes of Deuteronomy 34 (the time at the border of Canaan), 
echoes of Exodus 25.16-21; 40.20, even Hebrews 9.4 in the context of the 
Christian Scriptures (the ‘Testimony’, the jar with manna), and finally echoes of 
Joshua 5.10-12 (the cessation of manna at the time the congregation reached 
Canaan).  
In those terms, the text in Exodus 16 is not specific enough to justify focusing on 
any one of the above-mentioned texts as the one which Exodus 16 points to in a 
specific way. More precisely, the rhetorical change of the formal chronotope has 
the specific purpose, as analysed earlier, of visualising the ‘then-future’ time and 
the vast space according to God’s (external) chronotope and his ideology. After 
this rhetoric achieves its purpose, in verses Exodus 16.32-36, the narrative returns 
to using the formal chronotopes of the ‘travel-type’ genre, (see Exodus 17.1). 
Accordingly, this shift of the formal chronotope into the time of the Promised 
Land makes the narrative in Exodus resemble all the texts that share the same 
chronotope (of the Promised Land,) and not just one specific text. 
Furthermore, these links between the texts are not just limited and vague, but also 
leaning both ways. Consequently, as much as Exodus 16 echoes Exodus 40 and 
Hebrews 9.4, I believe, just as much, and even more so, it could be argued that 
Hebrews 9.4 draws its meaning from Exodus 16. In the same way Exodus 40.20 
has more value if the reader is aware of the echo from Exodus 16.33-34, where 
‘the testimony’ was already mentioned. The same applies to Joshua 5, I believe. 
Therefore, I do not find sufficient support to view the above-mentioned relations 
as monophonic, whilst I do see them present as polyphonic, echoic relations with 
their echoic markers. 
4.3.2 MARKERS OF THE RELATION BETWEEN EXODUS 16 AND NUMBERS 11 
Markers of the links between Exodus 16 and Numbers 11 are explicit as well as 
implicit. The explicit links are: murmuring, presence of voices of God, Moses, 
and the people, then also yearning for the food from Egypt, manna with its 
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appearance and methods of preparation, prayers for ending life/desperation, and 
finally the presence of quails in both of the narratives. 
The implicit links are: God as the most authoritative, also the one who has the 
highest authority to bring judgment, Moses as the leader among God’s people, as 
well as his role as the accused (both by God’s people and by God, see Numbers 
11.10-15), the motif of Moses’ assistant(s) (Aaron’s voice is absent from 
Numbers 11, but the motif of assistants to Moses is equally present), the motif of 
the people having to go out and collect their food, as well as the motif of 
measuring of the collected food.  
However, the differences between the two texts clarify the specific rhetorical 
dependence of Numbers 11 on Exodus 16. Namely, the text is ironic in terms that 
it resembles a mirror-image of Exodus 16. More precisely, the Exodus narrative 
describes an event towards the beginning of the desert-journey (thus, closer to the 
border with Egypt), whilst the Numbers narrative describes an event towards the 
end of the (initially planned) journey (thus, closer to the border with the Promised 
Land). The former describes the introduction of manna as the food; the latter 
portrays a people fed up with it. The former describes God as being incredibly 
slow to anger; the latter depicts God as being fed up with the murmuring of the 
people. Even the description of manna between the two narratives seems to be 
deliberately different (if something is the main quality of manna, like its scaly 
surface, why would a totally different quality suddenly become the most apparent 
feature of it?). After these initial differences the following details in the two 
narratives make this rhetoric’s purpose undeniable. 
Namely, the former narrative recalls quails preceding manna; the latter turns the 
sequence around. The former narrative describes the quails appearing in the 
evening, followed by manna in the morning; the latter turns that sequence around 
as well. The former describes God as rebuking Moses; the latter describes Moses 
as applying a complaint to himself and, thus, advising God to rebuke him to the 
full (take away his life). The former describes one assistant to Moses who 
disappears in the middle of the narrative; the latter does not mention Aaron, 
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whilst seventy totally new persons appear as new assistants to Moses. 
Furthermore, the former narrative does not add any new voices; the latter 
introduces the voice of Joshua and a young boy (voices of the elders are not 
heard, but are also described as present). 
In addition, the former narrative describes the quails ‘coming-up’ on their own; 
the latter states that the quails were brought with the wind. The former describes 
the quails as a one-night event; the latter as lasting at least two days (whilst God’s 
plan was to provide them for a whole month, see Numbers 11.19-21). The former 
narrative describes a measurement of one kind applied to manna; the latter a 
measurement of another kind to quails. The former uses the measurement of 
(two) omers per person; the latter of (ten) homers15 per person. The former 
focuses on the fact that manna was not to be preserved for the following day; the 
latter puts the accent on the fact that the people collected quails and preserved 
them for the future. The result of eating manna in the former narrative was the 
well-being of the people; the result of eating the quails in the latter narrative is 
plague. The former narrative describes the people naming manna; the latter 
describes the people naming the place. Finally, the former narrative ends with a 
commemoration of the prosperity by preserving the manna; the latter finishes 
with commemoration of the plague by ‘keeping’ the name for the place as  ִקְברֹות
 the graves of desire’).16 Finally, at the level of chronotopes (whilst both‘) ַהַּֽתֲאָוה
of the narratives represent the chronotopes layered on internal, formal and 
external), the first narrative accentuates time in its formal chronotope; the latter 
accentuates space. 
Accordingly, I cannot doubt that the two narratives are in a mirror-image relation. 
However, there is still the question whether the dependence is echoic or 
monophonic. My understanding is that, according to the analysis of Exodus 16, 
the narrative in Exodus does not borrow from Numbers 11. However, the 
opposite seems to be the case. Thus, Numbers 11 does not add to the meaning of 
                                                
15 I follow the difference in translation and transliteration from omers to homers, as used in 
NASB. Cf. Exodus 16.16 and Numbers 11.32. 
16 BDB, 869. 
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Exodus 16, whilst the narrative in Numbers acquires greater meaning when, for 
example, the reasons for God’s anger, are considered in the light of his patience 
in Exodus 16. The same is true regarding the judgment brought on the people 
who do not make progress with regard to their temper during the span of time 
between the two narratives. Accordingly, the character of the people’s voice as 
the one single common constant between the two narratives comes to the fore and 
connects the two mirror-image events. 
In addition, the argument against Exodus 16 borrowing from Numbers 11 is that 
the link between the two events supports the context of the latter narrative and not 
the context of the former. In other words, the account of the inauguration of the 
seventy elders to assist Moses in Numbers makes sense as a preparation to what 
follows most explicitly in Numbers 14, that is, the need to establish a leadership 
system which can tolerate and organise the people for the following forty years of 
travel. The opposite, however, is not true, since the focus of Exodus 16, that is the 
event of introducing manna and its seven-section time system does not seem to be 
clearer by the link with Numbers 11. 
In conclusion then, it would seem that Exodus 16 develops its narrative according 
to its relation to a text other than Numbers 11. There are, however, two more 
texts that are candidates for a potential link with Exodus 16, namely Exodus 12 
and Genesis 1-3. 
4.3.3 MARKERS OF THE RELATION BETWEEN EXODUS 16 AND EXODUS 12 
My understanding is that the events described in Exodus 12 definitely contribute 
to the reader’s understanding of the narrative in Exodus 16. In other words, 
Exodus 16 would not make much sense if it were not a part of the greater 
narrative of Exodus, as a whole, and, consequently, was related to Exodus 12. 
However, it seems to me, that Exodus 16 does not develop its narrative primarily 
in terms of importing meaning from Exodus 12, but rather in terms of continuing 
the narrative. However, a closer look to the markers in Exodus 16 will clarify the 
relation. 
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The first link between the two narratives is in the expression ְלִפי ָאְכֹלו ‘according 
to his eating’,17 which, as remarked earlier in this Chapter, occurs in the Bible 
only in these two narratives (specifically, Exodus 12.4; 16.14,21). Thus, the 
relation between the two narratives is indeed emphasised. However, further 
analysis is needed to clarify the relation between them. 
Accordingly, the paschal lamb was supposed to be killed in the evening, as well 
as the quails. Both events were meant to show that God is ‘the LORD’ (cf. 12.12; 
16.6-7). Furthermore, 12.14 states that the paschal lamb and the whole event is to 
be remembered, by establishing something called זִָּכרֹון … ְלדֹרֵֹתיֶכם ‘a memorial 
… throughout your generations’, just as the manna was ְלִמְׁשֶמֶרת ְלדֹרֵֹתיֶכם ‘to be 
kept throughout your generations’ (16.32). However, the choice of the narrator in 
the latter case not to use the verb ‘remember’, or the noun ‘memorial’, seems to 
be intentional, since it was the underlying thought, that the point of keeping the 
manna is to remember, not to keep it just for the sake of keeping it. 
However, already by comparison of the details above, I can see that the contrasts 
between the two texts are not consistent in any logical way. More precisely, the 
paschal lamb shares some details with the manna, whilst in other instances the 
details regarding the lamb are in common with the details from the account with 
quails. This type of relation, it seems to me, is present throughout the comparison 
of all the following similarities between the two narratives. Namely, verse 12.15 
introduces the seven-section time, something that corresponds to the seven-
section time in 16.22-31. Moreover, 12.16 introduces a cessation of work on the 
seventh day, clearly linked with the cessation of work in 16.29,30. 
Furthermore, verses 12.17-20 introduce the ‘feast of unleavened bread’ as a holy 
convocation, which is to be kept as a remembrance of God’s act of salvation from 
Egypt. This, I believe, in a way resembles, manna, which is to be kept as a 
reminder of God’s act of salvation in the desert. This seems to be further 
supported by the fact that God prefers to call it ‘bread’, not ‘manna’, as remarked 
above.  
                                                
17 BDB, 37, 805; GHCLOT, 43. 
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In addition, verses 12.26,27 make the same shift of the formal chronotope with 
the time and space of the people that made it to the Promised Land, just as we 
also saw the narrator in 16.33-35. These similarities seem to show that the two 
narratives are connected. However, the differences between them will clarify the 
relation even further.  
In contrast to the similarities mentioned, there is a number of dissimilarities 
between the two narratives. Verse 12.2 introduces, via the paschal event, a 
religious time system. Thus: ‘This month shall be the beginning of months for 
you; it is to be the first month of the year to you.’ In other words, whilst it is true 
that it uses the seven-section time system, the focus is not on the seven sections, 
but on the monthly and yearly sections of the time. This is, however, not the case 
with the narrative in Exodus 16.  
Furthermore, whilst it is true that the measuring of the food is present in both of 
the narratives, the measuring in Exodus 12.3-5 is focused on the food as a 
sacrifice (a sheep or goat lamb) which the families are to offer (see 12.7). In 
contrast, Exodus 16.4,8,15 puts the accent on quails and manna as something that 
God gave to the congregation. 
This is further supported by verse 12.5 where the people are warned to select the 
finest animal, without blemish or fault, as their offering, shaping this event into a 
ceremonial/sacramental ordinance. In contrast, the narrative about quails and 
manna provided no hint of a sacrificial system. Even when manna was to be 
linked to the ceremonial/sacrificial system of the Sanctuary, in 16.32-35, the 
accent was not on the sacrifice, but on the ‘Testimony’, that is, on the two tables 
of stone with the Ten Commandments engraved by the finger of God. The manna 
was thus linked to God, as the life-giver, life-sustainer, and life-organiser, and not 
to a sacrifice in the sacrificial system of the Sanctuary.  
This is again supported by the choice of the narrator in 16.32-35 to avoid using 
the verb זַָכר ‘to remember’, or its noun זִָּכרֹון ‘remembrance’, which in 12.14 was 
so clearly linked to the ceremonial/sacrificial system, which God was to establish. 
Accordingly, when the verb ‘to keep’ was unavoidable, the narrator’s choice in 
	
	
	
243	
16.32,33 was to use it in a noun form ֶרת  keeping, preserving’,18 instead of‘ ִמְׁשֶמ֫
its verb form in 12.24,25 ָׁשַמר ‘keep, observe’,19 as the verb form was used there 
in connection with the paschal lamb or its rituals. 
Furthermore, verses such as 12.12,13,25,35, make it clear that the context in the 
paschal narrative, God has an enemy to fight against, and whom God will ‘judge’, 
‘destroy’, ‘smite’, ‘strike’… (In the context, the enemy is Egypt and its gods.) 
Accordingly, God’s people are perfectly loyal to God, as is very much stressed in 
verse 12.28,35,50. (Thus, ‘the sons of Israel went and did so; just as the LORD 
had commanded Moses and Aaron, so they did.’) 
In contrast, God has no enemy in Exodus 16. All the problems are solely with the 
ignorant, murmuring, misbehaving, even childish congregation. There is not one 
indication that God has an enemy. Accordingly, even when Egypt and Canaan, as 
the chronotopic references are used (in 16.1,3,6,32,35), these lands are not 
presented as lands of an enemy, but only as lands of their departure and of the 
journey’s destination, respectively.  
Finally, 12.43-49 introduces an idea of a ritual proximity to God. More precisely, 
the children of Israel, the circumcised, are presented as being ‘close’ to God, 
whilst the sojourner, foreigner, an uncircumcised slave/servant, is presented as 
being ‘far’ from God. However, the presented proximity is ritual, religious, since 
the narrative explains that, in reality, it is about the people who are present all 
together, in the same house/household, thus ruling out the option for the 
proximity to be spatial. Accordingly, the way to ‘come closer’ to God is to be 
circumcised (12.48). 
Furthermore, the people’s voice, that of those who went out of Egypt, whilst 
being presented as in unison in obedience in chapter 12 (12.28,35,50), is 
polyform in its proximity to God, with some of the people closer to God, and 
some of them further away from God. Conversely, the manna narrative presents 
all of the individuals behind the congregation/people’s voice in unison in their 
                                                
18 BDB, 1038. 
19 BDB, 1036. 
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proximity to God, but polyform in their obedience. Thus, ‘on the seventh day that 
some of the people went out to gather …’ (16.27). 
This analysis shows that the contrast between the two narratives is stronger than 
the similarities between them, therefore it is not justifiable to claim that Exodus 
16 draws from Exodus 12, based on the similarities between the two. However, 
the contrast is not as strong and direct as in the case of the relationship between 
Exodus 16 and Numbers 11, for example. Accordingly, one cannot argue that 
Exodus 16 draws from Exodus 12, based on the contrasts between the two. 
Therefore, I will argue, that the two narratives draw from a common source, that 
is, from Genesis 1-3. Thus, my focus in what follows is on the relationship 
between Exodus 16 and Genesis 1-3, but much of the relationship between the 
latter and Exodus 12 will be elaborated on as well. 
4.3.4 MARKERS OF THE RELATION BETWEEN EXODUS 16 AND GENESIS 1-3 
Genesis 1-3 is the narrative that is best understood in the context of the above-
analysed dissimilarities between Exodus 12 and Exodus 15. Consequently, I 
argue, Genesis 1-3 has the potential to be the referential text for both Exodus 12 
and Exodus 15. Accordingly, there are the following dependence markers in 
Genesis 1-3 that emphasise the relation between that narrative and Exodus (12 
and) 15. 
In Genesis 1.1, the very first word in the narrative (and the Bible) ֵראִׁשית, 
‘beginning’,20 focusses the reader on the representation of time. Thus, it can be 
seen as referring to the introduction of the first time section in Exodus 
16.6,8,12,13. It is especially interesting that the text in Exodus 16 stresses that the 
first time section begins ‘in the evening’ (followed by the ‘day’ part of the time 
section), corresponding with the pattern established in Genesis 1.5,8,13,19,23,31. 
Furthermore, the same verse, Genesis 1.1, presents God as the creator of time and 
space, thus, the chronotope is presented as, first of all, God’s, and not solely the 
narrator’s. This is in fact a multi-layered representation of time (‘mise en 
                                                
20 BDB, 912. 
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abyme’)21 by which the narrator authorises a representation of time and space in 
which God’s representation of time and space is being authorised. However, the 
reference to this in Exodus 16 is found, I believe, in the clear intonation in the 
manna narrative that the seven-section time construct is God’s. 
Nevertheless, the three types of chronotopes (external, formal and internal) 
present in every utterance, (as explained in Section 2.2.2 above,) are not 
delineable in Genesis 1. That is to say that whilst the reader knows that there 
must be the writer’s chronotope (the external one, as a part of the author’s 
paradigm), the chronotope used in the text in order to narrate (the formal one, 
integrated into the author’s utterance), and the chronotope narrated about (the 
internal chronotope, time and space), these layers are not delineable in Genesis 1. 
That is to say, the layers are assumed but are never alluded to, in the text. Thus, 
the narrator’s representation of time and space, and God’s representation of time 
and space make one whole. Accordingly, this homogeneity of the chronotope in 
Genesis 1 stands in contrast to all the other narratives analysed above (since all 
the above-analysed narratives featured intermingling of internal, formal and 
external chronotopes present in the text). 
In addition, the last part of Genesis 1.1, presents God as the creator of not just the 
representation of time and space, but of actual time and space, in terms of 
everything.22 In other words, what was the time before ‘the beginning’? What 
was there before ‘the heavens and the earth’ were created? Moreover, what 
remains, if ‘the heavens and the earth’ are taken away? 
Furthermore, the description of the Earth as הּו ֹ֫ הּו formless’23 and‘ ּת ֹ֫  ּב
‘void/empty’,24 indicates that God formed spatial vessels and later filled them 
                                                
21 ‘Mise en abyme’ is literary device by which an intermingling of representations of time and 
space is achieved, so that representations of time and space on internal, formal and external levels 
mutually intrude on each other. 
22 Accordingly, the phrase ‘the heavens and the earth’ is rendered as a merism of totality, in 
accordance with Isaiah 44.24, Psalm 103.19, Jeremiah 10.16, Joel 3.15-16.  
23 BDB, 1062. 
24 BDB, 96. 
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with the created beings.25 The same can be said about the temporal vessel ‘one 
day’, formed in Genesis 1.3-5, which was to be filled (with creative acts). 
Accordingly, verse 1.5 clarifies the difference between the spatial vessels as static 
and the temporal vessel as flowing in night and day sequences (charting evening 
and morning as the night and day time of the one day). 
Therefore, this representation of God as creating the totality of the time and space 
is to be understood as the basis for the rest of the narrative, namely, narrational 
description of the notion that God has no enemy in the chronotope of the creation 
(since there was nothing before he created the chronotope). This notion is further 
developed in Genesis 1.3,6,9,11,14,20,24,26 with the pattern ‘God said … and it 
was so’. Hence, the totality of everything is presented as having no hint of a force 
that would counteract God’s utterance. This seems to be referred to in Exodus 
16.12-14, where God announces what will happen that evening, and ‘it was so’. 
In other words, there was no trace of a force that could counteract the utterance of 
God. Not even the murmuring congregation was presented as counteracting 
God’s (creational) force in Exodus 16. 
Furthermore, this idea of the absence of any opposition to God in Genesis 1 is 
supported by Genesis 1.2, which introduces the Spirit of God (literally  ַרּוח ‘wind, 
spirit, energy of life…’)26 as ְמַרֶחֶפת ‘hovering’ over the waters. Accordingly, 
there is a contrast between this representation of the wind/spirit/energy of life, 
which hovers (‘like a vulture over young’ in Deuteronomy 32.11)27 and any other 
possible representation of a wind in terms of a force that could resemble any form 
of warfare. 
Genesis 1.4 introduces the idea of the goodness of what was created in a direct 
way and, accordingly, the goodness of the creator, in an indirect way. 
Subsequently, this pattern of God evaluating his creation at each stage of the 
                                                
25 The similarity between this representation of the universe, as a specific time and space 
construct that is to be filled up, with the one presented by Einstein’s theory of relativity, seems 
stunning to me. For the latter see Section 2.2.2 above. 
26 BDB, 926. 
27 BDB, 926. 
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process of creation becomes the mainstay of the narrative in Genesis 
1.4,10,12,18,21,25 culminating with the conclusion that ‘all’ God created was 
‘very good’ (verse Genesis 1.31). 
Therefore, it is clear that this totality of goodness supports the previously 
established idea of the absence of evil in the narrative. Nevertheless, this 
measurement of goodness also introduces questions about law and origin of evil. 
Consequently, the existence of measuring the goodness implies the presence of 
criteria for measuring the goodness and the opposite of it, the evil. In addition, 
the accent on the goodness (and not just a simple, unaccented mentioning of it) 
implies that there is also a reality where the totality of it is not good. Simply put, 
why would the accent be on the fact that the creation was good, even very good, 
if everything has been very good, all the time?  
This, I believe, resembles the conflict between the two ideologies with their 
opposing systems of criteria in Exodus 16. Namely, the congregation claims, 
according to their representation of time and space, that the time and space of the 
past is the better one, very good even. In contrast, God’s ready-prepared 
representation of the time and space claims that this time and space, which God is 
about to set in place, is better, very good even.  
It is also important to note that whilst the emphasis on the idea of the measuring 
of goodness in Exodus 16 is implicit, the emphasis on the idea of the criteria for 
the measuring is explicit in Exodus 16.4,28 (criteria such as proximity of pots and 
vastness of the wilderness, versus God’s criteria such as following his 
commandments and laws). Accordingly, as analysed above, it is only God who 
explicitly mentions his ִמְצָוה ‘commandment(s)’28 and ּתֹוָרה ‘instruction(s)/law’.29  
In addition, in Genesis 1, the idea of the created vessels to be filled up is not 
delineable from the idea of the criteria for measuring within the chronotopic 
vessels. Accordingly, whilst the idea of ‘filling up’ implies both spatial emptiness 
which is to be filled up (by God’s creations) and emptiness in terms of time (to be 
                                                
28 BDB, 846. 
29 BDB, 435. 
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filled up by God’s acts of creation), the two are constructed so that the expanse 
(space) incorporates created criteria for time, namely ‘the bigger light’ and ‘the 
smaller light’ (and the stars, Genesis 1.14-18). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that these criteria for time, are not 
represented as something God used, since he delineated the day-sections prior to 
the luminaries being introduced. Accordingly, the author accentuates another 
measuring, which is defined when God ‘measured’ everything created, and 
concluded that the creation was ‘good’ (already in Genesis 1.10,12). 
Consequently, the single main criterion emphasised in Genesis 1 is God’s word 
according to which the world was made good. 
Furthermore, Genesis 1.5 expands the idea of who names what as the rhetoric that 
conveys meaning. Namely, it is God in the creation narrative who gives names to 
light (‘day’), darkness (‘night’), expanse (‘heaven’), dry land (‘earth’), and the 
gathering of the waters (‘sea’) in Genesis 1.5,8,10. In other words, God gives 
names/authorises the vessels of his chronotope, which are subsequently to be 
filled up. In contrast, there is no description of God naming the human couple.  
God’s act of naming of the chronotopic vessels is especially prominent in the 
light of the fact that Adam’s name was never introduced with the motif of 
naming. More precisely, neither Genesis 1.26, nor 2.7 gave any explicit 
significance to the name, even though the play on the words ָאָדם ‘Adam’30 and 
  .ground’31 is present‘ ֲאָדָמה
Accordingly, this differentiation between the chronotopic vessels and humans 
makes it possible to analyse the relation between them. More precisely, whilst all 
of them are blessed by God, only the chronotopic vessels are named by God. This 
is referred to in Exodus 16.4,28-30, where God’s efforts seem to be making the 
congregation accept the given chronotopic borders, both spatial and temporal, as 
something superior to humans (see especially verse 29). In fact, there is no other 
problem God seems to have in the narrative in Exodus 16. 
                                                
30 BDB, 9. 
31 BDB, 9. 
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Hence, the act of naming implies the idea of authority. Thus, the narrator, as the 
other voice in the creation narrative is not described as naming anything (as for 
example, if he/she in verse 1.21 uttered that, ‘the great sea monster’ which is 
today called that and that … or, which I/we call that and that …, which would not 
be a strange pattern in Biblical narratives, just as it was not strange in Genesis 
11.9; 16.14; 21.31; 22.14 and so on).  
However, the idea of delegated hierarchical authority is further developed in 
1.26-28 where God creates the first human couple and sanctions them to exercise 
authority over the rest of the creation on the Earth (but not over the chronotopic 
vessels). Thus, this idea of humans as beings with authority is developed on the 
basis that the humans are made ‘in the image of God’, not on the basis that they 
received a name from God. In other words, after clarifying that the human couple 
is not of a higher authority than the chronotope/chronotopic vessels authorised by 
God, the narrator moves on to clarify the relation between the human couple and 
other creations within the chronotopic vessels.  
In this context, the human couple is described as those who are to ָּכַבׁש ‘subdue’32 
the Earth and ָרָדה ‘rule over, dominate’33 the co-habitants in the chronotope. How 
is the subjugation and domination to be understood? In a context in which God 
has an enemy, the terms would normally be used to convey a warfare scenario, 
where the enemy is to be brought into bondage. In contrast, this context is 
depicted as God having no enemy. In addition, if an explanation of these terms 
would be reached from the perspective of the narrator’s voice, a direct or indirect 
formulation of the external chronotope would have to be made. This would go 
against the rhetoric the narrator intended, since in that case, a layering of the 
chronotopes would have become explicit, whereas the narrator sought to 
represent all the layers as one.  
Therefore, not being able to import an explanation from another chronotope, the 
narrator chooses to leave these terms unexplained at this point in the narrative. I 
                                                
32 BDB, 461. 
33 BDB, 921. 
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argue, the explanation will be given in the course of the narrative which describes 
the man naming the woman (something I will expand on when analysing Genesis 
2.18-23, in what follows). 
Furthermore, Genesis 1.29,30 introduces the idea that God’s intention regarding 
food for humans was a plant-based diet. This is evidenced in the notion that the 
quails in Exodus 16 seem to be God’s way of proving that he can provide pots of 
food better than the Egyptian pots from the congregation’s chronotope (and not 
something intended to be the basis for the congregation’s diet). Accordingly, he 
makes the entire micro-chronotope in the wilderness in Sin become a huge pot of 
food. Thus, the quails are not described as ‘flying’ to the camp, but as ‘coming 
up’ (Exodus 16.13, unlike the description of the quails in Numbers 11.31, where 
they were brought with a ‘wind from the Lord’).  
In contrast, manna in Exodus 16.4 is described as bread from heaven ‘raining 
down’. Accordingly, instead of sitting next to the Egyptian pots, God’s construct 
of time and space placed the congregation in the centre of the provided food. 
However, manna was intended to be the principal food for the congregation. 
Accordingly, the narrative resembles God’s choice regarding food for humans in 
Genesis 1. 
The relation between the two narratives is further developed by the description of 
manna. Strictly speaking, it would seem more logical, to have quails as 
something ‘falling’ down, and the manna as something ‘coming up’ (beneath the 
dew, especially in the light of Genesis 2.6.) The unusual representation of manna 
is also evidenced in that it was not just raining down (like from a cloud) but 
raining from heaven.  
Moreover, manna, as opposed to quails, is not something that was at hand, in 
terms that it already existed in the wilderness. Thus, whilst the miracle with the 
quails was one of many miracles God provided in Egypt and on the way out of 
Egypt, the miracle with manna, the narrative suggests, is a unique one. In other 
words, for all the other miracles, God used the already created chronotope and its 
‘filling-up’ elements, in an unusual, miraculous way (basket, bush, rod, serpent, 
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leper/illness, blood, frogs, flies, hail, darkness, death, wind, a tree, and now 
finally the quails). Accordingly, all of them were used within a very limited time 
span.  
In contrast, manna is described as a new element in God’s chronotope, to be used 
throughout the entire journey. In this sense, the manna narrative accentuates the 
awe of the congregation that could not recognise manna as something already 
existing in the created world. Thus, it sounds like God continued the narrative 
from Genesis 1-3 by creating yet another element to fill up the chronotopic 
vessels.  
In addition, Genesis 2.1 further develops the idea of the hierarchy of the 
delegated authority among the created beings, as is suggested by the military-like 
terminology of ָצָבא ‘host, army’34 and its application to both the cosmic elements 
and the beings on the Earth. Accordingly, it is interesting to note that this is the 
only instance in the Bible where this term is applied to all the things created on 
the Earth and in the heavens as God’s army (since the other instances of God 
creating the hosts refer only to ‘the heavenly hosts’, like for example in 
Deuteronomy 4.19; 17.3). Thus, the focus of the hierarchy (previously centred on 
the relationship between humans and the chronotopic vessels, that is, day, night, 
heaven, Earth and seas) in Genesis 1, moves to the relation between the humans 
and the other elements in the chronotopic vessels, in Genesis 2. 
Consequently, Genesis 2.1-3 begins35 by representing  God, at the top of the 
hierarchic structure, taking pleasure in the newly created chronotope. He is trying 
                                                
34 BDB, 838. 
35 There is no consensus among contemporary theologians regarding the particular border 
between the two representations of the creation in Genesis 1-2. Accordingly, numerous articles 
have been written regarding the matter. However, for the zoom lens method a precise border 
between the sections is not a prerequisite. The zoom lens method is more focused on the flow of 
the narrative, even when borders between sections are noted. Thus, it is interesting to observe that 
the first setumah is found only at the end of Genesis 3.15 thus focussing the reader’s attention on 
the depth of the verse. Nevertheless, the setumah also makes it clear that the three chapters are to 
be read as one whole. Even more interesting is that there are two more setumot in Genesis 1-3; 
namely the oracle about the consequence of sin over the woman (verse 3.16) and the rest of the 
chapter as the last setumah). This concentration of the setumot in this last part of the narrative 
helps the reader understand the accentuation of the three chapters as a whole (on the sin and its 
consequences). Furthermore, the same accentuation is also a sign of delineation. Namely, the 
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it out first. The culmination of the ‘very good’ impression is implied by God’s 
decision to separate, bless and sanctify the seventh day. This is the first time in 
the creation narrative that the reader is to understand that God’s chronotope is 
seven-section time based (even, more precisely, a six-plus-one-section construct, 
since the seventh day was implicitly separated, as a ‘special’ time vessel, and not 
as a ‘new’ time vessel). It almost comes as a surprise, since there is no hint of it 
in the preceding text. 
In the same way, God is described in Exodus 16.5 as keeping ‘the best for the 
last’ as a surprise. In other words, he leaves people with the impression that what 
was to come was a six-day event, so that on the sixth day ‘it shall be twice as 
much’ manna. Only, after the chronotope developed to the sixth day, was the 
seventh day revealed as the climax and culmination of the chronotopic construct. 
Nevertheless, the structure of Genesis 2.3 suggests that the separating, blessing 
and sanctifying of the seventh time-section is indivisible from what God himself 
did, that is, cease from his ‘work’ and ‘rest’. Accordingly, ָּבַרְך ‘to bless’36 and 
 to sanctify’37 as terms, in this context, are not linked to a‘ ָקַדׁש
ceremonial/sacrificial system, (since none is presented as existing) but are linked 
to God himself.  
Hence, the presentation of the seventh day in Genesis 2, follows the implicit idea 
of the absence of evil, a sacrificial system, and sacrifice, as well as the explicit 
idea of the presence of hierarchy. Thus, after God experienced the chronotope, he 
blessed and sanctified the seventh day, making it a special/sanctified temporal 
vessel in his chronotope. Accordingly, the seventh day was also the final thing he 
divided (implicitly and not explicitly in the text), the seventh from the six days, 
the day to be filled with creative rest, as opposed to the other days, filled with 
creative acts. 
                                                                                                                                
whole of chapter 4 makes a new sense division. Finally, petuchot in the three chapters show a 
deep sense of the small thematic division. Accordingly, every day of the creation is a new 
petucha, as well as 2.1-3 and 3.16-21. 
36 BDB, 138. 
37 BDB, 872. 
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In addition, the difference in the hierarchical authority between the seventh day 
(as a special vessel) and created beings (as elements for filling up the chronotope) 
is achieved by God blessing both the day and the beings, whilst sanctifying only 
the seventh day (cf. Genesis 1.22,28). Accordingly, the seventh day is the first 
thing sanctified in the Bible, among all the created elements that were (only) 
blessed. 
I see this reflected in Exodus 16 with the deliberate choice of the narrator to 
selectively distribute the authority given to voices in order to utter and name 
things. Accordingly, only God utters the terms ‘law’ and ‘commandment’, since 
he is the one who created and constructed the chronotope according to the laws 
and rules. In addition, the only law in Genesis 1 is also the only criterion for 
goodness, and was only God’s word. Therefore, it seems understandable that the 
narrator in Exodus 16 does not take the privilege of using the terms ‘law’ and 
‘Sabbath’. However, it is logical to question the reasons for giving Moses the 
privilege to utter the term ‘Sabbath’ in the narrative. I believe that Genesis 2.4-25 
provides an explanation for these reasons. 
Namely, Genesis 2.4-6 re-introduces the creation of the vessels in order to 
quickly change the focus onto the hierarchic relations, as mentioned above. Thus, 
Genesis 2.7 zooms the focus onto the relation between the man and the Creator. 
Accordingly, the formal (representational) chronotope in the narrative changes 
(whilst the reader’s questions regarding internal and external chronotope 
naturally arise). Suddenly, temporal categories are moved to the background, 
whilst spatial categories come to the fore and convey pragmatic, sociological and 
paradigmatic meanings. Thus, God is represented as creating not with a distant 
‘fiat’, but with his personal close touch.  Consequently, man has the following 
two closest entities: God as the first and the Earth as the second (which has, in 
Genesis 1.24, already been represented with attributes of a being). Accordingly, 
the immense, vast space of the creation narrative in Genesis 1, is suddenly 
narrowed to a close-up of the man.  
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Later, in 2.8-14, the spatial categories direct the focus to zoom out so that the 
habitat for man is depicted. Along with the depiction of the habitat, the reader is 
oriented, so that geographical/spatial categories have the purpose of pointing out 
the following: first, God prepares the place for man; second, it is good/beautiful, 
even very good/beautiful; and third, the reader is informed that the only 
chronotope changed in the narrative is the formal (representational). 
In particular, the narrator shifts the formal chronotope in verses Genesis 2.10-14, 
so that the perspective changes and moves to the chronotope of the first recipients 
of the narrative, that is, the time and space when/where ‘Pishon’, ‘Havilah’, 
‘gold’, ‘bdellium’, ‘onyx’, ‘Gyhon’, ‘Cush’, ‘Tigris’, ‘Euphrates’, and even 
‘Assyria’ are all common terms. The reader thus acquires the orientation which 
helps her/him to delineate the external chronotope (introduced in Genesis 1), 
representational chronotope (in which the geography, socio-political state of 
affairs in the world of Genesis 2.10-14 are the contemporary reality), and the 
internal chronotope (the time and space of the creation of man, as described in 
Genesis 2). In other words, just as Genesis 2 zooms into one detail from Genesis 
1 (the creation of the man), so the chronotope of Genesis 2 zooms into one layer 
of the chronotope of Genesis 1 (the formal, representational chronotope layer). A 
similar change of the formal chronotope was observed in Exodus 16.32-36, as 
analysed in Section 4.1.4 above.  
After this orientation is given to the reader, the narrator changes back to the 
formal chronotope and pulls it away so that the internal chronotope attracts the 
attention and conveys the author’s point. More precisely, the limited authority of 
man comes into focus in Genesis 2.15-17. Man is described as having authority 
over the rest of creation on the Earth. However, the limited nature of his authority 
is also clearly presented (verse 17).  
Furthermore, in Genesis 2.16, the idea that these verses follow up the ‘military-
like’ introduction at the beginning of the chapter is also emphasised with the 
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narrator’s usage of the term ָצָוה ‘commanded’,38 as opposed to ָאַמר ‘said’39 
throughout the whole narrative, and once again already in verse Genesis 2.18. 
This commandment, thus, is especially prominent in the context of God’s ‘fiat’ in 
Genesis 1, which had no hint of conflict, having God only ‘say’ and ‘bless’ 
someone and something. In contrast, according to the focus of the narrative, the 
instruction to man regarding the limitations of his authority is represented as the 
first commandment in the narrative, and indeed in the whole Bible. 
Finally, Genesis 2.18-25 finishes the representation of this hierarchic authority by 
further utilising the ‘who names who’ principle. Accordingly, the focus zooms in, 
back to man who is now granted the privilege of naming all the cohabitants in the 
chronotope. In other words, whilst the earlier part of the narrative utilised the 
detail that both the humans and the animals (and Sabbath) were blessed (and only 
the Sabbath sanctified), the focus in this part of the narrative utilises the detail 
that both the animals and man were made from the ground, whilst only he, the 
man, received the authority to name other cohabitants in the chronotopic vessels.  
Accordingly, the creation of the woman receives special focus. The zoom closes 
in, even closer, on the ribs of the man. Whilst God formed the animals and man 
from the ground, the woman is exclusively formed from the man’s rib. On the 
one hand, the potential superiority of the woman (formed from previously refined 
material) over the man (formed from the raw ground) is ruled out by the fact that 
the refined material was in fact the man’s rib. On the other hand, the potential 
superiority of the man over the woman (who names the woman and she is given 
the name, without her giving a name to anyone and anything) is ruled out by the 
fact that the man himself did not receive a name either in the narrative. 
Accordingly, even though the logic of the narrative and the play on the words ָאָדם 
‘Adam’40 and ֲאָדָמה ‘ground’41 would demand an answer to the question who 
gave the man his name, this information is concealed, so that the accentuation can 
                                                
38 BDB, 845. 
39 BDB, 55. 
40 BDB, 9. 
41 BDB, 9. 
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support the idea of the equality of the couple, created/formed equally in the image 
of God. 
Thus, this description of God forming the woman from the man’s rib (and not his 
heel, the only other part of the human body mentioned in Genesis 3!) supports the 
equality between the man and the woman, already introduced a in Genesis 1, 
where both of them received the blessing and the call to subdue the Earth and rule 
over ‘every living thing that moves on the earth.’ It is also important to note that 
the man has never received a call to subdue the woman. Furthermore, the verb 
used in Genesis 3.21 is ָמַׁשל ‘to rule’42 and not the previously explained ָּכַבׁש 
‘subdue’ and ָרָדה ‘rule’, denoting, thus, a different nature of the dominion 
acquired after the first experience of sin. In addition, whilst God called people 
into the dominion before the first sin, he never commanded or invited them into 
the type of the dominion that took place after the sin. Accordingly, the dominion 
after the sin is the consequence of the sin, not part of the original plan and God’s 
will. 
Furthermore, in Genesis 2.24 the formal chronotope, becomes more vivid again 
to further support the above-presented equality between the man and the woman. 
Namely, whilst in the external chronotope it is (only) the man who is to leave his 
mother and father (a nuance of a difference between the man and the woman), the 
reason for that is that the spatial proximity between the man and woman reduces 
so that they become bound to each other, becoming thus ‘one’. What is more, the 
idea of the absence of shame in Genesis 2.25 is the last hint of the absence of evil 
and presence of harmony and maximum proximity between the man and the 
woman (since the same idea of the shame will be linked to the idea of fear and 
explained as the main effect of the sin, causing spatial, temporal and ideological 
distancing between God, man and woman in Genesis 3). 
Thus, I argue, that the reader is left with only one plausible rhetorical function of 
the account of the man naming the woman. Namely, the account of naming the 
woman serves as the explanation of the context of the terms ‘subdue’ and ‘rule’. 
                                                
42 BDB, 605. 
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More precisely, after reading about the couple that was invited to subdue the 
Earth and rule over the other living creature in Genesis 1, the reader is introduced 
to the scenario where God brings forth the subordinates to the man, so that he can 
name them. It is thus understandable that the part of subduing and ruling is the act 
of naming. In accordance, the narrator accentuates that ‘whatever the man called 
a living creature, that was its name’, as if even God did not interfere in that, since 
it was indeed the man’s area of authority.  
However, in order to rule out any potential misunderstanding on the part of the 
reader, the narrator focuses on another act of naming, this time of the woman, 
who was previously introduced as the creature who is not to be subdued (but to 
be the co-subduer). Thus, the principal idea of naming, in the context of the world 
without evil forces on it, is described as an act filled with amazement, respect and 
awe. In other words, whilst the living creatures on the Earth are to be subdued, 
this was to be done, without a trace of the context from the time after the first sin, 
that is, with the respect, amazement and awe, initiated by the perfection and 
beauty in everything created. 
Accordingly, the narrative in Exodus 16 in general and particularly the emphasis 
on the congregation giving the name to manna, acquires a special meaning in the 
light of the focus on hierarchies. More precisely, the congregation was allowed to 
name manna, resembling thus the first human couple who received the limited 
authority to subdue the rest of the creation on the Earth. In addition, the explicit 
repetition of the motif of awe on the side of the name-giver is more than just 
coincidental. 
Likewise, following-up this principle, the narrator builds up the dependence 
markers in the two narratives. Accordingly, whilst God introduces rules, laws and 
limitations in Genesis 1-2 (just as in Exodus 16), he does not name the seventh 
day as ‘the Sabbath’ in Genesis 1-2 (just as in Exodus 16). Therefore, the narrator 
reserves the authority for Moses to utter the name for the seventh day. In other 
words, if the narrator would present Moses as the one who names the seventh day 
as the Sabbath, the narrative could be misunderstood as implying that Moses is of 
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a higher authority than the Sabbath, which is not in accordance with Genesis 1-2. 
Likewise, if God in Exodus 16 were presented as naming the seventh day as the 
Sabbath, the marker from Genesis 1-3 (where God did not name the seventh day 
as the Sabbath) would be thus removed, as well. 
Furthermore, in Exodus 16.16,32 God is depicted as giving commands. Not 
surprisingly, the commands were related to manna, as the created food for the 
congregation (just like the command in Genesis 2.16). Moreover, all the other 
utterances, which are not commandments, were depicted as proclamations of the 
blessings God was about to bestow upon humans. Accordingly, by this choice of 
the narrator, the relation between the Genesis 1-2 narrative and the manna 
narrative in Exodus 16 is stressed once again.  
The narrative continues with the text in Genesis 3.1-3. The text utilises the same 
chronotope, giving space precedence over time, since the reader understands that 
the woman is in the midst of the Garden, and near the tree from which the fruit 
was forbidden to be eaten. The chronotope is supported by the fact that the 
woman adds a spatial detail to God’s command from 2.17, so that the tree and the 
fruit are not to be touched.  
Furthermore, this is the first chronotope in the Bible in which God is represented 
as absent or distant. In that context, and, in fact, according to it, a totally new idea 
is introduced, which is the motif of a deceiver. The deceiver misrepresents God, 
his intentions and his creation. Consequently, the first human couple is deceived 
to transgress the borders of the created hierarchy (implied to by the statement 
‘you will be like God, knowing good and evil’ in Genesis 3.5).  
After the committed sin, the ironic ‘opening of their eyes’ illuminates their 
hopeless state. Furthermore, Genesis 3.9-11 depicts God as taking the initiative to 
reduce the spatial gap between him and humans. Afterwards, an investigation 
takes place and a judgment is made. The reader is privileged to hear the 
utterances of God, who, as the life-giver, proclaims changes in the conditions of 
life (Genesis 3.14-19). In contrast, the narrator informs the reader that Adam, 
according to the pattern in Genesis 2, gave a new name to his wife (Genesis 
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3.20). Ironically enough, this time, he does not receive the privilege of his voice 
being heard whilst changing the name of his wife. However, the new name, 
which strongly hints to further developments of the narrative, clearly directs the 
focus of the reader to the generations that are to come.  
Furthermore, in a nutshell, Genesis 3.21 introduces a second totally new idea, 
which is the idea of a sacrifice. Namely, in order to ‘make’ the garments of skin 
for Adam and his wife, and even to clothe them, the implied death of an animal is 
necessary. Conclusively, Genesis 3.22-24 utilises the spatial elements again, in 
order to convey the meaning of an apparently permanent distance between God 
and humans. The chapters that follow develop further the motive introduced by 
the woman’s new name, that is, the motif of new generations that are to appear on 
the stage of the narrative, under the new conditions of life. 
I argue, that the markers highlighting the relationship between Exodus 16 and 
Genesis 3 are all on the ideological level. Namely, both narratives depict 
transgressions related to food. Both the transgressions are caused as part of a 
neglect of and misconduct against the revealed will/law/command of God. Both 
of the narratives depict God as taking action towards a resolution.  
However, I believe that the differences between Genesis 3 and Exodus 16 are 
vital. Namely, the latter narrative represents no hint of an enemy neither any trace 
of investigation. Consequently, there is no judgment in Exodus 16. God in 
Exodus 16 only blesses and commands, never judges. Accordingly, I do not see 
sufficiently consistent dependence markers between Genesis 3 and Exodus 16 to 
validate a monophonic dependence between the two texts. In addition, all the 
similarities between the two texts are based on the similarities between Exodus 
16 and Genesis 1-2, and, thus, only in that indirect way to Genesis 3.  
Nevertheless, there are two questions regarding this reading of the narratives 
which I find logical, and which I have left to the end of this section. First, what is 
the relation between Genesis 1-3 and other texts analysed above (Deuteronomy 
34, Numbers 11 and Exodus 12)? Since my explanation of the relations has to be 
subject to my focus on Exodus 16, I will here point to only the specific markers 
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mentioned earlier, but not explained specifically. Thus, it is worth noting that the 
term ַלח ֹ֫  bdellium’ occurs only in Numbers 11.7 and Genesis 2.12. Further‘ ְּבד
analysis of other markers between the two texts should follow the same principles 
utilised in this Chapter, I suggest. However, that pursuit has to be left for a future 
research. 
In addition, the relation between Exodus 12 and Genesis 1-3, I suggest, is found 
in the context of what was recounted in Genesis 3. Accordingly, as analysed 
above, Exodus 12 follows up the context of the presence of the force opposed to 
God. There is an enemy that is to be judged and conquered. Nevertheless, the 
enemy is not the congregation, the people (but the Egyptians in Exodus 12). 
However, the rebellious people (the Egyptians in Exodus 12) are duped and 
misled. Namely, they subscribe to an incorrect construct of time and space, and, 
accordingly, follow the incorrect criteria for measuring goodness within their 
chronotope. God’s solution is to employ a twelve-section based formal 
chronotope (months and years) in order to introduce the idea of a sacrifice in a 
sacrificial system, which will even further support humans in accepting their role 
in the created world, and coming to terms with the creator. This construction of 
the formal chronotope in the religious/sacrificial system is meant to keep them 
safe from the snares of the deceiver.  
However, many of the Egyptians do not accept the hierarchy introduced with the 
presentation of the sacrificial system. Accordingly, delineation between those 
who subscribe to the word of God as the criterion, and those who subscribe to any 
other criterion (Pharaoh’s word, the word of his magicians and prophets, the word 
of the Egyptian gods …) takes place. Consequently, the outcome of personal 
choices of each of the voices in the narrative is recounted. However, there are 
specific rhetorical features in the narrative, especially the descriptions of the 
relation between God and the Pharaoh. Understanding of the rhetorical features 
is, I believe, subject to the reader’s acquaintance with the text in Genesis 1-3.. 
Accordingly, I understand that this draft of the analysis already provides clues 
regarding the relationship between the two texts. However, a deeper analysis of 
relations between these texts would require future research.  
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Finally, the second question: why is God presented as avoiding naming the 
seventh day in Genesis 1-2? That is to say, there seems to be no internally 
directed reason for that in the narrative. However, instead of trying to speculate 
on answers according to the information provided by this step of the research, it 
is judicious to wait for subsequent steps of the method, to provide them. 
4.4 VALIDATION OF PARADIGMATIC DEPENDENCE 
This is the fourth step of the zoom lens method. After following the centripetal 
forces present in the text, and thus concentrating (centralising) my reading to the 
smallest details in the text (so called ‘close reading’), I am about to draw a 
conclusion regarding the type of dependence between Exodus 16 and Genesis 1-
3. 
Accordingly, the fourth step of the method is the central one, where the 
centripetal orientation of the method will acquire the foundation to switch to 
centrifugal, in compliance with the conclusions drawn at this step. The 
conclusions drawn at this step are in/stability of pragmatic, sociological and 
paradigmatic meanings of the utterance, and in/stability of an image of a 
paradigm in the utterance. These conclusions will prove essential in the 
remaining three steps of the method, where I will decentralise my reading to the 
level needed for my satisfaction, as the reader of Exodus 16.  
4.4.1 IN/STABILITY OF MEANINGS OF THE UTTERANCE EXODUS 16.1-36 
As observed above, the principal case for the instability of pragmatic, 
sociological and paradigmatic meanings of the utterance in Exodus 16.1-36 is 
found in verses 22-30. Namely, the meanings of the Sabbath as an institution are 
understandable in the light of what follows in the narrative, in terms of the laws 
and regulations in the rest of the book of Exodus, as well as the last three books 
of the Pentateuch/Torah. However, the account of the Sabbath institution in the 
wilderness of Sin does not seem to ‘fit’ in the preceding parts of the narrative in 
the book of Exodus.  
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In particular, the sudden expansion of the terms related to the institution of the 
Sabbath is most surprising. Many terms do not seem to be introduced at all. 
Accordingly, if ַׁשָּבתֹון in Exodus 16.23 already means ‘Sabbath observance’43 
what are the pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings of the ‘Sabbath 
of the LORD’ pattern, in the same verse? 
Especially surprising is the fact that even though one of the expressions for the 
Sabbath is the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’, the Lord in the narrative does not seem to 
use the name of the Sabbath for the seventh day! Instead, the narrator and God 
seem to prefer the terms ‘seventh day’, and (God’s) ‘commandments and 
instructions’. The congregation and Aaron do not even refer to the seventh day. 
This matter seems to be even more puzzling in the context of the whole utterance 
in Exodus 16 that utilises the formal chronotope with such a strong accent on 
time, which takes precedence over space. In addition, the role of the Sabbath in 
the subsequent history of Israel makes this silence regarding its name hardly 
likely to be accidental. Therefore, the absence of any additional explanation of 
the name of the Sabbath and even of the whole institution of the Sabbath (in any 
preceding text in the book of Exodus, or the Pentateuch/Torah as a whole) seems 
to be an even greater enigma. 
Accordingly, the text on its own does not provide sufficient information to help 
the reader to stabilise pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings of 
almost half of the verses in the text (in addition, regarding the Sabbath, 
importation of the motif of the Sanctuary and the Testimony in verses 32-36, 
seems to destabilise the meanings even further). Therefore, I understand that this 
text has developing, unstable meanings, and accordingly has the potential to be 
qualified as an alluding text (i.e. a text in which the intended pragmatic, 
sociological and paradigmatic meanings are developed by allusions which trigger 
the stable meaning of a previous text in order to facilitate importing that meaning 
into the alluding text, as explained in Sections 1.8 and 3.4 above). 
                                                
43 BDB, 992. 
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4.4.2 IN/STABILITY OF AN IMAGE OF A PARADIGM IN THE UTTERANCE EXODUS 
16.1-36 
The paradigm(s) featured in the text are no less an issue than the problem of the 
institution of the Sabbath in the text. Namely, whilst there is a clear-cut 
polarisation of the voices of the narrator, God, Moses and Aaron on the one hand, 
and the congregation on the other hand, identification of the paradigm of the first 
group is not an easy task. More precisely, verses Exodus 16.22-36 leave far too 
many questions unanswered when the text is read on its own. Namely, if the 
restructuring of time and space is so prominent in God’s paradigm, why is he 
then so unwilling to popularise the name of the Sabbath? In addition, if it was the 
best solution in order to confront the opposing paradigm of the congregation, why 
is this method not used in the case of the other two desert-type narratives which 
frame the text into a larger whole (Exodus 15.22-17.7)?  
This unwillingness to promote the Sabbath as the key-ritual in the context of 
developing the new paradigm seems even more crucial when viewed at the level 
of the role of rituals in a paradigm. More precisely, faith-life imagery visualised 
in rituals is the common arena for all the three aspects of every paradigm 
(metaphysical, methodological and sociological aspects). Accordingly, a 
developed paradigm has symbols of communal identity, which is so prominent in 
the role the Sabbath acquires in the subsequent texts in the Torah/Pentateuch, but 
which seems to be missing in this narrative. Therefore, I cannot conclude that the 
narrative in Exodus 16 features a developed, stable paradigm.  
4.4.3 CONCLUSION REGARDING THE TYPE OF DEPENDENCE EXODUS 16.1-36 
As was analysed in the previous Chapter of the thesis, every text which has a 
developing meaning has the potential to be alluding, that is, to import a meaning 
from another text (alluded to). Furthermore, if an alluding text also features an 
unstable, developing paradigm, it has the potential to be paradigmatic. This 
potential is utilised when monophonic markers in the text direct the reader to an 
independent text from which the paradigmatic text imports and stabilises its 
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meaning and paradigm. Therefore, a validation of the independence of the 
independent text is needed.44 
4.5 VALIDATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF GENESIS 1-3 
This is the fifth step of the zoom lens method. The orientation of the method is 
now already centrifugal, since the developing meaning and/or paradigm of the 
dependent text demands orientation towards other parts of the text or another 
text(s) in order for the meaning of the dependent text to develop further. 
Furthermore, according to the analysis of the narratives that Exodus 16 could 
potentially refer to (in Section 4.3 above), I am most interested in validating the 
stability of the pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings and of the 
paradigm featured in the creation narrative in Genesis 1-3. However, in order to 
validate the stability of the meaning of the utterance, in this case, a validation of 
the stability of the paradigm featured in the utterance is essential. Subsequently, a 
validation of the creation narrative’s potential to function as the master narrative 
is needed. 
4.5.1 STABILITY OF THE IMAGE OF THE PARADIGM IN GENESIS 1-3 
The analysis of the paradigm featured in the creation narrative is subject/limited 
to the purpose of this Chapter (to show the feasibility of zoom lens method). 
Therefore, I find it justified at this (sixth) step of zoom lens method to 
decentralise my reading to the previous research/analyses of the relation between 
the Genesis creation narrative and other ANE creation narratives.  
However, it is also important to note that this decentralisation towards other ANE 
narratives does not contradict the previously argued principle that C centre of 
meaning (the text) should always be prioritised over c’ centre of meaning (the 
textual variants available as predecessors of the text in focus).45 That is to say that 
if there was a non-canonical text to which Exodus 16 could possibly point, and 
                                                
44 Independent text is the text which is seen from another (dependent) text as the text which has a 
developed stable image of the paradigm in which (the image of the paradigm) the meaning of the 
(independent) text is developed as stable. 
45 See Illustration 11 above. 
	
	
	
265	
Genesis 1-3 (as the canonical text) to which Exodus 16 could point, the exegetical 
priority should be given to Genesis 1-3. However, if there is no canonical text 
that could be validated as the reference text to Exodus 16, the search should 
broaden to non-canonical texts as well.  
My analysis of Genesis 1-3, in this Chapter, shows that Genesis 1 is the only 
other narrative (in addition to Exodus 16) that places the accent on the seven-
section construct of time in its chronotope. Therefore, the reference from Exodus 
16 to Genesis 1 has already been perceived. However, if Genesis 1 were also to 
refer to Exodus 16, as the only other narrative accentuating the seven-section 
construct of time, their dependence would have been mutual, echoic, without any 
importation of meaning or paradigm on either side (since, in that case, neither of 
them features a stable paradigm that could be imported). 
Thus, the following two questions are sufficient to validate both the canonical 
place of Genesis 1 and the stability of the paradigm in the Genesis 1-3 narrative. 
The first is: Does Genesis 1-3 refer to Exodus 16? The second is: ‘Does Genesis 
1-3 stand in a dialogue with other ANE creation narratives?’ 
Regarding the first question, it has already been observed earlier in this Chapter, 
that Genesis 1 is the only text among all the analysed texts that features an 
absence of layering of its chronotope, an absence of emphasis on pluriform 
criteria in the chronotope, and an absence of any link to a sacrifice/sacrificial 
system. Accordingly, starting with Genesis 2, additional features of the narrative 
are added to the basis provided by Genesis 1 so that the narrative develops 
towards the introduction of the enemy to God and the need for sacrifices/a 
sacrificial system. Therefore, Genesis 2 introduces layering of its chronotope and 
pluriform criteria in its chronotope, however there is still an absence of any 
conflict between chronotopes or the criteria in them. Finally, Genesis 3 
introduces a breech in the harmony so that, for the first time, a conflict between 
representations of time and space is featured as well as a conflict between criteria 
in the respective chronotopes. 
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Accordingly, Genesis 2 is dependent on Genesis 1, in that Genesis 2 builds its 
chronotope on the representation already introduced and established in Genesis 1. 
Moreover, Genesis 3 is dependent on both Genesis 2 and (indirectly) Genesis 1, 
since Genesis 3 introduces new elements to the basis provided by Genesis 2 (and 
Genesis 1). Therefore, arguing that Genesis 1-3 imports its meaning from Exodus 
16, or any other text among the canonical texts, is an argument against the logic 
of dependence featured so clearly in Genesis 1-3 itself. Thus, Genesis 1-3 forms a 
whole developed according to the dependence of Genesis 2 and Genesis 3 upon 
Genesis 1. However, there is still the question of the dependence of Genesis 1 to 
be answered.  
The answer to this (second) question has, in the latter part of the twentieth 
century, reached the status of an undisputed observation. Namely, ever since the 
time of Gunkel and his observation of the parallel themes between Genesis 1-3 
and Babylonian epic46 the dialogue/dialogism between Genesis 1 and other ANE 
creation narratives has been discussed in terms of how strong and what type the 
relation between the narratives is, not whether the relation exists.  
Accordingly, parallels between Genesis 1 and, for example, the Babylonian 
creation narrative Enuma Elish (from latest circa 1100 BCE) could suggest that 
the former borrowed from the latter. More precisely, the main similarities 
between the two narratives are creation of light, firmament, dry land, luminaries, 
and the divine rest on the seventh day.47 However, none of the advocates of the 
hypothesis of Genesis 1 borrowing from Enuma Elish have denied the unique 
focus the former has on the representation of God as the single creator of the 
world.48 
                                                
46 Hermann Gunkel, Schöpfung und Chaos in Urzeit und Endzeit: Eine Religionsgeschichtliche 
Untersuchung über Gen 1 und Ap Joh 12 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1895); 
Hermann Gunkel, Creation and Chaos in the Primeval Era and the Eschaton: Religio-Historical 
Study of Genesis 1 and Revelation 12, trans. by K. William Whitney (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1895; repr. 2006); See also Alexander Heidel, The Babylonian Genesis: The Story of 
Creation, 2 edn (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1942; repr. 1951), pp. 1-17, 91. 
47 Gordon J. Wenham, Genesis 1-15, ed. by David A. Hubbard and Glenn W. Barker, Word 
Biblical Commentary, 61 vols (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 1987; repr. Dallas, TX: Word, 
2002), I, p. 8. 
48 Heidel, The Babylonian Genesis: The Story of Creation, p. 129. 
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Accordingly, the other differences between Enuma Elish and Genesis 1 are so 
great, whilst the similarities between them so common with other ANE creation 
narratives, that many conclude that there is no borrowing between the two, but 
rather common engagement in the conflict of ideologies regarding the origins of 
the world.49 Accordingly, the same can be concluded regarding the relation 
between Genesis 1 and the Babylonian Epic of Atrahasis (from circa 1600 BCE), 
as well as Egyptian creation narratives. Therefore, there are the following 
seventeen claims of Genesis 1-3 that have been recognised as a response to the 
ideological claims of the other ANE creation narratives from the end of the 
second millennium BCE.50  
The Genesis creation narrative is so compact that every detail in it seems to be 
stable, in contrast to other ANE narratives that feature a plurality of streams of 
their development.51 
                                                
49 See David Adams Leeming, Creation Myths of the World: An Encyclopedia, 2 vols (Santa 
Barbara, CA: ABC Clio, 1994; repr. 2010), pp. 124-31, 332-35; W. G. Lambert, ‘A New Look at 
the Babylonian Background of Genesis’, JTS, 16 (1965), 295-96, pp. 287-300). 
50 See S. E. Loewenstamm, ‘The Seven Day-Unit in Ugaritic Epic Literature’, IEJ, 15 (1965), 
121-33; Nahum M. Sarna, Understanding Genesis: The World of the Bible in the Light of the 
History (New York, NY: Schocken, 1966; repr. 1970), pp. 1-36; Gerhard Hasel, ‘The 
Significance of the Cosmology in Genesis 1 in Relation to Ancient Near Eastern Parallels’, AUSS, 
10 (1972), 1-20; Gerhard Hasel, ‘The Polemic Nature of the Genesis Cosmology’, EvQ, 46 
(1974), 81-102; William H. Shea, ‘A Comparison of Narrative Elements in Ancient 
Mesopotamian Creation - Flood Stories with Genesis 1-9’, Origins, 11 (1984), 9-29; Nahum M. 
Sarna, Genesis: The JPS Torah Commentary (Philadelphia, PA: JPS, 1989); Jean Bottéro, 
Mesopotamia: Writing, Reasoning, and the Gods, trans. by Zainab Bahrani and Marc Van De 
Mieroop (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 201-31; David Toshio Tsumura, 
‘Genesis and Ancient Near Eastern Stories of Creation and Flood: An Introduction’, in I Studied 
Inscriptions from Before the Flood: Ancient Near Eastern, Literary, and Linguistic Approaches to 
Genesis 1-11, ed. by Richard S. Hess and David Toshio Tsumura, (Winona Lake, IN: 
Eisenbrauns, 1994), pp. 27-57; Nahum M. Sarna, ‘The Mists of Time: Genesis 1-11’, in Genesis: 
World of Myths and Patriarchs, ed. by Ada Feyerick, Cyrus H. Gordon and Nahum M. Sarna, 
(New York, NY: New York University Press, 1996), pp. 49-82 pp. 50-52); Kara Wynn, ‘Genesis 
1:1 – 2:3 in Light of Ancient Near Eastern Literature: Independent Study’ (unpublished Master of 
Theology Thesis, Dallas Theological Seminary, 2001); John Day, Yahweh and the Gods and 
Goddesses of Canaan, JSOTSup (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 2000; repr. 2002); Jiří Moscala, 
‘The Sabbath in the First Creation Account’, JATS, 13 (Spring 2002), 55-66; Wenham, Genesis 1-
15, pp. 5-10; A. R. George, The Babylonian Gilgamesh Epic: Introduction, Critical Edition and 
Cuneiform Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 3-70; Helge S. Kvanvig, Primeval 
History: Babylonian, Biblical, and Enochic, JSJSup (Leiden: Brill, 2011). 
51 This argument has been used against the so-called ‘Wortbericht’ and ‘Tatbericht’ hypotheses 
that tried to validate layering of the Genesis creation narrative according to what God said against 
what he did, according to the narrative. Accordingly, the layer describing God’s action preceded 
the layer of God’s ‘fiat’ utterances. For a critique see Odil Hannes Steck, Der Schöpfungsbericht 
der Priesterschrift: Studien zur Literarkritischen und Überlieferungsgeschichtlichen Problematik 
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In addition to the idea of monotheism, the Genesis creation narrative takes God’s 
existence for granted in that God’s origins are not reflected in any thought. In 
contrast, theogonies in other creation narratives are a common feature. 
God’s word is propositional in the biblical account, in that it expresses his will in 
a clear, discursive manner. Conversely, the gods in the other creation narratives 
use magical utterances. 
As analysed above, in Genesis 1-3, there is no force that would oppose God’s 
word/will. In contrast, theomachy is a common feature among the narratives 
describing gods who, for example, struggle to divide the firmament from the 
waters. 
‘Image’ and ‘likeness’ of God were used as rationale for separation of higher and 
lower societal classes in Babylon and Egypt, respectively. In contrast, Genesis 1 
makes a statement that humanity as a whole is created in (both) the image and 
likeness of God, making the creation the rationale for equality between social 
strata. 
Free will is a gift, granted to the humans, according to Genesis 1-3. In contrast, 
this idea is never accentuated in the other creation narratives (and is often 
implicitly questioned). 
Free will becomes the rationale for the presence of evil on the Earth. 
Accordingly, evil is not a created entity, but deviation of the creation which was 
good, even ‘very good’. In contrast, evil in the other creation narratives is either 
created or co-existent with other gods. 
In addition, God’s actions and the free will granted to the humans become the 
rationale for the creation of humans, created to reflect the responsibility, 
                                                                                                                                
von Genesis 1,1-2,4a (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1975). Nevertheless, see it 
advocated in, for example, Claus Westermann, Genesis 1-11: A Continental Commentary 
(Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1974; repr. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1994). 
However, for layered origins of, for example, Gilgamesh epic, see George, The Babylonian 
Gilgamesh Epic: Introduction, Critical Edition and Cuneiform Texts, pp. 3-70; Hasel, ‘The 
Significance of the Cosmology in Genesis 1 in Relation to Ancient Near Eastern Parallels’, (p. 2); 
Lambert, ‘A New Look at the Babylonian Background of Genesis’, pp. 288-89). 
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accountability and consistency, characteristic of God. In contrast, even the gods 
in other creation narratives are often described as of dubious morals.52 
This mutual responsibility of both God and humans’, becomes the rationale for 
both the judgment upon the fallen world (on behalf of God) and maintenance and 
restoration of the fallen world (on behalf of both humans and God), in Genesis 1-
3. In contrast, the plagues and calamities brought upon humans in the other 
creation narratives are often described as the ego-centred caprice of gods.  
The rationale for judgment and consistent ethic in Genesis 1-3 is furthermore 
supported by the accent on the ethical reasons God had when he planted the tree 
of life. In contrast to this ethical motif of the tree of life, the other creation 
narratives accentuate the aesthetics of the tree of life. 
Accordingly, the tree of knowledge in Genesis 1-3 receives the foremost focus, at 
the expense of the focus on the tree of life. Thus, morality takes priority over 
immortality in the biblical creation account. In contrast, the opposite is focussed 
upon in the other creation narratives. 
The Genesis account demythologises the serpent, the waters, sun, moon, stars, 
and sexuality, all of which were represented as gods or semi-gods to be 
worshiped in the other creation narratives. 
In addition, the ‘great sea monster’ Tiamat from the primordial sea of the ANE 
narratives is in Genesis 1.21 demythologised into a creature, equal to all the other 
animals God created. 
The creation of man in Genesis is the pinnacle of the actual creation, and not the 
by-product of it, as was the case in the other creation narratives. 
Even though the seven-day time construct is present in other narratives as well, it 
is only in the Genesis account that it is embedded in God’s own experience of 
                                                
52 On the consistency and accountability of God described in Genesis 1-3 in particular, see W. Lee 
Humphreys, The Character of God in the Book of Genesis: A Narrative Appraisal (Louisville, 
KY: Westminster John Knox, 2001), pp. 23-53. 
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(rest in the) time and space he had created, and in God’s decision to separate, 
bless, and sanctify the seventh day.53 
The rationale for the proximity between God and humans is based on God’s 
creating will and thus independent of the movements of any single cosmic entity. 
In contrast, the proximity between gods and humans is in the other narratives 
rationalised as influenced by the sun, moon and stars. 
Finally, in contrast to other ANE creation narratives, Genesis 1-2 describes the 
creation process without a single word of a sacrifice or a sacrificial system. 
These differences invite us to understand that the paradigm of Genesis 1-3 clearly 
stands in contrast and as a response to the paradigms conveyed by the other ANE 
creation narratives. Furthermore, the ideological claims explained above, within 
their context of discourse with the other ANE cosmogonies, provide answers to 
the previously raised questions regarding the meaning of the utterance Genesis 1-
3. 
4.5.2 STABILITY OF THE MEANINGS OF THE UTTERANCE GENESIS 1-3  
It is important to note that the ideology of Genesis 1-3 stabilises the pragmatic, 
sociological and paradigmatic meanings of particular utterances in the narrative, 
as well as the meaning of the narrative as a whole. For instance, the ‘heavenly 
beings’ in the narrative are only ‘the bigger light’, ‘the smaller light’ and ‘the 
stars’. In other words, according to God’s created time and space, stars are not to 
be named, since he named only those parts of the chronotope that are to function 
as the vessels which are to be filled. Thus, the expanse is named, not the creatures 
which are to fill the expanse. Therefore, the idea of the cosmic bodies not being 
gods is supported by the logic of the creation order, cosmogony. Simply put, the 
cosmic bodies cannot be gods, since they are not created according to the pattern 
that would make them be gods (Cf. Jeremiah 10.2).  
                                                
53 See especially, Daniel C. Timmer, Creation, Tabernacle, and Sabbath: The Sabbath Frame of 
Exodus 31:12-17; 35:1-3 in Exegetical and Theological Perspective, FRLANT (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009), pp. 74-85. 
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Thus, even though the narrator knew the names of the cosmic bodies (see Genesis 
15.12,17; 19.23; 28.11; 32.32; 37.9), he/she could not use them, according to the 
message he/she wanted to convey. In other instances, the composition of the same 
message/meaning demanded usage of specific terms such as ‘image’ and 
‘likeness’. Therefore, it made perfect sense to use the two, otherwise 
synonymous, terms together, since in the context of discourse, they responded to 
two different narratives, Babylonian and Egyptian respectively. 
Consequently, the solution to the ‘missing’ name for the Sabbath is found by 
following the same logic of the discourse. Namely, Cassuto argued that the 
absence of the name Sabbath is caused by the very similar term ‘Sapattu’,54 the 
Babylonian day of the full moon (the fifteenth day of the month).  
However, in the light of the previously mentioned usage of terms that do 
resemble the Babylonian and Egyptian gods, this argument does not hold water. 
More precisely, the narrator in Genesis has used the expression ַּתּנִין ‘great sea 
monster’55 that resembles the name Tiamat. A similar play on the words and 
sounds has been claimed56 even concerning the term ְּתהֹום ‘the deep, abyss’.57 
Accordingly, I believe, there have to be additional reasons for the narrator’s 
choice not to use a term that would resemble the Sapattu day. 
That first reason, in my opinion, can be found in the additional detail in the 
discourse between Genesis 1-3 and the other ANE cosmogonies. Namely, the 
seventh day in the Babylonian calendar was regarded as an especially negative 
day.58 The prohibition of work and sacrifices on that day supported the idea that 
the seventh day was indeed negative.  
                                                
54 Umberto Cassuto, From Adam to Noah: A Commentary on the Book of Genesis, Part One 
(Jerusalem: The Magness Press, 1961), pp. 65-68. See also H Zimmern, ‘Sabbath’, ZDMG, 58 
(1904), 199-203; Eduard Mahler, ‘Der Sabbat: Seine Etymologische und Chronologisch - 
Historische Bedeutung’, ZDMG, 62 (1908), 33-79; Mariam Nedospasova, ‘On the Typology of 
Week Days in the Saturday’s Calendar System’, BGNAS, 2 (2008), 127-33, pp. 127-30). 
55 BDB, 1072. 
56 See Wenham, Genesis 1-15, p. 16. 
57 BDB, 1062. 
58 Thus, already in 1905 Hans König observed that ‘the Babylonians and Assyrians solemnized 
the seventh, fourteenth, twenty-first, and twenty-eighth days of the month, while, as far as we 
know, the only week which the Babylonians had the whole revolving year through was a week of 
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Thus, there was a double system of counting time in Babylon.  On the one hand, 
the system was based on the ‘full moon day’ and resonated the name of the 
Sabbath. On the other hand, the system was based on the ‘evil day’ and resonated 
the time-structure of the Sabbath institution. In order to confront ANE 
cosmogonies, the biblical narrator chose to introduce a combination of both the 
name of the ‘full moon day’ and the time-structure of the ‘evil day’.  
Therefore, in contrast to the Babylonian worship of the moon on Sapattu, within 
the moon-evolution based time, the narrator in Genesis 1-3 introduces the moon 
as a lesser light, and evades any misleading support for Sapattu by avoiding usage 
of the name Sabbath whilst nevertheless introducing seven-day time structure as 
the main time structure in the created universe. According to the same logic, the 
negative connotation of the seventh day in the ANE religions is in the Genesis 
narrative confronted with the introduction of the seventh day as the culmination 
of the narrative, and the first entity ever sanctified.  
However, the second reason for the narrator’s choice not to use a term that would 
resemble the Sapattu day is in the very structure of the Genesis 1-2 creation 
narrative itself. Namely, whenever God separated something, in order to create a 
new chronotopic vessel, he named it, so that a clear distinction from other vessels 
and from the ‘filling-up’ created entities is unequivocal. Accordingly, if the 
narrative in Genesis 2.2,3 were to describe the seventh day as being divided and 
named, it would automatically imply that the seventh day is a new type of 
chronotopic vessel in general and temporal vessel in particular (like the day, 
night, heaven, earth and seas were). Since the seventh day is not a new temporal 
entity, but identical to the previous six, an addition that is blessed and sanctified, 
an explicit separating and naming of the seventh day would simply convey a 
different, unintended meaning. 
                                                                                                                                
five days. … This [the seventh] day was regarded by them as ‘ḫul’, which word of itself signifies 
evil … and on it they particularly feared the anger of the gods.’ (Eduard König, The Bible and 
Babylon: Their Relationship in the History and Culture (London: Religious Tract Society, 1905), 
p. 61.)  
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Therefore, the pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings of the 
utterance of Genesis 1-3 are made stable once the discursive context and the 
conflict between paradigms among the ANE narratives are recognised. 
Accordingly, for the writer of the narrative in Exodus 16, Genesis 1-3 could 
definitively serve as a reference text with a stable paradigm conveyed by it and a 
stable meaning within the paradigm. 
4.5.3 GENESIS 1-3 AS A POTENTIAL MASTER NARRATIVE 
As explained in Sections and 2.1.7 and 2.3.4 above, not every reference text to 
which a paradigmatic text refers is necessarily a master narrative. However, every 
master narrative is, by definition, a text with a stable meaning and stable 
paradigms. Accordingly, the decisive criterion for text with a stable meaning is its 
narrational and ideological features. Namely, a master narrative has to be 
compact, coherent, and consistent. In addition, it has to implicitly convey the set 
of beliefs about reality to which the recipients feel compelled to subscribe. In 
addition, every set of beliefs has its limitations as well. Therefore, the master 
narrative needs to be solid enough to be able to convey the limitations of the set 
of beliefs.  
According to these findings, I argue that the narrative in Genesis 1-3 meets all of 
the requirements necessary for a master narrative. Accordingly, I conclude that 
Genesis 1-3 is the master narrative from which Exodus 16 imported the 
pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings in order to develop and 
stabilise its own.  
4.6 RHETORICAL FUNCTION OF THE ‘SABBATH OF THE LORD’ 
MOTIF 
This is the sixth step of the zoom lens method. The ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif 
was shown to be the most problematic motif in Exodus 16, when the narrative is 
read on its own. Nevertheless, the same motif is shown to encapsulate the 
rhetorical function of the whole narrative in the wilderness of Sin. More 
precisely, the most distinctive claims of the creation narrative in Genesis 1 are 
reiterated in Exodus 16 by importation of the pragmatic, sociological and 
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paradigmatic meanings via the motif of the Sabbath in general and the ‘Sabbath 
of the LORD’ motif, in particular. In other words, I can see that the other 
Sabbath-related expressions in Exodus 16 (namely, the seventh day, law, 
commandment, and ַׁשָּבתֹון ‘Sabbath observance’59) gradually allude to the context 
in Genesis 1-2. Nevertheless, the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif brings that 
context to its conclusion, just as the narrative in Genesis 1-2 culminated in the 
motif of God resting in his newly separated, blessed, and sanctified seventh day. 
In addition, it is understandable that the context in Exodus 16 is the context of 
God dealing with the congregation made up of generations brought up in Egypt, 
with the above explained ideologies common to ANE. Accordingly, there was no 
better way to reintroduce God’s ideology (and its external chronotope), then by 
importing to Exodus 16 the claims from the Genesis 1-3 narrative that served the 
same purpose at the beginning of the Bible. 
Accordingly, this importation of the motif of God’s seventh day from the summit 
of the chiastic structure between the two representations of the biblical 
cosmogony (Genesis 2.2,3), is validated by the goal of bringing to culmination 
the desert-type narratives in Exodus 15.22-17.7. Thus, the manna narrative in 
general and the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif in particular serve the purpose of 
bringing the two parts of the Scriptures (Genesis 1-2 and Exodus 15.22-17.7) into 
the dialog/ism with clear ideological purpose.  
Therefore, at this sixth step of the zoom lens method, I can conclude that an 
allusion is utilised between the paradigmatic text in Exodus 16 and the master 
narrative in Genesis 1-3, in which the rhetorical function of B=A type enables 
further development and stabilisation of the paradigm and pragmatic, sociological 
and paradigmatic meanings in the paradigmatic text. 
4.7 POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE READING 
This is the last (seventh) step of the zoom lens method, where the decentralisation 
of the meaning developed so far extends back to the initial questions regarding 
                                                
59 BDB, 992. 
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the text (the questions raised before centralisation was applied). However, 
decentralisation is to be applied even further, so that the meaning reaches the 
contemporary recipient/reader of the text, as well. Thus, at this step the personal 
contentment of the recipient is likely to be challenged, since the meaning of the 
newly established paradigm in the text is likely to address the reader as well. 
However, as mentioned earlier, many of the conclusions technically belonging to 
this step had to be explained earlier in this Chapter, so that the initial questions 
have now found answers, the last answer being the reason for the sudden 
expansion of the terms related to the Sabbath, without God pronouncing them in 
the narrative in Exodus 16. 
Nevertheless, there are also many more general issues which are likely to be 
affected by the newly stabilised paradigm and pragmatic, sociological and 
paradigmatic meanings in Exodus 16. The first on the list, I suggest, is the issue 
of the canon. This reading supports the idea of the consistency of canonical ideas 
not only on the level of sociological meaning, but also on the level of the 
(biblical) paradigm (paradigmatic meaning). However, it is important to note that 
this consistency was not achieved at the expense of polyphony in the narrative. In 
fact, the opposite was the case, the narrator has utilised every single polyphonic 
element in order to convey the link between Exodus 16 and Genesis 1-2. 
Furthermore, this compactness of the canon, with this ideological coherence 
between its parts, challenges the reader on the level of applied ideology in 
everyday practice. More precisely, every ideology is part of the metaphysical 
aspect of the paradigm. Accordingly, faith-life imagery, charged with the 
metaphysics and visualised via rituals becomes the primary source for signs of 
communal identity. Consequently, it seems to be logical that the consistency of 
the faith-life imagery should be evaluated. Namely, the reader should rightly 
evaluate any changes of the faith-life imagery (ritual praxis). In other words, in 
the situation that demands a change of the faith-life imagery, the criteria for the 
change have to be in accordance with the constant ideology. 
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Accordingly, the reader should be challenged by the pragmatic, sociological and 
paradigmatic meanings of the text, based on the addressivity of the text as an 
utterance. Nevertheless, as observed in the previous Chapter, the addressivity is 
subject to the reader’s personal choice of faith. In other words, it is the reader 
who has the free will to open and close his/her consciousness towards the 
ideological claims found in the text. Accordingly, it is the reader who chooses 
whether to subscribe to the belief offered by the text, or not. 
My understanding is that each of the seventeen claims offered by Genesis 1 and 
imported into Exodus 16 has the potential to make changes in this world. In 
particular, these seventeen claims will firstly have practical implications on the 
personal life of the believer, as well as on his/her appropriation of: knowledge, 
her-/himself, health, life, work, nature, sexuality, material wealth and death. 
Secondly, these changes in the consciousness of the believer will affect his/her 
understanding of the ‘co-subduers’ of the earth and the animals in the external 
chronotope we are created to share. Accordingly, the ideology will have practical 
implications on the development of society. Thus, in times of challenged equality 
within societies of the world, this seems to be a promising solution to achieve 
genuine democracy in the world. Finally, these changes will affect the religious 
life of the believer. In particular, his/her religious practice will utilise faith-life 
imagery in practice, and, accordingly, develop his/her communal identity.  
4.8 CONCLUSION 
In this Chapter, I have applied the zoom lens method to the narrative in Exodus 
16. Accordingly, the rhetorical and textual features of the narrative led me to 
analyse the relations between the narrative in Exodus 16 and narratives in 
Deuteronomy 34; Numbers 11; Exodus 12 and Genesis 1-3. Consequently, an 
echoic relation between Exodus 16 and Deuteronomy 34 was validated. In 
addition to these echoic relations, further research was suggested towards 
validation of an allusive importation of pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic 
meanings of Genesis 1-3 into the narratives in Exodus 12 and Numbers 11.  
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Additionally, an allusive importation of both the paradigm, and pragmatic, 
sociological and paradigmatic meanings from Genesis 1-3 into Exodus 16 was 
validated. This validation revealed a distinction between the ‘Sabbath of the 
LORD’ motif and other Sabbath-related terms, meaning that the former has the 
potential to convey the context of Genesis 1-3 in the most compact and explicit 
way. 
According to this extremely limited explicitness of the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ 
motif in Exodus 16, I am drawing a conclusion about the way the narrative texts 
were used in order to utilise the allusion. Namely, none of the analysed texts used 
exact markers of the relation of dependence between the texts. In other words, all 
of them used only implicit dependence markers, with the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ 
motif being the closest to an explicit marker. However, even this motif was 
implicit in its nature, since just the idea of holiness of the Sabbath in Exodus 
16.23 could be argued to be an explicit link. However, all of the analysed 
narratives were shown to feature implicit dependence markers, which conveyed 
the dependence in an effective way. 
This conclusion confirms Klingler’s reasoning that there is a considerable 
difference between the means available to a narrative to utilise a relation of 
dependence, and the means available to a text in other genres.60 The same 
conclusion should also have been expected on the basis of Bakhtin’s theory of 
genres as specific utterances, which prefer specific types of chronotopes, and 
accordingly acquire specific stylistic elements for conveying their meaning. 
Accordingly, I assume that the Biblical writers used a different way of 
developing and conveying dependencies among legal texts that make use of the 
‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif. Study of those texts (Exodus 20.8-11; 31.15-17; 
35.2; Leviticus 23.3, 38; 25.2, 4; and Deuteronomy 5.14) should be undertaken as 
a continuation of my research in this thesis.  
  
                                                
60 See Klingler, pp. 130-31, 243. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
In Chapter 1, this thesis focused on the vicious circle in biblical interpretation 
according to non-conduit models of communication. I proposed that the possible 
solution to the problem is to develop a theory of meaning which could analyse the 
process of interpretation as a matter of (de)centralisation motivated by the 
reader’s (dis)satisfaction with his/her paradigm. I also explained my reasons for 
choosing Kuhn’s theory of paradigms, Bakhtin’s theory of literature, and Sperber 
and Wilson’s theory of relevance as the theoretical framework for developing my 
theory of meaning. I have drawn conclusions regarding this initial choice of my 
theoretical framework.  
In Chapter 2, I introduced the three theories (of paradigms, literature, and 
relevance) as well as the tools these theories provide. I compared and contrasted 
those tools with the purpose of elucidating the common elements in the theories. 
Based on those common features, I tuned/adapted those theories to develop a 
theoretical whole which I could use as the basis for my theory of meaning. 
In Chapter 3, I developed the theory of meaning (i.e. the theory of interpretative 
relativity) and a model of that theory (i.e. the zoom lens model). According to the 
theory and its model, one can distinguish between the textual meaning, 
pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings of any given text. According 
to my theory and model, only the textual meaning is stable, while the latter three 
change as the reader’s paradigm changes. In this sense, cognitive acts of 
centralisation and decentralisation guide the reader to appropriate the textual 
meaning, as well as the pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings in a 
given context. More precisely, the cognitive process from centralisation to 
decentralisation is facilitated by the textual clues of relations of dependence 
between the text in the reader’s focus and other texts, biblical and non-biblical. 
Accordingly, the reader’s appropriation of the pragmatic, sociological and 
paradigmatic meanings is not stable, since they are a product of the reader’s 
cognitive dynamics (cognitive movements towards and away from the text and 
other centres of meaning). In this sense, there is no intrinsic stability of meaning 
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on the level of pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings. Instead, every 
reading is indeed a cognitive journey.  
In this sense, every text can be read anew, based on the impact of the cognitive 
challenges the reader has experienced since the previous reading. Every new 
reading is a cognitive journey which effects the later readings. 
However, I also conclude that the stability of the textual meaning is a compelling 
factor in forming the reader’s cognitive universe. More precisely, if the reader 
can experience the attractive force of the cognitive field of gravity of the text, the 
reader will experience non-textual centres of meaning as secondary, subject to the 
textual.  
This precedence of the textual centres of meaning does not imply that the other 
non-textual centres of meaning do not affect the reading. In fact, their 
attractiveness is directly proportional to the lack of attractiveness of the textual 
centres of meaning. The less the text attracts the reader, the more attractive other 
centres of meaning appear to be. This is the most obvious in the special case of 
my theory of meaning, when the reader cannot approach the text on the level of 
its pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings. In that case, the 
attractiveness of other centres of meaning is not jeopardised by the attractiveness 
of the textual centres of meaning. In that special case, the non-textual centres of 
meaning govern the reader’s perception of pragmatic, sociological and 
paradigmatic meanings of the text. 
In addition, I briefly reviewed the methods of interpretation proposed since the 
time of Enlightenment. I grouped some exemplary methods according to their 
sensitivity to cognitive gravity of centres of meaning. I also showed that there is a 
correlation between a method’s limited sensitivity to cognitive gravity and the 
irritants the method is unable to resolve. I concluded that the method, which is in 
harmony with my theory of meaning, has to resort to a dynamic change of 
sensitivity to different centres, where the dynamic process should start from the 
gravity of the text as a centre of meaning. As part of the conclusion, I also 
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proposed the seven key steps of my method which combine centralisation and 
decentralisation of the meaning in the process of interpretation. 
In Chapter 4, I utilised my zoom lens method whilst reading the ‘Sabbath of the 
LORD’ motif in Exodus 16. My findings reveal that the method is feasible in that 
it provides the reader with the tools needed for appropriating the textual, 
pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic meanings of the motif in the given text. 
My findings confirm that there is a clear relation of dependence between the text 
in Exodus 16 and that of Genesis 1-3. Based on this dependence of Exodus 16 on 
the text in Genesis, I drew conclusions regarding the pragmatic and paradigmatic 
meanings of the ‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif.  
Moreover, one of the results of the reading were a validation of the findings of 
Klingler’s analysis of the narratives in the Bible. Namely, my conclusions 
confirm that the tools utilised by texts of the same genre are most always on the 
level of implications and allusions, as opposed to the tools that express 
dependence in a far more explicit way (e.g. paraphrase, citation, quotation …). 
In addition, my reading of the meaning of the given text in Exodus 16 did not 
bring about any change in my initial presuppositions, that is my initial set of 
questions regarding the entire enquiry. According to those questions, the purpose 
of reading was to find an explanation of how the text can affect my understanding 
of my world and time. I found a satisfactory answer and all the challenges I 
experienced during the enquiry proved solvable, within the initial paradigm.  
Accordingly, I conclude that this reading of Exodus 16, as well as the research 
done in this thesis as a whole, has not brought about change of my initial 
presuppositions. However, my theory of meaning clarifies and predicts when that 
is possible, but is not the purpose of this thesis. I can conclude, in line with my 
theory and the findings in this thesis, that if my reading of Exodus 16 did not lead 
me towards a master narrative in another textual centre of meaning, I would have 
been much more inclined to search for other master narratives in textual and non-
textual sources of meaning.  
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I now draw additional conclusions concerning the potential effect these findings 
can have on scholarship in the future. The conclusions are related to the following 
six fields of enquiry in which the findings of this thesis can be applied: first, 
judicial interpretation, second, history of interpretation, third, positivist and post-
phenomenological interpretation, fourth, theories of meaning in the area of signed 
languages, fifth, relation between quantitative and qualitative research, and sixth, 
development of denominational identities in postpositivism. This list is not 
extensive, but rather exemplary. 
Firstly, in this thesis, I applied my theory of meaning to the narrative in Exodus 
16. Using the same approach to legal texts with the same literary motif (i.e. the 
‘Sabbath of the LORD’ motif in Exodus 20.8-11; 31.15-17; 35.2; Leviticus 23.3, 
38; 25.2, 4; Deuteronomy 5.14) will lay the foundation for applying my theory of 
meaning to the sphere of judicial interpretation. This research will also test the 
flexibility and universality of my theory of meaning.  
Secondly, I did not focus my research on the history of interpretation before the 
time of Enlightenment. However, the findings in this thesis suggest that it is 
possible to analyse one’s interpretation by focusing on the centres of meaning 
that, that interpretation was associated with, just as I have done, to a limited 
extent, by reviewing the shifts in the history of interpretation after the time of 
Enlightenment. Consequently, it should be possible to reassess the history of 
interpretation and philosophy of language as the history of centralisation and 
decentralisation in interpretative paradigms. In other words, one could analyse 
movements in philosophy and biblical studies and compare them as regards their 
centralisation on a given centre of meaning, likewise from the earlier periods in 
history.  
For example, in philosophy in general and philosophy of language in particular, 
one could analyse the sequence of turns from the so-called ‘linguistic turn’ in 
philosophy, the subsequent rise of modern linguistics, and finally the speech-act 
theory as a reaction to the previous movements. In this example, the ‘linguistic 
turn’ is usually understood as the shift of the methodologies in philosophy from 
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those based on the ‘mind–world’ relation to those based on the ‘language–world’ 
relation.1 However, I suggest that the shift could also be interpreted as the 
transition from methodologies focused on the context associated with A centre 
(religious ideas, systems) to the context related to C centre (the text itself) on 
Illustrations 7 and 11 above. In this sense, Saussure’s approach to language, and 
the modern linguistics advocated by Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) are just examples 
of extreme centralisation on the C centre of meaning.2 Furthermore, as a reaction 
to the previous focus, the so-called speech-act theory centralises interpretation on 
either B centre (the author) or D centre (the ancient first recipient).  
Thirdly, in this thesis, I directed my research in accordance with postpositivist 
presuppositions and my particular theoretical frame. I suggest that a comparison 
with results acquired when considering the same or very similar postpositivist 
presuppositions, but with an alternative conceptual structure will contribute to a 
better understanding of the vicious circle in biblical research. Thus, on the one 
hand, I suggest future research be directed within a framework incorporating the 
following postpositivist theories: theory of the growth of knowledge in line with 
the theories of Popper, Lakatos or Barbour, and far side pragmatic theories in line 
with Grice, John R. Searle (1932-) or Stephen C. Levinson (1947-). If needed, 
one can also utilise methods for close reading of texts in line with for example 
David Kaplan (1933-) or Robert C. Stalnaker (1940-).  
On the other hand, since my findings show that the reader’s satisfaction plays a 
critical role in interpretation, I suggest that further research is directed towards 
affective approaches to matters of interpretation. More precisely, I suggest that 
my findings be compared and contrasted with, for example, readings which 
implement the theories of Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) and Félix Guatarri (1930-
1992) (i.e. their immanent philosophy and ’body without organs’ approach). I 
                                                
1See Herbert Hanreich, ‘Immanence and Transcendence’, in The Encyclopedia of Christianity, ed. 
by Erwin Fahlbusch and Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999-2003), pp. 
663-67 (p. 666). See also The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method, ed. by Richard 
Rorty (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1967). 
2 Hans Ineichen and Philipp Stoellger, ‘Linguistics’, in The Encyclopedia of Christianity, Vol 3, 
ed. by Erwin Fahlbusch and Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999-2003), 
pp. 283-87 (p. 284). 
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suggest that there may be ways to determine that through the theoretical 
framework of Deleuze and Guatarri, it is possible to see epistemology and 
phenomenology on the one hand, and post-phenomenology on the other hand, as 
a whole. The essence of the whole is, I suggest, the reader’s affective experience 
in general, and his/her satisfaction in particular.  
Fourthly, I believe that my findings can be used in the study of signed languages. 
Namely, my theory of meaning is suitable for interpreting the text as a speech act 
in the area of both spoken and signed languages. The most crucial element in my 
theory of meaning (i.e. the recipient’s satisfaction) applies to both domains. 
Furthermore, my theory of meaning is based on context as a cognitive 
space/sphere. This idea of the cognitive space, is in close proximity to the speech 
act in signed languages, where the use of the signing space is essential for 
establishing the cognitive context. I suggest that further research be undertaken 
on this assumption, providing a foundation for the better understanding of the 
vicious circle in interpretation in both spoken and signed languages. The likely 
outcome would be understanding spoken and signed languages as a whole. 
Fifthly, my theory of meaning can be further tested by using it in the quantitative 
enquiry. In other words, the theory should be applied in reading texts of the 
analytical scientific genre. Sensitivity to the paradigm in which a set of data is 
provided is the objective of scientific enquiry, often associated with quantitative 
research.  If my theory of meaning is relevant to genres related to the quantitative 
enquiry, the findings can support the view in which qualitative and quantitative 
research are one entity.  
Finally, I conclude that there is a potential impact my distinction between faith 
(i.e. the choice to believe) and belief (i.e. a given tenet/system of ideas to which 
one subscribes) can have in the light of the findings in this thesis. Specifically, 
this distinction can impact the realm of one’s personal affiliation with a given 
denomination related to the Bible. If the acceptance into the denomination is 
based on the matter of faith, is it easier or more difficult to maintain the faith in 
the various interpretive paradigms (i.e. positivist/modernist, constructivist, 
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critical theory, or poststructural paradigms)? How likely is it that one’s 
interpretive paradigm will affect his/her choice to join a given denomination (e.g. 
Lutheran, Anglican, Catholic, Seventh-day Adventist, etc.)? Is the nature of the 
choice in any way different within the of branches of Judaism (e.g. Orthodox, 
Conservative, Reform, or Reconstructionist)? 
In this sense, I believe that my theory of meaning would be useful in the 
development of denominational identities. The findings in this thesis support the 
conclusion that there should be a contrast between the conversion in terms of 
paradigm shift and the conversion in terms of one’s mindset. Therefore, I suggest 
that the former be called the cognitive conversion, and the latter the spiritual 
conversion.  
If this distinction is not applied in the process of the development of 
denominational identities, every new paradigm shift on a communal level (e.g. 
the Western society/culture) will result in the denominations established in one of 
the former paradigms, becoming incompatible with the need for nurturing faith in 
the new paradigm. This conclusion might explain why some denominations with 
their roots in the 19th century – positivism function well in the 
cultures/communities which still entertain presuppositions of that interpretative 
paradigm. However, the same conclusion might clarify the reasons why such 
denominations have difficulties nurturing faith in the parts of the world where the 
majority of the society entertains postpositivist/dialogical presuppositions. 
In the light of my findings in this thesis, it appears that many current issues 
related to denominational identity, in general, resonate with the problems of the 
first Christians. The age-old question in many denominations is whether 
postpositivists who choose faith need to become positivists/modernists, to be 
accepted by God as saved Christians? My findings in this thesis suggest that the 
same force that compels positivists to a satisfactory interpretation of the Bible 
also compels the postpositivists. In the final analysis, we all search for the 
meaning that is in harmony with our personal pathway from irritants to 
satisfaction. 
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Appendix A: Display of Illustrations 
 
 
Illustration 1: Lukic’s Circular Reasoning Characteristic for the Normal 
Science Mode 
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Illustration 2: Lukic’s Kuhnian Paradigm and its Aspects 
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Illustration 3: Lukic’s Inverted Dynamics of the Normal and Extraordinary 
Science Modes 
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Illustration 4: Lukic’s Manifestations of the Metaphysical Aspect of a 
Paradigm and its Influence on the Sociological Aspect 
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Illustration 5: Adaptation of Lukic’s Manifestations of the Metaphysical 
Aspect of a Paradigm and its Influence on the Sociological Aspect 
 
Illustration 6: Barton’s Centres of Meaning 
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Illustration 7: Five Centres of Meaning 
 
 
 
Illustration 8: Centres of Meaning after Application of Bakhtinian Theory 
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Illustration 9: Klingler’s Intertextual Relation 
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Illustration 10: Adaptation of Klingler’s Intertextual Relation: 
Intercontextuality 
 
  
	
	
	
319	
Illustration 11: Centres of Meaning after Application of Bakhtinian- and 
Relevance Theory Combined 
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Illustration 12: The Master Narrative as the Centre of Cognitive Gravity 
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Illustration 13: Angle of View, Centres of Meaning, and Relations within the 
Field of Cognitive Gravity 
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Illustration 14: Angle of View with Different Contexts 
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Illustration 15: Different Paradigm Enquiries 
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Illustration 16: Apparent Change of Distance Representing Cognitive 
Gravity 
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Illustration 17: Cognitive Gravity at Relative Distance, Ratio 1, Zoom of 25 
mm 
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Illustration 18: Cognitive Gravity at Relative Distance, Ratio 2, Zoom of 379 
mm 
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Illustration 19: Cognitive Gravity at Relative Distance, Ratio 3, Zoom of 600 
mm 
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Illustration 20: Wenham’s Conglomeration of Sources According to 
Documentary Hypothesis 
 
 
 
 
 
Illustration 21: Dating of the Sources to Pentateuch/Torah 
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Illustration 22: Lamp and Torch in front of the Text as a Canonised 
Utterance 
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Appendix B: Glossary 
 
Accentuation: a literary technique that utilises dialogical overtones as accents in an 
utterance, and thus narrows the scope of possible meanings the utterance can convey 
and highlights the direction of the utterance. (See also Canonisation, Direction, 
Heteroglossia and Re-accentuation.) 
Act of authoring: the process of developing images (e.g. the author, voices in the text, 
their motivations, intentions, aims, mindsets, worldviews, as well as of paradigm, 
recipients of the text) conveyed by the dependence markers in the text. (See also Image 
of a voice and Utterance.) 
Addressivity of every utterance: a measure of the effect the relation between the 
addressee and the author will have on the choice of genre of the author's utterance. (See 
also Finalisation, Expressiveness, Personal proximity and Utterance.) 
Aim: the fundamental direction of a person’s life, or some fairly stable subset of that 
fundamental direction. (See also Master narrative, Intention, Motivation, Mindset, and 
Worldview.) 
Allusion (literary): a literary device expressing a relation of a monophonic dependence. 
It is a literary device utilised by an author whereby allusive textual markers are placed 
into the alluding text (i.e. developing literary context) in order to activate meaning in a 
text previously alluded to (i.e. the stable meaning of a previous text) for the rhetorical 
function of importing that meaning into the alluding text in order to assist in the 
development of the author of the alluding text’s intended meaning. (See also Citation, 
Paraphrase, Reference and Quotation.) 
Allusive dependence: a one-directional relation between a dependent text (with a 
developing unstable meaning, but a developed stable paradigm) and an independent 
text, where there is only one, dominant relation of dependence, emphasised by 
dependence markers in the dependent text. Thus, one stable meaning can be delineated 
to be exclusively resembled in the stabilised meaning of the dependent alluding text. 
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(See also Monophonic dependence, Paradigmatic dependence, Polyphonic 
dependence and Referential dependence.)  
Alluding text: a text with a developing unstable meaning, but a developed stable 
paradigm as well as markers of a monophonic dependence. (See also Allusive 
dependence, Echoic text, Referential text, and Paradigmatic text.) 
Anomaly: is an irritant which causes frustration. (See Irritant frustrating and Irritant 
challenging.)  
Belief: a tenet to which a person of faith can subscribe. In contrast to the one type of 
faith, different beliefs have different tenets, so that there is always a plethora of possible 
tenets/beliefs to which a person of faith can subscribe. (See also Faith.) 
Canonisation (of an utterance): the final stage of the process of interaction of 
centrifugal and centripetal forces in formation of an utterance, resulting in blurring of 
heteroglossity of its voices and making its form and accentuation rigid. (See also 
Accentuation, Direction, Heteroglossia, Re-accentuation.) 
Carnival genre: the form of utterances, which features a horizon of expectations, 
brought on an utterance that is used with the purpose of developing a grotesque 
representation of the world, in which the world is in its unfinished form, with all 
boundaries in the world under development and movable. (See also Genre, and 
Grotesque realism.) 
Centralisation: the cognitive act of reconsidering the same expression as part of a 
narrower context. (See also Decentralisation and Context.) 
Centre of meaning: a source of information available to the recipient of an utterance 
regarding specific characteristics of the utterance. (See also Utterance, and Context.) 
Chronotope: a unique representation of a composition of time and space as one whole 
in an utterance. This composition is characteristic for a specific sphere of 
communication, and with the possibility of featuring several layers of time and space in 
the same utterance, representing, thus, external, formal and internal chronotopes (i.e. the 
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author’s actual chronotope, the one of the writing as a whole and the one associated 
with the voices within the written document). (See also Image, Mise en abyme and 
Sphere of communication.) 
Citation (literary): a direct literary marker by which the author points the reader to the 
referenced text. (See also Allusion, Paraphrase, Quotation, Reference.) 
Cognitive gravity: The attractive force of irritants which guides, either via challenge to 
satisfaction within the paradigm or frustration to satisfaction in another paradigm. 
Communicative intention: the author’s intention to inform the audience of his/her 
informative intention. (See also Ostensive-inferential communication, Informative 
intention and Ostensive stimulus.) 
Context: a person’s cognitive sphere of presuppositions related to communication in 
general and a specific utterance in particular. The presuppositions are concerned with 
relations of relevance between the utterance and one or more centres of meaning of the 
utterance. (The centres of meaning are one or more sources of information about 
specific characteristics of the utterance, available to the recipient of the utterance). (See 
also Centre of meaning.) 
Conversion cognitive: A paradigm shift as a response to a frustrating irritant (i.e. 
anomaly). It is the process which causes changes in the metaphysical aspect of a 
paradigm, and thus is in fact, a shift of the paradigm itself. The process starts with 
frustrating irritants in one’s paradigm. These irritants call for shift of the person’s 
motivation, intention, mindset, worldview and paradigm. If no satisfaction with the 
irritant is found in the old paradigm, the person is forced to look for satisfaction in a 
new paradigm. This paradigm shift can take place on both personal and communal 
spheres. (See also Conversion spiritual, Revolutionary science, Paradigm, Worldview 
and Mindset.) 
Conversion spiritual: a response to a challenging irritant. The decision to accept the 
challenge of the irritant to improve personal motivation, intention and mindset. (See 
also Conversion cognitive, Irritant challenging, Irritant frustrating.) 
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Decentralisation: the cognitive act of reconsidering the same expression as part of a 
wider context. (See also Centralisation and Context.) 
Dependence: The state of relying on, or being controlled by, someone or something 
else. (See also Dependence markers.) 
Dependence markers: markers in a text which point to previous parts of the same text 
or some other text(s) so that an image of the metaphysical aspect of the paradigm can be 
further utilised. They are also called dialogic(al) overtones. (See also Monophonic 
dependence markers and Polyphonic dependence markers.) 
Dependent text: a monophonic text. (See also Dependence markers and Independent 
text.) 
Dialogic(al) overtones: See Dependence markers. 
Dialogic(al): a feature which resembles dialogism as the context in which no part of the 
reality can be completely delineated and independent from the rest of the reality. (See 
also Dialogism and Utterance.) 
Dialogism: a context of reality and communication in which no part of the reality can be 
completely delineated and independent from the rest of the reality (as opposed to the 
approach to reality as a dialogue, in which author, text and recipient are presupposed to 
be delineable and independent from each other). (See also Dialogic(al), and Utterance.) 
Direction (of an utterance): a feature of every utterance by which dialogical overtones 
in the utterance are accentuated so that a specific relation towards another utterance is 
emphasised. (See also Accentuation, Canonisation, Heteroglossia, Monophonic 
dependence markers, and Re-accentuation.) 
Double-voicedness: a literary phenomenon by which a clear delineation among the 
voices of the author from the voice of the heroes he/she has authorised is not feasible, 
since each of the voices in an utterance is, in a more or less direct way, influenced by, 
and part of, the presentation of the author’s voice. (See also Canonisation, Chronotope, 
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Grotesque realism, Heteroglossia, Polyphony.) 
Echo: the (only) device expressing a relation of a polyphonic dependence. (See also 
Polyphonic dependence.) 
Echoic dependence: see Polyphonic dependence. 
Echoic text: a text with a developing unstable meaning, and a developing unstable 
paradigm as well as with markers of the polyphonic dependence, but without any 
marker of a monophonic dependence. (See also Alluding text, Paradigmatic text, 
Polyphonic dependence, and Referential text.) 
Expressiveness of every utterance: a measure of the capability of the utterance to 
convey emotional evaluations of the speaker, regarding the topic discussed. (See also 
Addressivity, Finalisation, Personal proximity, and Utterance.)  
External chronotope: a specific construct of time and space on the level of the 
metaphysical aspect of the author’s paradigm. (See also Formal chronotope, Internal 
chronotope, and Chronotope.) 
Faith: a cognitive choice of willingness to be open towards a belief. Belief is, in 
addition, the tenet to which a person of faith can subscribe. faith can be only of one 
type, whilst every individual can have it to a certain degree, or simply lack it. In contrast 
to the one type of faith, different beliefs have different tenets, so that there is always a 
plethora of possible tenets/beliefs to which a person of faith can subscribe. (See also 
Belief.) 
Finalisation of every utterance: a measure of the possibility of responding to the 
utterance, based on semantic exhaustiveness of the theme of the speech, the speaker’s 
plan and generic forms of finalisation. (See also Addressivity, Expressiveness, Personal 
proximity, and Utterance.) 
Formal chronotope: an artistic construct of time and space in an utterance as a whole, 
used with the purpose of conveying an image of the world in the utterance. (See also 
Chronotope, External chronotope, and Internal chronotope.) 
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Generic forms: see Genre. 
Genre: a relatively stable form of utterances which features a specific horizon of 
expectations, brought on an utterance by the specific sphere of communication the 
utterance is used in, and by the chronotope presented in the utterance. (See also 
Carnival genre, Chronotope, and Sphere of communication.) 
Grotesque realism: a representation of the world developed according to the 
presuppositions that the world is in its unfinished form, with all boundaries in the world 
under development and movable. (See also Carnival genre and Genre.) 
Hermeneutic circle: see Vicious circle.  
Hermeneutical model: metaphorical presentation of a hermeneutical agenda. (See also 
Model and Type of hermeneutical model.) 
Heteroglossia: the literary phenomenon which utilises the ability of voices to use (adapt 
to) different styles of speech according to the context of the discourse. (See also 
Canonisation, Chronotope, Double-voicedness, Grotesque realism, and Polyphony.) 
Image: a subjective comprehension and depiction of reality. (See also Image of a voice, 
and Chronotope.) 
Image of a voice (e.g. the author’s voice): an image of a voice (consciousness) which is 
created by the author of the utterance himself/herself, but nevertheless, always more or 
less different from the real person (the real author) The images of voices represent every 
voice in both internal and formal chronotopes of the utterance. (See also Act of 
authoring.) 
Independent text: the text which is seen from another (dependent) text as the text 
which has a developed stable image of the paradigm in which (the image of the 
paradigm) the meaning of the (independent) text is developed as stable. (See also 
Dependent text and Master narrative.) 
Informative intention: the author’s intention to inform the audience of something. (See 
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also Ostensive-inferential communication, Communicative intention and Ostensive 
stimulus.) 
Intention: a specific application of an ‘aim’ in a particular situation. (See also Aim, 
Master narrative, Mindset, Motivation, and Worldview.) 
Intercontextuality: a relation of polyphonic dependence, between contexts, within any 
one centre of meaning or between any number of centres of meaning. (See also 
Dialogism and Intertextuality.) 
Internal chronotope: an artistic construct of time and space in an image of the world, 
with a focus adapted to the purpose of conveying the message of the author. (See also 
Chronotope, External chronotope and Formal chronotope.) 
Intertextuality: a relation of monophonic dependence in a written context. Thus, it can 
be expressed by means of reference, citation, quotation, paraphrase or allusion. (See 
also Intercontextuality.) 
Irritant: a phenomenon perceived as a challenge to the current state of affairs in the 
world and time of the reader. (See also Irritant challenging, Irritant frustrating and 
Anomaly.) 
Irritant challenging: the irritant matches the interpretative paradigm of the reader, even 
when opposing the reader’s opinions/conclusions. In this sense, the reader perceives the 
irritant as a challenge and not a threat to his/her paradigm. The irritant is thus perceived 
as a new centre of gravity in conflict with, but under control of, the reader’s centre of 
cognitive gravity. (See also Irritant frustrating and Anomaly.)  
Irritant frustrating: a phenomenon which does not match the interpretative paradigm 
of the reader and causes frustration. With its attractive force, it is a centre of gravity in 
conflict and also out of the controlling capacities of the reader’s cognitive gravity. For 
example, in the predicting paradigm, this phenomenon is unpredictable, in explaining 
the unexplainable, in the critical paradigm, it escapes the criticism and nonetheless does 
not match the readers centre of gravity. In this sense, the phenomenon calls for shifting 
of the reader’s fundamental presuppositions and the paradigm as a whole. (See also 
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Irritant challenging and Anomaly.) 
Master narrative: an utterance with a developed stable image of a paradigm in a 
narrative form. The narrative states the limitations of the implicit set of beliefs about 
reality. If articulated by a voice privately, the narrative is the voice’s mindset. If 
publicly, the narrative is the voice’s worldview. If written, the narrative is the formal 
paradigmatic meaning of the text, conveyed by dialogical overtones, i.e. dependence 
markers in the text. In this case, the master narrative (i.e. formal paradigmatic meaning 
of the text) is a narrational manifestation of the metaphysical aspect of the paradigm. 
(See also Paradigm, Paradigmatic meaning, Metaphysical aspect of a paradigm, 
Independent text, and Worldview.) 
Meaning: an articulation of images of a text, voice, community or paradigm as they are 
presented by a given text (and appropriated as textual, pragmatic, sociological and 
paradigmatic meanings, respectively). (See also Chronotope, Motivation, Intention, 
Aim, Image of a voice, Textual meaning, Pragmatic meaning, Sociological meaning 
and Paradigmatic meaning.) 
Metamodel: the initial set of presuppositions, expressed in a metaphor, which serve as 
criteria for choosing a particular model. (See also Model.) 
Metaphysical aspect of a paradigm: an implicit set of beliefs about reality, limited by 
the paradigm’s master narrative. (See also Paradigm, Master narrative, 
Methodological aspect of a paradigm, Sociological aspect of a paradigm, and 
Worldview.) 
Methodological (problem-solving) aspect of a paradigm: a set of concrete problem 
solutions produced by a group of practitioners who make the sociological aspect of a 
paradigm, which (the problem solutions) tacitly carry the metaphysical commitments of 
that group of practitioners. (See also Paradigm, Metaphysical aspect of a paradigm, 
Sociological aspect of a paradigm, and Worldview.) 
Mindset: an utterance of a private, individual, personal articulation of the metaphysical 
aspect of a paradigm. Thus, it is the individual subset, or variant, of the worldview held 
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by the society or societies to which the individual belongs. (See also Aim, Intention, 
Master narrative, Motivation, and Worldview.) 
Mise en abyme: a literary device by which an intermingling of representations of time 
and space is achieved, so that representations of time and space on internal, formal and 
external levels mutually intrude on each other. (See also Chronotope.) 
Model: a visual, descriptive or analogical representation of something otherwise too 
complex, impossible, or difficult to be directly observed. (See also Hermeneutical 
model.) 
Model of interpretative relativity: model which utilises the telephoto effect. (See also 
Telephoto effect.) 
Monophonic dependence markers: the features of a text which highlight some of the 
polyphonic links between the text and another text (or part of the same text) so that the 
otherwise polyphonic (echoic) links between the two are thus made to stand out, and 
resemble a monophonic dependence of one text on the other text. (See also 
Accentuation, Dependence markers, and Polyphonic dependence markers.) 
Monophonic dependence: a one-directional relation between a dependent and an 
independent text, where there is only one dominant relation of dependence, emphasised 
by dependence markers in the dependent text. (See also Allusive dependence, 
Paradigmatic dependence, Polyphonic dependence, and Referential dependence.) 
Motivation: the particular sense that on a specific occasion, a certain action or set of 
actions is appropriate and desirable. (See also Mindset, Aim, Intention, Master 
narrative and Worldview.) 
Noise: a synergy effect of negative factors in communication. (See also Synergy.) 
Ostensive-inferential communication: the process in which the communicator (i.e. 
author, utterer) produces a stimulus which makes it mutually manifest to communicator 
and audience that the communicator intends, by means of this stimulus, to make 
manifest or more manifest to the audience a set of assumptions. Thus this 
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communication model consists of ‘the informative intention’, ‘the communicative 
intention’ and ‘the ostensive stimulus’. (See also Informative intention, 
Communicative intention and Ostensive stimulus.) 
Ostensive stimulus: the act of the author designed to attract the recipient’s attention and 
focus it on the author’s assumptions. (See also Ostensive-inferential communication, 
Communicative intention and Informative intention.) 
Paradigm: a unified whole in which all data gained by observation are organised. One 
can distinguish three aspects of the unified whole: metaphysical aspect (the set of ideas 
and beliefs about reality limited by the paradigm’s master narrative), sociological aspect 
(the set of sociological factors which influence the way the science is done), and 
methodological aspect (the set of the available scientific methodology). Different 
paradigms direct enquiry towards different questions regarding the reality. (See also 
Master narrative, Worldview, Mindset, Paradigmatic dependence, and Paradigmatic 
text.) 
Paradigmatic context: a person’s cognitive sphere of presuppositions related to an 
utterance as an expression of a particular paradigm. (See also Context, Textual context, 
Pragmatic context and Sociological context.) 
Paradigmatic dependence: a one-directional relation between a dependent text (with a 
developing unstable meaning caused by a developing unstable paradigm) and an 
independent text, where there is only one, dominant relation of dependence emphasised 
by dependence markers in the dependent text. Thus, one stable paradigm is delineated 
(and consequently the meaning) that is to be exclusively resembled in the stabilised 
paradigm (and meaning) of the dependent paradigmatic text. (See also Paradigm, 
Monophonic dependence, Allusive dependence, Polyphonic dependence, and 
Referential dependence.) 
Paradigmatic meaning: an articulation of a paradigm by means of an utterance. More 
precisely, it is an articulation of a paradigm in a given text conveyed by pragmatic and 
sociological meanings in the text. One can differentiate between internal, formal, and 
current external paradigmatic meanings, based on respective chronotopes with which 
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the meaning is associated. The ancient external meaning is out of the current reader’s 
sight. (See also Chronotope, Motivation, Intention, Aim, Image of a voice, Textual 
meaning, Pragmatic meaning, Sociological meaning). 
Paradigmatic text: a text with a developing unstable meaning, and a developing 
unstable paradigm as well as markers of a monophonic dependence. (See also 
Paradigm, Alluding text, Echoic text, Paradigmatic dependence, and Referential text.) 
Paraphrase: a literary device by which an author of one text intentionally reproduces 
the meaning of the words of another text. (See also Allusion, Citation, Quotation, and 
Reference.) 
Permeability (of language and utterances): the effect of diffuse borders which cannot 
prevent blending of otherwise delineated entities. Accordingly, the permeability of 
utterances implies diffuse borders between the utterances, otherwise delineated by a 
change of speakers. Every text is an utterance influenced by other texts and influencing 
other texts. 
Personal proximity of every utterance: a measure of the capability of the utterance to 
convey the emotional relation between the addressee and the author. (See also 
Addressivity, Expressiveness, Finalisation, and Utterance.) 
Phrase: See Word and phrase. 
Polyphonic dependence: the echoic bi-directional relation between a text (with a 
developing unstable meaning and developing unstable paradigm) and the rest of the 
world. The dependence is present as long as none of the dependence markers is 
modified in order to establish a monophonic dependence on another text. (See also 
Monophonic dependence and Polyphony.) 
Polyphonic dependence (echoic) markers: the features of the text which make the text 
resemble the rest of the world, so that the text and the rest of the world are in a mutually 
echoic dependence. (See also Accentuation, Dependence markers, and Monophonic 
dependence markers.) 
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Polyphony: a literary phenomenon in which mutual engagement of more than two 
voices takes place at the same time. (See also Chronotope, Double-voicedness, 
Grotesque realism, Heteroglossia, and Canonisation.) 
Pragmatic context: a person’s cognitive sphere of presuppositions related to the 
author’s intentions, implicatures, and all that is not explicitly present in the text. Thus, 
an interpretation concerned with intentions and implicatures surpasses domains of pure 
linguistics and semantics and is part of the field of pragmatics. (See also Context, 
Textual context, Sociological context and Paradigmatic context.) 
Pragmatic meaning: the meaning provided by the pragmatic context. It is an 
articulation of motivation, intention and aim of a voice in the text. Since the reader’s 
perception of the pragmatic context changes in the process of interpretation, the 
pragmatic meaning is not stable. The reader can differentiate between internal, formal, 
and current external pragmatic meanings, based on respective chronotopes with which 
the meaning is associated. The ancient external meaning is out of the current reader’s 
sight. (See also Chronotope, Motivation, Intention, Aim, Image of a voice, 
Paradigmatic meaning, Sociological meaning). 
Quotation (literary): a literary device by which an author of one text intentionally 
reproduces the exact words of another text. (See also Allusion, Citation, Paraphrase, 
and Reference.) 
Re-accentuation: a literary technic by which the changing of accents/dialogical 
overtones in an utterance and accordingly of the direction and meaning of the utterance 
is achieved. (See also Accentuation, Canonisation, Direction, and Heteroglossia.) 
Relativity of meaning: the phenomenon of unstable pragmatic, sociological and 
paradigmatic meaning in contrast to constant literal meaning of a text. The relative 
meanings (pragmatic, sociological and paradigmatic) change as the reader appropriates 
faith-life imagery presented in the text in general, and its internal and formal 
chronotopes, in particular. 
Reference (literary): a literary device by which an author directly identifies a person, 
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place, or thing existing in another text with no intention to draw further connections 
between the text doing the referring and the item referred to. (See also Allusion, 
Citation, Paraphrase, and Quotation.) 
Referential dependence: a one-directional relation between a dependent text (with a 
developed stable meaning, and a developed stable paradigm) and an independent text, 
where there is only one, dominant relation of dependence emphasised by dependence 
markers in the dependent text. (See also Allusive dependence, Independent text, 
Paradigmatic dependence, and Polyphonic dependence.) 
Referential text: a text with a developed stable meaning, and a developed stable 
paradigm as well as markers of a monophonic dependence. (See also Alluding text, 
Echoic text, Paradigmatic text, and Referential dependence.) 
Regular science: regular scientific research, that is the research that ‘fits’ the 
presuppositions entertained by the scientific community. (See also Revolutionary 
science and Conversion.) 
Revolutionary science: changes in understanding and explaining the fundamental 
principles in sciences. (See also Regular science and Conversion.) 
Relative distance: See Telephoto effect. 
Relevance: a measure of the effectiveness of an utterance to narrow the wider context in 
which the previous utterance was processed to be situated. (See also Centre of meaning, 
and Context.) 
Sentence: a linguistic unit which expresses a relatively complete thought, directly 
correlated with the other thoughts of a single speaker within his/her utterance as a 
whole, whilst lacking finalisation, expressiveness, addressivity and personal proximity. 
(See also Utterance, and Word and phrase.) 
Sociological aspect of a paradigm: a group of practitioners trained within the context 
of a particular implicit set of beliefs about reality, which (the group) develops a concrete 
disciplinary matrix within limitations of the set of beliefs. Their explicit public 
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worldviews, or private, personal mindsets are parts of the sociological aspect of the 
paradigm. (See also Paradigm, Metaphysical aspect of a paradigm, Methodological 
aspect of a paradigm, and Worldview.) 
Sociological context: a person’s cognitive sphere of presuppositions related to the state 
of affairs (i.e. sociological circumstances) of the author’s world and time in the way the 
text articulates these circumstances. (See also Context, Textual context, Pragmatic 
context and Paradigmatic context.) 
Sociological meaning: an articulation of the state of affairs related to mindsets and 
worldviews of voices in the text (i.e. private and public explicit formulations of the 
paradigm, respectively). One can differentiate between internal, formal, and current 
external sociological meanings, based on respective chronotopes with which the 
meaning is associated. The ancient external meaning is out of the current reader’s sight. 
(See also Chronotope, Motivation, Intention, Aim, Image of a voice, Paradigmatic 
meaning, Pragmatic meaning). 
Speaking consciousness: see Voice. 
Speech-flow: a change of speakers engaged in the conversation. (See also Sentence and 
Utterance.) 
Sphere of communication: a group of specific occasions in life in which language is 
used in a specific way characteristic for that and similar occasions (forming, thus, 
spheres such as ‘at work’, ‘at court’, ‘at home’, ‘with loved ones’…). (See also 
Chronotope.) 
Superaddressee: a third-party in the phenomenon of dialogism, (in addition to the 
author and the addressee) whose perfectly just and correct understanding of the writer’s 
utterance is assumed; thus, the functioning of the utterance in the process of 
communication is made feasible. (See Utterance.) 
Synergy: the combined effect of a group of factors working together, where the effect 
of the group is greater than the sum of the outcome achieved by any one factor working 
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separately. (See also Noise.) 
Telephoto effect: changes in the perception of reality achieved by zooming in or out 
while moving the camera closer to, or further away, from the subject in focus. More 
precisely, the space/gap between the object in focus and its background is perceived as 
bigger when the relative distance between the camera and the object is shorter. Here the 
relative distance is the ratio between the distance between the camera and the object in 
focus and the distance between the object and its background (achieved by moving the 
camera closer to the object in focus). In contrast, the bigger the relative distance 
between the camera and the object in focus (achieved by moving the camera away from 
the subject), the smaller the gap between the object and its background appears to be. 
(See also Model of interpretative relativity.) 
Textual context: a person’s cognitive sphere of presuppositions related to only the 
explicit realm of a specific text. With this narrow focus, an interpretation of a text 
remains within the domains of linguistics and semantics. (See also Context, Pragmatic 
context, Sociological context and Paradigmatic context.) 
Textual meaning: the meaning provided by the textual context. This meaning is not 
different from how the text reads. This meaning is the only stable meaning for the given 
text. It is the explicit meaning. (See also Pragmatic meaning, Sociological meaning 
and Paradigmatic meaning.) 
Type of hermeneutical model: a group of hermeneutical models that share a common 
visual metaphor, which explains their similarities and differences, by each particular 
model adjusting the visual metaphor in a specific way. (See also Hermeneutical model, 
Hermeneutical circle.) 
Utterance: a speech unit that is delineated by the rest of the speech communication by a 
change of speaking subjects (that is, a change of speakers), whilst featuring finalisation, 
expressiveness, addressivity and personal proximity. (See also Addressivity, 
Expressiveness, Finalisation, Sentence, Speech-flow, Word and phrase, and Personal 
proximity.) 
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Vicious circle: the closed line of reasoning in the sense that ‘A’ is claimed to be ‘B’ on 
the basis of what ‘B’ is in terms of its relation to ‘A’. (See also Hermeneutic circle.) 
Voice: a speaking personality (speaking consciousness), making poetics resemble a 
single-voiced reality, and prose resemble a double-voiced reality. (See also Utterance.) 
Word and phrase: linguistic units used as building blocks of sentences. (See also 
Sentence, and Utterance.) 
Worldview: an utterance of an explicit and public formulation of the metaphysical 
aspect of a paradigm. (See also Paradigm, Master narrative, Mindset, Aim, Intention, 
and Motivation.) 
Zoom Lens model: the model of the theory of meaning in which the cognitive path of 
appropriating the meaning of a text (from the reader’s formal chronotope, to formal and 
internal chronotopes of a given text, and back) is metaphorically explained as the effect 
of zooming in and out with an actual zoom lens whilst moving closer and further away 
from the subject in focus. The telephoto effect in the zoom lens metaphor explains why 
the text appears different on different junctures on the cognitive path. 
 
